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TITLE OF DISSERTATION UTOPIAN PROSPECTS OF CRITICAL SOCIAL  
STUDIES IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY  
STATE .....

DEGREE FOR WHICH DISSERTATION WAS PRESENTED..... Ph.D.

YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED..... 1983

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

UTOPIAN PROSPECTS OF CRITICAL SOCIAL STUDIES IN THE  
LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY STATE

by



ERIC CRAWFORD CLARK BURT

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH  
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE  
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF SECONDARY EDUCATION

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL, 1983



THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA  
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and  
recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and REsearch,  
for acceptance, a thesis entitled Utopian Prospects of  
Critical Social Studies in the Late Twentieth Century State  
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy in Secondary Education.  
Submitted by Eric Crawford Clark Burt



## ABSTRACT

This study investigates the political limits and possibilities of curriculum reform as one means of social and educational accommodation of popular dissent and aspirations within organized capitalist society. Social reform and its cultural derivatives such as curriculum reform and development is one important dimension of hegemony in capitalist societies. As such, curriculum reform must be identified, understood, and superseded if educational workers and students are not to contribute unwittingly to the reproduction of a society grounded in stratification, economic-political exploitation, the suppression of opportunities for personal and collective formation, and the global disunity of all dependent peoples.

The study develops a central methodological principle identified as practical method that draws from traditions of critical social theory and political philosophy. Practical method couples analytic perspectives of curriculum traditions, social structure and consciousness with the normative intentions of readers, the curriculum community, and the investigator in the practical organization of revolutionary political conduct. The study takes up the democratic call for citizenship preparation, through schools, by identifying and determining the critical civic competencies that persons now require to restructure public life for generalizable interests.

The study examines curriculum reform through an intellectual history of one subject field; namely, progressive



social studies education over a fifty year period in North America. It sees the developments of social studies education as symptomatic of the crisis of curriculum reform in the wider contradictions of liberal social reform in liberal, monopoly, and organized capitalist states. By tracing the inner history of progressive social education the study reveals the relations between school practice, the political economy of the state, the nature of curricular text and of consciousness formation that critical-minded school practitioners must attend to if they are serious about autonomy-based citizenship for the future.

In the first part of the study curriculum reform is identified firstly, by its phenomenal 'progressive' character in the socio-cultural work of persons, and secondly, in its essential character as a particular object within an ensemble of social relations of domination. Then the practical, methodological, and theoretical requisites for explaining, understanding, and superseding these social relations are specified as an instance of doing praxiological inquiry in curriculum.

In the second part of the study the historical manifestations of reformist interventions by the state, the school, and in curriculum development are examined. The problem identified in Part I as a problem of the mundane organization of consciousness is reconceptualized in the light of relations of accumulation and legitimation in monopoly and organized capitalist society. The role of the state as a



strategic intervenor in the organization of production and in the manipulation of cultural traditions is highlighted with a view to how personal and collective energies are emasculated by a social and vocational privatism that includes such cultural-linguistic communities as curriculum theory and research.

Part III of the study under the auspices of the practical method features a re-assembly of the sociological and interpretive perspectives on social reform-as-curriculum reform within a reconceptualized theory and practice of critical social studies education. Radical curriculum development and its derivative of critical social studies theory and practice contributes textually to the organization of discursive will formation on matters of political conduct in curriculum and community publics. As part of a wider strategy in political education the appeal to the integration of regional and global popular dissent is made as one counterinitiative against the hegemony of capital and the Canadian state within the North American empire, and its supplantation by substantive democracy.



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study would not have materialized in its present form if it were not for the efforts, patience and encouragement of some key others over the last four years. I want to express my gratitude and appreciation to friends and advisors such as Dr. Ted Aoki, firstly and foremost, as a person of great humanity and a supervisor beyond comparison; to Professor Max Innes as a friend; to Dr. Harry Garfinkle for his global visions and our long silent travels together; to Dr. William Pinar who is an icon against despair for me; to Dr. Herman Tennessen for his wonderful panache; to both Dr. Jim Parsons and Dr. Raj Pannu for good conversations and fellowship; to my parents; and to Linda Belyea, my typist.

This final year of the study, its fruition and my own release of creative energy owe a tremendous debt to Elizabeth Winsche who has stuck with me through trauma and through joy. To her I am ever grateful. I trust I can take that spirit forward in my work.

Fredericton, New Brunswick

E.C.B.

May 1983



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PART I

PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL REFORM IN LATE  
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY



We must have done with the inconclusive whinings of the eternally innocent. Every man must be asked to account for the manner in which he has fulfilled the task that life has set him and continues to set him day by day; he must be asked to account for what he has done, but especially for what he has not done.

It is high time that the social chain should not weigh on just the few; it is time that events should be seen to be the intelligent work of men, and not the products of chance, or fatality. And so it is time to have done with the indifferent among us, the sceptics, the people who profit from the small good procured by the activity of a few, but who refuse to take responsibility for the great evil that is allowed to develop and come to pass because of their absence from the struggle.

(Gramsci, 1977, p. 19) from 'Indifference' in Selections from Political Writings 1910-1920; Lawrence and Wishart, London.



CHAPTER 1

PROSPECTS OF SOCIAL STUDIES EDUCATION IN LATE

CAPITALIST SOCIETY

Introduction

The educational reforms of the progressive era must be seen, then, as the working out within the relative autonomy of the school and, in a larger sense, the state, of the ongoing dialectic between capital and labour as it developed under Canadian capitalism. Educational reform therefore had its own dialectic; and just as the working class provoked reforms which it later resisted or only partially endorsed, the reforms engendered further reforms which only reinforced the social control functions of the school. The emphasis on child study, for example, became a justification for ability grouping based on psychological testing, which only increased the internal stratification of the schools or class, sex and ethnic lines. Once again the educational bureaucracy was the key in providing the ideological legerdemain which translated the ideals of Dewey's progressivism into a reality of social control by ignoring, as Dewey himself did, the class nature of social reality.

(Schechter, 1977, p.396)

The preceding perspective that Stephen Schechter provides for us harnesses the thematic which I hope to capture and display as a research problem in this excursus. I am concerned with demonstrating and depicting the historical and political possibilities contained within the 'dialectic of educational reform' associated with reconstructionist-based social studies education, in late twentieth-century North American society.

I am concerned, in this research, with investigating the expression, practice, significance and status of social



reform in the reconstructionist social studies lineage, primarily as embodied in the text, philosophy and design of educational curricula in North America for the period 1920-1980.<sup>1</sup>

It is within this broader historical fabric that I seek the answer to the particular research thrust of this study. I ask simply about what the utopian-normative and practical-pedagogical prospects are for the successful implementation of critical social education in the everyday discourse structures and school practices of life in the late, twentieth century industrial society of North America. We are reminded throughout the literature of the sociology of education of the essential interdependence of school and of society (Karabel and Halsey, 1977) (Sharp and Green, 1975) (Sharp, 1980). I am concerned with how it is that the psychological and structural contours of the late industrial state can both limit, emasculate, empower, and embolden curriculum research and development formally committed to radical social change. Clearly, this research question in addition to its complexity is one that is concurrently normative, conceptual and practical. These three dimensions of the inquiry are, in the wax and wane of social-political life, quite entangled with one another. In my study the normative, the conceptual, and the practical are entangled as well. They will re-appear at different points of the investigation in different methodological guises but must be seen as key and strategic lines of inquiry if I am to begin to give tentative or heuristic



answers to the plausibility of critical social reform in curricular development.

Practitioners and theorists in the curriculum field are able to give ample and convincing evidence of a legacy of failure in curriculum reform projects in the last fifteen years in Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. By extrapolation Hamilton (1977), Reid and Walker (1975), Schubert (1980), Milburn (1977) are able to demonstrate a history of 'no significant' difference with the introduction and implementation of innovatory programs that ranged from science, language, technical to social studies education projects. They demonstrate, too, that our methods as curriculum evaluators have been practically and conceptually inadequate for understanding processes of curriculum implementation and adoption. These notes should further alarm curriculum workers and shake them of their somnolence when we realize that not only has curriculum change failed to occur in any essential way but also that we are unable to tell where we are going or what is occurring in classrooms in any meaningful pedagogical and historical sense. These remarks are generally true for the history of major regional and national curriculum development innovation, and evaluations for the period from the mid 1960's in the three countries cited. What is particularly alarming is that even as a community of workers loosely allied across two continents we possess no diagnostic languages that can point out the extent of our crises of reform; of how closely the muted conversations of



self-sufficiency and "we'll try to be more precise next time" obscure and conceal the paralysis in curriculum change efforts. Ironically, our concerns about the crises of reform in educational work parallel the deep structural crises of accumulation and of legitimacy in the political and economic life of the advanced industrial nations. Yet as persons who are self-consciously across disciplines and implicated in achieving practical and significant results with program, we display an indifference or a falsely conscious pragmatism of the nature of political, economic and social structuring of our primarily cultural practices.

I bring to you, then, a legacy of failure in curriculum reform in the form of a plea that we must confront passionately and historically this array of reform efforts if we are to proceed practically and critically with curriculum change that yields 'significant' outcomes. I am pre-occupied with several preliminary questions in this study that are expressed in political, epistemological, and practical terms. The first two ask how and why can we know what will work for us as curriculum theorists and practitioners interested in radical social change? The third asks, more circularly, what are the realities that affect us in our reform work, and that embolden or that restrain it in the struggle to determine how we can know what we are doing? Put more rationally, I ask how can we know what will work for us as radical theorists and practitioners considering the nature of the psychological, structural and cultural realities of



our living in late industrial culture that affect us as we come to struggle with whether we know we are being practical in our relations with others in curriculum reform - whether these others are teachers, students, interested parties or other citizens?

In dealing with a practical project such as this let me tip my hat to the wisdom of experience. In the following section a secondary teacher and now student reflects on the risks of personal and institutional illusion with radical curriculum change:

Well, I think first of all the teacher has to come to some type of respect, regard ... care for their students as human beings. Those types of artificial terms like teacher and student can virtually disappear. Lots of people think that in their classrooms that (critical thought) happens ... but just because of the nature of schools, nature of the day, so forth ... it's not what we'd like to think it is. But I do think that some teachers have the ability to relate to students ... human beings working together on some issue, some question.... ... it's only when relationships develop like that in classrooms that you can get to that type of (critical thought).

Some have taken a course here and ~~then~~ they can go and write the points on the blackboard and automatically assume that students become critical thinkers ... I didn't perceive it that way ... it's not a formula. Critical teaching is both ways. In classrooms there are so many impositions that occur that the attempt to make critical teaching is very, very difficult ... you have to be quite ... you have to live with yourself. Students often develop critical thought in such a way and begin to be critical of the institution that they're in (of which you're a part). So, you've got to be able to live with another form of criticism from your colleagues and from the institution as well.



(I think that) people look at the word fact and in people's minds it's always in terms of when did John Brown do this ... and when you look at fact critically that kind of meaning disappears and it means doing something together. You begin to recognize where you come from, your underlying assumptions, that we're all victims of ideology. So, it's very much a different type of educational experience. It's more than just questioning. In the '60's a lot of people thought they were teaching critical thought to their kids - it was just a matter of knocking things down!

But in critical teaching you must recognize that the way people perceive things is no more their fault than yours ... it's the whole historical tradition we come from ... of how we operate.... Students and you are to look at those operations.  
(if, in fact what you're saying is that fact is a relationship....)

Well, yes, relations are the important type of things for students to understand. Traditional schooling does not view fact in that way.

Even in the Alberta social studies program the way generalizations are handled... They're not seen in relational terms at all ... they're more like mathematical (additives)....

(author's interview with Educ.  
C.I. 462 student C, Edmonton,  
Alberta, April 1981).

I suggest that the above interviewee poses the question I wish to investigate. In order to answer my central question as to what are utopian prospects of a mode of critical social studies practice given the theoretic, everyday and structural parameters I have recognized, in living in a late industrial culture, I suggest two planes on which to see and understand the problem in this study. On one plane I am faced with letting the study portray the structural psychological forces that one confronts living as a citizen



and worker in contemporary everyday life (See Lefebvre, 1971). On the second plane I am concerned that through the conduct of inquiry of this study I can begin to ask and to reveal the kinds of questions that provide generative answers that lead myself and the community of curriculum workers (theorists and developers) somewhere along a route that redresses the historical practice of schooling. That is, this second plane is essentially a project of renewal in method. Such method is to be pre-occupied with jointly knowing and acting on several fronts. This methodological project unites my first and second planes of interest or, equally, is a normative, conceptual and epistemic practice. Answering the question of the practical and utopian efficacy of critical social education means a commitment to what Habermas (1971) has termed a realization of the good life. Given that fundamental conviction, one which I believe we are compelled to act towards as a human species and one to which a network of curriculum workers must orient self-consciously, I must assemble the kinds of qualitative inquiries this study demands.

Assessing utopian prospects for critical social studies and for projecting the kind of epistemic-practical career of such curriculum projects requires that this study ground itself, on four major inquiry fronts:

1. Existential and interpretive analysis of self and groups implicated in ongoing radical curriculum projects, that is to say, self-reflection.



2. Historical analysis of early, later and current strands of reconstructionist social education thought; that is to say, historiography of curriculum projects.
3. Social structural analysis of the late capitalist state, its modes of economic production, accumulation and legitimation and those organic linkages vital to the maintenance of cultural production in schooling; that is curriculum theory and practice. In other words theoretic description or political economy of curriculum is practised.
4. Practical, conceptual but speculative analysis of current manifestations of critical or reconstructionist social education and their utopian promises. This sub-project is couched in an essentialist reading of the material, cultural and axiological requirements of citizens living in late global capitalist economies. It argues for the kind of organization of curriculum practice generative of democratic publics. That is to say, this front of the study is explicitly a normative excursus.

The four fronts of sub-projects of the study can be seen to be unified and given perspective by an ongoing dialectic of method. The method is dialectical, firstly, in that it draws perspectives from four fronts of inquiry at different moments in order to confront and answer the immediate question of resistance and reform in social education. Hence, at different moments it draws horizontally, or synchronically, from diverse discourses to deal with an essential, practical issue. The method is dialectical and diachronic in contour, secondly, in that it demands the participation of both author and reader as co-sponsors of the critical project. It demands, as a community of curriculum workers, that our biographies and intimacies as persons be drawn into the fray of this



study as we embark on answering and reformulating the question of how we know the nature of effective reform in social education. As I or the reader or the traditions address the question of the practical, political and normative prospects of reform, we engage in a second dialectic of confusion and understanding - as each interest attempts to disclose the constraints and possibilities embedded within the language and practice of social reform education. In a sense, then, the study is regressive, synthetic, analytic and progressive in its project of the explanatory mobilization of curriculum change. (Pinar, 1980)

As a unity of interests on practical fronts, the study asks about the political, pedagogical possibilities required or inherent in successful forms of critical social education curriculum. I can restate this in terms that equate this study of social studies curriculum reform as the development and living out of a theory of ideology, as a citizen and school person participating in the routines and counter-routines of self-reproduction in late industrial cultures. I am concerned then, not just with ideas, but with the material practices this idea (curriculum theory) entails; for the signifying practices of our language are the crucial embodiments of ideology. They have a determinate influence upon reproducing and reconstructing our economic, cultural and political lives. Within our language lie the trajectories of hope.



I have argued so far, in this introduction, for the importance of situating the discourse and practice of educational reform within the political-economic structures of monopoly capitalism. I have also argued for the importance of historical portrayal of current and past curriculum activity in social reconstructionism. I have said that in order to appraise the utopian promises of new cultural forms such as a critical social studies, we must unify inquiry or the former fronts with a thematization of self and community struggles and ambiguities relevant to our interests in social education. Each of these fronts we must gather to mediate with one another in order that they can become radically practical in any discourse and action committed to critical social education. In investigating social studies curriculum change we are generating at the same time a theory of ideology or, as Willis (1977) would term it, a theory of cultural forms. In using the term ideology in its normative, investigative sense, I am employing an acutely Marxist usage (see Seliger, 1978; Geuss, 1981). In establishing an equivalence between the constructs ideology, cultural forms or reproduction and curriculum practices, I will argue for the importance of understanding the role of curriculum practice in social reproduction.

Considerable research in the sociology of education and the sociology of curriculum, or particularly, (Karabel and Halsey, 1977; Sharp and Green 1975; Sharp, 1980; Levitas, 1974; Flude and Ahier, 1974; Bernstein, 1971; Bourdieu, 1976;



Apple, 1979, 1982A, 1982B; Giroux, 1981 and others) have begun to document the functions of curriculum practice for maintaining the conditions for the elaboration and sustenance of continued material production under monopoly capitalism (Baran and Sweezy, 1966; Mandel, 1975). I take as a signal feature of this study how particular cultural forms such as curriculum theory and practice can sustain, mystify, resist and offer alternative possibilities for the reproduction of labour power, mental and manual dispositions to work, microcosmologies of cause and effect, patterns of intimacy, intellectual divisions of labour and modal forms of consciousness, itself, in the service of the socio-economic reproduction and legitimation of the society/social formation we inhabit. In particular, social theorists such as Bourdieu(1976), Bernstein (1971), Williams (1977), Habermas (1975), Horkheimer (1974), Willis (1977) point to the possibility of the study of the cultural as a semi-autonomous level of human practice, and its special case, curriculum practice, as being both determined and determining in its mediations with private consciousness, economic and social structures.

In a remarkable study, (Learning to Labour, 1977), whose origins lie at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in the English midlands, Paul Willis investigates the role cultural forms play in damning the lives of working class students condemned to a future in manual work. Willis is able to display that dominant cultural forms in English



industrial, class culture do not absolutely condemn these "lads" to a future of manual labour but that their social and personal fates are achieved with the active complicity of the lads. Despite the apparent dominance and opacity of working class and technological cultural forms, there is always room to generate alternative or counter-ideological movements to stabilize the penetration of dominant or repressive meaning systems. The "lads" are able to elaborate a series of alternative norms and meanings that challenge dominant forms enabling them to inscribe a circle of community, for themselves. I can note parallels in Canada and the United States in the way of curriculum projects, alternative schools and living educational policy options that represent counter-ideological thrusts, towards radical education change. The question that becomes investigable, through this study, is what the nature and possibilities inherent in our dialectic of reform become as possibilities and realities that we must become conversant with, in a community of curriculum theorists? In a deeply practical way, we must know what questions to ask about the structures and intentionalities that ground dominant and alternative cultural practices. The legacy and practice of reconstructionist social studies is theoretically and practically interesting with regard to the promises and visions it has made. This study carries an obligation to inquire into the practices that thwart or cultivate authentic criticism through social education.



I shall continue in this introduction with a brief delineation of what I consider to be the important theoretical distinctions that are a necessary ground plan prior to any detailed empirical sketch of the study.

This study is predicated on the notion that the cultural level of curriculum practice is important as an area of study in its own right; that by no means do economic structures of advanced capitalism absolutely determine cultural or ideological outcomes nor do schools through their intentional programs merely reproduce the de-skilled, docile gentlemen of Tony Burton's (1972) educational cornucopia. That, in fact, autonomous structuring is occurring at the level of curriculum practice. It is a structuring of relations that generate consciousness, community, rationality, constraint and divisions of labour and discourse. Granted, structural and economic determinants and class background interpenetrate curriculum practice yet do not cause persons, through schools, to blindly assent to their forces. I am interested in how such structures mediate with personal action and consciousness through curriculum practice so that in turn there are structural determinations within the cultural-curricular realm in its own right. Curriculum practice as an instance of cultural form is reproductive for the social totality since the material and practical embodiment of institutional and productive forces are achieved ultimately only through practical normative communities of expression, dissent, confirmation or transcendence. Clearly, the school as an ensemble of curriculum practices is a central mediating agency between production



relations, the state and ideological projections. The more organically interdependent social, economic, and cultural functions become in late capitalist societies, the more complex become the inner relations of these sectors. As a result, the importance of our inquiry into the language and practice of educational reform as an inquiry into the dialectic of reproduction and resistance through schools is confirmed as one route for understanding the possibilities of radical strategies in social education.

Curriculum as a field of endeavour being a set of normative conversations on how to proceed with children/students still begs the question of why decision-taking historically has occurred the way it has. Why has there been a legacy of failed reform initiatives in pedagogy, in learning psychology, and in curriculum implementation? And, why are the same forms of knowledge and procedure repeatedly used as decision bases to supposedly move closer to the pedagogical truth? How and why do teachers and students resist change efforts whether of a reproductive kind or of a more radical nature - especially when they may glimpse where their real interests lie? If the cultural level of curriculum practice depicts a world inhabited by persons actively, evaluatively, reflectively constructing their own accounts of their school world and of their occupational and economic aspirations in years to come, why are they often seen to be profoundly conservative and complacent? If autonomy can be documented and identified through children's culture, (York -O.I.S.E. projects for instance) adolescent and high school sub-cultures, (Winnipeg,



Edmonton and Philadelphia projects, for instance), the working class culture of Willis' lads in the English midlands, then, is it possible to take and deepen these self-in-the-future projects so as to have the language and practice of curriculum reform become pregnant with alternative, suggestive possibilities? Because of the complexity of cultural practices in late capitalist society, persons conduct their lives as precarious, ambivalent intentioned relations always on the verge of creative or transcendent possibility. To intercede with this dialectic of educational reform can bestow understanding for us of the realities impinging upon radical curriculum change. To intercede carefully means, too, to pose the questions and consequent discourse that is generative of critical, creative relations. It is the textures of restraint and possibility in school life and curriculum decision-taking that are the auspices of this study's portrayal of the deep structures of cultural elaboration. What could remain a tragedy is how the contestations over opportunity and equality of condition waged by citizens are effectively muted and emasculated by their own hands. What role does the theoretic and 'smiling face' of curriculum reform play in this struggle?

Or do we as curriculum theorists face a promethean struggle against the odds of history, mass inertia, false consciousness and industrial totality that render our plans for radical practice confined to private therapies or marginal communities? Willis discusses the residues of freedom



that the late capitalist state with its attendant contradictions provided.

The huge growth of the state in welfare and education, for instance, is not necessarily in any 'best' interests of capitalism. It has to some extent been forced on it by competing groups using their own real freedoms for self-advancement as they have seen it. Of course state agencies have utilized and modified to help cool out, or drive out, problems which capitalism produces but cannot solve. But whilst they help to solve problems those institutions cannot wholly be absorbed back into capitalism. They maintain spaces and potential oppositions, keep alive issues, and prod nerves which capitalism would much rather were forgotten. Their personnel are in no simple sense servants of capitalism. And further ... the bureaucratic educational welfare state machine so characteristic of Western capitalism must be seen in part as the result of a cumulative encrustment which capitalism manages to turn to its advantage rather than as the expression of its own will or straightforward domination.

(Willis, 1977, p. 176)

The structural position of groups within a late welfare state system who reproduce the capitalist form while also marginally or potentially critical of it is similar to the spokespersons of early progressivism. I can identify, as does the study, the rhetoric, curriculum planning, and calls to action of Counts (1969), Rugg (1936), Brameld (1957), Harris (1926) and others who saw school reforms as a necessary, but opportunistic, response to the dislocations of emergent monopoly capitalism. School reform and social interest-centred curriculum design was the response of progressive reform movements to shore up the fractures of community and



shared normative visions of earlier socio-economic eras in North America. Unwittingly, many progressive curriculum policies had the effect of instrumentalizing a sense of community amongst diverse ethno-cultural groups new to North America without securing their own participation in this movement. Curriculum reform, ostensibly directed to social renewal and the cultivation of individual interests in the New Society tended to divide future labour power into ethnic social classes. A specious common vision was achieved by the functional dependence and specialization of labour in industry. A technical calculus acted as the normative flux of a new organic order. What Willis reminds me of and what we see through historical study of progressive variants in education and politics, is the functional accommodation of labour and of future dispossessed citizens under the guise of progressive and sometimes radical thinkers of that generation. In examining their work, I have found little evidence of duplicity in their practice but a sense of structural blindness or amnesia when it comes to seeing the pedagogical and historical implications of living through class-mediated, monopoly capitalist forms. (The same can be said of Marx and the underestimation of the tenacity of capitalist production relations and hegemony). In this study I am faced with a distinct problem of working in and through the distorted consciousness of educational reform. For within this discourse is much good intention, courage and conscious struggle against the density of subtle reifications and the



not so subtle slanderous dominations of the state.

We are faced in a study of this kind with investigating how the deformities of educational reform and practices are accomplished structurally, relationally, epistemically and existentially. It is to the credit of curriculum scholarship of the last 10 years that it illuminates greatly the mechanisms of cultural practice in schooling. Theory and appraisal sponsored or produced by Aoki (1978), Apple (1971, 1979), Pinar (1975, 1981), Van Manen (1981) and many others has been able to point to the unintended, informal, or habituated vocabularies of motive of relations and practices in school and textual elaboration that mediate and reproduce institutional life. Research, alone, in the area of hidden curricula shows the importance of the school in the production of mental labour power, consciousness and reproduction.

In any discussion or study, then, of the formal or pragmatic practices of curriculum theory and development, it is incumbent on the investigator to view the effects of curriculum discourse as a formally-situated set of relations along with the effects of this discourse at an informally less-intentioned level of institutional maintenance. The notion of the hidden curriculum points beyond the formal to the deep relations, structural and existential, that are the grounds and stem of possible formal practices. These formal accounts have been in the absence of critical practical inquiry, the only focus of conventional research methodology or more human science ethnographies. The



deeply-felt intimacy of personal collaboration with and against others in institutional life has not been thematized. This is a necessary, preliminary yet ever present disclosure that must be available to this inquiry before understanding of the dialectic of educational reform can be sustained. Sharp and Green (1975) and Willis (1977) characterize the auspices of understanding school life and curriculum practice in this way even if not explicitly. That is, received curricular text, and its hermeneutics, is not sufficient disclosure for understanding the kind of human agency we see as a bemusing, contradictory flux. Received or formal curriculum text undergoes a more radical accounting at the levels of informal cultural practices in the attempt to integrate 'official' ideological versions within the life experiences of teachers, students and theorists. By transforming official myths, both Sharp and Willis argue school and curriculum practitioners exert some personal mastery over life and professional situations, yet ironically incorporate themselves and their alternative discourse into the wider logic of social reproduction. This is as true of the working class counter-culture of Willis' lads as it is of the community school, public issues curricula or reconstructionist pedagogy. Every reform move then occupies a social and historical space in time, both structural and interior time. Each reform, as well, is consequential, even if invisible in formal analyses, for social and cultural reproduction. Let me reconsider, at this point, the particular historical thematic of this study and I quote



lengthily from Willis:

... for instance, progressivism has been developed and theorised as an official ideology by academics in conjunction with wider social democratic, political and institutional movements to increase educational provision and access for the working class. (Pragmatically), progressivism is taken up in schools mainly as a practical solution to practical problems without any real shift in basic philosophies of education. (Culturally), it can be argued that often 'progressivism' has had the contradictory and unintended effect of helping to strengthen processes within the counter-school culture which are responsible for the particular subjective preparation of labour power and acceptance of a working class future in a way which is the very opposite of progressive intentions in education. It is this strengthened cultural reproduction in relation to the school which of course guarantees the future of educational experiment by always limiting the scope of its success.... Progressivism, (reconstructionism) have actually addressed real problems, have protected kids a little longer from the harshness and inequality of industry, and have helped to give them - in unintended and unexpected ways of course - a definite kind of insight and cultural advance not available to their parents. We must not, simply, be naive about what is meant by advance. We must ask in what form, for whom, in which direction, and through what circles of unintention, with what reproductive consequences for the social system in general, particular advances are made. (echoes of M.F.D. Young)

(Willis, 1977, p. 178)

The terms of a critical-practical or praxiological study such as this one require that we go beyond the institutional calculus of restraint and transcendence of Willis, Sharp and Green, Apple, Giroux, Marx and others to begin to disclose the strategies of intimacy, of courage, and revolution through others, and the deliberative mechanisms that



will unbind practitioners and citizens for radical curriculum and cultural practice; to pierce through the evanescent dogma of assembled wisdom as a guide to theory-guiding action.<sup>2</sup>

To reiterate:

1. One front consists of existential and interpretive analysis of self and of groups implicated in ongoing radical curriculum projects. That is to say, this front consists of personal and collaborative self-reflection. Owing to the praxical nature (to be outlined later) of the study, this methodological orientation is present within this proposal and the study as part of a generative, reflective, text that gels, dissolves and reconstitutes as a different unit as the structural, historical, and speculative moments of inquiry emerge. I will point to certain canons of method that I will observe in a following section.
2. A second front consists of historical analysis of early, later and current strands of reconstructionist social education thought. That is to say, this front of inquiry consists of an historiography of particular curriculum reform projects or movements in North America for the period 1920-1980.

Much of the activity of the progressive era in educational reform in Canada and the United States can be seen emanating from the decade 1925-1935. Social and historical theorists (Kolko, 1963; Williams, 1961; Weinstein, 1968; Karier, et al, 1973) of liberal and revisionist persuasion note that the rise of the philosophy of pragmatism was accompanied by the emergence of increased state intervention in



the educational and cultural policies of both societies. These historians argue that interventionist state becomes increasingly visible as the nature of the capitalist economy changes in North America. That the beginning of the decade, 1930, shows significantly increased state intervention in social welfare, educational, cultural and significantly economic policy direction. Not only, is the state seen to be acting as an arbiter of social dislocation, and immiseration that was rampant in the decade, 1930, but it acts to stabilize and direct capital accumulation, capital investment, and to allocate certain goods and services to an extent not structurally felt since the organization of laissez-faire capitalism. This intervention has had profound implications not only for the growth and stabilization of capitalist production modes but also for superstructural forms such as cultural practices, ideological expression and the elaboration of secularized, mass consciousness.

The bases for the Canadian welfare state, in the 1930's, lay with the interests of the indigenous business class who recognized not the injustices of monopoly capitalist production but the structural reforms needed to save the system from itself. The cyclical nature of recession and expansion was particularly acute in the decade 1925-1935. It was coupled with incipient radicalism that appeared in labour and farm groups and some professions. These movements induced the business class to sponsor programs of reform in government spending, social and labour



legislation and educational provision. Despite formal claims by the interventionist state, virtually no redistribution of wealth or power occurred. There may, in fact, have been a reversal in its democratization due to corporate concentration and government interlocks between industry and finance, which extended to cultural-educational sectors.

As is the concern in this study; I have assumed that increased state intervention or the announcement of social 'reform' has actually been synonymous with substantive or qualitative change. By looking historically at economic reforms and schooling reforms of the 1930's, I am posing questions about the ideology of reform rather than giving a prima facie documentation of societal changes. In determining the interests underlying the dialectic of reform, I discover that state expansion secured the economic and political privileges of the business class while 'retooling' sectors of the society further preserved its formally democratic yet repressive form. As the state increases its participation in labour control, tariffs and competition, infrastructural financing for the benefit of investment, and the socialization of employment, the impact on socio-cultural life is significant. Hence the state, in both the United States and Canada, can be seen balancing the environmental requirements of a business class for continual profit maximization and the smoothing of social and political unrest by the unemployed reserves and disgruntled labouring classes while rising expectations of prosperity and employment never



ceased. The state, increasingly, was accepted by both constellations of classes as a means of mediating the logics of capital accumulation and discontent. The consideration that the business and government pursued was, "How could social reform as a process be controlled or monitored so that their own interests and agencies were not undermined but sheltered by an ideology of reform?" Donald Creighton, the historian, documents in the period prior to the 1837 rebellions of Upper and Lower Canadas, that the British governors through constitutional sanction of political appointments favoured a political economy of persons that concentrated positions in government, merchant activities, banking and landholding. We find the same intervention documented throughout Canadian history from the National Policy of 1879, the state-sponsored reformism of the 1930's, to the extensive interlocks of industrial-financial-media-government sectors in the 1960's and 1970's (see Porter, 1965; Clement, 1975).

I am particularly interested in the capacity of the business class and the state to channel the politics, language and opportunities for social reform during the early progressive period and in its current expressions - either initiated by the state or by interest groups marginal to the locus of political-economic decision-making. In a study that investigates the curriculum practices of institutionalized schooling, I encounter ideological relations that express the interests of a dominant class as the



universally-shareable interests of all social classes. Clearly, curriculum planning is centrally implicated in the study of hegemony and the vital importance such a phenomenon has for cultural and social reproduction. For instance, questions of how curriculum practice contributes to the personalization of fault by citizens caught in the political-economic system; to the belief that social problems are resolvable through technical, piecemeal panaceas; that the images schooling and media project of Canadian opportunity and condition are tenable; to the radical concessions given to the labouring class as being what they seem; and the mass social conviction of the eternally fixed nature of structural and institutional forms as part of everyday conversation, all breed a cynical dilettantism in efforts at reform or radical restructuring by school persons and curriculum theorists. This outcome can effectively blunt the deep sense of what strategic political and epistemic practices are called for in the intellectual communities that we inhabit. Both a structural knowledge of the development of our society and a personal courage are required to lay the groundwork for generative debate and action that sees beyond the web of legitimation sponsored by increased state intervention.

At this point, I want to discuss briefly the role of reform and oppositional culture in the political, economic and cultural sectors in both Canada and the United States for the decade 1925-1935. I will select some key groups or movements relevant to the purposes of this study - some



of whom could be characterized as reconstructionist.

The Canadian context at the beginning of the 1930's saw a number of conflicting group conceptions that were in opposition to political-economic relations. Industrial workers, farmers particularly in the West, fragments of the intelligentsia, and small town petit bourgeois artisans or community producers formed over the course of this period movements, syndicates and political parties rooted in their particular interests. The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, a forerunner in social democracy to the New Democratic Party, at its first national convention in 1933, declared itself in opposition to capitalism yet remained committed to electoralism. Based on British Fabianism and Labourism, the C.C.F. saw the progressive reform of the human degradations of capitalism as a central aspect of its program. Although the 1933 Regina Manifesto reflected the "present capitalist system", as one of "domination and exploitation of one class by another" there was a steady erosion of its early radicalism to the currently milque-toast reform politics in the New Democratic Party.

A group attached to the early C.C.F. was a coterie of Toronto-Montreal intellectuals committed to ostensibly radical analysis and long range social planning. Comfortably ensconced, elite trained intellectuals the League for Social Reconstruction was of sad conscience for the immiserated underclasses of Canadian industrialism. They displayed through their writing and analysis what might be called an



aristocratic socialism. The League developed positions which insisted that political democracy be available to the people who in turn must entrust that proxy to experts, attuned to the social and historical needs of Canadian society. The key words that marked this incipient meritocracy of social planners were "efficiency", "planning", "education", "technology" and "order". The League, responsible for drafting a section of the C.C.F.'s Regina Manifesto indicated that

a proper collective organization of our economic resources such as will make possible a much greater degree of leisure and a much richer individual life for every citizen....Planning, it said, was needed for efficient development of national resources and equitable distribution of national income. It was proposed that a national planning commission, consisting of a (small body of economists, engineers and statisticians assisted by an appropriate technical staff) would work with the managing boards of socialized industries to insure that production, distribution and exchange were properly co-ordinated. Import and export boards, socialized finance, socialized utilities, socialized medicine and a host of milder reforms were included in the program.

(quoted in Finkel, 1979, p. 157)

This preoccupation with state intervention and long range model-building is resonant with the Parti Quebecois' chronic flirtation with processes of 'planification' in all sectors of society. Michael Young (1958) first coined the use of the term meritocracy to refer to the cultivation of 'politically-neutral' elites selected on the basis of achievement, intelligence and expertise - primarily in behavioral and engineering science. Organized labour either



through the All Canadian Congress of Labour, 1936 and 1940, the Trades and Labour Congress, the One Big Union, the communist-inspired ones, with the exception of the latter two organizations all occupied marginal political roles. Each union tended to dwell on bread-and-butter issues, and economic platforms and was quite defensive about state erosion of their bargaining rights. Although these organizations at one time or another advocated public ownership and the nationalization of resources, each considered the political state as essentially a neutral entity. As I mentioned at the outset, reform and oppositional politics having a reconstructionist thrust were also found in the farm and rural work sectors in the 1930's period. Alliances such as the United Farmers of Alberta and, of Canada, and the Social Credit movement were based on a regional populism and on occasions, radicalism. Their essential protest was buried in a sometimes right-wing, sometimes left-wing reaction to big business and Eastern monopolies that were charged with interest-rate manipulation and trade restrictions and domination over rural, western produce. The populism that farm people and small-scale producers expressed was spawned by the same kinds of structural difficulties all 'underclass' groups faced throughout the 1930 decade. For instance, the possibilities for single men owning their own farm or business were diminishing.

... and the ability of the capitalist economy to provide jobs was clearly in doubt. But workers and farmers held on the illusion



that prosperity would return and with it the opportunity of becoming an independent commodity producer. While the Liberals best capitalized politically on the desire of people to turn back to better times, the success of Social Credit in Alberta shows on a regional basis the illusions that kept people tied to the dominant ideology and suspicious of revolutionaries.

(Finkel, 1979, p. 165)

In assessing the decade of the thirties for the virulence of its cultural oppositions, there is evidence of considerable reflection, and rhetoric, on alternatives to the social-economic arrangements of Canadian society on behalf of industrial workers, farmers, petit bourgeois artisans, small producers and teachers, and progressive intellectuals. How deeply radically these reforms are as cultural and political practices is another question. The period, parallel to the late 1970's and 1980's, was marked by increasing state intervention and sophisticated repression. Citizens took on a variety of responses to the ideologies of reform generated by others or by the state in North America. These responses ranged from cynicism to fatalism to reckless stridency - all seemed inadequate as practical responses to the strategic intrusions of a state consciously sponsoring monopoly capitalist accumulation and stability. The absence of a tradition of political organization and dissent in Canada and the United States is widely regarded as a factor in the chronic stumbling of alternative groups before the prevailing hegemony of cultural practices (see Michael Horn, 1969).

What then were the implications of these political-cultural expressions for schooling in an emergent monopoly



capitalist state? There is little evidence of the formulation of independent schooling ideologies that is not also anchored in social and economic analysis of the wider society. It is in Ontario but primarily in western Canada that school persons, in the decades of the 1930's and 1940's, begin explicitly but to unevenly ground their pedagogy and curriculum planning in variants of progressive or pragmatist philosophy. Historical evidence suggests that school program administrators and teacher educators all were significantly influenced by the promise and innovation of American progressivism and American graduate schools. In the case of Alberta, theorists and administrators, such as Hubert Newland, John Barnett, Milton LaZerte and others instrumental in the provision of public school curriculum, demonstrated a bias toward the progressive organization of the school day. What historical inquiry fails to reveal are the connections practitioners of this kind of curriculum and pedagogy make from social amelioration, industrial or monopoly capitalism and school provisions for democratic citizenships. True to form, the dialectic of educational reform shines clearly in the case of mainstream school practitioners self-consciously adopting the methodologies of progressive education but remaining naive about its philosophical underpinnings or its socio-political outcomes. As Carnoy (1974) points out that as good social theorists of education and curriculum, we are compelled to see the internal colonialism of schools in our society, firstly, and then to carefully situate this structure of relations within the



context of international colonialism. Being a hinterland to the North American empire requires that our analysis of progressive-reconstructionist practices in Canadian curriculum extend internationally and, finally, globally.

Historical research done in the United States (Weinstein, 1968; Kolko, 1963) documents more explicitly that the political and educational movement of progressivism is in direct association with or a direct consequence of the development of monopoly capitalism in North America. These historians disagree with functional-pluralist analysis (Cremin, 1961) and with elite analysis (Callahan, 1962) with their respective explanations on the rise of progressivism since both approaches discount any fundamental relationship between economic structures and political-cultural practices. I have been suggesting, as do Kolko and Weinstein, that the motive force behind the rise of progressivism is the organization of the capitalist mode of production. This is also to say that it is the relation amongst different corporate capital forms and labour, whether mental or manual, which mediates and shapes the political and cultural outcomes of schooling. Kolko argues, as does Finkel in Canada, that progressivism was a voluntaristic policy chosen by large business interests and sponsored by political leaders to further their own class interests.

Economic structures in the United States, to a lesser degree in Canada due to colonial lag since the early twentieth century, have been dominated by monopoly, obligopoly



and the intensification of class conflict. Historians argue that due to this rigidification between capital and labour, the social reform movement of progressivism was spawned. I note that the idea of reconstructionism was but an educational variant. Earlier competitive capitalist forms suggested different social relations and working conditions between and within class sectors. With the development of the monopoly form the working class had burgeoned in size four times in size from 1860 to 1900 by five and one-third million. Work was concentrated in urban locations and carried with it all the caricatured symptoms of low wages, long hours, immiseration. Capital and labour strife increased considerably in the monopoly period to a figure of twenty fold the number of strikes in the mid-nineteenth century. Clearly, the relations between capital and labour had changed qualitatively and quantitatively by the decade of the 1930's in the United States and Canada.

The kind of reformism which we see renewed today which first attained a sophistication in the 1930's was the notion of a 'harmonious pluralism' of interests. Translated, this referred to the necessity for labour to accommodate itself to the changed exigencies of capitalist mode of production; and to lay down any political or ideological dreams of change and adopt only economic interests in negotiations with capital. As I have shown in the Canadian context, this kind of planning reform was a feature of middle class intelligentsia acting as apologists and retainers of privilege in the opening



monopoly era. More pronounced in the United States was the motif of the organic society and used as a corollary to the harmony of interests between capital and labour. This motif was used as an organizing metaphor for progressive pedagogy and moderate reconstructionist programs with thinkers such as Dewey, Harris, Charters, Rugg and A.S. Neill. It also found expression in the social theory of Cooley, the pragmatic philosophy of James and Pierce, in political theory and economics. These behavioral sciences, as they are termed ideologically, were concerned with the resolution of class conflict through the conscious domination of the state in the social, political and economic processes. Lippman (1943) the liberal political theorist was to write "the substitution of conscious intention for unconscious striving."

It becomes clear that the state's intervention in moulding these conflicts was not to be limited to the political organization of restraint but also was to be an active shaping of consciousness as a means of internalizing this noble harmony of interests for the organic society. Induction into the cooperative principle meant orderly functioning of persons of the the division of labour. Through the efficient planning of the state of all sectors of society, responsibility was assigned the school system for the effective ideological socialization of all classes. Public schooling emerged as a key player in organizing the future economic history of monopoly capitalism. Citizens had to be produced who practised the co-operative principle above merely narrow class or



individual interests.

How do we begin to assess the work of the pragmatists in progressive education? What ought we to make of their language and practices of educational reform - the residues of which are still inscribed in contemporary curricula?

Martin Carnoy argues that John Dewey

called for a change in the organization of work from an orientation to the needs of the economy - that is, the production of more goods - to the needs of the individual or society .... Dewey wanted the school to provide a period for the child in which he could live and learn without economic pressure, carrying out activities for their intrinsic value ... internalizing the joy of intellectual experience.

(Carnoy, 1974, p. 254)

I have found Bowles and Gintis arguing that Dewey as an arch figure in progressive reconstructionism was caught by an awareness of the miseries of work under capitalist organization yet not immoderate enough in his social reform. Pragmatism had tended to bind him to the optimization of conditions within the capitalist economy and society so that

the practice of the reform movement was clearly out of step with the democratic and open education advocated by John Dewey.

(Bowles and Gintis, 1978, p. 121)

Seeing some of the strands of progressivism in this light suggests that the practice of this philosophy essentially did not break through the prevailing ideological and cultural relations of monopoly capitalism. It merely 'makes the best of it' and gives the child 'a chance for some time away' from the fracas.



In any deepening critique of progressive education, I am compelled to characterize for future inquiry some central aspects of pragmatism.<sup>3</sup> The kernel of this philosophy has to do with the priority of subjective idealism as a constituting force for sense-making. Pragmatism through the idea of the receptive, but active constitutive subject was an instrumental philosophy for a United States in turmoil over class, social and economic conflict. It is important to see this as an intellectual response to a restructuring crisis. Its power lies in evocating through the individual the importance of cultivating community, loyalty and correct belief. The blindness and rampage of socialistic-anarchistic malcontents could be tempered by restoring to all classes the social significance of their lives. The resolution of the labour question, indeed all ethnic and moral fragmentation, could be achieved through pragmatist reforms.

The role of the school was to be a transmission belt for the "community of interests". These had taken on a universalist quality since pragmatism and can clearly be seen as displacing discourse on the nature of class conflict. Children were to see themselves as part of a greater unity embodied in the corporate-civic community. Their welfare was secured in their co-operative, technical or occupational contributions to the community. Public welfare was ideologically synonymous with corporated spirit. We see here the beginnings of the tripartism of 1960's and 1970's amongst industry, governments and labour hallowed by terms such as 'voluntary agreement and endeavor' and the 'planned joint regulation' of eco-



conomic life. The interdependence of particular interest and general welfare has been a dominant societal motif in North America for at least fifty years. It has the character of a self-concealing myth that smacks of a welfarist-reformism difficult for reformers to resist. The call for historical and ideological inquiry has never been stronger.

Classroom social relations, through Dewey and Rugg's methodology, were designed to mirror the social relations of production that exist in the larger society. Methodology, curriculum content and the physical organization of the classroom were intended to reinforce the sense of interdependence with the outside world, particularly the world of work. It is clear that the degree to which progressivist-reformist pedagogy spread in North American classrooms has been associated with the extent of dislocation or change in the social-cultural fabric of regions undergoing economic change, at that time.

The demise of laissez-faire individualism was a necessary step in the psychological and cultural re-tooling of students and citizens in the monopoly era. It was important to cultivate a sense of moral, collective calling within individuals by excellence in work. Individualism, as a personal political force, had to be submerged, only to be thematized by a pedagogy intent on uncovering children's interests for them in the service of a higher social goal. To put persons to work uncritically, and cheerfully, was a task progressive reformers faced. Pedagogy and curriculum theory reflected these political interests through its methodological and conceptual cate-



gories. Achievement testing, intelligence quotients, and tracking policies are cases in point. That the relations of production were mediated by classroom moral and political life is highlighted by the characteristic everyday laboratory school organization and career-vocational education emphases of many public systems on this continent over the last forty years.

It could be argued that moderate progressivism or reconstructionism in North American society sought to dissolve the strident conflict clearly emerging from a society changing in political, economic and ethnic make-up. The interest in constructing a unified ideal community of participants was vital to sustain and stabilize dominant economic and cultural forms in the process of their restructuring. Earlier forms of popular consciousness, concerned with the motif of individual entrepreneurship was dysfunctional for capital accumulation and political hegemony. Individualism required that the state continually intercede to dissolve, cushion or make opaque the presence of class conflict. Habermas (1975) discusses the importance for stable capital accumulation that the state's action appear legitimate and of the role that social science and philosophical knowledge have for this stabilizing function. Other cultural practices under the guise of reconstructionism would be social planning, electoral politics, accountability-competency models, and community school reforms. The tenacity of the faith of popular consciousness in the language and logic of unexamined reform has the effect of displacing



the contradiction of overclass-underclass production and hegemonic relations, through ideological provision, to the level of the subjective self. Habermas (1975) has referred to this as the role of state in uncoupling the economic and political sectors of structural conflict from the social-cultural processes of self-formation. The latter, as a result, has had less tendency to be infused with such conflict as a basis for life confirming motive.

The ostensible radical expressions of reconstructionism in education are part of the common root of progressivism. The strident and radical denunciations of established political-economic arrangements were hallmarks of writers such as Harold Rugg, George Counts, and Theodore Brameld. Virtual contemporaries of Dewey, it is significant for this study that the evolution or emasculation of their thought be portrayed. Their work, and that of their successors in current social education such as Fred Newmann, Harold Berlak, James Shaver and others can be considered as symptomatic of the crisis of hope and identity afflicting programs of reform rooted in the progressive tradition. I will consider the radical reconstructionists and assess their promise in detail as the study proceeds.

3. A third front consists of social structural analysis of the capitalist state, its modes of economic production, accumulation, legitimation and those organic linkages vital to the maintenance of cultural production in schooling, in other words, theoretic



description or political economy of curriculum theory and practice. On this inquiry front I begin to thematize the current form that the advanced industrial state takes as in the developed countries of North America and Europe. I do this because the features of the modal form, due to global economic linkages, render the patterns of state intervention and state crises resolution quite similar in different industrial countries. I want to characterize the advanced industrial state because key decision-making structures in the state, through its historical evolution, now have a disproportionate influence on the conduct of everyday life and on the form of cultural practice in schools, to name one agency. Additionally, the nature of the interrelations between the state and civil society has strengthened and complexified in scope during the periods of monopoly and late capitalism. It is important, for answering questions about prospects of utopian reform in social education, to understand clearly how significant a role cultural apparati have not only as nexi of ideological legitimation but also as real factors in the capital accumulation process. It is not possible, as much as we would like, to separate analysis of curriculum planning and reform, any longer, from a political economy of the state or of society. Inquiry into the political and pedagogical logic of curriculum reform movements calls out, as I have argued, for the ensuing structural descriptions at the same time as it does for collective/self-reflection and historical analysis. My contributions in this section amount



to a taxonomizing of basic attributes of the advanced industrial state and of tendencies of legitimation and motivational crises historically novel to civil and political society (Habermas, 1975, 1971) - as these empirical necessities impinge on efforts in curriculum planning, a dimension of which is this study.

In essence, Habermas (1975, 1970) presents a model of late industrial society wherein capitalism as a mode of production has become "advanced" or "organized". He claims that such a socio-economic formation as advanced capitalism is riven with two primary contradictions: the private appropriation of public wealth and the suppression of generalizable interests. As a successor to earlier monopoly capitalism the advanced formation oversees as much more sophisticated set of relations for capital accumulation by private corporate interests at the same time as the plausible social and political needs of masses of persons are repressed through the action of state, in order that accumulation may proceed in quantitative spiral. (See O'Connor, 1973). Suppression of generalizable interests suggests that economic and political decisions of some importance are accomplished at the expense of not receiving consensus, ratification, or participation whether morally or conceptually by the mass of persons affected by them or their formal representatives. In other words it would be impossible, following the general interest model, that if unrestricted discussion were convened on the validity of such political and economic decisions, by freely



associating publics, that such decisions could not withstand critical examination nor be justified.<sup>4</sup> Although the advanced capitalist state reduces such contradictions to technical puzzles, the form of the problem still remains "how to distribute socially produced wealth inequitably and yet legitimately " (McCarthy, 1978). This says that the stability of the capitalist social formation depends upon legitimations or the reproduction of certain cultural forms.

The type of social and political analysis conducted by critical theory is rooted in a Marxist tradition. Assessment of the conditions of social reality or moral consciousness is gauged, for Habermas, against normative ideals that individuals and social forms can attain given their stage of historical development. The other limiting conditions, against which societies and individuals struggle, are forms of political coercion, ideological residues, ignorance of the conditions, and scarcity of resources. At any one time critical theory can express, through its analyses, a normative position which acts as a type of criticism.<sup>5</sup> This analytic criticism pre-supposes ideal or counterfactual, normative standards resident in the ontogeny of the human species and in the social and cultural forms that either express underdevelopment and redundant repression in a social formation, or, which would express attainment of an historically necessary state that has been reached. This claim can be made for stages of personal enlightenment, as well as for the organization of political, cultural and social life.



A legacy that Habermas inherits from the Marxist tradition is the notion of historical necessity wherein humanly constituted structures possess an innate tendency to renew themselves to higher or more self-sufficient forms through creative or inventive praxis. I am not suggesting that this tendency allows historical prediction or events, catastrophes and intellectual developments but merely to say that the moral dialectic of human activity works itself out through an empirical unfolding.

I discussed the idea of crisis tendencies, in an earlier section, that was concurrent with the rise of laissez-faire but more particularly monopoly capitalism. One of the revisions of critical theory's neo-Marxism has to do with explicating crises tendencies in the advanced capitalist state. As a result of historical explication, Habermas argues that the particular crises tendencies that are identifiable are no longer situated in the economic sector of the society but in its socio-cultural practices. These crises do not concern the reproduction of economic or material conditions directly but are concerned with "the reproduction of reliable structures of inter-subjectivity " (McCarthy, 1978). Hence in distinction to classical Marxism there is with critical theory a dynamic interdetermination of structure with superstructure. Habermas, in reconstructing theories of social evolution, relies on his parallel distinction between labour and interaction.



Advanced capitalist states exhibit, according to Habermas, a set of four distinct types of crises. These are crises of economic reproduction/accumulation, crises of state and institutional administration, and crises in the requirements for legitimation, and crises of social motivation. Given the complexities of advanced capitalism it is difficult to anticipate the particular probabilities of any one crisis or combination occurring. Due to the displacement of conflict from the economic to the socio-cultural sector, one could argue that crises could precipitate of a legitimation or motivational nature and are more likely in the late twentieth century state. Crises of the last two types and a possible coupling with an administrative deficit are the most generative of escape routes to capitalistic self-transcendence. Consciousness effectively mediates participants' chances of reconciling their interests in any alternative social and cultural forms they may seek. The notion of a "truth-dependent mode of socialization" refers to having persons' life experiences still structurally connected to areas of reproductive decision-making so that any norms of meaning a community generates still have an impact on their most basic life-dependent actions. In other words, the "truth-dependent mode" permits a critical assessment of consciousness and meaning structures - as to their essential or apparent qualities - and their contributory possibilities for personal and collective transcendence.

Historically speaking, each social formation that evolves



from one major mode of production to another, also generates, partly prior and after, structural transformations or shifts in what could be called dominant forms of consciousness, traditions of knowledge, and personal meaning structures that account for, sustain, legitimize and criticise existing political-economic relations. If the "organizational principle" of a society limits the resolution of problems through knowledge or practical activity, attendant problems of social reproduction could precipitate a crisis of social integration. To the degree that social consensus is brittle, fragmented or absent, crises of legitimation or motivation under such conditions could occur. In earlier capitalist forms the organizational principle is "the relationship of wage labour to capital anchored in the system of bourgeois law" (McCarthy, 1978). In liberal capitalism economic exchange or the illusion of the market mechanism is the means of social integration. Through the universalist bourgeois ideology of equivalence exchange, it is given a home in the dealings of the market place. The latter becomes a final arbiter of conflict in society. What is not appreciated is that class relations have become institutionalized in the market effectively depoliticizing them for the time being.

In examining advanced capitalism the organizational principle has changed. Factors that affect this are the vital interdependence between the economy and the state. The latter also engages in global planning wherein capital investment, capital utilization and capital guarantees are made. Amongst



the multiplicity of its functions, the state intervenes in the cultural sectors such as education, school planning, program development and training wherein not only 'labour productivity' and long term capital accumulation prospects improve but legitimation and hegemonic functions are sustained. In essence, what occurs is that with state intervention in the processes of labour reproduction and accumulation, there is a corresponding production of "collective commodities" (both material and non-material, social, political and economic building blocks). These "collective commodities" comprise the kinds of pedagogic, curricular, intellectual and attitudinal outcomes that develop through educational practice, and through scientific-technical practice. Each sector addresses the twin functions of ideological maintenance and economic reproduction.

As a result of developments in the advanced capitalist state, too complex to broach at this stage of the inquiry, the organizational principle of the society has become one of "quasi-political" compromise between business and unions determining the cost of labour power. As McCarthy indicates

the unpolitical relationship between wage labour and capital and the autonomy of the economic sphere vis a vis the political, have given way to a "quasi-political" distribution of a social product and to the assumption by the state of market complementing and market-replacing functions.

(McCarthy, 1978, p. 365)

The state is faced not with the certainty of economic crises but with threats to the plausibility of its actions.



If it fails in its administrative rationality there is a likelihood of displacing this threat to a more general level of social approbation - that of system-wide legitimation. The state apparatus, in its manifold effects and relations, has become the agency of social integration in this era of advanced capitalism.

As I have argued, the need for legitimation "commodities" and resources of meaning are important for the unproblematic operation of everyday life in the advanced countries. The meaning deficit which can become acute, as a problem of social maintenance or mass loyalty, occurs historically since equivalence exchange or the 'natural justice of the marketplace' has lost its ideological and hence integrative functions for social life. It is generally acknowledged (Offe, 1972; Castells, 1980) that social rewards, social wealth and prestige are distributed in large measure through political negotiation, pressure tactics and as outcomes of particular government policies. (This is certainly accurate for the experiences I have had in curriculum planning projects across three provincial jurisdictions in Canada). But, concurrently the capitalist mode of organization has not withered away nor become obsolescent. Profit maximization and accumulation, although central as dynamic principles in the organization of economic reproduction, cannot command a taken-for-granted existence as modes of operation in the advanced societies. Consequently, there is always the prospect of a legitimation deficit that requires constant cultural



infusions in the way of "substitute program(s)". Habermas characterizes these contradictions nicely and points out the outcomes for citizen understanding and participation:

Recoupling the economic system to the political... creates an increased need for legitimation. The state apparatus no longer, as in liberal capitalism, merely secures the general conditions of production... but is now actively engaged in it. It must therefore... like the pre-capitalist state... be legitimated, although it can no longer rely on the residues of tradition that have been undermined and worn out during the development of capitalism. Moreover, through the universalistic value system of bourgeois ideology, civil rights - including the right to participate in political elections - have become established; and legitimation can be disconnected from the mechanism of elections only temporarily and under extraordinary conditions. The problem is resolved through a system of formal democracy. Genuine participation of citizens in processes of political will-formation, that is, substantive democracy, would bring to consciousness the contradiction between administratively socialized production and the continued private appropriation and use of surplus value. In order to keep this contradiction from being thematized, the administrative system must be sufficiently independent of legitimating will-formation.

(Habermas, 1975, p. 36)

The significance for my discussion of conventional educational reform should be clear. If citizens' real interests are, in fact, separated from the access to or influence upon centres of decision-making and if these civic interests and practices are lodged in a hollow, formal kernel of democracy, then radical reform efforts must address both a chronically false consciousness and the basic contradictions of sociopolitical life in the advanced societies. If the public realm is still conceived by curriculum planners as a traditional



institutional forum for solving grievances, for publicizing issues, and for applying leverage to dominant societal sectors while empirically it is a way of getting people entangled with one another, defusing dissent, and connoting to reform-minded persons that they in fact have tried and acted politically, then the depth and sensitivity of critique to society-curriculum problems must be significant, sustained and collaborative.

Habermas has argued that what accompanies legitimation maintenance is a structural manipulation of motivational, and socialization patterns of individuals. . Marcuse (1964) has shown that accompanying the emergence of the state-industrial complex is the tendency toward manipulation of human needs, interests, relevance structures and recreation. The kinds of content that embody socialization and recreation relations presently accentuate "civil privatism", "familial-vocational privatism", strong career and leisure orientation, and a sense of achievement at being a 'smart operator' within the system. Lifestyle and world view shift toward the 'naturalness' of pursuing strict self-interest. As the public sphere is depoliticized, the distortions or damage done to human practice is projected through to human intimacy and care. Political repression, unconsciously undergone at the level of public life, often emerges in a distorted, vengeful way within domestic and leisure relations. Hence extreme narcissism and the sadism of gender relations is often exhibited. Techno-



logical ideologies are effective substitute meaning systems for suggesting the 'correctness' of those lifestyles. Such ideologies act to foreclose much critical debate and community political expression that would act to countervail these tendencies to motivational rationalization. That there are gaps in civic or public expression for "discursive will-formation" is clear. Traditional erosion of organic individual and community bases of creative will and praxis may only proceed so far. Pinar (1981) argues that one baseline for political renewal is in the re-discovering and celebration of alternative gender relations. For our purposes curriculum planning in recovering its self-consciousness as a human practice is one instance of resistance to the administration of rationality and motivation. Curriculum work can make public and thematize prior taken-for-granted with the effect of 'stirring-up' spuriously settled cultural traditions. If curriculum work can be historicized sufficiently for an awareness of how lifeworld and formal cultural content is mediated, both technically and organically, then curriculum work becomes a motive political force - a full consciousness of alternatives. In the final analysis:

There is no administrative production of meaning. The commercial production and administrative planning of...symbols exhausts the normative force of counter-factual (ideal) validity claims. The procurement of legitimation is self-defeating as soon as the mode of procurement is seen through.

(Habermas, 1975, p. 70)

What would some of the cultural resources be for those of us who work in the reproductive sectors of curriculum and



schooling? Habermas claims that remnants of bourgeois tradition and science can contain affirmative, discursive, and transcendent functions if those who work and participate in these forms are assembled together in communities of interest. He refers to much of modern art, to scientific practice (in the way of natural science and philosophy), and to universal morality. Educational workers are particularly sensitive to the accretions of the latter two kinds of conceptual-moral practice. We are often too ready to reject the debunking and motive-forming power of logical positivism, analytic philosophy, and methodologies of physics and biology. The elaboration of moral philosophy, moral development and values education, in themselves, offer no practical route for self-transcendence but do demand a particular kind of justification of decisions-taken, research produced, and grants procured in the intellectual, civic and governmental sectors. Even traditional curriculum practice can restore a sense of human interest to our development and evaluation activities as it often casts up a pictograph of the good life that, once re-thematized, can be understood. Pedagogy, at times, does speak to the deep sense of care and community that grounded the conservative *gemeinschaft* of prior historical eras. When persons who remember this remind others of moral-practical dimensions lost or restored they also pose the question that asks where are we as persons heading collectively - whose interests am I preserving and ought I to build on the routines of opportunity and condition that are channelled my way? In many respects this is the perennial Canadian question of



whose bidding are we going to do? What other culture or person's history am I living through? "Often we substitute someone else's past and present for our own - a form of insanity " (Salutin, 1982). It is important for informal or particular projects of inquiry to remember that these cultural domains, with political organization, can mobilize effective motive formation and identify re-integration precisely because they are dysfunctional as alternatives for civil privatist neuroses and hence system maintenance. That sense of revelatory release that can accompany the fraternal awareness of one's global interdependence and of sharing particular and general interests with different ethno-cultural groups, each jointly oppressed, is indicative of human praxis.

In thesis three on his excursus of the anatomy of motivational crisis tendencies, Habermas begins to link up the possibilities of moral development, its elaborations, and the structural relations of advanced capitalist political-economics. Barely stated, he is concerned with the widening gap between the labour, capital and planning requisites of ever-spiralling accumulation needs and their variance with the normative expectations for personal efficacy, prosperity, and moral-familial anchoring. I cite both Habermas and McCarthy as a way letting them draw out the implications for a renewal of civic competence (in the advanced societies).

1. As long as we have to do with a form of socialization that binds inner nature in a communicative organization of behaviour, it is inconceivable that there should be a



legitimation of any action norm that guarantees, even approximately, and acceptance of decisions without reasons.

2. Since liberal capitalism, the need for legitimation of norms can be met only through to universalistic value systems.
3. Today, the only form of universal morality capable of withstanding the destruction of tradition is a communicative ethics in which all significant decisions are tied to the formation of rational consensus in unrestricted discourse,
4. The basic elements of a communicative ethics are today already influencing typical socialization processes in several social strata, that is, they have achieved motive-forming power.
5. As a result, the privatistic motivational patterns essential to formal democracy are threatened with disintegration, a threat that can be documented in the spread of withdrawal and protest syndromes.

(McCarthy, 1978, p. 376)

#### A REVIEW OF THE PROBLEM OF REFORM IDEOLOGY

At this point I would like to review briefly what some of the structural changes in the state mean for educational provision in Canadian society and how the reform rhetoric of progressive-reconstruction is instrumental in doing state-corporate sector bidding.

In my journey through the progressive terrain in the United States and Canada, I have argued that despite the semi-autonomy of cultural forms such as schooling, the career of reforms must be understood, in part, as the working out of the contradictions of capital and labour through successive shifts in the organization of economic or material reproduction. Despite the particular reforms directed to subordinate ethnic and social classes in this country, and the resistance



to these reforms or their incorporation by them, the logic of these struggles has been, it could be argued, a strengthening of social control over the direction of political-economic arrangements; this truly becomes a dialectic of educational reform in its own right inscribed within the broader capital-labour or social-cultural dialectic. Countless instances of school baggage, accepted at face value as inherently virtuous, such as the integrated day, individualization, activity days and extra-curricular options, interdisciplinary curricula, children's rights, and psychological testing seem, in the long run, to confirm the school's role in the stratification of class, ethnicity, competence, care, and world view. Bowles and Gintis (1978) indicate that despite the brilliance of Dewey's methodological devices in schools he neglected the political-economic interests of a class society that his advocacy sustained.

Some revealing examples of how educational planning has fused reform and control lies with provincial educational bureaucracies across this country where it seems the legitimization and accumulation needs of a social industrial complex are being serviced at a provincial-regional level, given the constitutional division of fiscal and other responsibilities. British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario and Quebec provide fine instances of senior level functionaries trained in graduate institutions imbued with the spirit of progressivism. In these places, we discover individuals surely cognizant of the commercial, manpower, and capital needs of corporate interests developing programs of reform that emphasize, nominally, skills of auton-



omy, and decision-making for public school students. Upon closer examination I found such curricula provided little in the way of personal freedom, thorough or radical opportunities for inquiry in social change - nor a particular appreciation for the sediments of classical thought. The highly structured formats of programs of inquiry in the social studies are best seen, impressionistically, as modes of reformist response to social discontent. They lead essentially, if ever implemented, to personality reformation of the type Bernstein (1971) calls 'flexible, conforming, generalists' of late twentieth century urban culture. Such future citizens are being prepared for participation in the service, extractive, and industry sectors of the 'New Northern Jerusalems; places such as Alberta, Texas and Florida. It is interesting to note the conceptual parallels between curriculum policy documents rationalizing the new Enterprise program in the Alberta of 1935 and the kinds of pedagogical and social studies of the period 1967-1975. Other parallels can be seen with the rise of the Social Credit and C.C.F. movements in the 1930's and their political homologues in the late 1960's and 1970's with the resurfacing of trade unionism and the N.D.P. both in Alberta and Ontario. This chain of reformist cultural commodities parallel the economic restructuring associated with the emergence of monopoly capitalism in different continental regions in the 1930's and the second structuring of organized capitalism in Canada, and globally, in the mid 1960's - 1970's period.

Schechter writes on the economic-occupational shifts



that had an impact on the kinds of school and curriculum provisions organized:

...not only the final transformation of the (Canadian) economy to industrial capitalism but also a shift in its internal composition; the growth of the tertiary sector, an increase in the white collar proletariat, the integration of significantly more women into the labour force. Between 1941 and 1961 the white collar component of the labour force increased from 25.2% to 38.6% while the primary occupational group declined from 30.6% to 13.1%.... Professionals accounted for the second biggest increase in the white collar sector, while the percentage of self-employed professionals declined.  
(Schechter, 1977, p. 398)

Clearly, as Habermas (1975) and O'Connor (1973) point out that as the state-corporate sector factors of production shift so must the problems of labour preparation and legitimation. Shifts toward the service industry and away from the primary or secondary industry also require a shift in the monitoring and control functions for these occupations in the corporate work day. Reliability, flexibility of skill and attendance patterns, and increasing fragmentation of the work regimen suggests that social relations of pedagogy and curriculum are re-negotiated. This is not to suggest a determinate correspondence between the content and process of schooling and structural change. But if schools were to prepare willing, secularized production factors for service jobs and industry, that would mean participants would have to accomplish school outcomes differently. It also suggests that the dialectic of resistance would change as well in a



state restructuring from a labour-intensive competitive sector to a capital-intensive monopoly sector. Problems of legitimation and motivation can reach crises proportions when large numbers of persons become unemployed or unemployable as a result of structural transformations. Concurrently, these phenomena can represent alternative perspectives for understanding such complexes as regional underdevelopment, work and achievement, and the state determination of persons' life chances.

What can we see, then, of the concrete shifts in the organization and realizations of the school program at the level of motivational patterns and understanding in students? Habermas has argued in his more recent work on communication theory (1981, 1979) that, generally speaking, the dominant mode of socialization in our society is primarily responsible for persons' willingness and capacity for action in the world. He also argues, as does symbolic interactionism (Mead, 1934), that socialization is possible because of linguistic structures generative of intersubjectivity. He suggests, for all practical purposes, that individuals act on the basis of norms that require discursive justification or with the expectation that cultural, political, social norms that they act through could be justified if they took the time to bother. Our actions, at the same time, are an interpretive practice of these norms, meanings, symbols and gestures. The significance for those of us working in curriculum is particularly acute for:



This communicative organization of behaviour can become an obstacle to complex decision-making systems.... As long as we have to do with a form of socialization that binds inner nature in a communicative organization of behaviour, it is inconceivable that there should be a legitimation of any action norm acceptance of decisions without reasons.

(Habermas, 1975, p. 43-44)

Clearly, the school as an organized activity mediates life in the socio-cultural sphere so that secondary socialization changes can occur through re-arrangements of classroom teaching and learning. To the degree that this is sufficient, extensive, and plausible, the psychological parameters of student personality development can be altered. (This is virtually axiomatic for anyone having been processed through the public schools). The redefinition, even subtlety, of knowledge forms and role requirements of students associated with the 'deskilling' typical of intermediate, secondary and vocational schools can produce a serious erosion of critical capacities in students. The practice of guidance counselling parallels Bernstein's 1971 admonition that the effect of integrated curriculum was primarily that of greater personal intrusion of institutionalized pedagogy within student consciousness. This had the effect of making more personal, subjective content available for institutional scrutiny. Social control through the reification of students' consciousness reflects shifting organizational patterns of economy and morality in the wider society. Under the guise of greater understanding, interpersonal contact, and 'socially relevant advice' for career planning these practices



are constituted. If students' subjectivity is more accessible to school curriculum workers without a corresponding rise in students' competence in standard and classical literacy and analysis skills, they are more prone to being buffeted through the institutional corridors of efficiency. Deskillling often accompanies a resurgence in interest in career education. Marvin Lazerson (Grubb and Lazerson, 1974) has revealed the adaptive function of vocationalism in schools throughout the twentieth century in North America. The primary effect of such soft techniques as integrated curricula, humanistic guidance, de-skilling toward more 'fun' courses, and the harp on vocational preparation seems to be to dissolve the "expectational framework" students could legitimately hold. Dissolving their expectations concerning future life chances and societal opportunities, reconciling them to their 'natural level of interest', is akin to rendering students senseless into what I could call the culture of narcissistic silence. Structurally, the impact of these programs is to re-integrate future citizens into changed horizons of work and expression - that is, the logic of economic reproduction. I find Habermas is able to sanction these possible psycho-political consequences of schooling:

Only if motives for action no longer operated through norms requiring justification, and if personality systems no longer had to find their unity in identity-securing interpretive systems, could the acceptance of decisions without reasons become routine, that is could the readiness to conform absolutely be produced to any desired degree.

(Habermas, 1975, p. 43-44)



4. A fourth front of this inquiry consists of practical, conceptual, but speculative analysis of current manifestations of critical or reconstructionist social education and their utopian promises. This sub-project is couched in an essentialist reading of the material, cultural and axiological requirements of citizens living in late global capitalist economies. I argue for the kind of organization of curriculum practice generative of democratic publics. That is to say, this inquiry front of the study is explicitly a normative excursus.

#### CURRICULUM STUDIES

In returning to the interest of political normative bases of curriculum reform, I shall provide a few thoughts on the direction the field has taken historically and intellectually and what requirements of community are called for in the recent language of reform.

It is clear that if curriculum theorists, as a community, have been intent on re-examining themselves over the last decade, so has the state been re-examining its commitment to education. As I, Willis, Habermas, and the progressives have argued, organized public education is a primary device for societal social and economic reproduction. As O'Connor and Habermas demonstrate, schooling is a means of increasing capital accumulation partly through direct economic growth and partly through the preparation of consciousness and labour power. The state, in the advanced societies, operates in sophisticated fashion as an entrepreneur of social and moral



ideologies and articulates these through symbolic structures related to notions of equality of educational opportunity and social condition. To some extent the plausibility crisis in society has occurred because of the contradictions between ends and means of achieving the 'good life'. In other words, organized state efforts and the empirical outcomes for people have lost some of their plausibility. Clearly, these crises are due to the human frailties behind the social, cultural and administrative devices that mediate meaning content and concrete life chances but also due to the ineluctable contradictions of an advanced capitalist society. As a result there is a certain urgency in having to alter, refine or repair the content, control and outcomes of the school curriculum. As always, in a social formation these socio-cultural repairs are met with resistance and challenge on behalf of citizens, teachers, students and other affected participants. One of the least debated themes surrounding public curricula has to do with who should hold the power to make, oversee and assess the changes in the selections from our cultural traditions and future.

Traditional curriculum research has tended to avoid the systematic or peripheral thematizations of questions of power and control, of the economic and social contexts that condition our curriculum work whether development, evaluation or theory. The history of curriculum research has shunned a mature examination of the relationship between theory and practice that has troubled unself-conscious state decision-



makers. I will argue that traditional curriculum research is practically and intellectually incapable of doing the kind of philosophical, social and educational analyses of structural questions that must be done, if it hopes to address felt-practical issues, questions of reform and change, or to achieve self-understanding of its own works.<sup>6</sup>

One of the pre-occupations that curriculum as a field of the practical must address is the dialectic of resistance and change and the way levels on which this praxical relation is reflected. Teachers, students, planners and other citizens can be portrayed as active in confronting contradictory experiences at a theoretical level. They can be seen as fully inhabiting this domain. What is not portrayed as frequently is how teachers, learners and planners reproduce themselves, in antagonism, at their places of work with colleagues and peers in trying to work through theoretical contradictions. These immediate contours of intimacy, of dread, anxiety and self-doubt, combined with a sense of personal possibility must form a part of the inquiry of curriculum research. The outcroppings of structure and circumstance impinge profoundly on curriculum work as we try to deal with purely methodological or pedagogical projects. The kind of working protocol that emerges as a negotiated order of professional settings must be examined not only for its formal qualities but also for its symptoms as a subtext of conflict and resistance in the reproduction of social life. This, too, is a research agenda for curriculum workers.



The twin concerns of curriculum theory can be considered as those of self and structure or the indeterminate connections between institutional ensembles and intimacy, between the force of historical sediment and the resistance of organic communities, between nature and culture, and between the saturations of state-sponsored hegemony and the refreshing qualities of cultural alternatives. Curriculum theory, in order to understand itself, its subjects and to submit to its warrant of theory-guided action, must situate itself intellectually as a movement and intimately as persons, in spite of their petty acquisitiveness, in the midst of these dangerous dialectics. Curriculum practice, to survive as a voice with power, must be organized by communities of teachers, theorists, learners, and participants interested in on their own revealed interests and enlightenment. The alienated power lying behind managerial-style, needs, and interests can be dissembled as curriculum study becomes a relational, radicalized, explanatory and practical affair; the community which throws off the ahistorical, asocial empiricism and redundant scales of scientistic curriculum-making. As structural change accompanies character re-integration, a revitalized curriculum study must be concerned with a "sense of audience".

Relearning to write and to talk with one another who inhabit formerly strange constitutencies is, too, a means of validating new research claims. In a collaborative system it is important to understand the dilemmas and positions of strategic others, easily isolated, through their own



projects of renewal. It says that in work

...men must accept their own unique talents and varying ambitions as authentic... they must consider the possibility that their personal impulses and special talents have as much right to be heard as the cultural norms.

(Gouldner, 1976, p. 320)

Curriculum theorists would do well to re-imagine themselves as Schutz' stranger whose "local ignorance is related to the fact that (he has) access to another body of knowledge, a knowledge of the surrounding but distant world " (Berger, 1973). This strongly precious self and situational knowledge of others and of their biographies complements our generalized knowledge of mere global spaces.

In making my way with the reader on this excursus of curriculum reform, I am implicitly suggesting temporary end-points of practice to where we might head as theorists and as citizens bent on enlightenment. I have hinted at the kinds of knowledge that we could reflect with and use strategically. I have been more circumspect about the mechanisms or devices that can correct us as living persons in 'intentional areas' that project our future moral, social and pedagogical states. In some ways I have refused to divulge these generative recipes to curriculum theory circles because there are not any recipes, equally because there are not any to my knowledge, and finally because I find it one of the most difficult things I have ever had to do. (To ensure that all this concern, that all this heat and light, is justified in trans-



forming curriculum practice, and that I, too, have not forgotten myself in a daring but idle dream of prestige this picture needs to be allowed to stand as a reminder of the state of our field.) How close to the courses we might teach this is:

We are back in the introductory curriculum class in an American university. Gone is the Greek insight that theory is the cultivation of point of view, of transcendence of practical affairs, and that practical knowledge is knowledge in its own right (Lobkowitz, 1967, p. 118), imperfect but necessarily so. Gone is the notion that contemplation is essential to the cultivation of wisdom; gone is the Christian view that good works follow from faith. Present is the demand for knowledge of circumstances not yet present, theory which controls the future as it anticipates it. Theory is no longer achieved through distance from human affairs; it has become a mere appendage to it, judged and justified solely according to its ability to predict and control those affairs. It is little wonder that elementary curriculum students demand such knowledge; they merely reflect the view of theory and practice which prevails in a scientific age.

(Pinar and Grumet, in Lawn and Barton 1981, p. 26)

The authors, in sum, have described the history of the curriculum field with its minor and major transformations beginning in 1920 to its first chronic reconceptualist convulsion in the early 1970's. This convulsion was a necessary, health-provoking one as the conceptual and political upshot was the re-assembly of a complex curriculum community - one that was dissipated for forty years in its role as puppet and magician for the logic of several years of capitalist re-entrenchment that we see named as banking educa-



tion (Freire, 1973) or as the agricultural-botanical model (Hamilton, 1977) or linear-technological rationality (MacDonald). From the heydays of conservative and moderate progressivism in the 1920's and 1930's, curriculum thought had taken an onward tumble to a 'dialogue of beautiful souls' where representatives of a variety of life-adjustment programs or plans dismissed conflict and performed cheap compromises with one another. The greater project for curriculum theory collapsed into a shabby psycho- and sociological reductionism. The reconceptualist turn-about beginning in the early 1970's under the auspices of people such as Bernstein (1971), Schwab (1969), Huebner (1979), MacDonald (1975), Aoki (1975, 1978), Pinar (1974, 1975), Apple (1979), Van Manen (1975, 1980) embodied a celebration and potential for organization that curriculum studies could not ignore. I close this section with a fine crystallization of the power of reconceptualism:

...(theory), then, is a critical exercise, descriptive rather than prescriptive, studying signs of educational practice.... It presses back the categories of learner and curriculum to the relations that bind a person to his or her particular cultural, historical and political situation and then dissolves that person and that setting into the ineffable possibilities...of the individual making a home in the natural world.

(Pinar and Grumet in Lawn  
and Barton, 1981, p. 38)

## THE ORGANIZATION OF ENLIGHTENMENT:

### CRITICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE

The Yugoslav social theorist, Mihailo Markovic, writing



in 1974, is illustrative of recent work contributing to the growth of modern, critical social philosophy in line with the tradition of Marx, Lukacs, Gramsci, and the Frankfurt School. (see Fay, 1975; Slater, 1977). He claims that the focus of this tradition of practical philosophy is on crucial contemporary 'social issues' in order to demonstrate

...the profound crisis of existing  
forms of contemporary industrial  
society.

(Markovic, 1974, p. 94)

We are urged to examine the philosophical foundations of critical social theory as a means of exploiting the possibilities out of a cultural and political 'impasse'.

Critical social philosophy attempts to integrate social theory and political practice as ongoing moments of its practical inquiry. It views theories as analyses of a social situation, in terms of those features of it that are perceived alterable, in order to eliminate certain frustrations its members are experiencing. The success or truth of a theory partially consists of determining the theory's relevance in leading to a satisfaction of human needs and purposes.

For critical social theory:

...what is to count as truth is partially  
determined by the specific ways in which  
scientific theory is supposed to relate  
to practical action.

(Fay, 1975, p. 103)

In other words, critical social theory is concerned with how knowledge trans-



lated into practical conduct and with how action is a chief element in knowledge constitution, per se. The normative validity, then, of critical inquiry is tied to how its theories translate into action, to whether its knowledge claims concerning social and psychological reality lead to states of human progress, and to whether the claims of influence and causality are made meaningfully transparent to the concerned with a number of joint tasks that include classification of conceptual traditions in linguistic communities - particularly those statements concerned with the fundamental structure of reality, cognition, man's nature and the type of society we should seek to build.

Critical philosophy, as a product of human practice, is seen as a rational inquiry preoccupied with uniting human desires, visions and aspirations with a global awareness of the 'IS' of the social, historical world. Critical social theory features a dialectical method that orients one to seek the solution of social problems by discovering the basic limitations of extant social forms and by indicating alternative, more rational, human historical possibilities of social organization. This method, ideal typically, incorporates descriptive and understanding functions, of man and the world at the same time as it engages in synthetic, critical activity.

Hence, a critical social philosophy is seen as a practical activity that embraces the instrumentalities of positivist uniformities and predictions and, the idealism of utopian radicalism in a radical project that contains a



knowledge of reliable social tendencies which plausibly lead to a horizon of new historical possibilities. Critical social philosophy as theory and as practice must not be reduced to an enunciation of what is or what might be but also what ought to be as forms of the significant expressions, understandings and conduct of human groups.

In another essay written in 1972 Markovic argues for a deepened sense of social responsibility amongst scientists and technologists concerning the practice and outcomes of their research. He exhorts social scientists in particular to steer away from a self-image as "producers of information who neither care about the basic goals of inquiry and about the broader context of knowledge within which their intellectual products acquire final meaning", or who as scientists are disallowed from "participating in the decision-making process about the use of these same products " (Markovic, 1972, p. 1). What is needed following the lives of a critical social philosophy is a 'concrete historical universalism.' Science is encouraged to recognize the importance of a global community that has the two-fold task of publicly calling-out its analyses of social injustice, contradiction and environmental degradation and of securing the conditions of personal freedom from vulnerability to state intervention. Such conditions of individual and collective autonomy are related to transformations in individual consciousness and in lifestyle in order that autonomy and identity are given a less-threatening base upon which to flourish. As in any



systematic tradition of inquiry, critical social science has a latent image of pedagogy and curriculum that permits the transmission and regeneration of this knowledge and practice for a new class of scientists and teachers. I note seven pedagogical elements that stem from this tradition of critical practical inquiry:<sup>7</sup>

1. Placing content into broader contexts that show the connections, mediations, historical location and psychological conditions under which the knowledge originated.
  2. The creative interpretation of knowledge wherein is expressed a new meaning or personal philosophical outlook.
  3. Awakening the intellectual curiosity of students, broadening their spiritual horizon, developing their capacities for critical thinking.
  4. A scholar must possess personality, being not only a man of knowledge and culture but also a man of integrity and character who is actively committed to the realization of his beliefs.
  5. In his calling the scholar will extend his activities beyond the relatively narrow, academic circle and become an active figure in the global community.
  6. Such public activity is an important link in the process of mediation between theoretical mind and concrete praxis of a society.
  7. The scholar-teacher has the opportunity to influence the course of the most important social processes in a double sense: on the one hand by his direct action, on the other hand, indirectly, by educating those who will change the world. (That is, simultaneous change of external conditions and self-change).
- (Markovic, 1972, p. 11,12)



I have encountered and used several texts in teaching curriculum methods courses in the last three years that begin to embody the normative and pedagogical scope necessary for critical study - as Markovic and to a lesser degree Habermas have outlined. The texts and illustrative pedagogy were used then within a number of course formats for senior undergraduates and graduates in teacher education. Clearly, the particular course objectives and structures mediated and carried illustrations from these texts, essentially dealing with character and structural criticism, to a level of pedagogy that matched the social experience and personal horizons of students in each of the courses. To extend these experiences of pedagogy in the courses to the full-blown political potential of the original authors would have required a longer period of psychological and cognitive incubation within these projects. Important data for my practical inquiry into the utopian potential of critical social studies or reconstructionism are those of the course outlines, assignments, activities, and the transcripts of interviews conducted with each of the students. Such symbolic and oral material will act as critical subtexts for the first self-reflexive inquiry front of this study. I cite the following as particularly, generative texts that I have uncovered and used:

Harold and Ann Berlak: Dilemmas of Schooling: Teaching and Social Change, Methuen, 1981 for Education 5067 School and Society. University of New Brunswick 1981-82.



Ira Shor: Critical Teaching in Everyday Life, Black Rose, 1980 for Education C & I 462/463, Developments/Innovations in Secondary Social Studies. University of Alberta. 1980-81.

Report on "Social Action and Consciousness": Perspectives of a Teacher Education Program . University of Utah, 1981-82.  
 Andrew Gitlin  
 Florence Krall  
 Shirley Hager

## THE PRACTICAL METHOD

In what follows I borrow extensively from the methodological work of Habermas (1971). I use this work as an analogue to the kind of organization of curriculum planning I would see occurring at a meta-level of practice and as an analogue to the kind of pedagogy critical social studies could comprise of, if teaching and learning were organized within the parameters of a community of critical social science. The theoretic and practical device I outline here is stipulative of the organization of curriculum planning only in a general sense. As such it is tentative and preliminary and is part of the generative text that the four different fronts of inquiry contribute to the analysis of the problematic of this study: "What are the Utopian Prospects of a Critical Social Studies in the Late Twentieth Century State?" Given the fact that the composite method of the study should be considered as an ongoing dialectic of historical, structural and self-analysis, the commission of the study is itself a datum which will be thematized. The final authority for the interpretation of the practical



method analogue and for the study as a project-in-accomplishment rests with the reader, his/her own convictions, and the strategic action this relationship may or may not convene.

Habermas has devoted much of his 1971 work to the question of enlightenment or the acquisition of critical awareness and the organizing role that social theory has in mobilizing insight and action in participants. Habermas likens the process of enlightenment with that of psychoanalysis. In the clinical situation the patient or participating subject engages in self-reflection of subjective and objective experiential contents that have been reformulated for him by the physician so the probability of self-insight is heightened. Self-reflection as a moment in the process of critical enlightenment "can be conceived as the internalization of a therapeutic discourse" (Habermas, 1971, p.28). The patient and physician of the psychoanalytic setting can be likened to that of partners in discourse. If speech is not to become merely analytic but reflective and generative, the participants in a discourse may start in asymmetrical relationship. If true consensus and enlightened communicative action is to be achieved, these positions by the conclusion of the discourse must become interchangeable and egalitarian. This structure of speech that evolves between participants affected by an issue is the only guarantee, Habermas contends, that the interests of all affected parties are secured and become the general interests of the group, or institution or community.

In a discussion of the role of the political party for



the organization of the class struggle, we discover that there is but an indirect parallel between mass enlightenment and the psychoanalytic transference. Still the similarities of situation are striking enough for me to see the role of the (communist) party, in this instance, as serving a partial pedagogical function. The model of distortion-free communication and the encouragement of self-reflection act as arrangements to guide connective insight for a person's past and future activity, and to dissolve sociopolitical barriers to communication. Authenticity in participants' self-relations and relations with others is one monitor of the "truth of the interpretation" developed by the physician, the party, the pedagogue or curriculum. Equally, the insight-laden theory used by a participant can instead be retained simply as a perspective that can disclose, objectively, the correctness of the socialized process of reflection being undertaken. That is, does the objectivating theory disclose aspects of the world for me that are apparent for others through their processes of self-reflection? When objectivating theory is used only as confirmation of empirical events, the enlightenment calculus is reduced to the possibilities of confirmation that flow from scientific discourse. Confirmation of the correctness of insight attainable only through interpretive self-reflection is thus stemmed. As Habermas says there are two kinds of social relations that can lead to critical awareness; namely, the level of theoretic (scientific) discourse and the organization of social relations that employ the reci-



procal of this and use reflexive theories as a connective device between self-group-and-society in a situation of interest to the participants. Objectivating theories anchored in scientific discourse can contribute indirectly to enlightenment as discourse situations in which norms of equality, truthfulness, comprehensibility and plausibility can be assured. Participants in this kind of situation are at least given the opportunity to radically analyze or taxonomize the social-political world. A revolutionary posture is more common from this kind of discourse since the political power, or in this case the curricula, acts as a vanguard test of some authority even though the theoretic claims can be debated.

It could be argued, as was the case with Adorno and his work on negative dialectics, that the reflexive-discursive circle of enlightenment carries with it a far greater potency of persuasion and hence success amongst participants than the "diffuse dissemination of insights" associated with only the objectivating theories of scientific discourse. Another way of saying this is that, because of how social change could be achieved, radical reformism is more fruitful than revolutionary or directly strategic action. Habermas puts it acutely in focus for curriculum planning:

... (such that) in advanced capitalism changing the structure of the general system of education might possibly be more important for the organization of enlightenment than the ineffectual training of cadres or the building of impotent parties.

(Habermas, 1971, p. 32)



No theory, in and of itself, will advance participants to militancy; but, as Willis and others point out, by insinuating a space within socio-cultural practice, teachers and learners can with the vestiges of spontaneity left harness different metaphors, symbols and thematize other relations of pedagogy that cut deep to motivational patterns. If the high school can de-skill and reinterpret students' needs under an insidious careerism, the possibilities of counterfactual interpretation should be greater.

(In this discussion it seems quite plausible to make the following substitutions: objectivating theory for curricular text; party or enlightened participants as curriculum theorists; organization of enlightenment becomes curriculum planning or curriculum development; correctness or truth of theory as curricular evaluation; and participants or members to be enlightened as students, learners, citizens or other interested parties; organization of enlightenment and reflexive theorizing as pedagogical relations.)

I conceive three different levels at which Habermas conducts his methodological project. Each corresponds to substrates of intentioned activity at the level of the social psychological, at the sociological, and at the socio-political. Each can represent areas of dynamic, personal, interpersonal or class/institutional activity in its own right but each is more properly expressed as a unity of interests, or interest-guided action. In my estimation, educational practice and its subset, curriculum practice, are the structural codification, par excellence, of these tri-level rela-



tions. Educational practice, then, connects an interest-laden way of life simultaneously as it represents the organization of species-warranted inquiry. In other contexts Habermas has termed this the social learning index of different societal forms.

1. I can identify a first methodological level as the elaboration and development of critical scientific theories (about science or society or literature or physiology, for example) that satisfy the rigours of scientific discourse or falsifiability in Popper's sense. The methodological aim here is the truth of propositional content; thus the correctness of the typical scientific community norms. Discursive examination, as I have referred to, does occur here as it ought in any conventional research deliberation. But the validity of such a theory for reflexive enlightenment can only be secured in a successful process of acceptance by those persons affected within an environment or social setting rid of domination. Each person directly affected by the theory's claims must, ultimately, have the opportunity of a reflexive validation of its emerging social interpretation. A way of characterizing this objective theory is by noting that the outcomes of self-reflection are changes in persons' attitudes due to therapeutic insight into past causative chains of self-formation which have impeded or obscured their ability to act. Objective theorising, if transformed to action, results in a technical praxis or strategic action declarative of the future. To some degree this would be close to the positions



curriculum theorists or developers find themselves in at certain moments in the process of cultural selection and organization.

2. I can identify as a second methodological level the arrangements and organization of enlightenment. Here, careful (in the sense given it by Langeveld) pedagogical relations apply and test the critical scientific theories (as curriculum content, for example) by the generation of self and collective reflection amongst the participants of the biographical import of these scientific representations of the world. The prevailing interest at this level is the precipitation of "authentic" insights. Such theory or curricular representation acts to portray for participants their social location in a society ridden with contradictions. It informs them, if correct, of their real interests in this situation as an objective fulfillment of their potential (see Geuss, 1981). The organization of curricular selections and pedagogy surrounding them must be such (as it is with Freire) that the 'victims' or members recognize themselves as the subjects of the interpretation proposed through the group and through pedagogy. If recognition of self-situation occurs via the interpretations consciousness of the objective or true interest for each person, respectively, emerges. In larger numbers Marx termed this stage of consciousness "une classe pour soi".

An interrelated outcome of the process of reflection is the awareness among members, whether as students in a history



class or otherwise, of the career of their own self or characterological formation and the corollary awareness of why they have acted in particular habitual patterns. This returns us, as methodologists, to the psychoanalytic setting of distorted communication. Self-awareness at this stage re-aligns communicative action from its distorted, uneven relations of inequality to a plateau of practical discourse. From this point on participants have been restored to a level of, as Habermas terms it, discursive will-formation or constraint-free communication. Participants, as students, for example, are unable to act categorically through the media of, say, social action projects. Restoration to a level of practical discourse enables the development of authentic consensus or understanding of empirical events including actions of others, but cannot forecast or prescribe in what action members could or ought to be engaged.

3. I identify the choice and embodiment of political action as the third methodological level in this unity of interest-bearing practical method. Its structural equivalents in curriculum practice lie within curriculum evaluation - the type and scope of school appraisal and within the upshots of carefully, reflective pedagogy in the classroom. In other words, what kind of value-laden action do students engage in as a reciprocal dimension of their learning? Is social action, political confirmation or rejection or further critical analyses, the form of strategic or tactical solution to



be adopted? The theory-guided outcome at this level becomes that of "prudent decisions".

What is the context of the organization of action for students or other citizens? Habermas indicates that it is only through the achievement of true consensus, in the post-reflective phase, that the justification of any course of action is recommended. By knowing their real interests, awareness of structural and political intrusions (e.g., the vulnerability of the classroom teacher) and possible political side effects of career discredit or violence to themselves the connections of the theory with the practical redress of reality can be more strategically faced by participants. Only through having amassed this calculus of possibilities through practical discourse (the lesson text) can the affected participants undertake to act politically in enlightened action. Participants can be in the position of acting in their best interests when they have achieved structural consciousness of their historical and social niche as an ensemble of persons or as a social class. Critical theories of an empirical nature, in themselves, do not vouch-safe correct political action. This is particularly important as an issue for students enrolled in public issues or community school social studies programs as far as what constitutes a project that redeems his/her insight.

This level of the organization of political action is *à propos* for the kinds of questions (radical) curriculum reformers face. Let us consider, for one moment, that a group such as the reconceptualists could identify themselves as the enlightened vanguard of a particular curriculum net-



work. Given their hermeneutics, phenomenological or structuralist insights, these members have a set of opposed responsibilities to other curriculum workers and teachers and to the citizenry at large. Such a group can isolate itself in self-sufficiency and act unilaterally with radical change efforts in schools, for instance, or even elevate itself to a position of privileged holders of meta-theoretical exotica. Equally, this same group can exercise the choice of not breaking off contact with less enlightened, teenage positivists but sustain and remedy conversation with members who have not achieved their insights in the interest of building larger, global constituencies. (This certainly would be in the interests of alliance or front building.) Despite the fact that, say, empiricist researchers or analytic philosophers of curriculum are ideologically frozen and bound by interests difficult to uncover is no justification for their dismissal as professional colleagues. Clearly, such groups may show an incapacity for communication, certainly not communicative action, with others. It is likely that this underdeveloped compulsion could be remedied by a deepening application and explication of reflexive processes. This issue, however, is speculative and cannot be pursued further without some context of action. As members' practising enlightenment we must pre-suppose the same capacities for truth, authenticity and consensus-seeking in others, even as ideological foes. For the structural success of enlightenment, as an educational practice, depends upon the re-integration of all others' interests in a generalizable community.



I am reminded of Markovic's insistence on the sanctity of conditions of work for critical scholarship when Habermas indicates that theoretic work, first methodological level, can only fruitfully generate under freedom of discourse, precaution against victimization and the involvement of all interested members doing research in any discourse sponsored by an academic or professional unit. There is considerable risk that a organization in the press of enthusiasm or international competition can manipulate or reify the practical discourse of participants as a way of 'hurrying along the tasks' of intellectual restructuring. In the short run it will be justified to conduct curriculum research of a radical reformist nature over, let's say, the carcasses of positivist colleagues. The short term history of curriculum reconceptualization seems to vindicate this strategic option. In the longer term those committed, now, to structural transformation of self and society must recognize the axiom that "in a process of enlightenment there can only be participants" (Habermas, 1971, p. 40).

The four fronts of inquiry as a unity of interests, tempered by my considerations, have now been presented. The particular implications for the analysis of reconstructionist social studies are treated less explicitly than in conventional 'power structure' research. I cannot treat the research question as a commodity but can only point to fronts of inquiry which by mapping their inter-relationships will uncover the conceptual and political implications of the



research. The exact methodological configurations of this study into 'utopian social education prospects' are not fully specified but are rather in emergence for there is no unbroken causality of method or canon in praxiological inquiry. The more discrete parameters of who, what, why and when are answerable at this time. I close with a succinct expression of the kinds of practical and normative concerns I feel ought to beset a researcher starting this kind of inquiry:

Attempts at emancipation, which at the same time are attempts to realize the utopian contents of the cultural tradition, can, under certain circumstances be rendered plausible as practical necessities, taking into consideration the conflicts generated by the system and the avoidable repressions and suffering. But such attempts are also tests; they test the limits within which human nature can be changed and above all, the limits of the historically variable structure of motivation, limits about which we possess no theoretical knowledge, and in my view, cannot in principle possess any.

If in testing "practical hypotheses" of this kind, we, the subjects involved, are ourselves included in the design of the experiment, then no barrier between experimenter and subjects can be erected. Instead, all the participants must have the opportunity to know what they are doing - thus, they must form a common will discursively.

(Habermas, Theory and Practice,  
(1974, p. 37)



## FOOTNOTES

1. By reconstructionist social studies I refer to the epistemological, instructional and political assumptions of progressive era educators such as John Dewey, George Counts, Theodore Brameld, Harold Rugg and others of the period 1920-1935 who held that the primary task of the school through its curricula was one of political education and social-structural change. Contemporary exponents of reconstructionist thinking in social education are James Shaver, Fred Newmann, Donald Oliver of 'Public Issues' fame, Lawrence Metcalf, David Hunt, Harold Berlak to name but a few. The case can be made as I do later that current work in reconstructionist social studies is in distinct historical and philosophical lineage with earlier progressive era thinking.
2. Rachel Sharp in the monograph, 'Knowledge, Ideology and the Politics of Schooling' (1980) argues that a renewed protocol of inquiry for a Marxist sociology of education must incorporate analyses of commodity fetishism, current state theories, the logic of capital accumulation, and the organization of the labour process. I see strategic homologies within the mandate of this study of educational reform with curriculum reification, state legitimation functions, the epistemic organization of curriculum design, and modes of instruction or pedagogy respectively.
3. Three primary traits of pragmatism run counter to classical bourgeois philosophy.
  - A. A denial of cause and effect laws in the physical social universe. The experimental method tries to break down apparent fixities and induce changes.
  - B. A denial of the logic of theory and its replacement by an empiricist philosophy of direct experience. As experience becomes the final arbiter of knowledge that which cannot be experienced does not exist. One can merely count on the present for future projections.
  - C. The active, constitutive subject shapes the social world through ideas. These are based on structures of instinct, patterns of perception and a posited consciousness. Within this cluster of traits is the species desire for a normative community. Mead, Pierce, James and Dewey contributed to method designed to develop and fix intrinsically individual thoughts into a community of beliefs. (Parallels with the fear of accelerated social dissent and the interventionist state can be seen here.) Hence sound habits based on philosophical



axioms were to be the transmission work of the school.

4. I want to disclose more completely here the roots of the kind of critical benchmarks that this tradition of political philosophy uses in the criticism of social, political and intellectual regimes. I am also able to allude to the one basis of the practical method elaborated in this study.

The model of the suppression of generalizable interests is logically and historically gratuitous to the idea of undistorted communication. The first model is historically mediated by particular social conditions and participants needs. These interests are, in principle, publically knowable and shareable. Yet the idea of distortion free communication resides in the very structures of rational speech. It presupposes a truth-seeking, validity conforming individual who as a member of a group seeks to redeem political and moral claims about the world in an authentic consensus. Ideal speech situations or acts are what Habermas would term anthropologically deep-seated interests, virtually trans-historical in scope. They are also the bedrock that praxiological criticism in this instance, falls back upon, if pushed far enough. Both models, clearly, are critical of the normative power institutionalized in power relations of late industrial society. Both, too, function as forms of ideology critique complementarily.

How would the members of a social system, at a given stage in the development of productive forces, have collectively and bindingly interpreted their needs (and which norms would they have accepted as justified) if they could and would have decided on an organization of social intercourse through discursive will-formation and with adequate knowledge of the limiting conditions and functional imperatives of their society?

(Habermas, 1975, p. 113)

In the introduction to Theory and Practice (1974) Habermas, in somewhat Hegelian fashion, promises that this kind of critique enables participants to become conscious of the intrinsic injustice of normative structures and their derived interpretations. The key intent, in the organization of enlightenment, is to have self-willed participants substitute interest-guided action for value-oriented action on strategic personal, professional and civic fronts.

5. A condensed but essential account of the historical, political and theoretical career of curriculum studies, from 1920 to the present, in North America is sketched in the essay by William Pinar and Madeleine Grumet,



"Theory and Practice and the Reconceptualism of Curriculum Studies" in Lawn and Barton (1981).

6. For an extended treatment of these seven pedagogical categories see M. Markovic, "Ethics of a Critical Social Science", International Social Science Journal 24:4, 1972. Contained within the same essay is an account of the possible universal, anthropological, ethical and characterological norms that could act to ground critical study from a universal-humanist perspective.



## CHAPTER 2

### PRELIMINARY METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON PRACTICAL CURRICULUM INQUIRY

#### THE NATURE OF SIGNIFICANCE IN CURRICULUM INQUIRY

Many of the methodological requisites associated with any piece of systematic inquiry need to be settled or accounted for in the mind of the investigator and in terms of the norms of the research community that provides the auspices for receiving and celebrating a study. I am concerned in this and ensuing sections to secure a number of procedural guarantees for this study. I address some conventional and some alternative questions that will, I hope, validate this kind of praxiological inquiry in the eyes and hearts of a particular but authentically, skeptical community in the area of the human sciences. I deal with some of these concerns impressionistically and with a sense of anticipation that by engaging in the study my procedures, constructs, theoretic assumptions and political perspectives may change in encountering the dialectic of this text, others texts, and theoretic and biographic consideration of the problematic so that I may grant the fullest interrogation to radical educational practice. In this sense, I strive through this inquiry of the dialectic of reform to make visible some of the contours of social and political emancipation.

This study attempts to stand in a tradition in educational



thought of radical social change. The history of reconstructionist philosophy in North America bears testimony to the possibility that educational practice and pedagogical visions can form one site with which to combat the reproduction of a repressive, exploitative society. In this inquiry I attempt to strike a line of commonality from the early period of progressive education to the contemporary expressions of this field in, for instance, critical social studies, public issues and jurisprudential-deliberative curricula. From the decade of 1925-35 theorists, philosophers, and curriculum developers imbued with the spirit of social reform, persons such as Theodore Brameld, George Counts, Harold Rugg, even the checkered work of John Dewey, apprehended a tradition, the legacy of liberal democracy, that legitimated the rights of citizens to call out against injustice, discrimination and gross discrepancies of economic condition. That the schools could be instrumental through curriculum planning and politically-conscious pedagogy in contributing to a restructuring of coercive political-economic arrangements or a re-adjustment of coercive institutional effects was an article of ideological faith held by liberal progressive reformers of that time. The same liberal democratic culture heritage is part of the received visions of school persons today. Despite the fact that we have been disappointed and hardened in cynicism by the rhetoric of reform and the structural inertia of the past fifteen years



(since the last wave of bourgeois cultural revolutions) the language of curriculum planning and theorising remains pre-occupied with understanding real social reform as only a logical-conceptual shift in its forms of discourse. I will argue in later sections that it is precisely the sense of hope and the fear of political engagement that render the husks of liberal democracy and of progressivism, in particular, a potent but mystifying force in contemporary social life. Since these traditions as cultural residues are reckoned with in our languages of reform and in our educational theory as operative forms, they must be understood, confronted and surpassed through the conduct of practical-radical inquiry.

In our own times it is to the credit of the "third force" that appeared during the 1970's that educational research is able to retain the social and political utopianism of the early progressive era. This group of educators of diverse interests mobilized new challenges and criticism of "the assumptions underlying existing modes of curriculum theorising." (Giroux, Penna, Pinar, 1981)

This study heeds the clarion call of this group of theorists such as MacDonald, Huebner, Greene, Apple and others for reconceptualizing the primary issues, procedures and research agenda of curriculum studies. I seek through the study a home in the community of efforts that re-focuses curriculum theory and practice.



Drawing selectively on such European intellectual traditions as existentialism, phenomenology, psychoanalysis, and neo-Marxism, these theorists (attempt) to offset the relatively apolitical, ahistorical, and technological orientation that has characterized the curriculum field for the last fifty years.

(Giroux, Penna, Pinar, 1981, p.7)

Within similar horizons this study implies, through the logic of its organization, a wide-scale re-arrangement of instructional settings, curriculum development and teacher-education. I attempt to call the bluff of the countless, vertiginous, energy-draining, horizontal models of curriculum development. Much effort and many resources have been funnelled into in-service-education and independent curriculum projects that call for horizontal participation in the development and implementation process. As a community we have lacked the means of understanding where and why our efforts and visions in these encounters have drained away. This study in part addresses the issue of how and why we can re-imagine possibilities for radical participation in curriculum development - living in this time and place. By instigating "internal dispute" as Giroux et al suggest, we can understand the historical evolution of the field in all its political, economic, and epistemological considerations.

This study is not anomalous in the contributions it makes to the reconceptualist movement. One of the methodological interests of the study lies in trying to tie the cultural practices and forms of our own biographies as persons working in curriculum to the societal structures that we inhabit and



sustain. I attempt to ground, as one of a number of conditions of doing practical inquiry, my curriculum thinking in dialogue with others in familiar, controlled historical space. In taking up the pleas of the curriculum reform movement over the last decade I see this work as firstly, involving the generation of a political and pedagogical stance through the utopian problematic. Secondly, I disclose the need for the embodiment, application, and renewal of the social relations uncovered by this research. If, as I have argued previously, the school and the curriculum community network become sites for political and cultural renewal, then radical-practical inquiry is an important activity. Experiencing the contradictions and structural gaps striating everyday life, in recognizing the role of the interventionist state in these contradictions and if the generation of lived-culture in schools, is not to reduce to a narcissism, but lead to the growth of antagonistic alternatives, then the possibilities for action through curriculum theory and development become key ones. The urgency of these sentiments is caught well by Apple:

By interrogating schools in a number of ways... focusing on class conflict, on cultural forms of resistance, on the workplace, on the school as a contradictory state apparatus, on the role of the formal educational system not only in reproduction and distribution but production as well - I am convinced even more strongly that such an analysis of education reveals how significant education is as both a process and a set of institutions. In a war of position, we ignore it at our own peril.  
(Apple, 1983, p.167)



I pursue, too, through this study the development of a general, critical theory of education. In displaying the relations of domination and resistance that the forces of structure and human agency inscribe upon school life or curriculum communities, I contribute to a vital element to such critical theory. The 'cultural capital' of participants in schools, in research communities, and on other fronts must be used in the reflexive and social analysis of persons by themselves and in their study of others. The cultural capital of affected participants as a dynamic of the classroom and the research pedagogy of our theorising of the state, of economic accumulation, and of comparative institutions must unite as an assembly of interests in a critical theory of education. This study speaks as a critical theory to the importance of democratic provision of decision-making in curriculum organization to the shifts of persons' consciousness that accompany such changes but also to the qualities of self-empowerment that can radically sponsor such alternative life forms. In some rewarding work on radical pedagogy, Henry Giroux warns of the dangers inherent in traditions of radical critique that conflate their methodological programs to either a romanticised subjectivity or to a grim depiction of external determinations as sole explanatory modes.

Such a view would take as its starting point an analysis of the interface between structure and agency, subjectivity and social practice. The critical moment of such an analysis would consist in developing a theory of pedagogy that embraced the conditions in which reproduction



and transformation interconnected within the lived experiences of those classes under study. The message here is that theoretical constructs that deal with reproduction and schooling must be returned to "their" living context.

(Giroux, 1981, p.92)

Finally, I would like to make some comments on the use of historical writing, and the conceptions of historical method that are incumbent upon this study to follow in large measure due to the problematic it embraces. The research question calls for a normative and practical appraisal of current and past reform initiatives in reconstructionist social education. By this token it must also respond to present calls for practical-accountable pedagogic practice in schools and pre-service programs. I find myself in the position of a fish 'rising to the bait' of such groups, for instance, who put such serious effort into competency-based and accountability instruction. As a result I am begged to provide a deeply radical response to such instrumentalist practices. In order to see the advocacy of control-centred orientations for what they are historically and politically, in order to give light to the eyes of those who would so self-seriously proclaim the importance of contractual objectives in the instructional and curricular performance, and then, in turn, to remedy profoundly the colonized directions administrators believe they want to take in curriculum planning and with schools, I suggest that as a research community, though riddled with internal neuroses and divisions, we take up the study and immanent possibilities associated with writing history. By writing and reading his-



tory we can begin to see that any talk of social change, and that means curriculum change cannot be done with any metaphor that excludes human attributes. In the long run understanding institutional life, and hence social process as we live and as others have lived it means rewriting history. In doing this kind of work, as in this study, we must necessarily take up questions of the nature of organized or advanced capitalist society. As Apple, and others, have so incessantly pointed out, it behooves us as theorists to recognize that capitalist society is by nature exploitative, and that the schools are not merely determined in their curricular forms and content by the dominant organization of economic production. Yet, there is more than that to it. Reading and writing history is one indispensable project for school persons, administrators and curriculum theorists interested beyond the mere legerdemain of opportunism or the character manipulation of others. To those who are humanly-interested, they will discover that in the late society they inhabit exploitation that is simultaneously economic, moral and cultural. For this reason no practical inquiry can afford to ignore the larger structures and the personal intentionalities that are the defining relations that entrap the problematic of reform. On the economic level, if we take up and examine the private ownership of the means of production and that for profit and turn it around, and it reveals itself now in one respect (wage labour or teaching), now in another (an acquisitive ethos or ideological curriculum content), and now in another (the alienation of such intellectual faculties



as are not required by the worker in his productive role, or pedagogical transmission as the separation of knower, from object, from the process of constitution we begin to appreciate (Thompson, 1978) how history reveals the inherent estrangement and powerlessness of much social and curriculum research on reform initiatives. In looking at the typical constituencies in the curriculum field, we find groups of particular people not amenable to social explanation neither through the use of a master concept, nor a refined or sensitive procedure nor through logical-empirical categories. Actually, if we look all we find are clusters of persons with different occupations, incomes, status concerns and so on. What we see of the curriculum practices of persons through historical understanding is

a friction of interests - the movement itself, the heat, the thundering noise...

(Thompson, 1978, p.85)

Nor, too, should any of us engaged in radical curriculum research excuse ourselves from inquiry on the other fronts of our problematic of utopian reform on the ground that the flux of history is all-answering. Edward Thompson writes in The Poverty of Theory that it is insufficient to conceive of historical method as some imperial telos of revelation because:

history cannot be compared to a tunnel through which an express races until it brings its freight of passengers out into sunlit plains. Or, if it can be, then generation upon generation of passengers are born, live in the dark, and die while the train is still within the tunnel. An



historian must surely be more interested than the teleologists allow him to be in the quality of life, the sufferings and satisfactions, of those who live and die in unredeemed time.

(Thompson, 1978, p.86)

Can we not see the irony of these comments for those more traditional curriculum theorists and educational administrators who insist on more 'precision' in experimental designs, for more 'fidelity' in curriculum implementation, for more 'accountability' in the teaching act, for more 'subjectivity' or 'understanding' in our phenomenological protocols? Let us work as inquirers with a sense of history on our backs when we relay the sufferings and satisfactions of our others in our schools. Too many curriculum development and evaluation projects have been convened, designed, and executed over the last fifteen years where those responsible for them as projects never saw Thompson's passengers, never spoke to them, never felt their sense of suppressed rage or humiliation of the way they were captured or dismissed as factors in subjective or mythological history - it really does not matter. This study creaks forward to answer all those years of immaculate results from furious educational research that came up with 'no significant difference.'

#### THE NORMATIVE WARRANT FOR PRACTICAL METHOD IN CURRICULUM INQUIRY

In the previous section I talked once again about the scope and importance of the precedence for inquiry I envisage as an upshot of my study. The prior sections in this research dialogue have been concerned with a discursive justi-



fication of method and of the urgency with which we must pursue the political and cultural questions behind curriculum reform. I would also like to address the more global justifications for engaging in this form of inquiry beyond the narrowed contours of curriculum studies - to display some of the appeals that other intellectual and technical workers stand for in terms of the reaching effects that studies of this nature done en masse could accomplish. A case was made earlier for the importance of reading and writing history in order that the flux of social relations that we partake in can be made sense of and acted on in strategic ways. To take this approach a little further I would like to extrapolate from several cultural traditions, movements, and theorists in Western science and use them in abstracted form as further warrants for my study.

I see myself investing energy in this study on a number of grounds; but, in one specific sense I am basing my commitment to inquiry on the legacy of a social democratic tradition found as pockets of political and intellectual circles in North America and Europe. In many of its manifestations, this tradition is in its finer expressions deeply conservative and deeply radical. As a form of cultural life each party, circle, organization or informal grouping shows the particularities of its members, their needs or interests and the regional biases and observations that have given rise to an historicised social democracy. As an agenda for political change and personal life trajectories, it anticipates the fu-



ture organization of social, cultural and economic life while allowing vital, critical elements of tradition to speak through as an ever present wisdom. The political culture of the movement is anticipatory, too, in the sense that social democratic forms can and ought to undergo change and dissolution once the possibilities of transcendence of social structures and consciousness contained within them, as communities of persons, are exhausted. What ought to be recovered for those dogmatic practising members is how a way of political life can and ought to change as self, structures and understanding themselves evolve. In this sense, the political legacy of this tradition should be seen as both deeply conservative and deeply radical efforts to convene communities of persons intent on remembering, determining, and practising a species-given quality of life. Pedagogically, I refer to a tradition that is concerned with cultivating help towards one's children and students. They become vital carriers of a social future and as persons who have a stake, if only they could see it, in re-achieving human dignity through their learning the public traditions and in their work with others. This study picks up on this suffused notion of education as help, (I am reminded of the work of Langveld in this regard), in wondering whether we remain capable as teachers, intellectual workers and theorists of resisting with every scrap of our energy dominant societal myths of progress, human intervention, leadership, dignity and tradition. What these hollowed-out myths can become if curriculum planning



couples public traditions with the organization of freely deliberating publics, in full recognition of the global texture of economic and political practices today, is an empirical question - of which the success or correctness of our intuitions will be confirmed in courageous intentionality with others. This study is one strategic move in fulfilling the responsibilities of this tradition. The organization of sets of educational initiatives is an obligation I hold.

The philosopher Richard Peters has worked extensively in the area of human conduct and the grounds of ethical responsibility and authority in education. In earlier work Peters (1964) has alluded to the importance for pedagogy of knowing and seeing the essential qualities of education as a concept and as a practice. He makes a number of conventional conceptual-practical contrasts for us between such notions as education and training, knowing that and knowing how, skilled instrumentalism and connective, imaginative mind, between thinking and doing, and between permissiveness or tyranny in pedagogy and initiation. All of these couplets are important orientating devices for curriculum organization in clearing up our historical and practical confusions on how to act pedagogically. Much of Peters' work acts for those of us in reconceptualism as a dialectical therapy or propaedeutic of discourse with others; that is, it helps us to get our concepts straight and a firmness of conviction in our reform work. More than that the pleas that such a philosophy of education contains act as warrants for this study.



Education, then, is a way of making explicit the criteria to which teaching and learning relations ought to conform. Education is to be seen as the commitment to worthwhile, freely do-able forms of the good life as it is empirically and counterfactually anticipated. This study and the cultural resonances that support and ground it are supportive of realizing those conditions. I must note how susceptible we become in designing and convening curriculum environments that mistake the polished performances of highly-skilled persons who inhabit academic disciplines for the critical educational practice this inquiry demands.

Peters warns us of the glib but highly-trained person, whether he works as the troubadour of philosophical idealism, or as the super-energized curriculum developer, or as the master philosopher well-versed in the magic of argumentative style who

...has a very limited conception of what he is doing. He does not see its connections with anything else, its place in a coherent pattern of life. It is, for him, an activity which is cognitively adrift.

(Peters, 1964, p. 27)

There is a warrant, too, at the level of teacher education for the kind of curriculum theorising and classroom pedagogy that I have been arguing for - one that initiates students into species-given worthwhile activities and modes of conduct. The University of Alberta, Faculty of Education, amongst some of its departments, consciously tries to reflect a philosophical and practical commitment, in its programs, to reflective action in as deeply a radical sense



as personal and political circumstances will permit. Over a period of the last five years social studies education has attempted to raise the horizons of its internal debates over the directions the field is taking politically, philosophically and pedagogically. Theorists and developers such as Mehlinger (1977), Shaver (1977), Newmann (1977), Berlak (1977), all in Shaver (1977) have struggled to reconstruct dominant discourse in social education so that it begins to question its organizing rationales and political orientations. Newmann argues that these choices are not merely voluntary volte-faces or linguistic turns of meaning in the field but are the conceptual and political restructuring necessary for the ethical and psychological survival of theorists, teachers, and learners living in late industrial culture. The social studies are by their own admission in a state of identity crisis and confusion. It is these very epistemic gaps that can become the intentional arcs of reflexive, radical reform for communities of theorists, developers and teachers in this field. I accent reflexive reform because of the legacy North American pragmatism has left with social studies program orientations. There has been a virtual oral attachment, during the years of optimism in the social studies, to the social inquiry model; it being understood as the singular source of a critical thinking which never really materializes. It is absurd to promote 'critical techniques' in the absence, in schools, of any tradition of problems with which to be critical about.

...the further point needs also to be made that



the critical procedures by means of which established content is assessed, revised, and adopted to new discoveries have public criteria written into them that stand as impersonal standards to which both teacher and learner must give their allegiance. The trouble with the models of education that I considered is that they fail to do justice to this essential inter-subjectivity of education which D.H. Lawrence referred to as 'the holy ground' that stands between teacher and taught. [emphasis mine]

(Peters, 1964, p. 52)

It is these species-given standards that evolve in historical time and space, under different productive modes that ought to incur our wrath when they are suppressed in theoretic debate or dismissed with the shrug of the teacher's shoulder. Critical historical work, self-scrutiny, theoretic understanding of institutional life and the unearthing of our shared normative possibilities that lie encased in our public traditions are moments of the dialectical inquiry that continually circle in historical spiral through us and beyond us. As a parody on the efforts of good reform in social education since the mid 1960's, I may say traditional content without public tradition is an empty opportunism.

I find a warrant, too, for this study in the history of failure endemic in curriculum reform movements in Britain, United States and Canada from the mid-1960's. Walker and Reid (1975), Schubert (1980) and Shipman (1974) document the commitment among curriculum entrepreneurs across three continents for substantive change. Through analysis and action they have recovered lost dimensions of the human sciences in order to determine the conditions for using schools as sites of social resistance. The need for a comprehensive, mediated approach to



the research of reform and the reform of research is amplified on each occasion that we slip into a deeper estrangement from our colleagues and our own real interests. A problem each of us experiences, insinuated as we are in the routines of a calcified everyday existence, is, as Habermas has noted, the recovery and development of motivational and characterological structures that will act as substrates for more extensive cognitive capacities, comportment, and relational possibilities with others in living through traditions. To ask what the point of the practical organization of persons in this manner is or what the aim of this study is, as I spoke to in an earlier section, is senseless, for, in order to truly understand what the good life is, is to be committed to living it. With tradition sedimenting behind our backs, we always reach towards the possibilities that the question provides.

The Italian Marxist theoretician, Antonio Gramsci, in his search for eternal educational principles to guide revolutionary action, speaks to the importance of a formative or classical education as a preparation for the organic intellectual - members of the underclass who help mediate and codify the world of dominant and external constraints with that of the spontaneity of revolutionary thrusts. In order to understand the dialectic of reform, criticism must bite the dust of tradition and labour that history throws up. To know about problems rather than to know of them requires for all of us a deeper symbolic and manipulative fluency. Within the intrinsic sediments of a full public history lies an important source of



educational practice. For pedagogy and for inquiry, then, I suggest

'There is a quality of life which lies always beyond the mere fact of life.' The great teacher is he who can convey this sense of quality to another, so that it haunts his every endeavor and makes him sweat and yearn to fix what he thinks and feels in a fitting form. For life has no one purpose, man imprints his purposes upon it. It presents few tidy problems; mainly predicaments that have to be endured or enjoyed. It is education that provides that touch of eternity under the aspect of which endurance can pass into dignified, wry acceptance, and animal enjoyment into a quality of living.  
(Peters, 1964, p. 48)

#### THE LIMITS OF PRACTICAL METHOD IN CURRICULUM INQUIRY

In preceding sections of this chapter I have established the importance of the problem and the reasons for its importance that this study is concerned with; namely, the dialectic of reform in educational provision expressed in terms of the history of progressive school and curriculum reform during the last sixty years. It is also necessary, in anticipating future objections to the proper scope of this study, to say what it will not encompass in the way of inquiry. I make brief but germane comments on a number of issues that are currently fashionable to mention in the logic of educational research. By fastening my methodological position around what I intend to do, I hope to defray any licentious and specious objections to what my study has failed to do, for instance, in the way of dereliction in listening to the subtleties of human relations or the inexorable logic of historical patterns. I am open, as ever, as this study demands to debate on its inner



validity, arguments, findings, and practices.

I have made the case extensively in the introduction that to understand the dialectic of reform in organized education, in the way of restraint or change, that investigators must begin to display the complex interplay of cultural practices, ideological forms, and structural relations; that is, the determinants and influences upon school life and curriculum decisions in the professional, popular, and family subcultures of different eras of socio-economic life in North American society. However, after having revealed the density and complexity of the contending faces, relations and interpretations that mediate the outcomes of curriculum projects, I will not have revealed or accounted for why teachers, developers, and students resist or sponsor intentionally processes of change in social studies projects - or for that matter any curriculum innovation. The only practical possibility I can point to for my community of readers is to declare and show the dense networks in which groups of teachers and developers work with the hope that others will see themselves mirrored in these relations or can re-imagine what for their own projects they can accomplish in the way of radical movement. This study does attempt to give descriptive sequences of students and teachers struggling with innovations, accompanying feelings of strangeness and their oral reports of these experiences. It is naive and reminiscent of positivistic dreams to hope to account for all typical contingencies in explaining social action and thence to go about rating the reasons for success



and failure in particular curriculum projects. What I consider, however, as a second possibility within the limits of study is the discernment of generic attributes of pedagogy, possibly transcultural, but also the social and the epistemic auspices of curriculum theory that can convene radical dissent and practical action.

What is not particularly thematic in this study are the lived world of meanings, intentions, and subjective formations of persons involved with curriculum reform and innovations. As a research program of sorts this study sees life-world description and interpretation as significant but not sufficient in accounting for restraint and mobilization in curriculum reform. It is necessary to allude to life-world descriptions as one front of a broad inquiry committed to critical human practice. But to deny the sediments of tradition and structure a role in this inquiry is to stagger blindly in a vortex of the exotic present.

Allowing children to 'become' does not alter the conditions under which they must toil. When self-consciousness dwarfs social consciousness, when self-understanding for a few takes precedence over improving the standard of living for the many, then, we have lost the essence of humanism. Over emphasizing the power of the individual, people are abandoned to lonely struggles with the forces of privilege, wealth, and power. Humanism may sensitize us to the symptoms of our age, and thus must be continued...it does not enable us to go the next step and commit ourselves to effective action to change them.

(Sears, 1982, p.35)



The prior two issues connect methodically with the significance I attach to the signs, actions, speech and language of persons acting with academic and professional curriculum communities. A convincing position can be made for why conversational analysis or a structural phenomenology of language ought to accompany praxiological inquiry in the area of educational reform. After restraint, fear and revulsion of persons are experienced intimately and organized linguistically. Our norms of speech, gesture and hesitation are co-sponsored by the dominant socio-political relations of the world of form and reproduction. Why should conversational analysis not be included in this study? I argue that in many ways I can justify its inclusion in my research protocol but that I will give it a supplementary position in this present study because we can learn something, as curriculum theorists, from noticing the signs and patterns of language usage, and professional vocabularies in schools and with projects. I seek no systematic theory or explanation for the reproductive role of speech in the dialectical career of reform nor for the active, constructive interconnection of linguistic forms with resources and social relations. I do suggest that the nodes of speech, the linguistic practices that we can more easily assemble in this study are nodes worth tracing further in research applied to specific problems in curriculum development and evaluation. The directions these research projects could take as conceptualizations have been treated in short form in the appendix.

The concern, which is also a methodological limit, that



silently fuels this study is how can research into critical social education as a radical possibility also illuminate the darkness of understanding educational reform; that is, how can praxical research consider practical resolution of critical social education curricula as an intrinsic part of its agenda so that collectively and individually convened projects realize possibilities of change, now. To be able to pose this question successfully so it is understood, taken-up, debated and whether ongoing curriculum work is re-imagined with these practical-normative interests in mind determines the effectiveness of praxiological inquiry and studies of this nature. Any attempt to offer definitive explanations, interpretations or exhaustive caricatures of traditional research styles, within any of the four inquiry fronts is bound-less as it means begging the practitioners of different research interests to say to you that you've done enough. The final validation of this composite theory and analysis rests with the accord given them by those students and practitioners who share the assumptions, insights, actions and work convened by these perspectives.

Each collective project in critical-practical inquiry must, labouriously, begin anew as the particular moments and interests, and their remembrances of the world they have lived through have to be re-convened and re-achieved as a consensus of participants. I speak loudly about the fallacies and the hopes that travel with the renewal of curriculum reform but I speak particularly to the institutionalization of a critical social studies and the pedagogical parameters securing that



teaching field alone. This study has four fronts of inquiry that accent and illuminate the different relations and levels of relations impinging on curriculum reform. Yet the study, broadly conceived, is but one small project in an array of current and future inquiries into the conditions of our rational self-determination in a historical world devoid of a sense of human values or measure of worthwhileness that can sustain political, curricular, or economic projects of renewal. As I argue in the final chapters praxiological inquiry means a commitment and courage to recognize virtual moments in singular inquiry, in communities of complementary studies, and in alliances with teachers, and other citizens in community world-making. This study contributes directly in these tasks by identifying moments on fronts of inquiry and strategic action that can be virtualized in everyday struggles with one-self, with others at home, and in different communities. Conventional methodological consideration over the role of the study in theory building and generalization is premature methodically, politically, and historically since this kind of excursus intends to convene a practical method of participants. It is within that kind of community, those relations of desire and theorizing that generalization becomes a radical possibility.

I ask the standard bearers of methodological respectability to consider that this study seeks to realize reflexively in its pages curriculum-as-informed, practically reflective action as it does the making of a pre-



cedent for theoretical objects in curriculum research communities. The grounds and limits of this study take their philosophical sanctity from these objectives. It is within the history of progressive social studies that I turn to answer my particular question about radical curriculum theory.

#### REFLEXIVE THEORY AS A DIMENSION OF THE PRACTICAL METHOD

I would like at this juncture in my preliminary discussion of method to become more explicit about myself, as the principal investigator in this study and to provide some comments that other social theorists and methodologists make on doing the enterprise of reflexive sociology. Accordingly, I make brief points that highlight the particular features of method with which I will be concerned.

As a principal investigator involved in an analysis of the possibilities and constraints of curriculum reform, I am necessarily using a particular subject field to "carry" my investigation. Given my knowledge of the social studies field, my teaching experience within it, and the historical organization of its content as a school subject concerned with the world around us, the method of this study necessarily involves using my self-experiences as a teacher, the historical and public traditions surrounding social study, and the normative or political impact this kind of teaching and learning has on the everyday world of students and others affected by the promises of social study. In short, inscribed within this



inquiry, and my role within it, are a normative interest and a pragmatic interest in strategies of curriculum development and implementation. In order, I feel, to address the question of real curriculum development and implementation means to ask what the conditions of curriculum change are that promote the common interests of all affected participants. To ground our inquiry of curriculum reform or change successfully in self-interest and in collective interest means to determine the questions and knowledge that will reveal transcendent human values and the forms of organization and deliberation required for educational projects of self-determination. I attempt to work through explicit normative and pragmatic interests since the dominant texture of curriculum work, today, is derived from its reception and production in schools, in ministries of education, with client-based groups and less so within alternative community projects marginal to the dominant political-economic institutions. Hence, I, and others must be intellectually and culturally sensitive to the institutional realities of participants in curriculum projects yet at the same time not lose sight of the utopian and normative premises upon which we base our renewal of curriculum theory. This means that the theory and method of curriculum confronts the structures of 'forgetfulness' and denial that are such encrusted features of everyday personal and professional determinations that occur in formal collectivities. It means repositing the lost themes of possibility and association we hold only traces of, and of deeply understanding the mechan-



isms of institutional suppression whereby gifted, committed persons are factors in their own disenfranchisement.

Conventional social or educational inquiry cannot easily decode the patterns of mystification that obscure our ideas and orientations towards reform and development in curriculum or cultural practice. To take the idea of progressive or its related historical term, progressivism, connotes so much in the hearts and minds of persons but is understood so little. It suggests a watery, emotionally-thin sense of continuity in the future with little specification of concrete end-states or outcomes whether in nation-building or program development. For the cynical amongst us it could refer to the continuance of estrangement or immiseration. The political culture of which progressivism speaks is one of liberal democracy which assigns morality and failure to individual shoulders in a social order of competition and acquisition. The loss of community, within the liberal vision, wherein individual interests are celebrated in a commonwealth of order is a signal feature of late capitalist society. As such we lack a social history of ideological expressions or symbolizations that can account in part for our forgetfulness in working with others and to what and where we can find our common interests with each other. To take the term progress and submit its everyday and formal usage to ideological analysis, alone, is one necessary front in inquiry not yet accomplished in an ongoing project of curriculum theory. It is only one sub-project that will partly reveal our unwitting complicity as professionals and citizens in our 'disempowerment' that is



reproduced and resonates within our family life, our leisure pursuits, in the relations of our work space, and in our internal organization of time. O'Neill provides a precedent for the kind of work that I envision must be the work of all educational inquiry. In borrowing the sentiments of C. Wright Mills he writes:

It is the task of (human and educational inquiry) to conceive of men's private troubles in the contexts of public concern and to furnish bridging concepts which will enable individuals to translate their private uneasiness into public speech and political action. It must undertake to shift the contexts of freedom, equality, and reason away from the private sector and out of the household into a public domain which will constitute a genuine common world....

Curriculum practice as a normative and practical ideal must become to develop these practical bridging concepts that will galvanize

...understanding and responsible control over the human and social values generated but largely dissipated in the corporate economy which enforces the privatization of men's lives.  
(O'Neill, 1972, p.37)

I am suggesting that these kinds of tasks fall, in part, to the self-reflexive inquirer and to the kind of study he convenes. This study, then, and my sentiments are distinctly romantic at times, encouraging all of us to leap over conventions to embrace responsibility and action. This study is determined to understand itself as it does students, teachers, developers, other theorists in the attempt to break with pro-



fessional narcissism and opportunism. I argue and do analysis in the larger effort to renew the historical thread between self-consciousness and consciousness of the social world. It has been all too easy for school persons to adopt the 'un-situated rationality' of instrumental procedures whose spurious success in schools and curricula has obscured those subjective bonds of practice and responsibility. The recognition that my knowledge, and our knowledge through this inquiry as educational perspectives, is social knowledge, self-situated and mediated within my own/our own experiences is a moment in this method as it assumes public or pedagogical responsibility as a subject community necessarily informed with moral vision. This is another way of saying, as does O'Neill (1972), that 'we can be aware of the reflexive limits of the body of human science knowledge tied as it is to the conditions of a social and political order.' So much of the substance of this inquiry resides in the asking of questions of this order: ones that pose the conditions of our knowledge of effective action and understanding in curricular or pedagogical projects. This implies that we continually seek to determine clearly as theorists and practitioners what the limits of our understanding and theorising are, against an entwined backdrop of self-consciousness, political and social structures.

For curriculum the 'institution of reflexivity' is particularly important as a method of inquiry and is a way of life for those who inquire. This is another way of saying that the conception of curriculum-as-informed practically-reflective



action is always a process of 'sedimentation and search'.

That is, this notion of curriculum practice I envisage and which informs this inquiry, implicates me, in

series of exchanges between subjectivity and situation in which the polarities of means and ends or question and answer are continuously established and renewed, no less than the institution of ideas, truth and culture.

(O'Neill, 1972, p. 231)

Is this notion of reflexivity yet another methodological device that I ask all of us in curriculum theory to adopt? Not really, since reflexivity encodes our efforts at self-creation and determination, at the same time as we acquire competence in public intellectual traditions that as Peters (1969) has indicated are the gateway to a recovery of the auspices of an original, species-given past. Our spontaneity, or accents of the lifeworld, initiate time and again world-building initiatives and the utopian promise,

...which is nothing else than ourselves, borne only by caryatid of our efforts, which converge by the sole fact that they are efforts to express

(Peters, 1964)

and utopian promises to redeem.

Within the alternative spaces, I, you, or we can carve out theoretical communities that nourish and support rational discourse in social and curriculum theory. As Habermas indicates the conditions of ambiance for rational discourse are ones rid of violence and repression. It is likely that unless the deliberative groups that theorise, develop and design utopian educational environments can work in



different conditions,

there will be an inescapable pressure that -  
openly and covertly, crudely and subtly -  
sets into motion a thousand inducements to  
false consciousness.

(Gouldner, 1973, p. 79)

# 1. The Investigator and Teacher-Developer as Data Sources

This study involves a number of dimensions of data and perspectives that I convene for the purposes of praxiological inquiry. One source in this multiple 'triangulation' of perspectives on the question of curriculum change has to do with my formal role as a teacher and developer of critical social studies courses and resources assembled for their pedagogy. In this study, and particularly, in later sections that attempt practical resolution of the bases of curriculum reform, I will recollect my formal work, experiences, and knowledge of approaches to the organization of social studies teaching, its content and evaluation sequences, and contingent world views that accompany efforts in identifiable critical-practical education--in other words my role, as an inquirer of this study at one moment in time, a theorist conversant with ways of organizing social studies teaching, curriculum development approaches often associated with this field and the discipline literature that acts to justify social education. My role as a naive theorist remains unreflexive in the sense that I do not at points in the resolution of the inquiry reflect upon the effect of my consciousness upon my formulation



of the social studies to students or practitioners nor do I at this moment of the inquiry consider the social and political contingencies of social studies teaching, development and evaluation. Assuming the role of a theorist in this sense serves a necessary function for the sake of analytic clarification in this study. Theorising, such as I point toward, is a suspended practice that is denied an historical context only for the time being so that reader and theorist alike can identify the cognitive kernel in the social studies literature or reform problem. The task of reflexive theorising is one that restores or re-embeds the former cognitive kernel within a living context of self, situational and structural relations. But to identify and know in some austerity the intellectual elements of (empirical) social studies projects that express critical-practical, libertarian, or social reformist intents in the organization of their pedagogy is a necessary moment in understanding intellectual and cultural traditions. These are traditions that have been encrusted with the generational interpretations of different professional, and economic interest groups over the course of two different eras of capitalist culture - from liberal, monopoly forms in the period 1920-1950 (Weinstein, 1968) to the advanced, organized form in the period 1950-1980 (Habermas, 1975). To isolate the original intellectual currents through naive theorising is to see the active, transformative role of interpretations that ideologically diverse groups have applied to terms such as progressivism, critical thinking, group-based learning, individualization, interest,



and accountability. As a form of naive theorising undertaken in social analysis, Gouldner captures well one of the motivating interests of this study;

Theory-making is often an effort to cope with a threat to something in which the theorist is deeply and personally implicated.

For a theorist (as for others) there are two kinds of social worlds: permitted (or 'normal') worlds and unpermitted (or 'abnormal') ones. The theorist is likely to start work when he sees or suspects the existence of an unpermitted world, or a threat to a permitted world. A considerable part of his work is an effort to transform an unpermitted world into a permitted one, thus normalizing his universe. Most particularly he is attempting symbolically to re-establish a threatened or impaired equilibrium between power and goodness....  
(Gouldner, 1973, p.71)

## 2. Self Reflection and the Research Protocol as Data Sources

What place is there in this study for what Gouldner (1970, 1973) and O'Neill (1972) have termed reflexive theorising or social study? My task as an investigator or curriculum theorist in this study also obliges me to become sensitized to my own constituting powers of consciousness. That is, in the way my bias, preferences, experiential accents, preferred worlds, interpretive schemata and so on act as practical embodiments of more formal curriculum and research protocols. It involves making myself as an inquirer and my readers explicitly aware of how all cognitive and emotive structures have impinged upon my choice of research design, my range of questions for the objects under study, and the



kinds of implicit choices that I have made as a developer and teacher of a particular social studies course. To identify this kind of reflective theorising as a methodological responsibility that I bring to the presuppositions of my inquiry in the logic of curriculum reform means that the formal or naive theorising I alluded to earlier becomes entangled when self-consciously thematizing the biases I have worked through as my presentation in the lived world of pedagogy and curriculum theorising. As a self-reflexive inquirer, then, the auspices of my investigation require that I am at the same time under my own investigation and part of my own inquiry. This is the same task that O'Neill (1972) poses for the logic of social theory as to whether we are as an intellectual-cultural community, 'authentically aware' of the limits of human science knowledge due to its links with social and political orders. I can repose the question by asking what limits do I impose upon the problematic of curriculum inquiry by my being tied as a consciousness to a politicized body in a world in which I with others reproduce ourselves?

I am involved, too, in reading my text of inquiry as I do the work of others in what has become public tradition. Reading text implies a knowledge of the traditions that a person works within and care for those who are recipients and participants in this work. Hence self-reflection of text and of inquiry means the arrangement of my speech or argument to the interests of others. It is addressed to readers as both criticism and persuasion through discussion of old traditions



in search of new possibilities in curriculum and social study. I elaborate persuasively in my arguments in order to demonstrate our essential connectedness and responsibility with the utopian moments of dignity, necessity and friendship. I can communicate the textures of alternate social orders by cultivating a style of thought, speech and gesture. (The style of question in any human inquiry is bestowed by the times.) The elaboration of human science research is determined by the logic and the limits of the questions posed - these are particular, as we have discovered in the history of curriculum practice, to a historical and political context. My inquiry recognizes that the logic of any methodological question into a study of formal human accomplishment (curriculum reform) is a biographical one or self-formative one at the same time as it is one that draws its warrant from our theoretic and public communities.

All forms of collective life (e.g. religion, law, morals, political institutions, customs, teaching practices), have their reality independent of the individual consciousness of the persons carrying out these precepts that the group prescribes and proscribes, and they can accordingly be studied independently. But, as Durkheim notes, not all social consciousness (as opposed to individual consciousness) achieves externalization and materialization. There is much - the greater part - which is diffused and "at liberty".

(Cicourel, 1964, p. 192)

The inquirer embarking on any analysis of cultural forms, the social relations that produce them, and how such cultural forms as practices act back upon persons requires an under-



standing of the language used by participants and of the codified language of the practices themselves. The formal or structural arrangements of curriculum is codified language that possesses a history and a power of constraint upon persons. Yet those cultural meanings are not sufficient for understanding the ongoing accomplishment of outcomes in, say, curriculum projects in critical social studies. Until the inquirer not only theorizes about the general conditions for curriculum reform but also treats, in some way, his own and participants' common sense categories of experience as theoretical data he forgoes using inquiry as a communicative organization of practical activity. In not making thematic the inquirer's constructs as he does other participants typified notions of innovation, development, or pedagogy, or evaluation, say, he risks a biographical confounding of both his study and of the practical curriculum projects he seeks to reconstruct. I refer to what Cicourel might call the 'outer and inner horizons' of objects of sociological inquiry. To be cognizant of the history of curriculum reform, its dominant approaches, and its political context only yields typical distributions of types of curriculum innovations and kinds of strategies that have been used for organizing persons. Equally, to dwell upon protocols and typifications of participants of temporal descriptions of their life inside and out of curriculum projects in short, their inner horizons, yields structures of personal knowledge and coping strategies persons generate in the order of group life. This inquiry, as



curriculum inquiry to be practically responsible, must incorporate 'both sets of typification as objects of sociological inquiry'. (Cicourel 1964). The grounds of our theorising about our practices and about curriculum reform are embedded in each other's biographical situation. The level of cultural or ideological practice, although an object of independent theoretic interest does not dissolve in the energies of the self-situation but remains tensionally tied to it.

### 3. The Public Self, Students, and Curriculum Knowledge as Data Sources

Another way of seeing my role as self-reflexive inquirer is to view this study as beginning with me and ending with me in some shift of resolution. The study starts by my posing in the introduction the nature of the practical, political problem of curriculum reform as I have encountered it. I make available theoretic insights and historical evidence to help illuminate for the reader my sense of the problem. The logic of this kind of theorising has its own career throughout the study. I also start another strand in this study doing as I have been doing now, writing about method and about my own involvement in the constitution of method. I feel it is important to declare directly, but not simplistically, the kinds of personal and structural contingencies that occur for me in formulating method—particularly deeply practical method. The neutral observer model of theory construction and verification will not permit me to display how



my self figures in this study as a systematic object of inquiry. The false consciousness and hidden partisanship that accompanies these methodical approaches severs the very social relations between myself, my text or study, the world of social objects, and the resolution of the questions posed by the inquiry in a large professional or intellectual community. At any of these moments of deliberation whether as self-reflection, dialogue or consensus I am implicated as an author in original speech as I am caught in the tentative outcomes of this inquiry. These outcomes can be further questions of questions, the 'search and sedimentation' of intellectual gatherings or the hard-nosed scuffle of curriculum development and implementation projects.

The other broad fabric of relations that co-mingles with myself-in-text-with others is the interconnectedness of myself in the world with students. Typically, relations with students that are directly related to this study have been with those students in courses dealing with critical pedagogy, with critical social studies, and in seminars concerned with alternative educational research traditions. I have used depictions of these students, our courses together, and the structures of our teaching and learning as paradigm cases for the recurring constellations of doubt, anxiety, and celebration each of these pedagogical encounters has meant for myself and for my students. As these cases appear in later sections of the study they are intended neither as positive proof statements on or evidence of the way critical social studies and



hence radical curriculum reform can be. As descriptions codified within them are hope and desire for new possibilities for all of us in teaching and learning arrangements - indeed in the selection of courses and students I draw from over a three-year period the kinds of responsibilities, encounters, and inquiry they did as students and teachers had shifted radically from what was conventional in their experience of teacher education to that time. It is important rather in these methodological considerations to consider those lifeworld portrayals as emblematic of what this study seeks to answer: how is radical curriculum reform possible and what do we need to know and to practice curriculum in that manner? The cases and descriptions which emerge in a later section serve as students speaking for themselves about their wonderings throughout such pedagogy and as a reminder that the methodical threads of this inquiry, as must critical, historical curriculum research, display an interweaving of perspectives of self-in the world-with students-in science-in the world. The understanding and personal energies that accrue from allowing the relations to re-surface within a practical gestalt amongst each other are professional tools curriculum workers at all levels require.

One resistance from students that I have encountered during the course of critical social studies sessions is a difficulty in accepting the presuppositions of a pedagogy that recognizes not only the awareness of evil or injustice in the world but the commitment to remedy them. It has



seemed 'extremely painful and threatening' for most teachers in training to believe that what is powerful in society is not good or that 'things of moral value lack power'. Often when this occurs, students in a world they live in and see, which is unpermitted, remedy these contradictions internally.

Students "depose the unpermitted world and readjust the flawed relationship between good and power in various ways."

Students while formally agreeing to the tenets of the course often "find ways to affirm and accentuate the goodness of the powerful". (Gouldner, 1973) This kind of occurrence through pedagogy indicates one instance of the depth of contradictions facing radical curriculum reform. It also indicates why we must cultivate the kind of careful, caring inquiry in methods courses that can as a language of invitation be present with students when they encounter the shock of discovery, about political relations, opportunity, and personal choice. To discover that even in despair one can collect others around him is one mark of this study.

For my part, there can never be any question of the transcendence of (social theory); it is given with my relation to the world and others around me without flight beyond this touch or talk. Socially, our universals lie between heaven and earth, in the toss of the clown, not on the tightrope of pompous metaphysical generalities but in the face-evident relations between myself, others, and the world around me.

(O'Neill, 1972, p.219)

#### 4. Mediating the Primary Sources of Students and Pedagogy

It is important in a study of this nature to clarify



what I will not attempt to do with the historical, conceptual and phenomenological evidence available to me. I have argued about the importance of including the political and normative concerns that ground the study. I have indicated the importance of including the perspectives of the investigator as a teacher of social studies. I have stressed the importance of becoming self-reflexive so that I, as the investigator, become an object of my own scrutiny as do my pedagogical relations with my students in the course of our classroom encounters. All of these dimensions I suggest are invitations to consider how to be deeply practical in our efforts in curriculum reform. This study, it is important to note, has no pretensions as a piece of phenomenological writing. I make use of classroom descriptions, student responses, and lifeworld fragments in the tradition of a reflexive sociology. To the degree that my transcripts suggest something of what critical teaching in a classroom is like in relation to more elemental structures of human experiences then it may well be episodically phenomenological.

Let me characterize how I intend to use student descriptions, fragments of historical evidence, and ongoing projects that characterize critical pedagogy. In understanding social action, I rely, in part, upon portraying the cultural meanings that can be collected from personal expression, from group encounters, from the sediments and traditions of second hand knowledge I have of curriculum and social education practice, and from the theo-



retic perspectives I use to sort, generalize and evaluate the political and cultural phenomena of my study horizons. The reach or visions of social action, in large measure, hinge on the possibilities and limits cultural meanings have for persons' movements or commitments in the social world. These meanings act to orient, guide, and shape social relations in person-to-person exchanges as they do with secondary relations and interpretations. Ideas such as curriculum, development, evaluation, and reform, as social action can be explained as practices without reducing our inquiry to the psychological, substrates of motivation and perception. Or, equally I am not bound methodologically to go to the phenomenal lifeworld solely or entirely in order to understand the embodied resistance or mobilization for change characteristic of the history of curriculum innovation. What I do attempt to portray and use as evidence for explanation are the norms, interests, and ideologies binding on persons, on groups, on social classes and "that transcend any particular action taken as a psychological entity". (Cicourel, 1964, p.196) In order to study curriculum reform in a deeply practical way, so that what is uncovered for a community of readers leads them in dialogue beyond the private spaces of heads nodding in assent to set precedents for themselves, means to lay bare the power of normative and biographic unconcealment.

Despite our intellectual sensitivity to reading the minds and stepping into the trousers of the 'salt of the earth', it is important to do our intellectual history. The



power of what is great in humanist social theory lies precisely in its abilities to understand social structure and social action concurrently. To understand refers to this seeking and sedimenting of essential properties of human practice. Hence the methods appropriate to curriculum inquiry must incorporate both in the life and times of the theorist. My study is concerned with making sense of the nuances, the questions, those first words of all of us in pedagogic situations and the commitment to renewal that each makes in true words and deeds towards others. I view that kind of interest as a critical moment in recovering the history of practices in any study of curriculum reform. It is a moment in method, however, and we are behooved to see more than actors in the horizon of our work. The importance of the sense-making affairs and cultural meanings of persons is transformed when we consider such persons' energies collectively and historically. This study dwells not as much on the relations of meanings to particular events but on the invariant properties of meanings that act as constitutive boundaries or rules over space and time. Hence, I am concerned with an analysis of particular persons' responses to critical social studies teaching under set conditions. But I am more fully concerned with how these cultural meanings, say in the educational practice of progressive reform in North America 1920-1980, have become the dominant ideologies and values that make up the professional vocabulary and motives of action of teachers in classrooms



across the continent. I am more concerned with the expressions and effects of these ideological encrustations upon teacher pedagogy, teacher and student consciousness, and the implications this cultural and political legacy has for reform and innovation in curriculum. It is not the speech that my students have used in explaining their pedagogy or in doing social study qua speech that interests this inquiry methodologically. It is the relations of use and recurrence as sustained forms of world-making and resistance that is my theoretic object. It is the recurrent styles and forms of argumentation that liberal and radical progressive reformers alike have used as ideological discourse and as typified cultural practices in texts, programs, and philosophical relations, in a late industrial state that is the methodological and conceptual focus of this study. Understanding existential domains as expressions of historical and structural relations is of strategic importance for praxiological research but equally as a practical gestalt for curriculum field operations such as development and evaluation. Cultural forms, as Willis (1977) and Williams (1977) conceive them, are practices internalized and socialized that can constrain and deny reconsideration of social and political relations or can generate reflection and organization of alternative practices. It is facile to beg the question of radical dissent in politics and education. Too much hope has already spilled from the bridges of organization connecting our ideals with our practices. Fifty years of re-



constructionist historiography has shown us where the radical tracks stop. Praxiological inquiry fails if it does not communicate what is urgent about present political and academic contexts.

In mediating the contexts of relations that the cultural forms of curriculum history express, I weave an inquiry of speeches that implicate me as an historical-biographical person, as formal teacher-developer, my students, the intellectual traditions the problem convenes, and the structures that are the sediments of generations of speech on these matters. This inquiry as a theoretic speech in recognizing those former constituencies as the historical present is a method of utopian thinking. Its 'practice is that of a humane society.' (O'Neill, 1972, p.225)

##### 5. Naïve Theorising as an Aspect of Practical Method in Curriculum Inquiry

In what might be considered undialectical in some radical academic circles, this study also engages in what I have termed naïve theorising in contradistinction to reflexive or self-reflexive theory. Left on their own as self-evident perspectives my analyses of progressivist history, theory of the state, and re-conceptualization of reformist curriculum theory will wither with the remainder of the fallen literature in academic repositories. As O'Neill suggests, the proper role of human social theory is to discern the limits of our social science knowledge and the roles ourselves play in constituting those through our



ties with social and political regimes. It is necessary but not sufficient to know what we know about injustice, or racism, or repression, or curricular mystification. Vital, as well, is to know why we know and why we ought to know about our structural and biographical worlds. That kind of questioning is the kernel of a praxiological method. That is, why and why ought we to know that we theorise in the social world? That we do critical theory, pedagogical theory, systems theory we have less difficulty, as a community, in comprehending. The question of what brings us to theorize and account for what are selected as problems are rarely seen themes in the corpus of social science research.

I am engaged, in this study, in a critical historical analysis of developments over a sixty-period in liberal and radical progressivism. I portray the variety of curricular, pedagogical, philosophical, ideological paradigms that have dominated discourse in progressivism. I examine two ideological strands in progressivism in order to give historical depth and texture to the origins of current struggles within educational reform. This also allows the current problem, achieving radical curriculum reform, to be seen as a historical outcome of contending interest groups holding degrees of state power.

I extend this historiography through an in-depth conceptual analysis of current practices in social education that clearly bear the stamp of both moderate and radical



progressivism. Although I look here at contemporary programs in North America, I am interested in what conceptual analysis can provide of the ideological and political character of those writings. How would such programs be taught and organized; what outcomes can I envisage in terms of student consciousness and community action? In the introduction I pose the problem while a critical history yields a sense of the generational struggles over educational definitions and social utopias. The conceptual analysis completes the relationship of particular-to-universal that can define the educational problem by posing the existential and political-pedagogical opportunities, the cultural resources, and requisite organizational forms available to us as curriculum workers living everyday life under organized capitalism. Further conceptual work occurs as I attempt to uncover the latent intellectual and political possibilities for reconstructing social education programs in the light of preceding analyses.

Various theories of the state in an intellectual line consistent with critical social theory will be examined and integrated within this study as a means of showing how economic and political power is distributed in organized capitalist states. I have placed particular emphasis on displaying the effect of the Canadian state, Canada's social structure, and the occurrence of economic crises upon the content and structure of educational provision. An important principle to demonstrate is how the changing nature of



economic and political crises in Canada has contradictory effects upon the role of schools as mechanisms of social control and estranged consciousness and as sites of radical curriculum planning and deliberation.

What I begin to confront in part II of this study and what achieves tentative resolution in part III is the question of political power and the role of human science knowledge in convening new definitions of knowledge and practice. Problem-posing, theory, and evidence constitute recurring phases of a dialectic in this study that set to question their respective historical, economic and curricular interests. At the same time these traditions under the auspices of this study set to question their first premises as a way of understanding of educational change. I have then a dialectical inquiry that examines what has been called the typified world of institutions, comparative social structures, and ideological histories that situate progressivism as a series of cultural practices in North American societies. In a memorable passage written over ten years ago the late Alvin Gouldner, upon whose shoulders this study finds precedent writes:

The vital thing is not the willful assertion of an alternative theoretical position. The decisive thing is to establish the human conditions that will nurture intellectual and theoretical alternatives, new technical paradigms, new middle-range theories, or even new epistemologies. 'Establish' here means that one wants a critically justified understanding of what kind of human conditions would be preferable and it also means putting this under-



standing into practice; it means an effort to enact these understandings in new communities and reconstructed institutions.

(Gouldner, 1971, p.92 )

## 6. On to the Practical Method

So far in this study I have taken that there are distinct parallels between the nature of curriculum theory and some varieties of social theory. As a youthful community of practitioners we are concerned with collective life and with often unstated informal struggles of persons or groups of persons in institutions such as schools, theory, development, and policy evaluation. We are concerned with the spatial arrangements of schools, of our research and of the historical distance between our practical projects. This distance, whether physical or of consciousness, clearly affects the nature of our primary and secondary relations with another as it does the norms, values and ideological dispositions with which we contend - and to which our actions are often limited. This could be considered a large part of the purview of curriculum theory.

At the same time we inhabit as practitioners and citizens a larger collective life that often materializes informally in sub-cultures, group life, orally, and in unstated understandings. What we know of our interests, our policies, our ideologies in a formal sense is often insufficient to account for what moves persons in social conduct. This is because much of the measure of collective life is



constituted by the rush of perceptions and interpretations of participants acting in concert or individually. Our official sociological or economic accounts do not reconstruct how social life is endlessly accomplished. Our social science knowledge that is directed to communication or interaction often crystallizes the implicit ideological interests and conceptual schemata as the invariant properties of social action that it really has not uncovered. In a field of study such as curriculum theory and practice since research to explain change, or for that matter failure, has depended upon hypostatized constructs or methods that assume narrow models of participants' rationality serious doubt has to be placed in the analysis and results of analysis in curriculum practice to this point. Since the 'inner horizons' for one, of a curriculum project, or the contingencies of radical curriculum innovation for two, are "sufficiently indeterminate" for inquirers who measure, theorise or practice in this field, methodology that is other than dialectical, historical, and interrogative will deny the very bases of human being. In the absence of a self and social reflexivity curriculum theory and research has no place to work as its auspices in membership and tradition have dissolved.

Reflexivity is essentially an act of criticism. Research or theory that is reflexive becomes a chain of acts which claim membership in a community of knowledge. For understanding curriculum this is truly an interdisciplinary practice. Theory as



criticism means acting within and for a community of men in solitude and in solidarity. As a rebellious act it requires that we recognize our common ground and possibility with one another - which is the measure of all relations of all critical projects taken on together. Since the grounds of our criticism as theory lay in our assembled communities, we are able to work through what Habermas has termed the species-given interests of labour, language, and struggle. In curriculum theory, as in the social world, pedagogy teaches us that attunement to the things of the world as well to the possibility of their coalescence in the ideal means care in human transcendence and in suffering. Clearly, to confront the possibilities of radical change we work with our hearts and our theory.

This study, and the coalescence of moments of inquiry as outlined, requires a deeply practical commitment from its readers to examine their work and their engagement with others since to understand curriculum reform means to understand how and why our work reproduces political practice. We must shed the insulation of our illusions to see practice as a direct materialization in society in the same way of economic practices. Curriculum theory, as this study becomes, is a theoretical labour that requires interrogation of its own grounds in the reproduction of social life. Hence curriculum theory can be investigated from many fronts including those that demand epistemological breaks from a prescientific, redundant past. Reading, writing, arguing as



structures of intentional criticism in curriculum theory are the relations of authorship in a utopian community of infinite language, labour and love.

It is a shuddering experience at times to consider that in our world-making enterprise of curriculum it is the sheer power of the powerful, who are able to default on their moral obligations, that makes our inquiry so desperate and imminent. Typical inequality of condition, of opportunity, and of privilege in our society are due partly to the arrangement of power. The power of occlusion that comes from redundant cultural practices is one task that reflexive theory can directly address. As an epistemic and practical activity, the reconciliation of theory and practice is an urgent problem facing educational research presently. Organizing theoretical communities is also a step in reconsidering the social organization of curriculum theory and the nature of its ties as a deliberative process to world-making. Lest I have appeared glib and casual about the utopian potential of the practical method I defer to the wisdom of an aphorism or two on truth:

The jealous keys to Truth's eternal doors.

SHELLEY, Triumph of Life.

The locks of the Temple of Truth are neither to be picked by cunning, nor forced by clamorous violence. The noise of furious arguers is the noise of shutting rather than opening the temple-doors. The loud shouts with which some people appeal to reason imply that reason lives a considerable distance off. If their hearers feign



conviction, it's for the sake of peace rather than of truth. The very style in which the autocrats of opinion (brought up "in the school of one Tyrannus") State their proposition is a warning that they do not mean to have it questioned; and their fate, as far as the chance of arriving at the truth is concerned, seems well described in the following words of Soulie: "Ils considèrent le silence comme une victoire, leur vanité s'en gonfle, et ils arrivent à un état de demidieux, où rien ne peut plus les atteindre."

(from J.F. Boyes, Lacon In Council, Undated, London)



## CHAPTER 3

### OUTLINE OF A METHOD

#### HISTORICAL TRACES OF THE IDEA OF PRAXIS IN CRITICAL HUMAN SCIENCE

Human emancipation cannot emerge from only one realm of necessity, one set of social relations. It cannot come from a transformation in the public realm that expects a merely reflexive transformation in the private realm. It must emerge from an understanding of the dialectical movement within and between the relations of reproduction and production that makes it entirely possible for historical change to be initiated within the social relations of reproduction.

(O'Brien, 1981, p. 157)

In this chapter I outline the method of analysis and activity that will be followed, and has been followed, in this study as I investigate what we must know to engage in curriculum reform and radical social education. As such this chapter adumbrates the historical, philosophical, conceptual and methodological contours of the idea of praxis - what some social theorists have called the tradition of political philosophy most urgently and precisely expressed in the words of Marx. I present these sides of the idea of praxis not in an exhaustive or even synoptic sense but as a means of demonstrating the implications for this study of particular historical interpretations of praxis as one instance of both normative social theory and practical



method.<sup>1</sup> Any historical survey might reveal other traditions that incorporate theory and practice in concrete projects of world amelioration; but, I am concerned with the particular promise of Marxist and neo-Marxist interpretations of reflection laden practical activity. I seek to justify by implication that this kind of method has a more powerful mandate for attracting our professional and personal attention as curriculum theorists interested in radical curriculum change due to the potentiality of a Marxist or neo-Marxist praxis to realize, collectively and personally, the fundamental changes called for in radical curriculum theory than do other strategic sciences - some of which I will mention. I make the case that for curriculum theorists' best interests, a familiarity and appropriation of the theoretic and practical forms for praxiological inquiry is necessary in order to redeem their utopian interests. They alone must choose whether the curriculum theory they sponsor is to become a social practice of emancipation or a social practice of justification. Although no social theory can be locked into a frozen dualism, we must learn to speak our interests in the debate of social science theory as it has emerged historically but then to consider how it will be transcended.

I want, at this point, to mention my usage of the term 'practice' in distinction to the term 'praxis.' I use the former term through personal preference in the attempt to avoid philosophical dilettantism, in the same way as the



Marxist tradition has used 'praxis'. I recognize the cultural and linguistic difficulties associated with the use of praxis and want to absolve the concept from its common utilitarian focus such as "student teachers really only want practical information and techniques". Hence, the reader is begged to dissolve his commonsense association of my use of 'practice' or 'praxis' with efficiency and procedural technique, per se. But I frequently employ the adjectival form 'praxiological' or even 'praxiology' to name a form of interest-seeking inquiry that is derived from my use of the concept 'practice'.

The method of practice or practical method I elaborate has to do with a form of inquiry which not only interprets the social and psychological world but involves and guides the transformation of that world. Marxist and neo-Marxist conceptions represent a more elaborate, concrete form of practice than other traditions I will claim. Such inquiry goes beyond subjective idealism, and extends its projects beyond commonsense consciousness and practices. Critical conceptions of practice involve the negation and incorporation of commonsense consciousness, its contents, and the quasi-scientific traditions of materialism and idealism. This occurs through a dialectical incorporation of and advance from current historical practices whether reproductive or speculative, to qualitatively new embodiments in transformative concrete practice.

Marxist or critical practice considers it necessary



not only to provide a theoretic account of institutional realities but to demonstrate the factors (social, political or methodological) that must be secured to permit the transition from a theoretic account to its absorption in practice while sustaining the unity of both moments of inquiry. Neither materialism nor idealism are features of this method since no logical priority is given to the here-and-now of a pseudo-concreteness nor to an all revealing universalistic subjectivity. In effect critical practice seeks a reconciliation between the interests of these two traditions, as it does between the worlds of the concrete and the ideal, as it does between the sediment of historical tradition and the immediacy of the conscious present. Reconciliation, in this tradition, is accomplished not for chivalrous reasons but because the practical organization of socio-historical world is composed of these elements, in tension, dependent upon one another that limit and grant possibility to human action. Mens' consciousness, their institutions and their intentional activity that links them to the future are knowable, extendable spheres of relations that remain separable but interdependent spheres. Their conjunctions are world-sustaining or world-building.

To suggest that inquiry of this sort can attain strategic practical knowledge for its educational projects from men-on-the-street would be misguided since commonsense consciousness and its contents although presupposed in practical method cannot be taken for granted as a pure



material expression of critical thought. Commonsense consciousness is topicalized in praxiological inquiry because it is as necessary to understand any theoretic account of the social world; yet it, too, is riven through with contradictions, deformations, with a whole way of life cognitively operative. Commonsense cultural practices, as does science for instance, encode the contradictory relations of human society which are not immediately apprehendable to observers or philosophers. As a result, practical method involves a casting up of the appearances of commonsense practices while, at the same time asking what the essence of these practices are in relation to the particular development of our socio-political and economic forms. Practical method aims at the dissolution of commonsense consciousness, and its transcendence in a dialectical negation of dominant, retarded forms of consciousness and society. To understand and realize persons' practical activity in a human scientific and objective sense, reflection and action are united in a higher, creative, globalized consciousness. The retarded forms of consciousness such as idealism, positivism, materialism or the teenaged forms of magical or animistic consciousness are partial fronts from which practical method as a transformative, reflective, revolutionary consciousness must supersede through organization. Practical method represents a way of life as much as it does a way of collective inquiry. We cannot afford to subscribe to the natural attitude of a



quasi-social science that considers practical activity in the world as self-evident, begging no explanation; and that considers the relations of men's actions to objects of meaning in direct and unproblematic correspondence. According to the story of ordinary consciousness' baldest form, whether of the street or in taxonomic, statistical sociology, it is alleged that the presence of theory and speculative discourse serves to mystify the opacity of everyday life - indicating a failure of nerve on the part of social theorists who are not real men. It is important to note just how close commonsense consciousness walks with contemporary, public philosophies of history and education. Radical curriculum change requires that we begin to specify through practical method the conditions that can shift persons from magical, through reflective to critical-practical consciousness. To the extent that commonsense consciousness is riddled with ideological deformations, it is not a knowledge of cultural form that has strategic importance for curriculum change. But this same consciousness is symptomatic of structural and moral crises in an advanced society; it represents a dominant form mediating understanding and mass activities and consequently must become a theoretic topic for praxiological inquiry. One task, then, of a critical-practical inquiry is to point up to its constituents in schools, in the streets, and in the academy are the social and class dimensions of our cognitive activities and organization of our physical space. How ironic it is that the story of



how commonsense consciousness thinks practical acts, yet does not consider the act of social transformation a practical one.

What has been the contemporary history of our consciousness of practice? The well-worn distinction of Marx of the proletariat holding consciousness, in itself or *en soi*, and consciousness for itself or *pour soi*, is useful in demarcating the everyday awareness of persons from a critical-reflective awareness. Quite often persons display a typical *en soi* consciousness of the world of everyday objects and events such that they find meaning inherent in the things they confront. The conception of the world as self-evidently knowable or ascertainable deny the active, constitutive powers of persons in actually making and shaping affairs. Hence the relation between objects and consciousness is flattened to a utilitarian calculus of speed or power or efficiency or profit, or surplus value. Anything that cannot be accounted for in this calculus of consciousness is impractical or speculative whether it be literary criticism, health care or economic production.

Habermas (1975) draws us to these relations at the level of state organization where a logic of public consciousness emerges that manipulates and emasculates the civic political intentions of persons in everyday life. With the state's emphasis on practical, participatory policy-making persons are drawn into massified depoliticized structures of public tradition. Here political activity is



reduced, as practical consciousness, to the consumption and production of policies and programs. By sustaining mass consciousness in a depoliticized form, the way is open to sustaining naivete, cliches, prejudices, and modernistic superstitions in key classes of the social order. Inhabited by a sense of the 'earnestly practical', persons act out their ordinary interests and life trajectories in an infinite good faith of anticipation.

In ancient Greek philosophy, the basis of contemporary Western philosophy, the practical, material world was disregarded. It was discarded as second order activity along with that of human labour. Free men were to cultivate and develop contemplation, intellectual activity, and the political state. Material practice in Greece was regarded as inferior activity and was considered to be the work of slaves since no correspondence existed in the Greek cosmos between mundane reproduction and the transformation of the human universe. Liberation acquires the character of freeing the person from material, reproductive toil in order that creative energy occurs in theory. Both Plato and Aristotle assign priority to a knowledge of essences. The social world, its structures and purposes, epitomized in the city state can receive direction from essential contemplation on universal forms but its maintenance as a material entity was the work of lesser social orders. In this respect theory is severed from practice. Aristotle can be seen to give a wider scope to theory's role in informing practical matters. Politics



was a slightly more legitimate realm of applied contemplative activity scarcely less slavish than the less of persons to matter. Leisure, philosophy and politics, the transmission and dialogue of ideas, and their role in the conscious regulation of social and political life were considered worthy of the commitments of citizens.

Theory acquires a quasi-practical character once politics was recognized as an activity worthy of interest as soon as knowledge is seen assuming a social and political function. Theory becomes practical in Greek society to the degree that it reduces enslavement to the material world. Aristotle living in an altered political structure in ancient Greece is driven to recognize that although theory and practice do mediate one another, they are essentially separable in the organization of the polis so that philosophers could not substitute as kings and the converse. Practical reason and theoretic reason become complementary in the life of the state. Yet the Platonic-Aristotelian world view still held that the highest elaboration of man's destiny was acquired through the theoretical life. Politically, the nature of the theory-practice link was sustained by the structure of Greek society. This philosophical position combined as hegemony to secure the mode of production of Greek cities based upon castes of patricians, citizens and slaves. Each was anchored in part by the progressive debasement of human labour. Objects produced in Greek society usually acquired only a use rather than an exchange



value. Hence their worth was fixed only to their capacity to satisfy human needs. These products never became commodities in the sense of the contemporary capitalist West nor human labour a product to be valued, bought and sold.<sup>2</sup>

The contemplative class considered production geared to the self-transformation of man, not to the domination of nature as the valued form of human activity - intellectual work. The social division of labour as an ideological and political ensemble could sustain the schism between contemplation and action, between theory and practice. Human nature, free activity, and the 'life of the mind' were associated in spiritual unison. The organization of work, of productive activity and political meaning systems corresponded to and were mediated in the Greek city states by a philosophical conception of praxis that mirrored the universe of eternal essences. The portrayal of this universe would at times reflect the social order that had unfolded as the social structure of the city states. I can go further to suggest that because ancient Greece constituted a slavery-based mode of production, its essential philosophical and economic categories were trapped in an ultimately non-expansionary or adaptive social-economic form. Hence the importance, for our purposes, of seeing how important a discourse of closure was for reproducing Greek society but also the brittle quality ideologically of this conception of practice. This appears to be true of most slave-owning



societies so that the relations between theory and practice, generically, have been ones of distantiation rather than explicit embracing of one another. The former conception of practice in societies such as Greece that has also made them vulnerable to technological change from outside cultures - and this disallowed the generation of political discourse that could respond to rationalizing forces in the event of economic transformations.

With the Renaissance in Europe and the rise of a nascent bourgeoisie the person was no longer considered as a passive object of the cosmos but as an active, subjective builder of the world. Human being was redeemed through action rather than through contemplation. Reason, will, and action were considered motive forces in the transformation of material or external nature. Clearly, knowledge and its importance in transforming nature are linked to the development of the merchant and capitalist bourgeoisie. Theory and intellectual activity was actively used as a factor in mechanical practical problems and the new economic mode of production. Once again we can see how the organization of the social relations of production mediate with a formal, socially-latent corpus of knowledge in the development of science and technology directly instrumental in the forces of production. As the knowledge base shifts in its conception of theory, so the social division of labour and reward shifts dialectically from the repression



of slaves to the organization of free men with a commodity to sell. The shifts in social value that occurred in cultural practices such as philosophy, the mechanical arts, science and experimentation , arts and architecture all prefigure this change in the conception and redeemable value of practice seen for instance, in the work of Da Vinci , Bacon, More, and Descartes. Although according human labour an instrumental role in man's rise to the higher spiritual tasks, Thomas More in Utopia still saw contemplation as the pre-eminent labour.

Seventeenth and eighteenth century developments in the productive forces of European economies signalled a bourgeoisie ever more cognizant of the importance of science and technology as factors of economic expansion. It is argued that the Industrial Revolution (Bernal, 1969) represents a conjuncture of class interests, scientific shifts, and economic exigencies that reemphasized human labour's role in material practice. Rising global competition as a result of earlier mercantilist adventures intensified the need to dominate nature and free the social world of compulsions prejudicial to innovations in production and output. The focus, at this time, on the practical was how science and its derivatives of technology could hasten and intensify the technical dimensions of the production process. Virtually no concern lay with the effects or changes upon the social and cognitive organization of workers or craftsmen that arise from the scientific transformation of nature. To be sure some awareness amongst intellectuals, state officials and



entrepreneurs existed of the significance of the human transformation that paralleled an assiduous domination and commodification of nature, yet these effects upon men's inner nature were never topicalized at the point of productive relations. The calculus of evaluation for scientific or theoretic investment, effort and benefit was solely utilitarian. For philosophers, as for entrepreneurs, technology became the unity of theory and practice.

During the period of the enlightenment the growth of the positive sciences reflected a faith, particularly in France, that man's labour, the new sciences, and the perfectibility of culture would be expressed in technology. Rousseau was the exception in the mid-eighteenth century to the uncritical Enlightenment beliefs in the material, productive and progress of nature as practical and theoretical culture. Human transformation through domination of nature yielded only a vile side of man that social labour coupled with mechanical technology led to the repression of authentic praxis. Human productive activity was the normative form of organization for groups such as the English political economists. Ricardo, Smith and others argued that the unseen hand of selfish industry guided by technological innovation would provide a measure of Commonwealth for all workers in the society. Human labour for this group was conceived as the generative force of all wealth and cultural practice. Yet it is due to their narrowed notion of human labour, and its social organization, that both Rousseau and the Marxist tradition were



to criticize ontologically and politically. Theory as a time bound perspective on the nature of man, and of knowledge, had not yet pervasively acknowledged the active, constitutive, social character of man's consciousness with its integral mediations in human labour. Nor would the new positive sciences admit of historical and class nature of their emergent theories; how their epistemological limits stemmed in part from the social interests preserved by particular conceptions of the world.

Marx's response to these conceptions of practice was two-fold. He attempts to answer in the more mature writings such as Capital and the Grundrisse that human labour, when confined to techno-economic activity, is reductionist of man's practice. He criticized the political economy school while incorporating its insights of human productive activity into a larger synthetic science of knowledge and society. By incorporating theoretic features of earlier ideological paradigms whether of economic production and innovation, or of consciousness and knowledge, or of social-strategic organization, he provides a more manifold, historical science reflective of man's creative, world-building interests that is self-critical of its own theoretic forms and of redundant social relations that fetter the necessity of human practice. By combining the socialism of St. Simon, the transcendental philosophy of Kant, and the political economy of Ricardo amongst other theorists, Marx attempts the recovery of a flattened conception of human labour or practice.



If we remember the Greek conception of the theory-practice link as emphasizing the contemplative subject of eternal forms, the philosophic correspondence with Kant can be made. If we remember the increased value placed upon material activity and technical proliferation of the late Renaissance and Enlightenment, the correspondence to political economy can be made. In both of these traditions the theory-practice link is, according to Marx, deformed and insufficient to account for the full historical and creative possibilities of human practice, that is man, as seen situated in society, in history. By uniting different theoretic traditions with their respective explanatory interests, Marx displays the moments by which man transforms material nature, social reality, and consciousness in an ever-present dialectic. Transcending the philosophy of Descartes, Kant and Hegel but not dissolving those theoretic moments, Marx establishes the subjective and objective worlds as distinct yet totally interdependent spheres of human relations. By assigning priority to the integrity and mutual dependence of subject and object, Marx revolutionizes philosophy to human science and restores a critical, creative tangibility to human labour. With a totalized conception of theory and practice or praxis, Marx can begin to ground ideological criticism to the nature of the progressive humanization of the species. Hence production and society-in-history become the correlates of subject and object in complementary unity.



So far what has been the upshot for philosophical or theoretical practice? The validity of any philosophy is secured if it retains the relation between its key problems and that of practical human activity. Philosophy's obstacles or problems are those of a human science and are as much theoretical as practical. For instance, both are involved in the resolution of collective practice of classes and persons needlessly deformed by the social relations of money, private property and the state. These obstacles to the progressive humanization of man require reflective praxis and material praxis such that their effects are understood, generalized, and strategically dissolved by all affected persons in a totalized, creative praxis. The historical deformations of exploitative economic modes, social class structures, and interest-laden linguistic practices maintain one-sided, reductionist conceptions of the theory-practice ensemble and hence what becomes the dominant organizing motif of different but unequal societies. I have argued this in the case of Greek city states, medieval, renaissance and post-enlightenment Europe.<sup>3</sup> Clearly, transformations of society or what passes as modes of social reform are tied to the prevalent notion of the practical in different social formations. This form of theoretic practice is, in its turn, mediated by relations inscribed within the specific economic mode of production as is the realm of cultural-ideological practice. Hence, violent, revolutionary transformations or invasion were the typical outcomes for change in ancient



Greek states while some bourgeois revolutions in Europe have occurred with less profound transformations; England, Germany and Holland being cases in point. In our own time despite extensive rhetoric, there is pessimism about the possibilities of real social change through reformism and gradualism. The political-ideological porosity of the advanced capitalist societies obscures the tenacity and complexity of everyday life in monitored, organized economies. Marx was particularly critical of the reformism of social democracy under the Second International. He points to the delusions of a praxis based on vulgar economism where societal change emerges inevitably or to that based on political moral suasion typically expressed by the social democratic movement. Each tendency occludes man's role practically and conceptually in institutional reconstruction. That is:

... the most emphatic recognition of the revolutionary energy, revolutionary creative genius, and revolutionary initiative of the masses and also, of course, of individuals, groups, organizations and parties that are able to discover and achieve contact with one or another class.

(Lenin, 1964, v. 13, p. 36)

The role of theory in the above sense, then, is to portray historically the subjective and objective conditions under which radical social change can be achieved. For my purposes theory that addresses different fronts in this study of curriculum reform is immanently practical as well as practically informative or generalizable within projects



of programmatic deliberation that are organized by different kinds of curriculum workers. I ask, too, how much longer the curriculum field can hold off examining the society it is situated within as economic, political and cultural contradictions deepen? Surely, a portrayal of our work in curriculum reform is called for as one instance of a wider social practice in order that we can truly recover and reassemble an historical consciousness of praxis. This requires as this study makes clear an opening to diverse intellectual traditions so that through their touching arcs, we come to see the spectrum of truth and practice in everyday life.

It is difficult to raise the question of praxis fruitfully in a time of immense but deceptive closure in philosophical circles and when the possibilities for radical change in our society seem unclear. But it is from working within a Marxist and neo-Marxist tradition, coupled with the recognition that political alternatives could emerge from organized capitalism, that reflective, material, and revolutionary practice could be raised as a primary topic of investigation. Practical, radical education projects of which this study points to are in the position of theory that anticipates the maturation of subjective and objective conditions for radical intervention before they present themselves practically. On the other hand in an educative field such as curriculum, the practical intervention requires this theoretic anticipation so that its strategies make sense with persons in deliberation, in schools, in writing groups as concrete



possibilities. Marx, in a long history of theory-practice ventures, apparently is the first to see praxis as an expression of man's theoretic-practical being. The natural course of this being is world-and self-transformative. Curriculum theory as a human science must recognize the unity of theory and practice and their relative autonomy if its participants, as social and historical beings, are to be granted a self-determining future.

Let me approach something of an outline of the dialectic in Hegel and Marx' method. Progress or development in the natural or social worlds, for Hegel, meant an act of negation of the immediately present signs of reality. Practices, whether institutional, intellectual or political, were particular instances of reality that had to be overcome and so promoted to their higher stages of potentiality. The process of negation, overcoming and promotion to the future, was a means of realizing the universal essence in reality. Rather than an uncritical acceptance of the world of immediate sense appearance as was the tendency of the positive sciences, Hegel posits the historical principle of transition. We see, too, in Marx that a distinction is forged between the appearance and the essence of social reality; that man, through inquiry, is to go beyond the *prima facie* density of social life, its forms, and cultural practices in order to 'recover its historical presuppositions'. What this movement achieves is critique.

The forms and practices as resistances in the social world are explained in terms of their origins



and the mediations of persons in the course of the evaluation of these forms and practices. The everyday routine density is no less real as an appearance that confronts us and slaps us in the face as we 'do our washing' so to speak. The recognition and critique of this everyday but historically mediated process is accomplished but also its truth is seen as a 'world-historical' process promoted in Hegel's time by the state as an absolute construction and by the proletariat in Marx's time. Each accomplishes, if unfettered, the development of the 'universal society' of emancipation. The notion of a realized end-profit of emancipation is problematic when interpreting the practical implications of a Marxist or neo-Marxist tradition. My position in this study is that no end-point is sensibly attainable politically or intellectually - only the conditions for organizing practical enlightenment can be prefigured. What is of interest to me is that the dialectical method elaborated by Hegel and by Marx has some obvious similarities which should interest those contributing to practical method. (The fact that there is a gulf of difference as to the ontological character of Hegelian philosophy and Marxist practice should not deter us presently.) What I find in parallel between the respective methods of analysis and practice are the four stages of embracing, negating, overcoming and reconciling immediate structures of reality. Both Marx and Hegel start off from an immediate apprehension critical of reality. Particular social forms are identified in the context and



function of a society. These forms are then subject to criticism or negation from interest-laden premises. What both Hegel and Marx then do is incorporate but not dissolve an understanding of these forms in a fuller, structural comprehension of the social totality. This is no mere philosophical exercise since through criticism they are able to overcome the partial determination such practices have upon men's consciousness. This process permits through negation a freeing awareness of the opportunities and possibilities of their own life projects. Each moment of a man's social reality is experienced as contradiction in social relations, incomplete, deformed, such that if not overcome intellectually and practically becomes a regressive relation. The partial relations of the world of appearances need to be seen as only moments in a historically totalizing process. Ideological linguistic practices, class relations, or particular social relations of production are overcome through shifts in self-consciousness and revolutionary praxis with Marx, or in the advancement of social experience to absolute knowledge with Hegel. Both are processes of social learning as both contain evaluative indices of rational knowledge, universality and human progress. Each sharply differs in the kind of human activity that realizes the shifts towards universal consciousness as each difference in the political consequences of the method. It is important to note, particularly with Marx, that the implications of his own practical analysis were simultaneously



scientific, philosophical and normative. The primary intent of praxis as a transcendent theoretic-practical inquiry is to reconstitute a human science that reconciles ideological perspectives of social science caught in past social formations with the practical organization of persons in pursuit of their global interests in economic, social, and psychological freedom.

Much has been said (Avinieri, 1969, McLellan, 1973) about the polemics against the proponents of an idealist criticism. These theorists insist that change in persons' consciousness must accompany material and economic revolutionary activity. Marx was often skeptical of the young Hegelians' program that mass action in the absence of shifts in consciousness or attitude would result in the re-institution of dogmatism of the state or party in a new regime. Structural economic transformation has not dissolved the webs of animism, prejudice, and violence towards others that is found in socialist or communist regimes of the twentieth century. Early critical theory from Korsch, Adorno and Horkheimer onward has made much of the logical strategic importance of encouraging community discourse that is ethical, universal and rational. I make a case for seeing discourse and discourse shifts integral to cultural practices and as real as other material conditions of social life.

This study is relevant, in some measure, as a tradition of neo-Marxist inquiry. This tradition as has the study,



so far, argued that institutionally and spontaneously reality is 'praxically' constituted. Although baldly stated, this suggests that the circumstances of our reality, and our knowledge of it, can be critically-practically altered in congruence with the virtual, universal aspects of what it could become. Both Hegel's and Marx's point about this is that the higher stage of development (cultural, political, economic) is historically inscribed within the dialectic of persons' social and collective practice; that is, it is inscribed as a virtual becoming in the "ensemble of social relations " (Marx, 1970, p. 122). Theory, it is argued, must reveal the social world as sensuous, practical activity in order to promote radical change in circumstances which is a revolutionary and qualitative shift. But it is self-consciousness and material practice that coincide in truly radical change in any social formation. It is only in this state of self-directed consciousness, organization, and material revolution that social planning becomes humane and universal. Critical-practical activity invests participants with the historical legacy to act on their personal and collectively revealed interests. It is through careful inquiry and educative processes, that move persons to self-consciousness, that the historical dialectic of Marx and Hegel is realized as a rational, collective community or society. A limitation placed on the development of new social forms is the level of productive forces. In our own



time it is made more complex by the interpenetration of technocultural relations within the mode of production. Any debate on social reform must recognize these qualitative changes, since Marx's time, in the social formation of organized capitalism. As a collectivity and as individuals we are always in the position of throwing out "newly authenticated stages of development" so that truth and history are continually reposed as practical problems. I turn now to the contributions of critical theory for our understanding of practice; the core of the practical method.

This study considers that the Frankfurt school of critical social theory presently best exemplifies the legacy of Hegalian Marxism both intellectually and methodologically. The core of the practical method, and of the primary structure of this chapter is reflected in my practical synthesis for curriculum theory of the tradition of critical theory as embodied in three pre-eminent theorists of that tradition. I identify as first generation representatives, Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer and one second generation representative as Jurgen Habermas as the currently most-advanced expressions intellectually and politically of the transition to post-Marxist practice. The transitional nature of their work will emerge through my writings and their application as curriculum practice. This is not meant to imply a transitoriness or depreciation of their work but to suggest, à la philosophy of science, that it recognizes cultural, moral and structural crises in organized global capitalism. It is



prepared to examine these crises, and to prescribe the kind of normative life and theoretic collectives that critical natural and human scientists must struggle to build. But second generation critical theory 1950-80 in North America and Europe addresses the questions of the symptoms and the anodynes of everyday life and inquiry for intellectuals and citizens of the late twentieth century. It offers no solutions, political or emetic, nor any schemes of global, ethical reconstruction. This requires the emergence and gathering of a new human science. Curriculum studies, in my view, are strategically placed to contribute to this project.

Accordingly, I will briefly characterize some of the theory and methodological interests of Max Horkheimer as a way of travelling this journey to a new human science. Horkheimer had been concerned, during the period 1930-1950, with the antagonisms and complementarity between what he identified as critical theory and traditional theory as two world theoretic views of practice. In a 1937 essay he portrays traditional theory in terms that descriptive, hypothetical, deductive social science would recognize today:

The phenomenologically oriented sociologist will indeed claim that once an essential law has been ascertained every particular instance will, beyond any doubt exemplify the law. There is always, on the one hand, the conceptually formulated knowledge and, on the other, the facts to be subsumed under it. Such a subsumption or establishing a relation between the simple perception or verification of a fact and the conceptual structure of our knowing is



called its theoretic explanation.  
(Horkheimer, 1972, p. 192)

Horkheimer goes on to, in line with the socially 'promotive' tendency of critical theory; situate this bourgeois science in the context of the development of particular, in this case European, societies. Clearly, this was the knowledge and means of generating knowledge of the newly ascendant class in the eighteenth century. This was scientific theory that had the function of rupturing the socioeconomic status quo. It was promotive and transformative in disrupting older, redundant cultural-intellectual practices; the legacies of medieval, feudal, and theologically-monistic structures. It had an active, generative role in technological practice as English political economy of the eighteenth century demonstrated. Horkheimer warns that, similar to the consciousness' of earlier social formations, theoretic practice of one social formation can retard and obscure the necessary interests and developments of new social relations. The repressive, ideological function of cultural, material forms emerges in social life when persons 'forget' the origins of social knowledge and institutions. When theory becomes free-floating, or "absolutized" in men's minds, it obscures the relation between individual existence and social change. This latter theme is one that pre-occupies the second generation critical theorists evidenced particularly in the work of Habermas (1975). In a society of extreme differentiation where a sense of community life as a moral



anchor has been dissipated, what precedents for personal conduct are available for a person? For our purposes in curriculum theory, and as citizens, with what do we fill the categories of morality and responsibility as the enactive practices of the good life? Horkheimer and other proponents in the critical theory tradition grapple with these issues. As theorists they often embark from points of epistemology or methodological procedure and arrive at the political expressions of this theory in the society at large. If, over the period of bourgeois ascendancy and the elaboration of stages of capitalism, certain kinds of theoretic practice is progressively sedimented in the intellectual, formal, and popular culture, then what kinds of civic competence or opportunity need be acquired in order to properly resist these forms of life (as politicized culture)? The question becomes a methodological and practical one for human science when persons acknowledge that science historically has confirmed the mode of existence of powerful groups in each social formation, but typically has only justified the position of one class at the expense of others. Hence, the importance of a science, which in separating its subject and object, methodologically, becomes a reproductive force politically and economically once it has been diffused formally and popularly through a culture. This dualism gives rise, according to Horkheimer, to a situation where individuals are abstract yet conscious



in a 'society that is concrete yet blind'. The experience of society as a totally administered structure beyond the individual is one that is traceable, I argue, to the accent given by the theoretic practice of bourgeois science. The ascendancy, and consolidations of social relations based on a radical dualism at the points of production penetrate the lifeworld sufficiently that the self-experience of persons is retarded to that of monads. Through this kind of analysis, critical theory has demonstrated its interest in conjoining theories of knowledge with theories of society.

Dualistic, descriptive social theory or what Horkheimer has called traditional theory expresses a definite conception of practice - one that corresponds more closely with what Marx and others had termed abstract materialism or even economism. It is world-creative in its material praxis and cannot be discounted as integral, Horkheimer would maintain to social analysis. Yet, despite its materially productive outcomes, in the domination of nature and in technical development 'traditional theory', it is an outcome of the social practices of definite groups in society having existed under certain political conditions. It is, in principle, a theoretic practice which if generalized, extended, and detached as popular discourse both limiting and regressive of alternative intellectual and political arrangements. As a theoretical activity, in its own right, it presents a more unified theoretical practice in the tradition of Marx and



Hegel completing the dialectical circle between subjective reason and objective historical structures. Each kind of theoretic practice carries with it a particular "attitude". Nature, in the case of traditional theory, and society as a progressive accomplishment, in the case of critical theory, became the conceptual and practical objects of each.

Critical theory is formulated through Horkheimer, and as this study demonstrates as a practical method goes beyond a normative prescription for a new society but emerges from the dialectical necessity of transitional theory once its social origins are considered. Hence, in line with Hegel and with Marx, the organized social totality within which men labour and reflect contains the structural seeds of its own, necessary higher development. Critical theoretical practice attempts to continually restore transparency to the historical, humanized tendency to transcend its creations rather than for citizens to experience, as monads, society as a blind, behemoth tendency. Critical theoretic practice struggles to become human science of analysis and judgement concurrently. Society can "lack reason" (Horkheimer, 1972A, p. 208) when the

concepts used by men of the critical mind always contain a tension between recognition of the categories of society and the realization that they must also be condemned since the structures they represent are not the creations of a 'unified, self-conscious will'.

(Kilminster, 1979, p. 187)



The role of critical theory within its research program is that it can identify and bring to citizens the technical, political and cultural possibilities that are suppressed but within the social structures we commonly inhabit. In this sense critical theoretic practice, and the practical method of this study, do not escape from but embrace the utopian potential that men's educational and political projects contain. Inquiry as critical theory, where organization permits has a three-fold task of portraying historical, structural tendencies, portraying these tendencies through a discourse that secures persons in their immediacy and understanding in a promotive, strategic organization of persons' interests. Critical theoretical practice is distinct in that through social research, as a form of dialectical logic, civic competence develops in persons who by virtue of being active, conscious, and collaborative in their projects engage in a continual reconstruction of their life-worlds secure in solidarity and historical consciousness. Its project introduces us as citizens and theorists alike to the "antagonistic whole of our life". (Horkheimer, 1972A)

It is this whole which at one and the same time in its alienated objectivity creates and sustains traditional theory, critical theory as Reason and the perennial possibility of greater rational self-determination.

(Kilminster, 1979, p. 194)

In drawing to a close this brief excursus on the historical career of theory and practice and in anticipation of the



core elements of the practical method in a later section, I want to lay with some austerity the kinds of generic tasks that await the critical theoretic practice of radical curriculum workers, a tendency the practical method seeks to promote.

1. Persons involved in critical human science as a research tradition will inevitably encounter an almost hysterical dogmatic resistance to self-determination and criticism because of the 'high density' of our sedimented political culture. Getting people to 'shift their bets' despite all the rational argument and grounded evidence encoded or presented to them 'in their immediacy' is a task ridden with hostility and more easily said than done. Persons, particularly in semi-professional pursuits, do not want to be "...show(n) (that) their painfully won adaptation to reality to be perverse and unnecessary" (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 232).
2. It should be noted by researchers and practitioners doing praxiological inquiry or development that theory or description in all its manifestations has public consequences for social activity - a truism to be remembered by curriculum developers. Assertions about societal or mass tendencies need not be self-consciously attributable to critical motives for their transmission to teachers, students or other citizens to qualitatively



mould social arrangements. For instance, merely calling a teacher - training or curriculum project "critically reflective" will not necessarily make it so, yet the traditional organization of content and pedagogy on key structural themes could well determine future practice. It is up to praxiological inquiry to become aware of the 'illocutionary force' of particular forms of discourse upon social reality. (This point will be taken up later).

Daily do I get more and more convinced  
that theoretical work achieves more in  
the world than practical. Once the  
realm of ideas is revolutionized,  
actuality does not hold out.

(Hegel in Avinieri, 1972, p. 68)

3. Persons doing curriculum or social inquiry in this tradition are faced with two classes of struggle that must be recognized and mastered in their theory and practice. One has to do with being open to the nature-like historical tendencies in society, for example the logic of capital investment shifts or state depoliticization strategies, given the basic structure of society. This means developing an awareness of how it affects you personally in your family, vocational, and political decisions and hence incorporating this awareness of the corrective dimensions in your research protocol. A second struggle lies with coming to embrace the kinds of relations and events that need to be sponsored in



self-conscious projects that restore self-determinism to relations that reproduce us. Actions of civic competence that marshall dissent towards the side effects of government regional economic projects, or towards the outcomes of cultural policies and funding patterns upon ethnic renewal are some of the kinds of critical projects I have in mind.

4. That the alliances between critical intellectuals, practitioners, and other citizens in projects of reform, or opportunities for collective action or consensus-formation are likely, in our culture, to be tenuous, short-lived, shifting and contradictory. Such alliances are likely to coalesce through the inflammations of "prevailing injustices" that state and corporate activity incite. It could be said that whether in alliance with others as relatively homogeneous groups within our field of labour, manual or mental, we may be marginal persons with a sense of moral obligation, mobilized by the scientific knowledge, and the historical sense to act. Through practical discourse or the assembly of invisible theoretic colleges:

History teaches us that such groups, hardly noticed even by those opposed to the status quo, outlawed but imperturbable may at the decisive moment become the leaders because of their deeper insight.

(Horkheimer, 1972A, p. 241)



## THE FORM OF SCIENTIFIC ENTREPRISE KNOWN AS PRAXIOLOGICAL THEORY OF RESEARCH

I will now characterize the kinds of intellectual traditions and research issues that lag behind the theoretical practice I advocate and use to inquire within curriculum studies - and the attendant problems of curriculum reform.

Praxiological inquiry draws from linked but separate traditions in the history of sociology. Empirical, descriptive sociology has more recently been used as a social technology of human engineering and for administrative management. Critical sociology has been concerned throughout its varied career with ideological criticism and has organized practical-interpretive inquiry into social ends. In this respect, critical sociology is mobilized and organized by an emancipatory interest.

What accompanies this interest of critical sociology is a global program that grounds across disciplinary fronts yet is theoretic, practical, and political in its research character. This program has correspondent world views of knowledge, society, and man which form its background contexts of discovery, theorization, truth-generation and social amelioration. These kinds of practical, historical connections are not made within a sociology of research based on logical empiricism.

Praxiological inquiry writes both of these historical lineages of sociology in a global, ethical program of research and social action. The kernel of praxiological



inquiry, as I accent it, is the prescriptive linkage between a sociological ideal and a societal ideal. Social inquiry, and here curriculum inquiry, should mobilize persons through theoretical practice to realize some forms of the societal ideal. From this position, praxiology represents the political and epistemological legitimation of a theory and practice oriented to global, ethical sociology. As theorists and, as educators, this position means that our linking of theory and practice points to the twin projects of social theory-in-political practice and political practice-in-social theory. As curriculum workers using social theory, we are inevitably brought into the fray about research policy and the role of curriculum research in policy-making. That is, what role does critical social science and curriculum theory, as praxiological inquiry, have in the development of policy-making? For curriculum workers, this is a clarion call they cannot avoid attending to, since it demands that they account for the ways in which curriculum organization contributes to the realization of the ideal society. If we accept that curriculum study is grounded in a stance of world amelioration, hence coupled to persons' human interests, theory and practice are indissolubly linked. They are furthermore portrayed through a science of self-understanding and practical historical action. Praxiology, then, is the self-conscious nexus of science and its interpenetration with everyday life. Of those who embrace a dialectical critical sociology in the tradition of



Gurvitch, Lefebvre, Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse and Habermas, curriculum practitioners, in particular, take upon themselves the two self-conscious complementary vocations of citizen and scientist.

Central to what we cultivate as a self-conscious praxiological community is the idea of practical reason. This is the sense of reason as Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx used in its progressively materialist refinement as the active, constitutive subject of institution and history. This notion of reason connects, as a deliberative force, with the praxis of conscious society-building. Social practice, following practical reason as a human-species interest, means the "reasonable conduct of life" at the same time as persons engage in progressively global, historical dialogue with divergent others. Practical reason, as a quality and motive force we all possess in an unsuppressed state, means that the development of a science of social affairs in principle is one that guides practical conduct. Husserl linked reason with the humanization or radical transformation of labour in full cognizance of the origins of our self-formation as of each others' collective and global formation. Habermas discusses the same process as being the "full transparency of man". Individual identity and autonomy are predicated, in part, on the idealized society, or fragments of its organization that will eliminate human misery or redundancy in work and consumption. Practical reason, then, informs a critical science that is simultaneously



revolutionary-transformative and historically-conservative at a personal and collective institutional level. Praxiology achieves an understanding of our historical situation for theorists and practitioners in which the socio-political practical questions of curriculum research arise yet integrates the questions this understanding sponsors within the communicative organization of which individuals and groups acquire their identities. Praxiology connotes a practical urgency as a research program in that, as social theory, it theorises societal forms, in their current and historical formations, as a kind of practical criticism. But it also harnesses these taxonomic and interpretive contents in a projective urgency of what and why we must become aware of and do in the future: to plan and shape the future. Hence, we struggle through praxiology to a relation of self-consciousness, to relations of the fully-open society, in economic and cultural life, and to relations of global, ethical discourse. Radnitzky (1973) provides a generic example of praxiology intervening with social life:<sup>4</sup>

If critical sociology shows us that, say, social emancipation which is bought at the price of increasing regimentation is not freedom, that prosperity bought at the price of objectification of enjoyment is not affluence, etc., then such a check upon the results of social planning is its contribution to prevent the society from becoming a "closed" society.

(Radnitzky, 1973, p. 343)



Radnitzky points to the popular but under-analysed symptoms of political life in advanced industrial countries that the Frankfurt school has written about (Marcuse, 1964 and Schroyer, 1973). For my interests, the overside of formal democracy in the open societies of Europe and North America is the ruddy-cheeked faith in the idea of science as progress; the hail-fellow-well-met syndrome at the level of culture and a verbal utopianism in political life. These features of organized life under advanced capitalism bespeak of a society in all its dominant forms and life-sustaining practices based solely upon an economic-technical calculus of ends and means. Curriculum reform as instance of social amelioration or adjustment is one expression of political contingency planning to control crises of dissent and credibility amongst different social classes in the population. Curriculum reform, naively or insidiously, becomes a process of wish-fulfillment on behalf of the clients and entrepreneurs of school environments. Repeatedly, the faith in the rhetoric and measures of reform comes crashing down often engulfing persons in resignation, 'system-cynicism', or indifferent opportunism as common responses to a milieu they live and work in but only partially understand.

PraXiology as a programmatic response to this pessimism presupposes that identity and autonomy as human expressions of emancipation are possible. That to distance or marginalize oneself, and to theorize, are important



moments of criticism and spiralling awareness, in a mildly contradictory 'political participation'. Political and intellectual tolerance is deceptive in the organized capitalist states. The free flow of pluralist alternatives in the culture at large masks an inability for communication ever to touch ground with critical analysis, or radical strategies, or the nightmares of doubt that lurk behind the smiling personae of every day lives. The "public languages" of policy-talk or of popular solutions or commiserations act as glosses on the possibilities for conceiving or determining social alternatives. The public language of conventional intellectual communities is rarely in evidence as a creative deliberative invitation to students, factory or office persons, union members, or neighbourhood groups to question the way of life they follow, or to connect for them their private troubles with an historical backdrop that could secure confidence in themselves. 5

... they have brought into focus the paradox of tolerance, the problem of the tyranny of the majority and of the idolatry of the Western style of life which tends to "thingify" man, to reduce the individual to a functional task, and to depreciate "non-Western" forms of life. They recognize that technization and specialisation has led to a form of estrangement which Marx could not even foresee, that both Western capitalism and Eastern socialism produce the well-adjusted Consumer as they concentrate almost exclusively on advance in technology and natural science, and that these two systems converge in their unsolved problems. Of course all this is raising questions, not offering any



solutions.

(Radnitzky, 1973, p. 350)

Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, Habermas and many others are important in that they demystify the political cultural relations reproducing social life in the administered societies. It still remains to be seen whether they have 'reconnected theory and practice' as the critical-practical, deliberative realization of the good life. Curriculum studies as a praxiology of desire is one vantage point that can take up these questions. I take up now a few considerations that lie behind the construction of practical method and which ought to be borne in mind by the community of readers of this kind of inquiry.

Susan Sontag in an 1975 interview in *Salmagundi*, said, "In my opinion, the only intelligence worth defending is critical, dialectical, skeptical, desimplifying " (*Globe and Mail* reprint, February 19, 1983). So it is with this study in its representation of social and curriculum inquiry that goes beyond the bounds of conventional social research and critical social science in its bravado, its practical, ethical syntheses, and I believe in its power to know and change curriculum practice. This means, too, that I break often with accepted methodological canons whether in exact social science or in the alternative practices of qualitative or materialist inquiries. In a single work, the practice of this inquiry, this practical method, is inconsistent,



uneven and contradictory in its theoretic development, in its embodiment of field methods, in the roar of mixed traditions it borrows from, but not in the force of its address to the contours of our anxieties, dreads, hopes, and complexities of our work in organized education. I am reminded of the frequent analogies to history that lesser ethnographers make when extolling the virtues of their work. It is said that 'the history of man and nature is much richer, more lively, more subtle and more multifaceted than ever the best methodologist or best historian can imagine.' History is a complex of accidents and conjunctions that no simple rule followed by methodologists can ever capture.

This study argues, in its ongoing formulations of the practical method, that epistemological openness is a first condition in my attempt to understand and instaurate practical action in a primarily unknown entity - the politics of curriculum reform. Standard epistemological operations deemed proper for the subject matter of curricula and the organization of decision-making do not guarantee the yielding of 'new facts' or some substratum of social-psychological principles. Monological movement in methodology will not cultivate the educative potential of this study because it thwarts our reconciliation with a humanitarian attitude. In part, this excursus directs itself to the integration of personality amongst its author and its readership since monological consistency in method encumbers.



By compression, like a Chinese lady's foot, every part of human nature which stands out prominently, and tends to make a person markedly different in outline....

(quoted in Feyerabend, 1975, p. 20)

I work in this study for a kind of scientific practice that increases psychological, social, and political liberty, simultaneous with the unearthing of the mysteries of the material and the social worlds. To the extent that it is necessary for problem clarity. I break with traditional procedures of social research protocol; I have rejected the systematic proliferation of assertion and evidence and the fetishism of disciplinary consistency and the linearity of singly hypothesis elaboration. This irreverence is a signal feature, I argue, of praxiological research and its internal division and context of labour. I quote slightly embarrassingly from a portrait of Niels Bohr's work and life:

He would never try to outline any finished picture, but would patiently go through all the phases of the development of a problem, starting from some apparent paradox, and gradually leading to its elucidation. In fact, he never regarded achieved results in any other light than as starting points for further exploration. In speculating about the prospects of some line of investigation, he would dismiss the usual consideration of simplicity, elegance or even consistency with the remark that such qualities can only properly be judged after the event.

(in Rozental, editor, 1967, p. 117)

If we are to embark on new global philosophy and new human science, organized in part by collectives of practical



method, we, as divergent communities, in our struggles to describe and understand new relations encounter the tyranny of sedimented speech in which no discovery and no progress is radically possible. Feyerabend (1975) discusses the difficulties for a historicized scientific practice to penetrate the 'traditional categories' of everyday speech and that includes scientific thinking that portray 'false thought and action' of a technicized praxis. He proposes 'dialectic thought' as a means to 'dissolve into nothing the detailed determinations of the understanding' that formal logic convenes.<sup>6</sup> Closely connected to the struggle of historicized science for linguistic-political renewal in conceptual and popular structures is the meaning that we assign the idea of progress. Progress according to Feyerabend takes on multiple meanings according to different methodological fashion. It is important to recognize it is a word that must be given key political and cultural content and to realize the unstated historical sediments it has for most persons. Progress as in progressivism suggests a view of society, of knowledge, and of the person that is historically and structurally specific. We must be prepared to reconsider explicitly the utopian and political contents of progress in any conceptual or cognitive shifts that accompany praxiological inquiry. Progress, for instance in the history of science, has often connoted to grim-faced, hardened men of natural science that parsimony in theory and the exclusion of speculative alternatives brought assumptions



closer to empirical reality and hence success - that is, the truth about nature. Feyerabend points out that instead,

suspicion arises that the absence of major difficulties of normal science is a result of the decrease of empirical content brought about by the elimination of alternatives, and of facts that can be discovered with their help.

(Feyerabend, 1975, p. 43)

Theory in these circumstances is successful because no case can be made that could falsify its assertions. 'Success' as ideology is achieved by the self-sustenance of the theory citing its own evidence as support for its correspondence with reality. Political implications arise when scientific, social and economic decisions are based on this body of myth which has reached deliberative and justificatory closure.

Much of Marxist historiography, and the small uneven part this study plays in it, is impelled to recognize that science is a contradictory historical enterprise that perhaps is both elegant sophisticated system, diffuse speculative cosmic anticipation of physical or social tendencies, and redundant encrustations of outdated theories. The yield from scientific practice comes from the exchange and contrast of these conflicting positions and the 'unevenness' of their development. The notion of Marx, in The Poverty of Philosophy, concerning the lag and the leap of cultural practices in contrast to the modes of material production suggest parallels between the development of capitalism in



different societies and the contradictory nature of scientific revolutions. How is it that advances in cybernetic, or high energy physical theory can co-exist along side the moribund structures of empiricist social science, or pedagogic philosophies - particularly in the advanced global economies? Why are measures of social control, or social reform in our societies articulated through the social thought or natural philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth century? These considerations imply that it is not science itself in its 'unevenness' that must do self-inquiry but that a world view of science-in-society-in the global community must be a root image for doing self-reflexive, ethical science. At this stage our inquiry can be nothing but a 'verbal gesture', an invitation to participate deliberatively in critical theoretical practice. And to those teen-aged positivists of traditional social theory and falsificationism who yearn for the 'absolute certitude' of a dubious and falsified epistemic past Horkheimer admits that

There are no general criteria for judging the critical theory as a whole, for it is always based on the recurrence of events and thus on a self-producing totality.

(Horkheimer, 1972A, p. 67)

It must be remembered that the cry for an empirical correspondence and hence 'theoretical adequacy', with an imagined other society, and which it is critical theory's commitment to realize can only occur when that imagined new social order emerges through human praxis - as partial a realization



as this alternative social formation might become. Yet it is only in this transitory period, when the imagined order emerges that there is likely to be equivalence between theoretic criteria and the state of a present society in a traditional theory-fact unity. For to follow the developmental logic of critical theory, new social and historical tendencies emerge as conditions shift always in anticipation of fuller self-determining, rational societies - here theory, in the critical sense incorporates the theoretic essence of the older, superseded forms while it promotes a practical-theorisation of the future.

#### RUDIMENTS OF THE PRACTICAL METHOD (AS GROUNDED THROUGH THE THREE NECESSARY PHASES OF ENLIGHTENMENT)

This section of the methodological development of the study delineates the methodological core of the practical method. This will entail a specification of its structure and procedures, the functions to be assumed by the investigator, and the capacity of knowledge and action that can be generated through the practical method. In my formulation, based in the tradition of Marxist philosophy of praxis, I outline three essential methodical elements that I argue must occur for participants in any inquiry into cultural forms and practices - in this case the organization and planning of curriculum reform. The elements are freighted with ethical, epistemological, conceptual and practical leanings. The creative dimension of this practical method is the particular synthesis and accent I give to it as a




methodological procedure for reconceptualist curriculum work. I identify the three phases as immanent criticism, negative dialectics, and public discourse as analytically separable phases of theory and action. In practice this method expresses an organic unity bound up with participants and the selected problem for study. One could initiate the process of inquiry with immanent criticism although starting with other moments of the method is conceivable. The latter situation is more likely if it is a case of stepping into ongoing research or criticism, practical action, or consensus-formation in the research, development, or citizen groups. Immanent criticism I suggest represents the existential and structural identification of a problem as a problem in curriculum inquiry. Negative dialectics as a second phase ~~inquiries~~ critical - ethical interpretation of the problem in its conceptual and ethical dimensions in the attempt to cultivate personal and collective familiarity with the problem in shared social contexts. A value position is declared regarding the historical fate of the curricular problem as expressive of retarded or progressive social relations. Finally, the latent energies of participants in this critical-practical inquiry are mobilized discursively, politically, and possibly collectively as a grounded action laden resolution to the curricular problem under study. I am intellectually indebted to the early Marx, to the early Georg Lukać, Karl Korsch, Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Jurgen Habermas for the elements of this



formulation. The practical synthesis is mine alone, particularly for curriculum studies, but I still stand on the shoulders of giants in doing so.

### The Idea of Practical Method

Figure 1



In characterizing Horkheimer's contributions to this synthesis of practical method I draw primarily from the early period or first generation of critical theory work; that is, the period 1930-50 wherein the Institute for Social Research was established and the exile to America occurred. I do this because of the fertility of Horkheimer's ideas of those years for the practical method. After 1950, a number of critical theorists returned to Europe, the pace of their intellectual work shifted, and the emergence of a second generation in critical theory was evident. Throughout the history of the Institute and Horkheimer's writings there is a strain that seeks to connect philosophy and science, fact and value, criticism and objectivity in reconceived ways.

Horkheimer's project in this light was first and foremost as a sociologist in the tradition of Marx. He draws



extensively in his writings on Hegel's work on dialectical thought. Concerned with a critique of knowledge and society Horkheimer indicates that these activities must be grounded in a context of historical and human interests. It is Hegel's contribution in the Phenomenology of Mind, to see a particular relation between subject, object, and reason in history. Consciousness, as the subject, is defined as the motive force of world knowledge. The mundane, object world is set off as alien to consciousness. Yet through historical progress the subject as a process realizes it is implicated in the object world as one part of its own construction. While the socio-historical world, hence constituted, requires the moment of subject and object constitution as an interdependence, these same realms are in practical opposition to one another. There is both identity and antagonism between subject consciousness, and object world as materiality. By materializing Hegel as do Marx and Feuerbach we find that the totality formed of subject and object in world praxis is composed of a complexity of relations in continuous reconstruction. This finds institutional expression in the elaboration of consciousness in persons, in classes and in knowledge forms as it does in the material objectifications of human labour. Instances of the latter are the economic organization of production, the social and material appropriation of nature in institutional forms. It is the sense of determinate negation or the motive principle of the dialectic



in contradiction, transcendence, and resolution of personal and collective antagonism toward cumulative sediments in forms of higher social learning and material appropriation that interests Horkheimer. For with the possibility of development of a more generalized reflective attitude in world cultures persons are bound to knowledge or ideology critique. Since subject-object relations are historically mediated knowledge, forms become open to our understanding through criticism and hence to their supersession in new forms - mediated by changing loci of relations. New forms of consciousness embedded in the cultural practices of knowledge generally correspond to new social formations in which new antagonism reside - whether political, economic or cultural.

Horkheimer takes Hegel to mean that knowledge critique, as one project of transformative activity points up the essential limitedness, partiality or dogmatism of particular concepts, ideas, or practices in the current social totality. Each fragment of conceptual tradition is superseded in itself but incorporated in a new organicity of relations, concepts, and intentions. Hence history is being made continually present. The progress of the subject object or materials and dialectic while ongoing is not pre-determined in terms of social-political ends by 'history' nor can we vouch safe the abolition of contradictions, of suffering, or of the increasing self-determination of persons. What critical practical inquiry must recognize



is that progressive emancipation from redundant conditions is a continuous project but men can exert some control over the social and cultural practices of reproduction. These possibilities are never once and for all clear to persons in the role as active subjects. Criticism and practice must clear the opacity that history leaves and restore the awareness and confidence amongst persons that they can begin to appropriate their personal and collective destinies. Practice not only sponsors the cultural organization of persons together but allows the question of how to act and what to build as socio-historical projects against the tendency to self-estrangement in the world of social and material objects. To conclude:

Concepts like theory and knowledge must, of course, at any given time have a clear meaning, since only when they are described or defined, however inadequately, can they be understood and applied. But dialectical materialism takes such meanings to be abstractions formed within the context of the contemporary situation out of materials supplied by the past, and not fixed, changeless elements on which the future is to be built. ... The application, therefore, of definitions constructed in the context of the contemporary situation or, what comes to the same thing, the contemporary signification of these concepts can some day become meaningless. ... the image of an endless process involving the simple realities "knowledge" and "object" proves to be an hypostatizing of abstract significations. Such absolutizing is the other side of the exaggerated relativization of science by many Kantian and other idealist trends.

(Horkheimer, 1972A, CT, p.31)



## HORKHEIMER'S CONTRIBUTION AS A MOMENT OF IMMANENT CRITICISM

It should be noted in the context of this methodological portrayal that there is no one conventionalized approach for understanding and appropriating the relations between subject and object, particular and universal that this kind of study convenes. The methodological procedures remain for re-searching each complex of intentioned relations whether in curriculum reform or other social relations. The historical work, theorising, socio-empirical results and action vary with each case.

1. It is the breach between word and deed, concept and object, theory and empirical reality that is to be investigated as part of immanent criticism according to Horkheimer. The presence of this hypostatized duality is not to be collapsed, nor is to be seen as infinitely fixed. What we refer to here would be critical theory's interest in occupying the tension between the historical reality of an institution, or practice or event and the conceptual structures that are meant to demarcate it. The intent is to identify this historical-empirical-conceptual schism, to understand the relations between the two but then to supersede these relations. The gaps between word and deed take on specific historical-political meanings in a recognized societal era - in our case the bourgeois formation of monopoly and organized capitalism.



Immanent criticism is particularly important for knowledge critique of dominant ideological practices as they have sedimented the popular culture and consciousness of everyday life. Immanent criticism in our era is intent upon revealing the false claims to universality that reside in the symbolic and economic practices when in fact the partiality of popular claims is manifest upon 'deeper' criticism. For instance, institutions such as law, wage labour, the market economy, the idea of individual pursuit of freedom formally 'represent' universal principles of justice, equality, and freedom - echoes of the earlier liberal era of an ascendent class - which now have no practical, political content. The class-ridden partiality of these institutions in the capitalist state is expressed in the finely-manicured hegemony of capital. Through identification and structural appropriation of these concepts and their empirical correspondence in society, we discover not universality of access to justice, equality or freedom through institutions such as the public media, curricula or labour markets but the mass participation in practices that reproduce suffering, political stupidity and pseudo-fulfillment of needs through consumption neuroses.

A praxiology that relies for one of its moments on immanent criticism needs theory that recognizes the social world in tendential movement. It does this by taking target concepts of the problem under study, examines their logical structure appraising the relations and their outcomes.



Concurrently it examines the object-as-institution or as-practice in its implications. Through internal criticism the practical method deduces the political-epistemic connections between words and objects/institutions constructing a portrait of the internal contradictions and limits of this relation - in its own terms. A similar propaedeutic occurs with Marx in his analysis of essence and appearance in capitalist commodity relations. Immanent criticism can demystify the taken-for-granted image of a social object, I could say a new social studies program or the in-service approaches used in its introduction, by its internal dissection into a set of revealed political-cultural relations. The object emerges in relief while the contradictions between those practices reveal the split with the conceptual practices that advance the object in routine formal or informal life. The conceptual practices themselves are shown as contradictory in their partiality in portraying the social object. Immanent criticism can yield to practitioners the rhetorical nature, limitations of its language practices or of their essential misidentity and difference with objects in question. Ideological de-mystification of cultural and linguistic practices opens reform efforts to a possibility of radicalization. A propos, here, is the 'ruddy-cheeked' language of curriculum innovation and evaluation projects that offer extended claims to the possibilities for unlimited happiness and wisdom of their program planning. Negation as a methodological device works here to question prima



facie the word-deed relation of specific, organized social settings. In anticipation of Adorno's further elaboration, negation indicates the limits of sets of symbolic resources locked within the present social order but equally reveals the converse of symbolic-practical possibilities within present or unrealized alternative social formations.

Philosophy (negation) rejects the veneration of the finite, not only of crude political or economic idols, such as the nation, the leader, success, or money, but also of ethical or esthetic values, such as personality, happiness, beauty, or even liberty, so far as they pretend to be independent ultimates ... basic cultural ideas have truth values, and philosophy should measure them against the social background from which they emanate. It opposes the breach between ideas and reality. (Negation) confronts the existent, in its historical context, with the claim of its conceptual principles, in order to criticize the relation between the two and thus transcend them. (Negation) derives its positive character precisely from the interplay of these two negative procedures.

(Horkheimer, 1974, p. 182)

Immanent criticism in the service of the practical method criticizes cultural forms, discloses hitherto relations, reconnecting them in our awareness to the social totality. By revealing the connectedness of 'fixed' institutions to their historical ensemble, we can see how class relations and class knowledge can limit or sponsor change. In this way immanent criticism is a moment that sponsors developmental practice; a positive moment inheres within it.



Of particular import for understanding curriculum reform is the extent to which its language or constructs are ideological. That is, do the practical language or program orientations, for instance, represent teaching and learning situations as harmonious rather than the possibility of their being conflict-ridden; do program rationales assume uniformity in instructional objectives, that technicization of evaluation protocols promote the general interests and social learning styles of all children regardless of background rather than the political sponsorship of particular class and ethnicity of children? We can consider that immanent criticism can reveal ideological practices, then, that are materially real in their effects as they channel interpretation and action in social life to particular directions. Ideological practices, as cultural practice, can cause social relations to take on a reified, nature-like quality in the minds of participants thus accenting particular "modes of existence." Each project, in curriculum study, sponsoring these questions will use different protocols yet each is committed to dwelling in the tension between the performance of reality and its formal 'competence.' This tension is sustained by particular social relations that are, in principle, empirically knowable.

For instance,

... subjected to such an analysis,  
the social agencies most representative  
of the present pattern of society will  
disclose a pervasive discrepancy between  
what they actually are and the values  
they accept. To take an example, the



media of public communication, radio, press and film, constantly profess their adherence to the individual's ultimate value and his inalienable freedom, but they operate in such a way that they tend to forswear such values by fettering the individuals to prescribed attitudes, thoughts and buying habits. The ambivalent relation between prevailing value and the social context forces the categories of social theory to become critical...(reflecting) the actual rift between the social reality and the values it posits.

(Horkheimer, (1941) quoted  
in Held, 1980, p. 187)

Here then is an instance of the kinds of questions, immanent criticism promotes through a praxiology. Although only one moment in the practical method, it is both normative and descriptive work.

2. What then is the situation of knowledge appropriated by the activities of immanent criticism. Horkheimer, as have indeed all the members of the Institute of Social Research, insisted the critical was to be open and in sympathetic coincidence to the advanced thought forms of the global intellectual critique, through philosophy, was to ally itself whenever conceptual bridges permitted with the progressive advances in social empirical analyses, social psychology, economics, literary criticism and so on. This meant as well that the moment of criticism would draw from and incorporate traditional theory as well as the progressive 'critical' forms of marginal, advanced groups. This occurred in



Marx's work particularly on political economy, its criticism and supersession. What this suggests is that traditional theory contains points of view that, in situ historically, had their 'moment of truth' and must be incorporated into the progressive formulations of the present nexus of social relations. Hence battling with positivist apologists, as we are so wont to do in contemporary social theory, has its value as a tactic only so that attention is drawn to the partiality of traditional positions, the fact that they are rooted historically, yet generalized politically and ideologically and this to be transcended in a new totalization of society and in new method. Often conventional criteria of methodical adequacy, and systematic reflection is preserved when working in the methodological categories of traditional social science. Horkheimer saw the schism between social science and critical theory as one wherein the inert facts of traditional science were presented generationally to students or to other scholars so this knowledge was merely diffused or transmitted to larger circles of believers. Research then constitutes naming and diffusing facts. Critical theory, instead appropriates the facts of empirical inquiry and re-presents in research and in pedagogy their connective relations to a past social formation. It uses conventional research outcomes as part of the material for understanding segments of socio-historical reality. But it also integrates those



'facts' into a research program of a higher level of complexity - contextualizing or re-contextualizing facts, concepts, principles from its own progressive method as well as the residues of earlier intellectual work. The research practices become a re-totalization in interdisciplinary terms that incorporates the old and the new concepts secured by a sense of the problem under study in its particular and universal aspects. This representation of the diachronic and synchronic aspects of social phenomenal analysis had not occurred in any systematic inquiry prior to Marx's work on alienation and capitalist production. The search for transcultural principles of human universals is conducted alongside the immediacy of social life. As a result what evolves is not merely a more totalized understanding of social and cultural phenomena, previously partialized, but a re-conceptualization of conceptual structures, methods of procedure, and the unfettering of societal tendencies held in check. As the different mediations of a social phenomenon are revealed one sees a kind of historical accounting so that new possibilities of learning, man's nature, lifestyle, societal organization and research practices emerge. As the bases of social learning shift, our understanding shifts from the immediate to the universal global experiences and back again. Immanent criticism as a moment of practical method allows inquirers and citizens to inhabit that tension between the results of



other persons' labour as history, and the possibilities of a future in the critical appropriation of the present (see Johns, 1978).<sup>7</sup>

In the more recent literature of curriculum research, much attention is given to re-attaching theory, development, and evaluation to the concrete human practices that sustain them. To do 'deep' program evaluation can mean to practice an immanent criticism of say, school members' language and work, program outcomes and the latent significance for social mobility or professional autonomy et cetera. Taking the presentations of members, investigating the gap between rhetoric and performance, and then resituating these performances in a large social and professional context constitutes a structural withstanding of selected innovations in schools. Consciousness-raising is a potential outcome of a research theory of practical method. Under the democratic organization of evaluation procedure and dissemination, participants can develop those horizontal shifts of consciousness into the logic of their pedagogy - something traditional vocabularies have not promoted. To the degree that consciousness shifts of particular types amongst school and curriculum people is 'successful' (that is, empirically correct, mobilizing, forging the sense of particular-universal dialectic), then the conceptualization of progressive educational acts will be seen as both possible and necessary.

What is underdeveloped, so far, in my discussion of Horkheimer's contributions to practical method is the praxical



or power to act that can infuse immanent criticism with life. I will refer to the problem of action repeatedly in this chapter as method and throughout the study. This is the most chronic blockage that faces curriculum reform today on three counts: failure to act reflectively, failure to know when one is acting progressively, and failure to overturn the illusion that one is acting at all. It should be noted that I refer to progressive or promotive action - action that advances a generalized interest of all participants in a definite social formation. This of course has to be specified with each curriculum project. (Traditional theory is a practice of sorts since as an activity conceptually, and technologically it sustains redundant conceptions and outcomes in social life.) The works of Horkheimer, Adorno, Habermas, with whom I build this text, invite members to take up criticism, negation, and discourse as forms of progressive, theoretic practice that restructure the illusions of the epoch leading to a necessity to act generally and historically. This is not beyond the interests of curriculum workers but integral to their projects for the good life.

Horkheimer realizes that a position on practical mobilization of persons must accompany theory that critically restructures itself. He notes via Marx, Lukács and Gramsci that any philosophy of praxis entails the verification of theory in real persons' concrete projects or praxis. He recognizes that despite the pessimism of the 1930's in Europe, equally so under current organized capitalism, that theory



and practice must be consciously united to change 'reality' and to change consciousness. A propos Hegel to see the subject appropriate reason differently is necessary but insufficient since 'reality must be changed so it no longer distorts consciousness!'. Understanding curriculum change, and its determinations, need not alter the alienating social structures in which it is embedded.<sup>8</sup> Practical material action must achieve the result of consciousness and reality shifts so that a continual restructuring and humanization of the general and the particular is achieved. Practice for Horkheimer is a political, epistemic, and historical category underwritten by the organization of collective energy.

The verification and confirmation of ideas, which relate to men and society, does not consist in laboratory experiments or in the search for documents, but in historical struggles, in which conviction itself plays an essential role. The false view that the present is ... harmonious, forms a moment in the renewal of disharmony and downfall ... itself becoming a factor in its own practical refutation. The correct theory of the prevailing circumstances, the teaching of the deepening of the crisis and of the imminence of catastrophes are, to be sure, constantly confirmed in full detail, but the picture of a better order which is inherent in it and by means of which to claim for the evil of the present is oriented - the immanent representation of mankind and its possibilities - is determined, corrected and confirmed in the cause of historical struggles.

(Horkheimer, quoted in Held, 1980  
p. 192)

What about the organization of participation of Who is to



become theoretically and practically mobilized for projects in the general interest? Horkheimer suggests that theoretic criticism and the practical projects that accompany it, in a society of chronic differentiation, often fall to the hands of "progressive social forces" that are small, isolated and marginal. This is likely to be a practice short on participants but necessarily conducted in the general interest for emancipation that anticipates later popular participation. Because of the relative isolation of the reconceptualist community in curriculum theory it finds itself in such a strategic yet marginal niche. The 'correctness' of its theory, of its curriculum projects, as generalizable interest, is only vindicated in the steps all participants take toward political and professional autonomy.

As the new needs of character, intimacy and social interests of persons are fulfilled in discourse and action organized in progressive collectives, rational forms of social learning become more plausible.

The awareness of the self as an autonomous individual with his own goal is giving way to the corporate mentality; I might almost say that the earlier self-awareness is now being unlearned. The phenomenon is not wholly negative in its implications. The movement away from the self-awareness of the ego to the self-awareness of the community, and the negation of the individual which is certainly part of modern life, do have as one element a turning from egoism and from self-love as such. The meaning of the whole process will depend on whether in a regulated world the ego will be



raised to a higher level or simply forgotten.

(Horkheimer, 1974, p. 157-8)

#### ADORNO'S CONTRIBUTION AS A MOMENT OF NEGATION

Theodore Adorno, another core member of the Institute for Social Research and who has now popularized what the Frankfurt School wrote in the period 1930-1969 in both Europe (including England) and the United States in the areas ranging from cultural sociology, epistemology, studies of contemporary consciousness, and the nature and role of philosophy in society. Adorno once suggested that his lifelong inquiries were primarily a means to get to know the norms of commonsense since they would provide a natural control over thinking that merely classified and registered mundane facts. Instead, to consider everyday facts as relations of 'infinite mediation' was the understanding through which commonsense could be transcended. The latter for Adorno, and for most of the Frankfurt theorists was an essential normative premise in their work in what could be called - their philosophical methodology of cultural analysis. Adorno in attempting to redeem the critical promise of philosophy in society since Kant sees

His essential effort is to illuminate the realm of facticity - without which there can be no true knowledge - with reflections of a different type, one which diverges radically from the generally accepted canon of scientific validity.

(Adorno, 1981, p. 7)



In our context, in this study, we ought to be concerned with the complementarity that exists between the work of Horkheimer and of Adorno. As each other's thought matured in the 1930's and 1940's and their respective statures became independent of the Institute, we can see divergences within their general concern with the redemptive power of philosophy in social reconstruction. In many respects, Horkheimer, through his writings on the methodological differences between traditional theory and critical theory, the symptomatic spread of instrumental reason, and the functional relations between forms of social science and state or bureaucratic authoritarianism in the advanced societies of the West, have not served to oppose him in intellectual interests to Adorno. Instead, like a prism, the social totality as the constitutive object of both their analyses captures and refracts many dimensions of structure, culture and consciousness that both men helped to illuminate.

Adorno, among his arrays of interests within a neo-Marxist tradition of discourse that included Lukaćs, Korsch, Gramsci, Benjamin, and others in the period 1920-1940, was particularly concerned with how forms of knowledge caught and reflected the nature of society within their methods and objects of analysis. That is, not how did social problems or value conflicts become topics of study in a research agenda in human or natural science, but how did the dominant relations of the social totality express themselves



procedurally and substantively in what becomes philosophy for the age? In other words, how is it that in the reading and practice of a liberal economics text such as Samuelson and Scott's Economics - Canadian edition (1968) by students and researchers are the social forms of an organized way of life reproduced - again, not as self-evident topics of Canadian economic life such as regional disparity, or fiscal transfers, or the theory of secular inflation but how it is that these become constituted as problems, at all, and that we act intellectually on them and materially through them in a certain way? Clearly, the implications of this interest of Adorno's for curriculum research are enormous - or for what some have called a sociology of educational knowledge. (Young and Whitty, 1977; Gramsci, 1971). I rephrase one point of Adorno's interest for us to be how the mode of productive organization and dominant opportunities for cultural practice are embedded as truth statements in protocols of curricular knowledge. To learn more about how the society is constituted and the nature of its impingement on our consciousness means, in part, to examine the internal structures of curriculum protocols and rationales as a particular kind of dialectical criticism. This suggests that Adorno's interest in renewing philosophy as criticism through dialectical negation is a way of revealing the material force of cultural meanings and their roles in social resistance, change, and reproduction. The origins and forms of this philosophy of cultural criticism can be seen in works such as Prisms (1967),



Negative Dialectics (1966) and the Authoritarian Personality (1950). As the imminent revolutionary transformation of society by the proletariat, and the challenge of progressive social science to state orthodoxy did not materialize, members of the Frankfurt Institute drew closer in their pessimism and community. An increasing focus on the problems and practice of human science research, and on the systematic deformations of cultural and intellectual awareness were self-conscious choices by Horkheimer and Adorno seeking to transcend an increasingly administered reality. Each, intellectually, complements the other in a subject-object dialectic between philosophy and society.

What is it about Adorno's mature views (1950-1970) that should interest us as an element of the practical method? In order to answer this it is necessary to present some of his first views for philosophy.

Adorno contends, as would Horkheimer, that the history of philosophy since Plato has been the history of underdevelopment in subject-object relations. That is, philosophy has either led to the atrophy of subject relations or object relations. Where it has made explicit the world constitutive role of each, it has paid inadequate attention to their interrelationships - as, in the career of praxis, for example. Hence we have a history of philosophies either concerned with a hyper-subjectivism or equally, with an all reductionist objectivism. This study has made frequent reference to the methodological effects of either development in understanding



human practice. Typical forms of these philosophical exaggerations are idealism, platonism and select existential-phenomenologies or materialism, empiricism, and experimentalism in research - each form expressive of specific periodized economic organization and ideological necessities. The Frankfurt group in lineage as a neo or post-Marxist tradition, dealt severely with the omissions of vulgar 'Marxist' materialism as a whole. It is the work of Adorno, Benjamin and Horkheimer that deals integrally with the presence of idealist thinking in research practice and in the popular consciousness of the Western societies in their politics, economics and culture.

Adorno is concerned to show idealism in bourgeois societies as a form of identity thinking. Identity, endemically used is the mode of subsuming theoretic and concrete or practical objects under unitary concepts of self-sufficient rational systems. That is, an action, or attitude or practice as an object of interest is assigned unambiguously under a general schema or plan. This kind of thinking prevalent, in western societies, is found as the dominant cognitive-practical mode of organizing corporate life, social policy, intellectual labour, cultural practices, and common-sense understanding. Adorno argues that this kind of identity thinking as an idealist or materialist hypertrophy results in the maintenance of ideological relations in that the conditions of dependency are named but are not historically affirmed. Such thinking is typified, I suspect, by the ideal



type methodology of Max Weber wherein particular cases are subsumed under the sense of the empirical universal. The particular case, in question, is seen as self-sufficiently explained with this procedure. No mutual address of the grounds or origins of the particular are possible once subsumed under categorial universal - whether of social science or of physics, say. Despite the problems of conceptual contradiction with such reductionist sciences, the further import of such thinking is the severance of any critical questions that address the social existence of the object, in question. In such situations a wild sociological relativism has often emerged in an area of inquiry - with the absence of any grounds that could judge the 'power' or 'truth' of competing explanations. Adorno is concerned, then, that there be a standpoint upon which to press the worth of social science research for its qualities of self-renewal and initiation of progressive humanization of group life. Interestingly enough, the grounds of this transcendent renewal for Adorno are found through the understanding of the mundane life practices of individuals and collectivities. It is from within the 'things' themselves, from the subtle unfolding of interdependencies of subject and object that his analysis is centred - as a form of internal criticism of concept and of object. As a weapon of ideological criticism Adorno continually seeks to show how non-sequiturs, illicit contradictions, one-sided arguments, reductionism, glib subsumptions in the materiality of thought essentially express



the structure of society. It is common of identity thinking to confuse the desirability and possibility of single stand-points that conceive and subsume development under an objectivist category. Such thinking, as was the paradigm case for curriculum theory prior to 1971, has its practitioners operating in theoretic self-sufficiency forgetful of the historical circumstances under which their theorising is a reproductive labour. Theory or thought is always a form of praxis, historically situated dependent on physical labour to reproduce the object world as the latter depends upon the distribution of meaning in social forms for its representation or reality accent of the world. This position realizes that both subject and object relations cannot be dissolved practically or intellectually. Theoretical revolutions or embodied criticism has an obligation recognize the grounds of its object world and hence its limits. Philosophy for Adorno cannot embody or lead structural transformation but can establish pre-conditions and a reflective remembrance throughout the struggle.

David Held suggests some of the formative influences upon Adorno:

... first his acceptance of aspects of Marx's critique of Hegel's notion of history; second his concern with Benjamin's criticism of conceptual thinking, Benjamin's stress on the impossibility of universal history, the importance of the particular and the difficulties of comprehending it; third, his adherence to Nietzsche's views on the absence of ultimate foundations



in epistemology, the falsity of identity thinking and the importance of method and style.

(Held, 1980, p. 203)

This patchwork of influences gives Adorno's work a contradictory but powerful quality for showing the complexity of social life at the levels of everyday consciousness and of structure. It was important for Adorno, as it was for Hegel, to account for the formative conditions of particular and typified consciousness in societal culture.

If we examine the history of typified or periodized consciousness in society, diachronically, we discover the passage of different conceptual systems served, usually tacitly, an interest in control through class rule. The Hobbesian sense of disorder in the polity became of increasing concern to a bourgeoisie that became ascendant through violence and revolutionary science. The interest in control of economic production, of social planning and of cultural practices has become a chronic pre-occupation with capitalist societies and the organization of a world economy. With the risk of sounding too-Orwellian, philosophy is the organization of social science, and by implication, school knowledge is effective as a system of control from without, structurally, in the materialization of meaning and representation, and internally through consciousness. The question which pre-occupies Adorno and to a lesser extent, Horkheimer, is the 'congruence' between conceptual systems and empirical phenomena; that is, between the concept and the object or subject



and object adequacy. If grand systems theory, for instance, claims to represent through its totalization the sum of cosmic relations, its vulnerability lies in its brittle rejection of alternative premises and scaffolding that claimed even marginal non-identity with empirical conditions. It is the mind set and flawless assumptions of exclusive conceptual mastery characterized by systems theory or by ordinary-language philosophy that invite investigation by Adorno and the critical theorist. Each of us as investigators is encouraged by Adorno's precedent to look at the particular empirical elements or objects whether they be ideas, text, action, artifacts or relations first of all as non-conceptual objects and then as sets of subject-object relations. It is this tension between the category or concept and the thing names, with its place in specific historical relations that characterizes non-identity thinking. For instance, in Dewey's pedagogy the concepts of interest or discovery, or autonomy, or progressive organization embody a set of subject relations which in turn pre-suppose a set of object relations each of which in turn mutually determine one another theoretically, practically, and pedagogically. Each set of relations, in turn, limits and promotes possibilities of consciousness, of deep understanding, and what is taken to be pedagogy, within the school and in the wider community. Each can support critical analyses of its practices and of the mediations of one with another in conceptual, political, and professional contexts. I could proceed, for example, with a



project that examined the conceptual underpinnings of the idea of interest and perform internal criticism. Equally, I could see how the claims of this concept 'squared' with the practice or object relations that intertwine with the interest idea in the classroom, or in the community. Does the concept "interest" connote more or less than the field of its object relations - what qualities does the conceptual field express or illuminate - does not the nature of the object remain unexhausted by the intellectual structures that claim to predicate it practically and theoretically? Further, what about the historically - situated interdependencies that pertain between the Deweyan notion of interest and its pedagogical practice? That is, how do teachers' consciousness and professional 'vocabularies of motive' mediate the intellectual system with the practical choices of their work - in the ongoing process of materializing curriculum? These types of questions and others dealing with formal educational system conceptions, their commitment to sustain 'equality of opportunity', for example, inside school programs and outside in occupational access and civic participation, can each sponsor analyses of 'factitiously real' practices whether of concept or object, subject or object. Non-identity thinking for Adorno means beginning the material, heartless, task of demolishing the arrogance and mistruths of established intellectual practice and its role in the embodiment of evil in society. We may note:



...Auschwitz demonstrated irrefutably that culture has failed....That this could happen in the midst of the traditions of philosophy, art, and of the enlightening sciences (sociology, education) says more than that these traditions and their spirit lacked the power to take hold of men and work a change in them. There is untruth in those fields themselves, in the autarky that is emphatically claimed for them. All post-Auschwitz culture, including its urgent critique is garbage. In restoring itself after the things that happened without resistance in its own countryside, culture has turned entirely into the ideology it had been potentially - had been ever since it presumed, in opposition to material existence, to inspire that existence with the light denied it by the separation of the mind from manual labor. Whoever pleads for the maintenance of this radically culpable and shabby culture becomes its accomplice, while the man who says no to culture is directly furthering the barbarism which our culture showed itself to be.

(Adorno, 1973, p. 367)

## CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NEGATIVE DIALECTIC IN ADORNO

1. One of the legacies of Nietzsche's influence upon Adorno has to do with the importance the latter placed on the form-content relations or style of his written texts. Adorno felt it necessary that not only his topical content but the structure of its form be crafted in such a way as to reflect everyday and intellectual life in the advanced societies. He was concerned through his writings to display the subtleties of inconsistency, and contradiction that plagued all rational conceptual



systems of our time. As the social structure influenced the possibilities of theoretic activity, and its conditions of labour, so too should thought through form and texture display something of the lived experiences of bureaucracy, capitalist production relations and the culture industries. To the extent that those object relations display hypertrophy, one-sidedness or repressive tolerance, so must the text show their non-identity with the concepts, or ideological representations that stand for them. Adorno is interested in not only mirroring the deformations or non-identity of subject-object relations in culture and society, but also in restoring a sense of particularity and 'at-homeness' to object life. In knowing society as a nexus of subject-object relations through the pre-dominance of object particularities means to know the social totality formatively and particularly; as it were in the minds of men. Given that the texture of everyday life for many persons is experienced as contradictory, mystifying, and incomplete in our understanding of it suggests that textual forms must display the relations similarly not as a descriptive act but as a generative-interpretive act. It is within the recognition that persons as readers experience in these texts that the possibilities exist for a provocative transcendence of the relations depicted and analysed.



Adorno's use of literary techniques, omission, irony, idiom, startling comments, vignettes, essays, formal theoretical argument and other devices are found across the range of his writing. Texts such as Minima Moralia (1974), Prisms (1967), Negative Dialectics (1966), Dialectic of Enlightenment (with Horkheimer, 1972) and Jargon of Authenticity (1973) and others display a wide range of arguments whose stylistic constructions in their often fragmentary incompleteness were designed to jar, and provoke readers into a remembrance of their social life experiences. Adorno attempts through these texts a provocation of critical thought in the community of readers. It is important to see how these characteristics of his critical analyses are not chosen for the purpose of mere titillating effect. Methodologically, the non-identity thinking of the texts serves Adorno's first premises of renewal in philosophy. The reader is intended to less introject and more actively reconstruct meanings and relations that occur cryptically in the text. The reader struggles to make sense of the evidence, allusions, and relations of a social object in the way of a literary 'praxis'. Methodologically, the reader seeks to dispense with the conventional, closed, totalized categories of earlier social science and popular wisdom as their incompleteness, and dependency-provoking functions are unearthed. It is essential, for Adorno, that his texts, others' critical philosophy challenge the insular self-sufficiency of earlier



scientific and popular discourse acting as the bulkheads of consciousness of an administered, reified society. The title Prisms suggests a multi-sided search and display of historical perspectives, often in conflict, can refract the deformities and possibilities of the social totality.

Clearly, then, Adorno's textural style is not meant to entertain the reader or community, first, but is a dimension of his critical methodology. He both provokes, and raises the reader in self-generative criticism at the same time as he provides social and philosophical relational theorizing. Chosen themes, as I mentioned in a prior section on Adorno, serve to give a normative and historical unity or transparency to these prismatic adventures of text. Form and content as methodical devices in their own right form part of a practical method for intellectuals in emigration.

The specific approach of *Minima Moralia*, the attempt to present aspects of our shared philosophy from the standpoint of subjective experience, necessitates that the parts do not altogether satisfy the demands of the philosophy of which they are nevertheless a part. The disconnected and non-binding character of the form, the renunciation of explicit theoretical cohesion, are meant as one expression of this. At the same time this ascesis should atone in some part for the injustice whereby one alone continued to perform the task that can only be accomplished by both, and that we do not forsake.

(Adorno, 1974, p. 18)

2. It was both Adorno's and Horkheimer's growing sense of pessimism about the possibilities of emancipation in a



technical-industrial culture that drew both of them to re-focus their inquiries to research practice, to the methodological and to the particulars of the mundane consciousness. Hope had faded for proletarian revolution and the promise of a public challenge through progressive social change had never materialized. As I have argued, the influences of Hegel, Nietzsche, and Kant can be seen to express themselves differently as objective conditions changed and his pessimism deepened. The idea of the transcendent, as something beyond concept and cognition, has also occupied a part of the political-culture vision of the Frankfurt school. Adorno, in particular, can be seen to couple this interest with his methodology of subject-object relations. He comprehends the possibility that the concept, as in utopian thinking, extends beyond mere empirical referents as in the organization of civic culture. It can point to conditions imaginable but not yet realized and use the transcendent moment as a lever of hope for those persons who can begin, through discourses, to identify common human interests. Adorno retreats then to the idea of the question, not as a point of political or intellectual escape but as a refuge within which to reflect and inquire in anticipation. Joining in the symbolic violence of the dominant order is always laden with risks that threaten to dull critical perceptions. Received thought, whether formal or commonsense, must be subjected to a



critical dissolution as a way of breaking its hold on the minds, imagination and activity of persons in concert. Curriculum planning is a case in point where the naming of the world is generally grounded in closed, ahistorical conceptual systems that prevent the discussion or imagination of origins, or of changes in our naming protocols. Dependency in consciousness and sclerosis in practice occur as the object relations are prevented through symbolic manoeuvres that convey the object relations of social historical world as fixed, atomized, calculable objects. The necessity of social life is the constellation of object relations and subject-object constitutive relations that must be made transparent and intimate to participants. I do not suggest that persons in the community begin to master first premises of philosophy but that responsibility for civic cultural forms, their production and distribution, be made the political property of all citizens. What Adorno seeks through the negative dialectic is an openness to critical junctures in personal or collective movements and that a practical vigilance be maintained through one's writing, one's inquiries and remembrances, and presumably through chosen ways of living. For instance,

As the thinker immerses himself in what faces him to begin with, in the concept, and as he perceives its immanently autonomous character, he clings to the



idea of something beyond contradiction. The antithesis of thought to whatever is heterogenous to thought is reproduced in thought itself, as its immanent contradiction. Reciprocal criticism of the universal and of the particular; identifying acts of judgment whether the concept does justice to what it covers, and whether the particular fulfills its concept - these constitute the medium of thinking about the non-identity of particular and concept.

(Adorno, 1973, p. 146)

Is there a way of proceeding methodically, once more, in our projects that would instance our work as a dialectic of negation? Adorno has argued that in order to understand a social object, it requires that we recognize its historic positional value, or context, and its constellation of relations with other objects within and without its institutional universe. To know an object means to work out the 'inner history' of that object that has been constituted. Through its social-political mediations so we are able to some degree prefigure its transcendent potential and its limitations for us in our projects. We can see that if the social objects were re-conceived and re-experienced, it may become a motive and action-forming source. In order to unlock the weight of tradition around us that saturates our lives, our concepts, and our visions so that it works for us as a history of and for humanity, Adorno employs negation or non-identity thinking. This becomes a means of exploding convention as a coercive, non-progressive form. In our case, with the later Adorno, we are particularly concerned with



textual negation. As I have argued, this kind of analytic-theoretic practice serves to wedge a gap between the supposed correspondence or concept-object, appearance-essence, if you will, that identity thinking assumes. Using negation, a means of exploiting the inner tension or energy between the traditions of naming and the actual historical practice, the theorist explores the unredeemed norms that the object construes or carries immanently. By freeing the object from being caught in an historical redundancy, its possibilities as grounded alternatives in a constellation of multi-textured relations in the world become accessible to persons. The project of inquiry under non-identity thinking involves as analytical-empirical exploration, then, of this gap or tension between concept and object - a tension or contradiction that identity thinking glosses over. The exceptional importance of language use and evocation is necessarily underscored with negative dialectics. Two items that become central to this kind of analysis are possibility and object. They acquire, as do others, a methodological status as procedures that reveal for and empower participants in the practical method. As Adorno says,

We can see through the identity principle, but we cannot think without identifying. Any definition is identification.... Non-identity is the secret telos of identification. It is the part that can be salvaged; the mistake in traditional thinking is that identity is taken for the goal. The force that shatters the appearance of identity is the force of thinking; the use of "it is" undermines the form of that appearance, which remains inalienable just the same.

(Adorno, 1973, p. 149)



The notion of rational identity is a methodological and normative standard that Adorno considered to reside in unredeemed objects. Rational identity is an organizational ideal, that can emerge, but conventional thought has failed to perceive. The typical charge of this kind of thinking is that utopian elements are abstractions of the object, in question whereas non-identity thinking reveals the utopian projections as but aspects unseen or suppressed by linear, conventional thought. Another approach is to start out from the concept, as Adorno indicates at one point in Negative Dialectics, so that an interpretive and evaluative rendering can be made of the object. In a discussion of the equivalence of exchange principle or the bourgeois free market ideology

The barter principle, the reduction of human labour to the abstract universal concept of average working hours, is fundamentally akin to the principle of identification. ...Once critical theory has shown it up for what it is - an exchange of things that are equal and yet unequal - our critique of the inequality within equality aims at equality too....If no man had part of his labor withheld from him any more, rational identity would be a fact, and society would have transcended the identifying mode of thinking.

(Adorno, 1973, p. 146,147)

I refer, as well, to another example of Adorno's use of negative dialectic in connection with the concept of freedom. Here what he seeks to display in his section on method is the concept - object rift that pertains to freedom under current bourgeois hegemony. Adorno does not merely state an incongruence between the two object fields, in the sense of a



logical non-sequitur, but traces the organization symbolic expression or naming of freedom to the (unequal) power relations of a late capitalist society; that is to the reproductive sites of naming practices. He is then able to couple this part of the dialectic to an empirical analysis or survey of what conditions obtain for men and women civically and economically in our society. By then bringing the two parts of his analyses, subject relations and object relations together, he partially completes the dialectic of negation. He thereby enables participants to see the historical interdependencies of subject and object - out of which practical activity may be organized. Depending upon circumstances a project of practical social inquiry informed by a negative dialectic can begin on a subjective or objective moment. Each, however, must recover the other. I would like to illustrate this approach further by citing Adorno's discussion of freedom. (It should be remembered that he talks not of abstract notions of freedom but of something that we as persons living now, in our industrial culture, invest in and expect from, concretely).

The concept (freedom) says not only that it is applicable to all individuals defined as free; it feeds on the idea of a condition in which individuals would have qualities not to be ascribed to anyone here and now....The concept of freedom lags behind itself as soon as we apply it empirically. It is not what it says, then. But because it must always be also the concept of what it covers, it is to be confronted with



what it covers. Such confrontation forces it to contradict itself.... The individual is both more and less than his general definition...this day, he will experience this "more" as his own negativity.... The potential of freedom calls for criticizing what an inevitable formalization has made of the potential.

(Adorno, 1973, p. 151)

3. Because socio-cultural and philosophical inquiry can begin, for Adorno, on different fronts, even though subjectivity or objectivity cannot be known as a pure datum, certain methodological concepts have a general significance in negative dialectics. These are useful ways of determining the particular (i.e., unique historical character) of a concept or object and help trace the internal subject-object relations of a social or physical phenomenon. It is important to convey this dynamic between subject and object, not only for the critical theorist, but for the wider participants in certain cultural practices for this theoretic work shows the 'push and pull' of creative-regressive relations lying behind the particular character of the object in our society, in our subculture and, in our school or program or scientific tradition. To begin to know how and what to resist means to recognize what determining marks the society we reproduce for, makes upon the object of our interest. I am speaking here about the everyday appearance that say, 'freedom', or 'individualization', or 'competency based teaching',



or 'formative evaluation' or 'affirmative action' have for us routinely coping in our society and institutions - at their stage of productive development. This is another way of saying that although objects are not known directly, they have primacy as an ontological field for Adorno, and for critical theory. Methodologically, as questioning persons we approach the object field from within ourselves - seeing each pole as points of energy. Yet, the recognition that needs to be re-achieved continually is that our reciprocal constitution is a reflective-formative process irreducible to mechanical or subjective centres.<sup>9</sup> Each shift in the history of social science methodology has tended to leave one or the other relational field obscured.

Other methodological concepts which need mention as composites of an approach in negative dialectics are those of constellation, essence-appearance, particular-universal, and synthesis. I have treated some of these obliquely in the earlier discussion and examples.

Constellation(s), suggests Adorno, is a means of "illuminating the specific side of the object, the side which to a classifying procedure is either a matter of indifference or a burden" (Adorno, 1974, p. 162). The analogue for this kind of thinking is that of language conduct. It is suggested that language is so much more than a sign referent for its concepts and their objects.



Its primary function in appropriating the world is not by naming it but by revealing concepts, centred around an object through a relational network impregnated with intention. In coming to know the object field, the constellation connotes and evokes far more than the concept in its bold singularity can possibly indicate. Concepts that may subsume, or pretend, or correspond, 'excise' far more practically than they achieve politically through a spurious clarity. Adorno cites Max Weber's sensitivity to the difficulty of defining historical concepts. In attempting to compose a scientific practice adequate to historical sociology Weber illuminates his concept of capitalism relationally. Profit-motives are seen as emergent 'principles of lucrativity' and market relations. The axis of the latter is 'capital and interest calculation'. This is generated through the exchange, freely, of work-centred wage labour. This organization of production requires a 'rationalistic legal system' to account for cost, price, work flow, not to mention the separation of responsibilities "...and a pervasive governing principle of rationality at large" and so on. Nothing less than this kind of treatment restores the object field, capitalism in this instance, to its particular identity within history. It, too, can become the social totality to the particularity of other objects.

The paired ideas of essence and appearance have played strong methodological roles in the work of Marx, Hegel, Lukaćs and others in their investigations of capitalist



social relations and of the contemporary consciousness of those relations. Adorno incorporates this paired idea within negative dialectics as part of a methodical arsenal for determining instrumentalist practices and for disclosing progressive states of rational identity that lie within the objects. Adorno argues that essence is not the rather more Hegelian notion of a "hypostatized, spiritual being-in-itself." It is rather that which is undisclosed behind a "facade of immediacy." Although it constitutes what the facts are, their roots in an essential constellation of categories are denied or obscured by contemporary scientific practice. Factual representations in both our formal and popular thinking as intentioned projects help recede the essential into a 'background' world. Essence is the *bête noire* of a social life set up to reduce men to the anaesthetized routines of their existence. Appearance, then, is a way of describing the subject-objects relations of a "world that curtails and threatens their life by reproducing it and making them believe that it has this character so as to satisfy their needs " (Adorno, p. 167). Like the larger method of non-identity thinking essence - appearance posits the contradiction between the 'way things are and the way they purport to be.' Above all the hostile primacy of an object world is what confronts and stands over against men. Marx's analysis of capitalist society, is among other things a macrosociology, is paradigmatic of work that



unveils the fundamental relations of this society and shows how facts, or appearances are a material part of our totalized relations. Even as ideological representations, they partially determine social and economic production but they also actively "deceive us" about the laws of society. As Adorno says,

Essence (in our society) is what must be covered up, according to the mischievous law of unessentiality; to deny that there is an essence means to side with appearance, with the total ideology which existence has become.  
(Adorno, 1973, p. 169)

What this study has pointed to in the context of curriculum reform, is reflected in the essence-appearance idea on several levels. Substantively, we have much difficulty in recognizing what curriculum development work actually is progressive, reformist, or reactionary. We have difficulty separating out, as practitioners, what it means to appropriate a theoretic tradition, critically, and commit ourselves to the practical transformations that follow its use. It is not only in worlds of research discourse that 'the levelling of essence and appearance' is felt. Adorno contends that subjectivity within persons is arrested. The knower as an emotive being has a reduced capacity to feel suffering and happiness, 'to separate essentials and in-essentials', and 'to know cause and effect.' It is not that the universal sense of essence is lost but that it **is covered over** in a hypertrophy of ungrounded cultural and political



practices. Criticism of the sort being assembled here can begin to denude the prevailing generalities of the social world as somehow necessary appearances in a natural order.

In subject-object relations, that is in critical practical inquiry, we see a tendency amongst theorists to conflate each pole to basic equivalence of one another - a pointing to 'in-here' and to 'out there' at the expense of each others' qualitative differences. Particular or particularity as part of the object pair particular-universal is a methodological concept that is used throughout Adorno's work to sustain a knowledge of social and cultural objects. He argues that to use the concept of the particular in pointing to objects necessarily means its negation at the same time. It narrows the presence of the vivid object and what in fact lies, nameless and looming behind the object. This negation is a limited but necessary moment of negative dialectics. We live through and convene constellations of particulars in our lives. Yet we know more than we can name since "the particular would not be definable without the universal that identifies it, according to current logic; but neither is it identical with the universal " (Adorno, 1973, p. 173). In order to understand and act within society means to favor it from inside formatively - as within the particulars of consciousness and the symbolic practices (curriculum) of a particular social formation (society). Thus to participate creatively in society means to know, if not dwell, on its



social forms and cultural practices. For Adorno identity thinking, as thought reified, means the inability to dissolve the opacity of appearances in capitalist society to see how, for instance, equivalence exchange as a distributed meaning is examined, in itself as a symbolic form, and to what it, among other social forms, opaquely about the relational dynamics underlying this society.

But what about the converse of identity thinking? Is there not a promise that arises out of the workings of the negative dialectic? In order to convene critique, or a discussion of essence and appearance, or the particular and universal means we suppose or know of the possibility or presence of another realm of relations where emancipatory interests can be achieved. Adorno argues that the methodological concept, rational identity, preserves a 'true consciousness' or 'objective reason' over against ideology, false consciousness, appearance, or identity thinking. This supposes that the subject-object suppression, at formal and popular levels of our society, masks the idea of the object as containing ideal properties unrealized and unthematized. The concept for the object contains utopian relations that under different social relations could be met by the object in question. In social inquiry the questions of validity and origins of our knowledge, or truth, accompany the organization of a rational society. Negative dialectics, then, is both a method and normative materialization - up to this



point still unfulfilled. It inserts itself self-consciously and methodically in thought and in physical material reality and recognizes each as contradictory. Yet, these contradictions are particulars (capitalist commodity society) which are dialectical relations in their own right. Inquiry begins with these points. No interpretation of these contradictions is exhaustive. Negation seeks their transcendence through the force of its practical questions.

Society, if it is understood as the functional context of human self-preservation, 'means' this: namely, that it aims objectively at a reproduction of its life which is consonant with the state of its powers.... As soon as it were no longer retarded by societal or scientific authoritative orders, the subjective reason of the ends-means relation would be transformed into objective reason, which is contained in the axiological moment as a moment of knowledge itself. Value and value freedom are mediated dialectically through one another. No knowledge orientated towards the mediated essence of society would be true if it desired a different state of affairs. To this extent, it would be an 'evaluative' knowledge. Nothing can be demanded of society which does not emerge from the relationship between the concept and the empirical, which is not therefore essentially knowledge.

(Adorno, 1976, p. 62, 63)

The practical method that I develop through this study tries to unite the fragments of inquiry, into curriculum reform, from several different fronts. I am concerned that the notion of rational identity is brought a bit closer to us, as a community of readers doing curriculum work. Different



aspects of the study methodically emphasize and recover the subject and object relations of practices in curriculum reform in a way reminiscent of Adorno's critical philosophy. In itself, as a study, it is necessarily incomplete and fragmentary.

#### HABERMAS' CONTRIBUTION AS A MOMENT OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE

As I approach this third moment of the practical method I want to remind the reader of what he and I have been embarking upon. The practical method that I construct here and reiterate throughout the study is operative on at least four levels. By combining immanent criticism, dialectical negation, and public discourse I assemble firstly a critical scientific theory for explaining the phenomena under study; namely, curriculum reform as a social political practice and its special case in social studies education in North America. Secondly, the practical method is to have been taken as a way of reaching this text as a research discourse in a reflexive manner such that the structure of its arguments, its conceptual-methodical features, its political prejudices and the life interests and lifestyle of this researcher are continually made problematic as these relations impinge upon others who practice human science and research in the progressive paradigm of curriculum studies (circa 1970-1982). Thirdly, the practical method is to be seen a form of ideological criticism, *prima facie*, in that it orients its analyses of curricular text, conventional pedagogical- relations, bureaucratic educational



vocabulary and school-society-world relations against a normative background of the anticipatory good life - post - Marxist socialism. Fourthly, the practical method contributes to a movement in this transitional phase of neo-Marxist thought, to secure the conditions for the organization and embodiment of political discourse and action in public institutions such as schools and universities and in the community life of persons not formally studying problems of discursive will-formation in civic and educational participation. Each of these four functions of the practical method is emphasized at different points of this study. Elements of each can only mediate with one another in a research community that gives it a home. The authenticity of this community is at test in responding unequivocally to these four levels of my study. The test of the practical method, never unequivocal, resides in the discourse and action of participants who challenge and appropriate it as a tradition of political philosophy.

Jurgen Habermas, now the most prominent representative of the Frankfurt School, demonstrates through the range of his writings on social evolution, social science methodology, analyses of the state, language and moral development a concern with the idea of the public sphere. Habermas sees the public sphere, an ideal of civic participation developed from early bourgeois society, as a normative and organizational standard to assess everyday, political, and



intellectual life under organized capitalism. The public specifically refers to an arrangement of social life whereby citizens could assemble, discuss, and form opinion freely and robustly - concerning issues of social life. It was seen as a means by an emergent, enfranchised mercantilist class to contain the influence and caprice of established authority traditionally emanating from state, court, or church. The bourgeoisie as a social class was interested to secure a political foothold in the civil life of society in order that their commercial - economic interests could thrive in a social and political climate unhindered by dogma or the weight of precedent. The free and full expression of articulate opinion, as organized through relations of formal democracy, became one means of securing cultural-political hegemony of an economically ascendant class. The procedures of free argument became the justifying force for legitimizing public opinion. Hence discussion in order to have warrant and significance in the society is to proceed by force of critical reason. The bourgeois ideal, although now recessive in its particular class connotations, of the discursive formation of will has become a cultural institution under liberal and organized capitalism of considerable ideological and political force. This sphere, as the idea of public opinion, has been considered historically to express the general interest. This belief has prevailed despite the observations that it is affluent 'well-connected' persons who carry, formulate, and



project authoritative opinion. The popular assumption, then in our society, is that certain classes of persons represent the 'reasoning public' by virtue of their capital and property.<sup>10</sup>

However, despite its historical career, it is important not to forget the rational, critical impulse that lies embedded within the idea of public opinion as a process of discursive will formation. The possibilities that lie with this social institution in contemporary technical-rational society have never been fully realized in either North America or Europe for civic or educational participation. It has been argued by Habermas (1975) and Offe (1972) that the potentiality of the public sphere as one organization of public discourse and action has lessened under 'progressive' epochs of capitalism. In the context of everyday relations in the advanced capitalist democracies, the public sphere as a critical and rational organization of opinion in civic practice has been distorted and shrunk to resemble 'media' and 'public relations' work. The possibility of the organization of discourse and action in the general interest in public life has correspondingly lessened. It has been noted (Habermas, 1975; Touraine, 1968; Bell, 1976) that relations between the state and civil life or society have become progressively more intertwined as the sector seeks to stabilize capital accumulation, investment crises, and popular anxiety through intervention in economic and social benefit decisions. Additionally, natural science



and its technological derivatives is now considered a productive factor in the economic subsystems of society - losing its formerly quasi-independent and critical position in socio-cultural life. These tendencies Habermas contends reduce the possibility of the popular organization of will and decisions over issues affecting public life.

As the social system restructures itself, the form of social integration and class-based social interest shift from an economic organization based upon equivalence exchange, at least ideologically, to one based on organized corporate-state sector concentration and 'securement' of markets, pricing and investment structures. As a result the nature of intervention in everyday economic life shifts, as do the expectational profiles of work. Legitimation becomes a problem of fixing 'mass loyalty' to a system that still organizes social production for private interest. One gambit the state uses to secure the bases of legitimation and motivation of the remainder of citizens is the 'depoliticization of practical issues.' The social value of popular and educational knowledge is defrayed by its sublation to instrumental thinking and technical problem-solving. Organized capitalist societies seem to be drifting toward a 'negative utopia of technical control over history' (Habermas, 1975).



Such contradictions can no longer be designated accurately as antagonisms between classes, yet they can still be interpreted as results of the still dominant process of the private utilization of capital and of a specifically capitalist power structure.

(Offe quoted in Habermas, 1970, p. 108)

Class distinctions persist in the form of subcultural traditions and corresponding differences not only in the standard of living and life style but also in political attitude.

(Habermas, 1970, p. 109)

In his work on the social evolution of societies and consciousness, Habermas attempts to reconstruct Marx's own method and analysis of historical materialism (see Habermas, 1979, c.4) to take account of the structural shifts in organized capitalism occurring in the late twentieth century—something Marx apparently did not foresee. The effects of these shifts upon the normative structures and ego development of persons living in these societies is the most current interest developed by Habermas (Habermas, 1981). For the purposes of this study, it is Habermas' recasting of earlier historical materialism from productive labour as practical activity to work and interaction (or language) as the twin reproductive interests of human social organization. Habermas argues that neither Marx nor contemporary social theorists effectively recognized work and interaction as the material-historical struggles that constitute the project of the social work and hence social evolution. Hence, a



humanized praxiology must concern itself, according to Habermas' criteria with not only productive, material transformation but also with transformations in institutional and identity structures. In a study, such as this one, concerned with curriculum reform, as a cultural practice, the particular organization of symbolic interaction, and of cultural tradition is of primary importance.

The practical method which assembled, here, contends to have the capacity to accomplish analytic, interpretive, and critical or enactive inquiry concurrently. I achieve this by thematizing a particular cultural object or practice, curriculum reform, and begin to reveal the social meaning and possibilities of this object, often hidden, through the three moments of practical method. In one important sense, although the practical method contends to be human science and critique concurrently, it does so or unfolds only through revolutionary practice - anything less suppresses its encoded possibilities as a human project. In order to unfold in the general interest, as it were, means that explanation, interpretation and critique must be situated in self-conscious public discourse. This can be equally materially momentous as revolutionary research discourse, paradigmatic of human science or it can also be the revolutionary organization of enlightenment in public communities, and in school-based instructional settings where issues and decisions of real general interest (see Geuss, 1981) have emerged in the minds of affected citizens.



What becomes of concern for curriculum workers, organic intellectuals (see Gramsci, 1971, p. 6) and, ironically, social policy bureaucrats in the state sector is the nature of self-understanding of citizens under successive re-entrenchments of capitalism. That is, what outcomes for social learning are associated with structural economic shifts in mediation with dominant cultural forms that would be significantly different generationally for citizens' latent interests in practical action? As Habermas shows, in his reconstruction of social evolution shifts in productive forces at the societal level imply necessary shifts in social learning so that changes in work relations, for instance, either lead to incorporation within a docile population or so that the population acutely challenges the shifts in their macro social reality; that is, as the principles of social integration within a society shift so do its relations of moral order and consciousness (see Bernstein, 1971). Although underdeveloped by Marx, Habermas develops the realm of symbolic interaction on both subjective and intersubjective planes. Social learning incorporates relations of moral insight, imagination and practical knowledge within the communicative organization of action. Within the universe of social learning communicative action is a means society introjected whereby conflict, consensus, and action are regulated in the course of everyday life. Clearly, as the complexity of the economic subsystems, and with that new productive relations occurs the more mature



forms of social integration develop. Using the notions of socialized labour and socialized consciousness in this context, it could be argued that more mature social learning could occur. Hence, the possibility of superior moral insight organized around language and interaction could be realized through crises events in organized capitalism. A central insight of Marx had to do with the progressive developments that often emerge from crises of contradiction. In Habermas, the "dialectic of forces and relations of production" as a potentially revolutionary relation is extended and elaborated to include communicative organization; that is, as a motive-forming interest.

Human language, as an outcome of intersubjectivity, brings together subjective needs and feelings, cognitive ability, normative motives, and transforms them into an intentioned project of action and desire. Percepts and values through utterance are transformed into projects of general and particular validity. Such action, normatively bound, reflects stages of economic and social development as well as it does stages of ego and moral development. The later work of critical theory has been to demarcate these stages, more fully, giving it the ability to name social psychological factors behind often paradoxical social movements (e.g., return to fundamentalism, neo-conservative politics and social acquiescence). The risk for those of us as educators who work in 'social reform' as a vocation is that the other side of the dialectic of maturity and regression, under an



organized capitalism, can occur. It is equally possible that the dominant institutional framework we all labour under "will gradually absorb communicative action " (Habermas, 1970, p. 106). In considering all our friends in this, I wonder if

Sociopsychologically, the era is typified less by the authoritarian personality than by the deconstructing of the superego. The increase in adaptive behaviour (that we witness) is, however, only the obverse of the dissolution of the sphere of linguistically-mediated interaction by the structure of purposive-rational action.

(Habermas, 1970, p. 107)

In his more recent work on communication and evolution, Habermas (1979, 1981) suggests that social theory may be in a position to tie the development of technology (one level of the productive forces) to stages of formal cognitive development. In large measure he draws from Piaget, Kohlberg and the history of technological developments (see Freyer, 1965) in demonstrating how linguistic-cognitive structures mediate with productive forces. What Habermas inserts, analytically, between identity structures and economic organization in explaining the contradictory development of each is the world view of persons and of groups. Early work on communicative competence (Habermas, 1971) indicated the generative role (action and understanding) that shifting world views had in concert with both the semantic properties speakers held and their social setting of



communication. If these relations are elaborated in the directions research in critical theory proposes then world views of persons, of texts, of institutional expressions become one more access point for curriculum studies in understanding the deficits and possibilities of social reform programs. Since curricula encode social representations of the world, to more deeply investigate, using negative dialectics as prototype method, the concatenation of ordered world views, these 'grand suppositions' of particular rationality structures, also means disclosing the practical force of these particular mediations.

Habermas in his earlier works (1970, 1971, 1974) has relied extensively upon Freud to give projects of critical-practical theory its normative and emancipatory zeal. Through combining Marx and Freud, or characterological and social structure, individual development, at the level of persons is given collective, historical content at the level of institutions. For Habermas, as it was implicitly for the aforementioned, it is important to appreciate and thematize the mediations between the two levels of movement. Critical theory has come to accept that the therapeutic and psychodynamic investigations of Freud into consciousness, its style, origins, and functions also have implications for understanding collective social organization - not, however, as a mere transposition of insights to a collective level since the insights of analytic therapy for the person are causally organized. Freud's applied psychology



construed conceptions of normality, and deviance as 'disturbances of communication, behaviour, and organic function.'

However, what wants as a normal or deviant self-formative process can be defined only in accordance with the institutional framework of a society, then this society as a whole could itself be in a pathological state, when compared with other cultures, even though it sets the standard of normality for the individual cases it subsumes.

(Habermas, 1971, p. 274)

The extent to which there is homology of function, but not identity, between the structures of consciousness and those of societal forms according to Habermas' interpretation of Freud's metapsychology, if we accept it, secures the importance of communicative organization in the promotive tendencies of persons' political projects. That is,

the reality which the ego comes up against and which makes the instinctual impulses leading to conflict appear as a source of danger is the system of self-preservation, that is, society, whose institutional demands upon the emergent individual are represented by the parents. Consequently, the external authority whose intrapsychic extension is the superego has an economic foundation. ... The same configurations that drive the individual to neurosis move society to establish institutions. What characterizes institutions is at the same time what constitutes their similarity with pathological forms. Like the repetition compulsion from within, institutional compulsion from without brings about a relatively rigid reproduction of uniform behaviour that is removed from criticism.

(Habermas, 1971, p. 275, 276)



Habermas sees the tendencies of purposive-rational action in society to be embedded in an interaction structure that is carefully mediated by cultural forms such as media, community life, schools, and local civic expression. Since the communicative action organized in these structures must serve the interests of social labour, these linguistic and cultural resources are available to express group interests aside from reproduction. The latent contradiction in the deployment resides in the fact that this normative cultural system of interaction, embedded in the above forms requires to be 'institutionally stabilized' for the prevailing economic interests, yet this normative structure of interaction although it accomplishes a restless pseudoconsensus among persons also can become the means, the expression of transcendent interests. Not all expressed social and instinctual needs find gratification through the dominant social organization of everyday routines. Yet these action motives are not countered, Habermas argues, cognitively or discursively, as much as they are through affective forces. That is, the

...institutional framework consists of compulsory norms, which not only sanction linguistically interpreted needs but also redirect, transform, and suppress them.

(Habermas, 1971, p. 279)

The argument can proceed the following way. If social repression is partly achieved through organizing distorted



communication within cultural forms then as economic conditions shift and ego development occurs then the institutional framework of the society requires less ideological and political repression and more progressive forms of gratification can be tolerated. This is one dimension of the implications between styles of consciousness and the particular level of organization of social-cultural and economic development. Clearly, if I refer to progressive or mature forms of development it refers to the personal appropriation of freedom by those who experience suffering, suppression, or the failure of their projects. Radical change of this kind presupposes that we abandon the commodified transmission of help from centres of expertise and research. These changes must emanate from the articulation of locally recognized and expressed conflicts - in our case from the inner and outer boundaries of the school community.

It is important to remember how Habermas recasts Marx's historical materialism. By extending Marx's ontology of nature and social labour into a developed categorial framework the importance of work or labour and interaction or language is emphasized. Using Freud's model of psychoanalysis as a prototype method for critical theory's projects, Habermas has us understand the appearance and durability of power and ideology as relations of distorted communication. This suggests that in order to understand the problems of resistance, domination, and human praxis for social reform



and hence curriculum reform means that linguistic, cognitive, moral, and psycho-sexual development become formal topics of research in praxiology. Although no formal research or private opinion at present suggests a qualitative, progressive shift in our institutional frameworks, it is to the organization of communication in formal and informal settings that curriculum inquiry energies could be placed if we accept Adorno's dictum on the unredeemed object; that is, the bringing to public consciousness the possibilities of personal and collective development. To be sure this is no mere idealism but the laying of a basis for critico-formative projects in which human praxis is understood as the reconstruction of speech, cognition, and action - as modes that re-express intimacy, necessity and nature with others. Habermas (1979, C.3) has recently delineated the stages of moral consciousness and relational capacity that can accompany these ideal shifts in speech and action.

It is in Theory and Practice (1974) that Habermas suggests some of the important methodological caveats for a critical inquiry that seeks to inform political organization.

The theory thus encompasses a dual relationship between theory and praxis. On the one hand, it investigates the constitutive historical complex of the constellation of self-interests, to which the theory still belongs across and beyond its acts of insight. On the other hand, it studies the historical interconnections of action, in which the theory, as action-oriented, can intervene. In the one case, we have



a social praxis, which as societal synthesis, makes insight possible; in the other case, a political praxis which consciously aims at overthrowing the existing system of institutions. Because of its reflection on its own origins, critique is to be distinguished from science as well as from philosophy.

(Habermas, 1974, p. 2)

In partially disassembling this quotation, what the reader is admonished is that inquiry that seriously seeks and risks an understanding of radical curriculum reform will investigate the origins and context of the research problem as posed within a particular research community at the same time as it recovers the motives and interests of those doing inquiry within their personal structures of opportunity and commitment. Secondly, it maintains the former insights as it prepares for political action emergent from particular cultural and interactive fields in full recognition of the coercive limits, 'cooling-out' strategies, and interactive opportunities of state-society relations. In addition, this kind of inquiry, Habermas indicates, must be cognizant of the history of how political power has been used; and that of its distribution and appearance. It is within these kinds of constitutive contexts that we can attempt substantive projects of radical political criticism.

What then can be said about the organization or retrieval of power over practical questions in the form of public or practical reason? It is within the context of the public sphere that practical questions show their manifold implications



for reflection and action. The public sphere as I have argued earlier was a cultural form for the text, expression, and rejection of public opinion or normative perspectives on issues in the lifeworld. For the mercantilist class these were norms that were oriented action and could be validated or dissolved only through critical reason(s). Cognitive support, in the way of intellectual inquiry or theorising entered the structures of discussion of the public sphere to be integrated within communicative practices, in situ. Such theorising, as I have assembled, throughout this study for instance, leads not directly to correspondences in political struggle - it contains an explanatory and interpretive function for persons' interests, which are often latent or non-symbolized, in 'the reflexive formation of volition.' Hence, theorising through public discourse practices is reconstructive, clarifying, and anticipatory in that it sets the institutional and psychic preconditions for the organization of political action. In a real sense, it is through the public discourse that we, as self-interested groups, begin to recognize social domination in its density, as it corrodes our self-confidence and solidarity. It is through public discourse that we can see how resistance can be formed to those relations that play upon our guilt complexes and our sense of deficit at not holding expertise in understanding society. Political action requires that practical discourse over questions of real interest (see Geuss, 1981) be institutionalized within



publics prior to more collective<sub>11</sub> action. The objective within interested publics<sub>12</sub> then is the generation of a practical discourse that convenes the open, unconstrained, non-technical discussion of community problems - that is, by freely selecting participants. As I have argued in earlier sections what is key to public discourse as a practical accomplishment is the dissolution of distortions and compulsions in communication which are lodged in the social structure, in textual forms and traditions of interaction and in persons' consciousness. In broader terms what emerges through public discourse is the "general discursive formation of public will " (Habermas, 1974, p. 5). This structural organization of communication has become increasingly difficult as public issues are absorbed and depoliticized in the logic of technical hegemony. Public discourse, too, has the vital function of recovering the cultural contents of a class, ethnic, and vocational consciousness that aids in reforming a public tradition.

The university, under assault presently and contradictory at the best of times, ideologically committed as it is to critical scientific research, can serve as an advocate indirectly of the organization of viewpoints and political organization that would run counter to dominant state-corporate perspectives. Its history as an institution provides some precedent for internal and public 'discursive will-formation.' In our time the role of the organic



intellectual in Gramsci's sense, is typically more evident in groups allied around ecology, labour, and civil rights issues. The womens' movements, certain labour and ecology coalitions exemplify the possibilities of a practical discourse rather than most educational organizations or electoral politics. One difficulty, for those of us involved in curriculum planning is to recognize the important differences in organizational approach between those in the society who passively withdraw their consent from primary practices and those who are in a disguised, but virtual position for political action on concrete community issues. Symptomatically, the appearances of dissent are similar; practical methodology can begin to clarify the potentiality in different strata of consciousness.

The historical and political importance of curriculum work should not be undermined as epiphenomenal cultural practice. By re-institutionalising new patterns of discourse through school organizations, teacher education and development, the contradictions of liberal reforms in education can often be exploited. In severing curriculum development from its original authoritative bases in church and class, program content is relativized and laid open to discipline intervention. With a professional vocabulary of 'openness', 'individualization', and 'integration', content and form is vulnerable to counter-ideological influence. Bernstein (1971) has pointed to the contradictions



between psychologized social control and cultural alternatives of the 'new' curricula. The unboundedness of cognitive contents of interdisciplinary programs can affirm a kind of practical discourse in the planning and the pedagogy of such programs. For teachers and learners this would represent an extension in social learning patterns as themes mediate with organization/pedagogy in the formation of will. The underside of this contradiction best seen in the light of curriculum reform efforts is how 'affirmative' curriculum philosophies and their progressive vocabulary, often do little to ensure a practical discourse within classrooms and within the regions immediately outside them nor to generate new knowledge forms. The phenomenon of 'no-significant-difference' in implementation and development project history attests to the material power of appearances, as legitimation devices, in the organized economies of the capitalist state. Curriculum reform can be likened to the

"bold fiction" of liberal democracy which was shattered . . . by the restrictive conditions of production, a polarization of forces resulted ...(and) a tendency has set in to reject as illusion the claim that political and practical questions may be clarified discursively, and to deny, positivistically, the truth value of such questions.

(Habermas, 1974, p. 26)

Public discourse can occur and become a practico-creative force if we consider its movement to be composed of at least three interests. One of these is constituted through the



moment of immanent criticism or the generation of critical scientific analysis of societal processes (see Horkheimer, 1940) - projected and historical. A second interest consists in the interpretive analysis of subject-object relations where text, event, and speech are subject to self-formative and conceptual analysis of their inner limits and possibilities as historical sediments in social-political time, or negative dialectics (Adorno, 1981). Thirdly, these two interests and their respective insights and thematizations need to be embodied in a progressive, public normative structure whose deliberations are conducted and resolved as the practical organization of communicative action directed toward political struggle, or public discourse. Public discourse contains the prior systematic insights on structural developments, the contents of consciousness and cultural text and the strategic and tactical planning of political action in reflective-discursive relations. As Habermas terms it, the organization of discourse within publics possessing real interests aims at the production of prudent decisions - (understood in its original sense). Practical method, as normative analysis and method, convenes these interests organizationally and publicly (understood as C.W. Mills usage) in substantive practico-creative projects of curriculum planning, development and evaluation.



Only to the degree that organized enlightenment and consultation lead to those groups toward which this is directed actually recognizing themselves in the interpretations actually become consciousness, and does the objectively attributed situation of interests actually become the real interest of a group capable of action.  
(Habermas, 1974, p. 32)

This is a reminder to those social reformers amongst us who, even in good faith, will use the clout of electoral social democracy or the gentle expertise of teacher consultancy models, or progressive methods of curriculum decision-making as the appearance of rational consensus unsecured in the hearts and minds of participants in a project. The truth of functional analysis and negation, in a practical method is never independent of the wills of those persons in resistance. It is in publics acting self-consciously in some semblance of solidarity over common interests, that have been arrived at through discourse they have convened, who can act humanely and critically, temporarily outside of ideology. Such groups whether intellectuals, lay organizers, or interest groups act on the understanding that the risks and outcomes of political action are considerations generalized as the responsibility of all participants as speakers to their shared discourse. In the heat of public discourse a group that considers the posture of its political action must reconcile any 'divergent' perspectives virtually within organized action.



Every 'theoretical' tendency or clash of views must immediately develop an organizational aim if it is to rise above pure theory. (Each tendency) is a tangle of individual deeds on the part of individuals and groups....This tangle, confused in itself, can only acquire meaning and reality if it is comprehended within a historical totality...By gauging the situation, by preparing for action and by leading it such an analysis attempts to isolate those factors that lead from theory to the most appropriate action possible. (Lukaćs, 1971, p. 299-300)

Lukaćs implicitly refers to how preparation (public discourse) for political action is not only a test of theoretical insights and organizational finesse. It is above all a test of the limits of the motivational contents and moral insight possible for a particular public over a particular issue. How it assembles its inner relations in order that participants have purchase on the design and 'validation' of the inquiry so that they "know what they're doing" is indicative of the limits of its consciousness.

Such consciousness is carried forth and achieved through discourse. Discourse must be distinguished from mere reflective action since the latter seeks an automatic correspondence between experience, opinions, and outcomes. Reflexive action envisages participants exchanging experience, judgments and acting tentatively but compulsively in the light of these sequences. Discourse, however, seeks to argumentatively justify and marshall motive and insight in the validation of norms and opinions. It tries to express the speech-laden interest in consensus or understanding under conditions



of maximal freedom for deliberation. One objective of discourse organized around problem complexes is the achievement of an understanding of norms, events, ideas as to their actual and potential existence in the social world. Discourse recognizes that human speech, under conditions of political equality, presupposes that four orders of validity could or would be met ideal typically in the construction of intersubjective consensus. Discourse differs from reflective action in that it explicitly raises the question of the achievement of these tendencies in all speech oriented to true understanding. It is by recognizing these promissory tendencies in speech that communication organized as discourse can reflexively approach and secure the true or rational consensus - so important for public, political conduct. Discourse imputes "the idealization of pure communicative action" as the justifying norm that lies outside of all other norms of justification. It is upon this that the authenticity and praxis of "speaking and acting subjects can be judged." This is not only a normative-linguistic condition, for discourse, but a structural-political condition to be achieved in publics. Consensus through discourse is achieved if the four different orders of speech claims are realized. In any communication between speakers and hearers or participants in a focussed group (see Goffman, 1963) in which say, issues or problems or sentiments are being discussed, each person presupposes through the very act of speech the possibility of attaining



consensus amongst each other 'vertically' and horizontally.' That is, with each speech act come four suppositions or orders of claims that have to do with "the comprehensibility of the utterance, the truth of its propositional content, the correctness and appropriateness of its performatory component, and the authenticity or sincerity of the speaking subject " (Habermas, 1974,p18). That this speech carries cognitive or normative content means that the topics of deliberation are filtered through a network of deliberative, justification. It is the organization of communication as discourse that permits the testing and securing of these speech claims. If they are redeemed, so to speak, participants can infer that rational consensus has been achieved - or, the discursive, constraint-free formation of will. Clearly, this achievement represents a kind of communicative action suitable for the deliberative organization of conduct for political struggle or critical inquiry. These communicative norms are reformed only implicitly in reflective action, information exchange, monological or instrumental decision-making, and communiques - the possibility of actually achieving misunderstanding gross or subtle amongst participants is unclarified as are the political and prestige conditions which impinge upon or deform the structures of interaction that convene this talk. In the case that unreflexive talk is the mode of relations between participants, we can say that there is distorted communication sustained. Relations of ideology and domination are the



'essential' concealment of distorted communication and are thus action-laden or of material consequence in the world of their participants. Habermas indicates that we can project stages of moral-social autonomy and ego development from their bases in the experience of rational consensus with others (Habermas, 1979, C.3). Hence the degree to which discourse on themes of structural and existential significance is consistently virtualized corresponds to shifts in world views of persons and thence to their cognitive-moral relations with others in the world around them. Reason organized practically and discursively is rich in implications for social praxis and world reconstruction.<sup>13</sup> The historical importance of discourse for achieving rational consensus, or the frank dissolution of common interest is that the subculture of technical expertise and planning, we live with, operates unself-consciously in pretence of communicative action such that there is no self-correction possible, amongst persons who 'behave strategically.' There is an importance here for curriculum reform that should not be lost. In any social formation, such as organized capitalism in Canada, the constellation of interests in educational practice, say, inevitably obeys a "logic of force." The communication of interests that run counter-ideologically to dominant traditions cannot be easily or massively thematized as themes to organize. As a result what passes for 'public participation' and 'political discourse' in curriculum policy is mere appearance. It is important to note that



Marx understood that the bourgeois democracy of liberal capitalism 'had to remain as ideology and as false consciousness.' In part because of the contradictions between the organization and relations of production programs of democracy and reform could never be realized but were the idle, naive dreams of well-intentioned men. So, too, is the case of curriculum reform, as it is practised, in our time under organized capitalism. As legitimation and compensation measures are injected in to more remote corners of the social structure in the attempt to defuse and depoliticize dissent and withdrawal the appearance of critique and political partisanship grows. Yet, what seems to happen instead is the institutionalization of quasi-public traditions of debate and problem-solving secured in a "natural manner" but unreflexively. Citizens are treated to the orchestration of 'natural discourse' that suggests opportunities for their progressive rationalization. Two examples, that come to mind are the form of professional and community representation on provincial curriculum policy boards, and the kind of bounded allowances for critical exchange and debate allowed opposition electoral parties during the question period in provincial legislatures. In the first case the actual selection of representatives is severely contaminated, particularly as to what constitutes vocational excellence; and in the second case, there is such a dearth of structural support for the tradition of negation and opposition with no reasonable financial resources for issues research that in



these two examples the kind of activity that passes for critical, political constraint-free discourse is a sham - the form of the proceedings in effect merely ideological. I mention the second case, a typical one in most provincial legislatures where third party presence is a new event, since the parallels with alternative curriculum reform are striking in terms, for instance, of the thicket of procedural, legalistic subterfuge that persons must pass through and manipulate strategically to be "heard." Hence, I express faith in what has been called "radical reformism" as a communicative initiative at certain historical-political moments in our society. This represents, as both Marx and Habermas maintain, a faith in the capacity of ones' opponents to contend with you in dialogue where argumentative justification may be a serious option for deciding on policy and action. Changes in the general structure of education under organized capitalism make it increasingly difficult, however, to sponsor this kind of public communicative action let alone to couple the forces of opposition for revolutionary struggle. Both marginal and electoral parties show a dearth of political education in cadre training, and formally democratic decision-making structures that easily close under the press of opportunism and personal advantage. Notably, curriculum reform is paradigmatic of reformist, cultural practices where persons in organizations act toward expressions of progress encoded



within strategic-theoretic protocols which practically and cognitively render the organization of their enlightenment impossible. It is the practical organization of reason and commitment reaching toward "adult autonomy" and which must figure in allrational discussion that could begin to secure cultural-political projects transcendent of ideological deformations of human interests.

... reason as controlled insanity gains an oppressively acute sense under technological domination over a praxis,.... The motive of reason was already central and determining in myth, religion and philosophy; there it had the function of laying the foundation, within the manifold of shapeless phenomena, for the unity and coherence of a world; this motive lies on in a perverted manner in insanity. When the sciences, within a flux of phenomena in principle devoid of world, seek to wrest from contingency that which is empirically uniform, they are positivistically purged of insanity. They control but they do not control insanity; and therefore insanity must remain ungoverned and uncontrolled ... this way reason falls between two stools. Accordingly, the danger of an exclusively technical civilization, which is devoid of the interconnection between theory and praxis, can be clearly grasped; it is threatened by the splitting of its consciousness, and by the splitting of human beings into two classes - the social engineers and the inmates of closed institutions.

(Habermas, 1974, p. 282)

In sum, public discourse gathers together the other two moments in order to develop a dialectical criticism which actively embodies attempts at reconstruction. The tradition in which discourse is legitimated assumes, as



is the case of the public sphere, that moral and practical questions ultimately have a rational foundation and that their claims to "collective rightness" can only be settled discursively and in public discourse. This argument then overrides those of cultural relativism and technical-strategic decision - a relative of probability theory. This "cognitive ethics" suggests that the procedures for offering binding reasons for the acceptance or rejection of moral-practical and propositional claims can be found in the relations of discourse. Discourse can purchase these expectations because as a practice it thematizes persons' expectations for attaining consensus, and bespeaks for an idealized common interest, generalizable, and conducted under constraint-free conditions. Hence, there are two interests of socialization at work in discourse-achieved consensus: the tendency to understand personal interest as derivative of common interest or generalizability, and the politically-established access to free and horizontal communication. This is seen as secured historically through the humanization of democratic cultural forms, and ontogenetically as a transcendental interest of speech (acts).

A core element in my notion of public discourse is communicative competence (Habermas, 1971; 1979; 1981). The latter project is a practical-conceptual formulation that intends "to identify and reconstruct universal conditions of possible understanding " (Habermas, 1979, p. 1). What is significant about this for the study's purposes



is that conflicts, strategic action, social action are all derivative of action designed to reach communicative understanding since each involves a virtualization of interests endemic to speech. To look to the organization of political conduct only outside of language is to deny key human traits and to fail to see speech, in its fully redeemed state as a social praxis - not of the mind but of material forms. Clearly, as is the direction in reconceptualist curriculum theory, gestural, bodily, and non-verbalized relations can form part of a critical, communicative praxis (see Pinar, 1983). These human relations, historicized, must become part of a broadened agenda of research in curriculum studies and radical curriculum reform.


Of the three moments of practical method that I dwell on in this study, none can prefigure the ultimate conduct of political struggle whether it occurs in our formal research communities, our schools and communities, or with focussed groups of publics. I have discussed in earlier sections the form and boundaries of the 'organization of enlightenment' through our knowledge of critical philosophy, of self-reflection, and of the organizational dynamics of capitalist society. I am unable to compose directly the form of political struggle. This can be justified discursively as a moral-practical action, in situ, by participants affected by such action. Only idealistically or dogmatically does it provide strategic recipes. What cannot be rationalized is the extent of personal and collective risk involved by those



who are engag  . The degree of organicity, of inner subject-object relations of each moment of enlightenment can be read indexically by the presence of repressive or distorted communication norms. In reading these norms participants or researchers can determine only through discourse whether there is a systematic application of critical science theory, and self-reflexive and textual analyses productive of insight so that their testing is one of authentic confirmation. In a sense, like indices that can be read off, certain structural features appear sequentially in conversation if rational consensus and communicative action is accomplished. The following figure helps to organize the discrete possibilities of a social praxis generated from a practical method:

#### A Typology of Possibilities for Social Praxis Emanating From Practical Method

Figure 2



(adapted from Habermas, 1979, p. 209)



Each of the above discrete classes of action can be investigated empirically as can the generative socio-political conditions that give rise to each within focussed interaction settings. What I am proposing is that research protocols can begin to assess the extent of repression or distortion in patterns of speaking and hearing in concrete settings. It can also specify the formative and political relations that act upon participants in communication. A normative, cognitive ideal of communicative competence is used as an ultimate justifying norm against which 'processes of enlightenment', reform movements, institutional political democracy, and quality of lived program life might be assessed. The following section takes up some of the practical, empirical possibilities for curriculum and pedagogy.

It must be remembered, however, that such utopian blueprinting, occurs against a particular normative horizon in organized capitalist society. Once outside the curriculum laboratories and seminar rooms are we as persons who reproducing ourselves, daily, able to resist, confront, or mobilize against the dangers of our cultural traditions, our civic and political autonomy being absorbed by extraneous planning? Part of our bulwark against this are the living connections our cultural lifeworld has with our means and relations of economic production. This practical reason which is an emergent practice of these relations cannot be severed from a concern for public, discursive justification. Habermas has suggested (1975) that structure of "bourgeois



consciousness" is undergoing changes which nonetheless are ambiguous. It is uncertain as to whether we are seeing the bluff of bourgeois civic culture being called unable to deliver (as Marx suggested) its political and economic dividends to the mass of persons, or whether school curricula patterns have shifted systematically enough that mature ego development has become regressive and persons' capacity to put forward and recognize practical interests has totally eroded.<sup>14</sup> The efforts for renewal in curriculum reform, however, must preside strategically over these junctures in its social organization of research discourses.

#### CREATIVE HISTORICAL POSSIBILITY

As I have presented in earlier portrayals, one of Habermas' major projects has been the reconstruction of Marxist historical materialism. Human emancipation, for the former, becomes a practical activity and not one bound up solely with the level of technical development of productive activity. For persons, individually and collectively then, self-realization is both a self-formative process and a productive material process. In an era of political economy critique, class, was a major category of analysis. In our later era of sociological critique, ideology also becomes a second methodological concept of particular importance in the analysis of domination and social organization in organized capitalism. As a result of the recognition that domination proceeds as much from social psychological compulsion



as it does from economic deprivation, a broadened dialectic of political-economic critique and self-consciousness is called for. Clearly, work has begun on these needs; one that brings us closer to home in these projects when we recognize that our domination is conducted in terms of the manipulation of private needs as well as class position. When our labour and practical interests are in part directed to dissolving the dependence of consciousness on, or the recovery of consciousness from reified controls, our research, as practical renewal, must seek to understand language use and its role in creating possible objects of knowledge. The goal is the development of normative prescriptions from empirical research.

What are some of the structures peculiar to constraint-free communication that practical method is interested in portraying in order to understand more directly the creative possibilities resident in speech and in society? Habermas (1970) suggests constraint-free communication shows a non-contradictory correspondence between the three levels of non-verbalized communication. That is, in the acting person, verbalizations are found to match with behaviour which in turn matches with gestural moves. Hence, no contradictions in meaning or intent, latently or explicitly can be detected in persons' performances. This suggests that praxical movement is embodied in a horizontal project that unites desire, reason, commitment and self-consciousness.



Constraint-free communication within which discourse falls partakes of an implicit intersubjective agreement of speakers in a community such that significations made by speakers are recognizable and shareable identically by all persons in this community. This feature speaks to interest in real consensus as one in which deliberation and event are geared to their redemption in the generalizable interest.

Constraint-free communication logically and practically implies that participants are conscious of the methodological distinction between subject-object, concept-object, essence-appearance, form-content, possibility-facticity as dimensions of social-historical space and time which they resist and produce. Speech operating under this recognition displays these distinctions explicitly in discourse with others over "issues" or "attitudes" or "conceptions" and, in textual formulations, pedagogy or curricula. Constraint-free communication does not simply will away these distinctions, if indeed the empirical work of researchers has revealed them.

In line with Adorno's views on subject-object or concept adequacy constraint-free communication preserves the importance of the particular, or the uniquely historical, in a constellation of relations of reflexivity and materiality. That is, language use is seen as a way of maintaining the face of personal identity structures and intersubjectivity. Equivalent levels of class and structure, region and state, or action and tradition reproduce this notion of the



irreducible particular as a starting point for interpersonal relations or formal research.

Constraint-free communication demarcates the verbal (often research) protocols for categories such as causality, time, history, explanation, resolution, and fact. Clearly, the kind of decision-making shifts if it refers to natural-physical events or historical-interactive events. The outcomes for discourse and action are altered considerably if historical time or social space are not used in accounting and planning for human action.

These properties of constraint-free communication, if actualized, work toward rational consensus in participants. When the properties analytically decompose, they become a normative standpoint that allows us to evaluate processes of communication (distorted or constraint-free), and institutional or societal structures. That is, practical method which builds upon this normative-linguistic core allows inquiry to reconstruct intrusions in communicative action, to reconstruct 'world-building' practices, and to materially challenge the bases of legitimation of the current social order. This method rests on criteria which reside within the actual structure of speech and within the subject-object constellations of society. It reveals the creative historical possibilities of this dialectic of resistance and possibility while it dispels the reified appearances of reform.

What is it within the internal structures of speech,



itself, that compels us to understand its potential for creative historical possibility? The issue of understanding is key to seeing the creative, dialectical core of the speech act. Understanding can simply refer to the commonsense agreement that two speakers have over a linguistic expression or turn of phrase - the boundaries of their shared thought fixed simply by that single semantic unit. Rational consensus or structural understanding implies a totality of agreement, not identity, in dimensions of action, intention, meaning, and reciprocity. Typically, such consensus is keyed to one issue, or policy, or attitude the social and epistemic significance of which is protracted and grounded through discourse. In many respects, the appearances of simple understanding and rational consensus are similar. In analysing the structure of socialized speech we are able to reconstruct the suppositions and conditions in general understanding. In ordinary communication, and even in formal verbal protocol in research circles, these presuppositions are assumed but never tested or explored. In such circumstances political conditions, internally or externally, and speech usage could determine misunderstandings and repressed communication would become the norm.

According to Habermas' particular formulation (1970, 1979), persons' sentence use in utterances is 'rule bound' in its relation to provinces of reality. Each sentence in use attends to the domains of physical-external reality, social-normative reality, and subjective-intentional reality.



The speaker attends to each domain concurrently and attempts to demarcate the boundaries of each; in other words, the speaker in utterance with others take up and accents each reality domain. Hence competence in communication represents the virtualization of claims embedded in speech to representation, expression or subjectivity, and interpersonal action. (Linguistic philosophy conventionally ignores these kinds of considerations and concentrates on issues of conceptual usage and syntactic consistency in order to establish competence, see Chomsky, 1965; Hare, 1972; Wilson, 1963; Derwing, 1973; Taylor, 1960). Although these generative features are considered in Habermas' formulation of competence they are only a partial account of what is involved in the virtualization of speech acts.

In the recent work linking critical theory (Habermas 1979, 1981) with speech acts theory points to underdevelopment of our knowledge of the expressive and interpersonal dimensions of utterances. The parallels with the development of social science methodologies are clear. For critical theory it is the interpersonal function in utterance that is the more vital to be developed. Speech act theory as developed by Searle (1969) and earlier by Austin (1962) is essentially interested in the analysis of how it is we say something is in fact a doing. It represents the achievement of some relation between persons; that is, between speaker and hearer. Both Austin and Searle consider that the achievement or dissolution of the speech act resides in its



illocutionary force. This means that the nature of the speech act entered into by a speaker carries with it a normative obligation to call out in the hearer a particular relationship intended by the speaker. There are both general and specific conditions that must be fulfilled for the successful realization of a speech act to occur. I refer here to cases where speaker and hearer are in institutionally unbound or non-ritualized settings such that might occur in critical-practical projects, revolutionary situations, or in rational research discourse. In this settings the bulk of the warrant, its particular transmission, and its acceptance or not by the hearer are primarily accomplished by the participants to an action. These are cases in which tradition, institutionalization, or dogmatic precedents in language and meaning are relatively non-contingent upon communicative action. Although latent properties of all native speakers, it is only in the attempt to accomplish dialogue and to participate in discourse that the other modes of speech with their range of validity claims rise to the surface of interaction. Discourse provides a kind of 'bas relief' upon which to ascertain these claims discursively. The following figure helps to summarize the range of points discussed.



## Discourse and the Progressive Humanization of Conduct

Figure 3

<u>Domains of Reality</u>	<u>Modes of Communication: Basic Attitudes</u>	<u>Validity Claims</u>	<u>General Functions of Speech</u>
"The" World of External Nature	Cognitive: Objectivating Attitude	Truth	Representation of Facts
"Our" World of Society	Interactive: Conformative Attitude	Rightness	Establishment of Legitimate Interpersonal Relations
"My" World of Internal Nature	Expressive: Expressive Attitude	Truthfulness	Disclosure of Speaker's Subjectivity
Language		Comprehensibility	

(adapted fr. J. Habermas, 1979, p. 68)

In order to come to a point of true consensus or understanding speech as an utterance between persons must display what is called its "double structure" of reflexivity (Habermas, 1979, p. 41). This means that a sentence aiming for consensus, rather than, say, a command to someone to do something, communicates propositional content and it communicates how the communiqué is to be taken by the hearer; that is, it indicates as an expectation the role the hearer should assume interpersonally within a particular utterance. Commonly, ordinary speech assumes the double reflexive structure but does not pursue it thematically as a topic between participants. Often, formal language, particularly, that derived from instrumental thinking often communicates or 'transmits' propositional content or representations of an



external, possibly reified world. Most of the validity claims pre-supposed in some way by this communication are either unchallenged, ignored, or non-discursively sustained. That is, relations of unequal power intrude upon participants' communicative practices. Clearly, this kind of analysis would continue in a number of directions such as the implications understanding language use in this way has for personality, interpersonal relations, styles of discourse, carries with it an assertion and a promise utterance by utterance. It asserts the intention and reality demarcation claims of the speaker, or text, or tradition and makes to the hearer/reader a promise of entering into a certain kind of relationship with the speaker by virtue of this communication which he/she will reciprocally honour. This illocutionary force of redeemable speech acts builds up a level of intersubjectivity which can be acted on one way or another by the participants. Either the claims put forth by the speaker are received unexamined by the hearer; or the hearer declines the relationship that is promised; or the hearer accepts the interpersonal force of the utterance and extends their incipient intersubjectivity in a discursive redemption of the claims that the speaker promotes. If these are found through dialogue or discourse to be unjustifiable claims, then the opinions, decisions, or actions that are part of the discourse are rejected. It is important to see the speech act, its contextual conditions for justification, and the upshots of the critical and practical discourses; if



sustained, are concurrently political, cognitive and emotive activities. Each utterance received and interpreted in the nexus of participants becomes a specific claim because of its content and feelings but also it is a general claim because of the conditions under which it is debated and resolved. That is to say, hearer and their participants in a dialectic circle can be "rationally motivated" to accept the assertion and promise of the utterance. Discourse, in this process, goes beyond rational assent because it touches upon and thematizes the different levels of reality such as subjectivity and expressivity such that they are integrated formally in the decisions and actions of participants. To the extent that speakers and hearers make explicit the four claims to validity and achieve some joint congruence of the four 'domains of reality' demarcated by speech in their project-specific utterances, then they approach a state of communicative competence. This, then, is one sense of the idea of 'discursive will-formation.'

Utterances can be 'cashed in' at two primary levels of action. Either speaker and hearer have the obligations to discharge the expectations for understanding in an immediate sense (that is, an immediate affirmation is what is wanted) or in a mediate sense where the speech obligations are extended in a series of actions. The mediate extension and redemption of mediate speech acts is of particular interest to this study and its interest in the analysis of curriculum



reform. For in this case speech claims, verbal or textual, are often made about the truth value of curriculum (cognitive attitude), or, the appropriateness of particular theoretical or developmental strategies are often claimed (interactive or expressive attitude); or, the sincerity or authenticity of competing conceptions, or analyses of curriculum, or planned reforms are often raised. Each of these claims when made problematic can be tested and justified through theoretic and practical discourse for its truth value, its appropriateness, its authenticity, and its comprehensibility as a curriculum object embedded in the social-political constellations of the society we live in.

In the final analysis, the speaker can illocutionarily influence the hearer and vice versa, because speech-act typical commitments are connected with cognitively testable validity claims.

(Habermas, 1979, p. 63)

This means moral-practical claims, cognitive-propositional claims, as well as claims to political conduct can all be investigated in principle. Speech acts

are embedded in relations to reality in such a way that in an acceptable speech action segments of external nature, society, and internal nature always come into appearance together.

(Habermas, 1979, p. 68)

According to Habermas (1970) idealism and the counter-factual nature of the speech act is sustained primarily, only, by



world views that become barriers to will-forming communication. Ideological practices at the institutional level have their practical correspondences in the neurotic disturbances of the individual. This I believe is an admonishment for each of us doing research in pedagogy and curriculum.

Discourse, as practised ideal typically, implies that decisions-made, theories developed, attitudes and actions that arise as topics in publics or other interest groups depends finally on the stronger and more elegant argument. It suggests that ethical, political and material actions are ultimately rationally and discursively settled; that is, no other criteria ultimately can be standpoints by which to organize enlightenment internally and collectively. Discourse, as in the public discourse of the practical method, has been conceived to be a "radicalization of argument" in topics that become claims, which tested or justified, altered, accepted, or discarded and enter the stream of participants' political wills. Theoretic discourse as an analytic distinction from practical discourse would initiate its process with representational statements and sequentially arrive at a knowledge and ideology critique. Practical discourse initiates its processes with emotive or normative expressions and sentiments which produces sequentially critical-practical will. If the internal validity claims of the object 'statements' have been met, and the situated political relations have been neutralized, then a rational consensus can emerge reflective of the lifeworld interests and



intentionalities of the collective project. At the same time it can be assumed that because of validated knowledge of the structural conditions of the society within a perspective of species global history that participants are in a position to consider questions of political strategy. It is the anticipated situation of justice, equality, and truth grounded as it is in the ideal speech situation, that permits the connection between discourse and action or progressive emancipation to be seen as a transcendental species interest. The construct of the ideal speech situation allows those in human science to do the necessary evaluation of intellectual-cultural production, of distorted or ideology-laden or neurotic communication and to organize for the legitimacy of critical-practical action. Clearly, there is a dialectical, yet not dialogical relation between individual development and social evolution, shifts in the structure of formal and practical thinking, and the volitional capacity for theoretic and practical discourse.<sup>15</sup>

I can imagine the attempt to arrange a society democratically only as a self-controlled learning process. It is a question of finding arrangements which can ground the presumption that the basic institutions of the society and basic political decisions would meet with the unforced agreement of all those involved, if they could participate, as free and equal, in discursive will-formation. Democratization cannot mean an a priori preference for a specific type of organization, for example, for so-called direct democracy.

(Habermas, 1979, p. 186)



In summary, the practical method constitutes itself normatively and analytically as an anticipation of the good life - one that is grounded in its criticism of prevailing social arrangements. Each of the three moments interacts one with another in a practico-creative project. Embedded within these relations of research practice is the core of a communicative ethics.

### Immanent Criticism

This represents a way of identifying an alternative organization of societal and human resources that promise a progressive humanization of material and learning capacities - based on a criticism of present forms. This has taken the form of functional critique and utopian theorising, that is traditional versus critical theory.

### Negative Dialectic    A

The former category overlaps with negation in the sense that in both cases assessment through criticism are made of the necessary pre-conditions for revolutionary human transformation. This would refer to the presence of rational social learning forms and levels of moral consciousness appropriate for the discursive formation of democratic organization.

### Negative Dialectic    B

So that material and human resources, social learning and consciousness structures are plausible as alternative



forms in socio-cultural transformation then must the internal relations of self-knowledge and formal knowledge represent a concept-object adequacy which develops the possibilities in each. This involves the thematization through concept-object relations of possible historical tendencies meaningfully portrayed and discursively apprehendable. Adequacy of the inner relations of objects is significant, too, for the action that such understanding will promote.

### Public Discourse

This involves in the broadest sense of practical method the reflexive capacity to situate participants biographically and structurally, in the conditions of domination and resistance of their society. Communicative action allows persons to experience these conditions as "socio-historical relations." Deliberation, choice, and action discursively grounded become a praxis in the projects of publics.

It typifies a conception of freedom that analyzes the content and form of existing struggles within the context of their historical genesis and development ... modes of reasoning, interpretation, and inquiry develop a critical capacity to the degree that they pay attention to the flow of history.

(Giroux, 1981, p. 117)

One of the most significant developments in educational theory over the last decade has been the breaking-free of curriculum theory from the slavish orthodoxy of mainstream social and behavioural science research and their practices of social



apologetics. At this point at the end of much fruitful alternative intellectual stance-taking in curriculum, it seems that we ought to embark on a second generation of scholarship in the field and begin to do the research and development tasks that our well-cultivated positions have called for. The risk if we do not is that our language and our actions will lapse into that same kind of opaque blindness and sclerosis that our ten year project in intellectual pluralism and neo-Marxist adventures has so vehemently criticized in earlier, instrumentalist versions of "doing curriculum". If we do not engage in a kind of 'de-exoticization' of our theoretical projects and relate these cultural topics to the other real questions of resistance, intimacy, competence, and community that are bound up with understanding curriculum phenomena, then we merely exchange one form of arrogant elitism for another; that is, substituting the phenomenologist for the salesman of the medicine show. What we are faced with, as Henry Giroux (1981) has said, at this point of our intellectual and political history are the tasks of self-renewal and self-criticism. He argues that in order to understand the essential underdevelopment of curriculum as a field means to see how ideology, dominant institutional interests and our theoretic object relations interpenetrate one with another. In another sense this means that our modes of inquiry and discourse become hollow ones lacking the potency to penetrate our commodified vocational and civic existence. Moreover, although current curriculum language



'talks a good show' about contradiction, injustice, and repression in classroom, through curricular text and pedagogy, and in macro-structural relations, its capacity to rationally and compellingly motivate us to act politically as citizens and researchers is not apparent. One of the arguments I make through this study is that as participants interested in new horizons or comfortable niches, we do not really know the realities we inhabit and reproduce. We have forgotten or never known depending on the mobility circumstances of our careers what in social reality confronts persons like ourselves in our deepest anxieties that incites forgetfulness and disavowal of struggle and intimacy with others. Hence we are not positioned existentially, intellectually, or politically to sponsor, 'with a good heart', the only kind of theoretic and development work that curriculum for human possibilities is warranted to pursue. This kind of position can be pursued infinitely but as an overall research strategy I have proposed that our concerns must be directly concerned with coming to know the textures, structures, and symptoms of routine human life in our culture. This involves coming to know the phenomena

...that reproduce and support forms of mystification and ideology that conceal the essence(s) of reality.

(Giroux, 1981, p. 117)

I am attracted to posing the phenomena of curriculum reform of our own vocation and of social reform of our own society as key issues for research and practical renewal in the opening cries of the second generation in curriculum theory. We



must 'search for truth beyond the false harmony between subject and object' or between biographies and history. A task of curriculum theory, too, is to generalize the conviction for those who receive the formal products of curriculum work that the social world may not in fact be arranged as they see it.

Practical method as an historical and intellectual formulation, if organized as a generalizable interest, has strong implications for the conduct of future curriculum research, for the development strategies of the field, for pedagogical practice, and for our intimate relations with others as private persons, co-workers, and citizens. These latter concerns we should never forget for they so often carry our tangible sense of how the dominant reality is experienced by us conditioning our intellectual efforts and affecting whether we relate important issues through communiqués with our students and co-workers or whether we seek conditions of discourse. We embody in our actions and speech the substance of disavowal and promise in curriculum reform and social reform that I argue are the necessary grounds for moving paradigmatically to a second generation.

What generalizable practical method does for the organization of curriculum theory is to hold out promises that can only be redeemed by those participants in the field as researchers, teachers, and students committed to 'other visions.'



Practical method supplies the understanding that schools, curriculum, and pedagogy ought to be examined in a context of history, understanding, reproduction and production. As a method it seeks to show the multisided determinations of particular cultural objects linking our knowledge of them with specific normative interests.

Practical method forces us to think relationally about knowledge, classroom social relations, values, and between school and society. It attempts to raise common sense consciousness to new, globalized levels of understanding.

Practical method is committed to a view of the unfolding, creative subject. It is through a radical pedagogy featuring critical dialogue and non-authoritarian social relations that we can re-establish our intimacy with the creative, caring centre in each of us. Practical method though its conceptual categories can reconstruct practically for teachers and students the formative conditions of the hidden curricula and school evaluation arrangements in terms of their own experience.

Practical method contains in each of its moments a transcendent quality referred to obliquely by Adorno and Marcuse as the negation of the negation. Transcendence in those terms means to refuse to participate or assent to problematic or duplicitous practices in everyday life, in vocation, in political and civic endeavours that sustain a 'radical evil' in personal and collective relations with transcendence, to deny a validity to social forms that arrest



us developmentally means that its denial once accomplished is refused as well. Contained within the structure of criticism is a reconstructive core that 'emancipates our sensibilities, imaginations, and reason' in subject-object relations.

Practical method sponsors as the duplex of negation the ideal organization of human communities as a reflexive social learning. Curriculum planning informed by historical materialism, reconstructed, means that the 'development of productive forces can proceed in conjunction with the maturity of forms of social integration so that there is development of learning ability in two dimensions - progress in objectivating knowledge and in moral-practical insight ' (Habermas, 1979).

Kosik reminds us to make a personal project of identifying the particulars of the pseudo-concrete

The world of reality is not a secularized image of paradise, of a ready-made and timeless state, but is a process in which mankind and the individual realize their truth; i.e. humanize man. The world of reality, unlike the world of the pseudo-concrete, is a world of realizing truth, a world in which truth is not given or pre-ordained, and as such copied, ready-made and immutable, in human consciousness, but rather a world in which truth happens. This is why human history can be the story of truth and the happening of truth. Destroying the pseudoconcrete means that truth is neither unattainable, nor attainable once and for all time, but that truth itself happens, i.e. develops and realizes itself. (Kosik, 1976, p. 7)



## FOOTNOTES

1. Professor Herman Tennessen, University of Alberta suggests the definition of praxis given in Klaus' and Buhr's Philosophisches Worterbuch is as historically comprehensive as any. This study borrows partly from this definition. "The word praxis is a philosophical, sociological and political keyword with a somewhat loose and variable use. The standard definition could be rendered roughly as follows: "Praxis" denotes the total societal process which consists of the transformation of the objective reality by the humanity. Praxis is the objective activity, all the doings ("das ganze Tun und Treiben") of the societally united human beings in their effort to change their natural and social world ("Umwelt").
2. For an exhaustive treatment of the relationship between the organization of science, modes of production and social control outcomes in history consider the work of J. D. Bernal's Science in History 4 vols. (1969); C. C. Gillespie's The Edge of Objectivity (1960); I. Zeitlin's Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory (1968), S. Hughes' Consciousness and Society; J. Habermas' Knowledge and Human Interest (1968); I. Meszaros' Marx's Theory of Alienation (1970) amongst others.
3. Varieties of conception of theory and practice are given extensive historical review in N. Lobkowicz' Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx (1967); A.S. Vazquez' The Philosophy of Praxis (1972); K. Axelos' Alienation, Praxis and Techne in the Thought of Karl Marx (1967); J. Hoffman's Marxism and the Theory of Praxis (1975).
4. Radnitzky refers to Karl Popper's distinction within his criticist frame of reference to open societies and closed societies in The Open Society and its Enemies (1945).
5. The conscientization work of Paulo Freire in Chile, Brazil, and Guinea-Bissau comes to mind as instances of radical pedagogy that leads to humanized, political action. Culturally and intellectually the problems of consciousness and enlightened political participation differs in the metropole countries of organized capitalism. Structurally, of course, we are linked ironically as brothers and sisters and, as exploiters in a global network. The possibilities for political education in




North American education must come through curriculum networks elaborated around our own regional and community expressions of global underdevelopment. Practical method in part draws from theory and practice of critical social theory founded on the terrain of Europe and America. Curriculum workers in Canada can draw from these traditions yet must structure their work methodologically in such a manner that they are open to our own dimensions of colonized space, time and symbol and to the intellectual and political resources of our regions. See P. Freire's Pedagogy in Process (1978), and M. Novak's Living and Learning in the Free School (1975) and A. Burton's The Horn and the Beanstalk (1972) as early attempts at cultural-political transformations through the schools. Counts ought to be alive to comment on these projects!

6. I make analogy here to the distinction found in Chomsky's (socio) linguistic theories between a subject's capacity for linguistic performance and language competence in social settings. Habermas (1971) takes these distinctions and builds a normative model of communicative competence which can be indexical for the political repression resident in speech acts. I take up this issue in a later section.
7. See R. W. Johns for particular curricular and pedagogical contours of a social studies for global citizenship based upon a non-Marxist view of human nature and social-cultural development in the world in Theory and Research in Social Education, 6:2, 1978.
8. I use practical, here, in the special sense of achieving worldly and relational awareness through thematically-inspired degrees of heightened intersubjective encounters with others. Curriculum deliberation would be a possible instance where the re-examining of themes can bridge the persons' mutual estrangement. Practical as used here galvanizes structural understanding and restores competence to act insightfully in concert. It is similar to Ricoeur's notion of giving a home to interpretative activity.
9. I refer here to the tendencies of social science, rather than human science, to posit the development of social forms in either mechanistic metaphors (eg. vulgar materialism, systems theory) or atomic-subjective centres of meaning (e.g. idealism, transcendental phenomenology, linguistic analysis.)
10. For an elaborated discussion of the public sphere and its civic organizational potential in organized capitalist societies see in English, J. Habermas (1975), (1974) intro. c. 6, 7; (1970) text; (1979) c.5 and Strukturwandel der Offentlichkeit (1962) text.



11. See R. Geuss (1981) for an acceptable view from an analytic philosopher of the concept of 'real' interest in critical theory.
12. I rely upon the sense of 'publics' that C. Wright Mills employs in "The Structure of Power in American Society" in Power, Politics, and People (Oxford, 1963).
13. It is, I feel, quite unfair and more than annoying to continually charge Habermas with practising a form of cognitive idealism or 'talk as purity' detached from the concrete world of everyman, etc., etc. What is alarming in my experience is that presumably serious intellectuals take not the time nor the interest in understanding the core assumptions of Habermas' sense of communicative competence and their solid grounding within an historical-materialist dialectic. The motive of the former seem to be a fear of systemic thinking that may entrap their glorious narcissism preventing it from being admired.
14. Habermas in Legitimation Crisis (1975) p. 141 offers only tenuous projections about the fate of the individual and historical consciousness under the structures of advanced capitalism. One knows not on this account whether to fall into chronic despair or to take more decisive action - first, of course, at the level of personal lifestyle.
15. The organization and sequence of discourse developed through practical method has distinct parallels with Habermas' notion of the "radicalization of argument" in J. Habermas (1975) 'Wahrheitstheorien' in Fahrenbach ed.





PART IV  
HISTORIES OF DISSENT AND  
RESTRAINT IN SCHOOLING



They, the people. - The circumstance that intellectuals mostly have to do with intellectuals, should not deceive them into believing their own kind still more base than the rest of mankind. For they get to know each other in the most shameful and degrading of all situations, that of competing supplicants, and are thus virtually compelled to show each other their most repulsive sides. Other people, particularly the simple folk whose qualities the intellectual is so fond of stressing, generally encounter him in the role of those with something to sell, yet who have no fear of the customer ever poaching on their preserves. The car mechanic, the barmaid, have little difficulty in abstaining from effrontery: courtesy is in any case imposed on them from above. If, conversely, illiterates come to intellectuals wanting letters written for them, they too may receive a tolerably good impression. But the moment simple folk are forced to brawl among themselves for their portion of the social product, their envy and spite surpass anything seen among literati or musical directors. In the end, glorification of spendid underdogs is nothing other than glorification of the spendid system that makes them so. The justified guilt-feelings of those exempt from physical work ought not become an excuse for the 'idiocy of rural life'. Intellectuals, who alone write about intellectuals and give them their bad name in that of honesty, reinforce the lie. A great part of the prevalent anti-intellectualism and irrationalism, right up to Huxley, is set in motion when writers complain about the mechanisms of competition without understanding them, and so fall victim to them. In the activity most their own they have shut out the consciousness of tat twan asi.<sup>1</sup> Which is why they then scuttle into Indian temples.

(Adorno, 1974, p. 28)

1. 'Thou art this': mystic panteist formula of the Upanishads.



## CHAPTER 4

### PAST & PRESENT PROGRESSIVISM

#### A CRITICAL HISTORY

##### A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE FIELD

Theodore Brameld, second generation leading representative of the 1930's social reconstructionist movement and a figure determined not to preside over the demise of that politically conscious variant of progressivism, argued in 1971 that part of the public school's task was to strive for

a new articulateness, a new sense of collective strength, a new wrathful but righteous indignation, a new hope for the achievement of worldwide democracy for mankind - all of these are mingled together. In this vast, rumbling, clumsy infinitely powerful mass of hundreds of millions of human beings lies the great reservoir of strength for tomorrow's education. Here, indeed is the fountainhead of all utopian potentials presently emerging. The immediate task before the (teaching) profession is to draw upon this strength and thus to strengthen control of the schools by and for the goal-seeking interests of the overwhelming majority of mankind.

(Brameld, 1971, p.356)

Some have argued, as does Charles Bowers (1969), that with the exception of Theodore Brameld and the lesser known philosopher of education, Isaac Berkson, (1958) no direct conceptual links or transpositions of the 1930's reconstructionist position can be found in contemporary curriculum or educational theory. Although this study disputes that view, particularly with reference to the social



studies, the lineage from 1930 to 1978 is difficult to detect conceptually and practically. Though much of the flamboyance, public rhetoric, and optimism of the position has dissipated, it is now articulated, I feel, most cogently in the curricular and instructional proposals of certain schools of thought in social studies education. (Shaver, 1977). Historically and currently in the social studies, and in educational theorizing at large a profound sense of malaise, disillusionment and cynicism concerning the nature of institutional life, of knowledge and of social purpose prevails. (See Mehlinger, 1977). In more specific terms those representative of the 'reconstructionist' position make the assumption that a sector of the education establishment, such as the schools, is obliged to organize actively for radical institutional and social change.

Systematic social reform proposals were being articulated as early as the late nineteenth century in North American education. Progressive education reform proposals either directed their attention in broad terms towards social amelioration strategies for the poor and dispossessed children of North American society or focused their efforts on a 'humanization' of the institution of schooling through revisions of method, content and teaching style. The period after 1920 saw a distinct crystallization of these tendencies, each derivable to some degree from John Dewey's pragmatist philosophy. Both a child-centered wing and a radically, reformist wing emerged. An uneasy relationship that persisted



between the two schisms was institutionalized with the appearance of the Progressive Education Association in 1919. Until at least the mid 1930's the child-centered wing which emphasized creativity, learner interest and integrated curricula was the dominant fraction that held professional and public attention. (See appendix VI for a more extensive discussion of these intellectual-political cleavages in progressivism).

In a context of economic depression coupled with political cynicism in North America (and the western industrial world) the reconstructionist group clustered around faculty at Teachers' College, Columbia University. This group revisited some of the larger concerns of the early years of the century in which teachers and related practitioners were exhorted to take the lead fashioning a 'new and more humane' society. This plea transcended early notions of progressivism that dealt with individual development and student acquisition of social coping skills in the face of rampant change. George Counts and other Progressive Education Association members such as John Childs, William Kilpatrick, Harold Rugg and Jesse Newton, developed through their publication, The Social Frontier, a plea that teachers qua professionals orient themselves and their students through the schools to actively combat social injustice and to systematically strive for political and institutional change.

The cluster of educators from Columbia University congregated in the late 1920's to discuss the relationship of the schools to an industrialized society. They considered how education could become a more effective instrument in



humanizing society by equipping teachers and students with the intellectual tools necessary to understand and direct social change. Lawrence Cremin (1961) quotes from the writings of William Kilpatrick who argues the task of education was

to prepare individuals to take part intelligently in the management of conditions under which they will live - (and) to equip them with the intellectual and practical tools by which they can themselves enter into direction of (social) forces.

(Kilpatrick, 1933, p.269)

Such an outcome was to be partly achieved by revising professional training. By placing more emphasis on history and the social sciences, it was felt that teachers would be better informed on pressing social issues. By altering the educational system, teachers and students could play a much more central role in school management. (Cremin, 1961). It is important to appreciate the central significance George Counts played in the reformist educational program. Although the reconstructionist movement extended far beyond this individual to bodies such as the National Education Association and to the legislative level, in the United States, Counts historically seems the most politically salient and eloquent spokesman for the movement. Counts was prompted to action by an assessment of educational practice characterized, as he saw it, by class bias and ideological subservience to the interests of liberal, competitive capitalism and



individualism. This position could be contrasted with the collective mass welfare notion for all citizens. As Counts wrote in 1932:

There was consequently a great and fate-  
ful cultural lag. Almost everywhere  
(the school was) in the grip of conser-  
vative forces and (was) serving the cause  
of perpetuating ideas and institutions  
suited to an age that was gone.

(Counts, 1969, p.28)

His earlier arguments were based on the inseparable relationships of educational institutions to political and economic activity. He argued that no educational institution could be completely impartial or without bias and value assumptions since "the school must shape attitudes, develop tastes, and even impose ideas,..." and "accept full responsibility for its acts". (An accepted purpose for education was to prepare the individual as a future citizen to contribute to the direction of social change.) As early as 1932 Counts enunciates some of the progressive criteria of reconstructionism by saying

...it must emancipate itself from the in-  
fluence of this class, face squarely and  
courageously every social issue.... es-  
tablish an organic relation with the commu-  
nity, develop a relativistic and comprehensive  
theory of welfare, fashion a compelling and  
challenging vision of human destiny, and  
become less frightened than it is today at  
the bogeys of imposition and indoctrination.

(Counts, 1969, p. 259)

Counts' comments on schooling support the contention



that there are present-day educational and curricular descendants of the field who at least partially address some of the elements in this reconstructionist stance. Donald Oliver, in a 1976 treatise (Education and Community), argues extensively for a revival of authentic community structure wherein species-given primary bonds and relationships are sustained. The school, with a narrower function than presently, is charged to integrate its practices and roles with those of the primary community.

Coupled with these general prescriptions for educational organization, reconstructionists urged the formation of militant teacher organizations closely allied with labour unions and political interest groups. The journal, The Social Frontier, was a forceful medium for conveying these exhortations and illustrating, in explicit terms, the reciprocal relationship between politics, the economy and educational theory and practice. Theodore Brameld, in 1935 in The Social Frontier, suggests to practitioners that

...realistically minded teachers might profit, therefore, by greater acquaintance with Marx than most of them made through classroom channels. If they do so they will find that several of his basic postulates are likewise those of a considerable group of progressive educators and liberal political philosophers today. (He includes Charles Beard and John Dewey in the former category).

(Brameld, The Social Frontier, 2:4, p. 53)

Brameld proceeds to sketch some guidelines of classroom method:



implied by the Marxian approach by which progressive teachers can to some extent be effective while living in the midst of a capitalist society.

(Brameld, The Social Frontier, 2:4, p.58)

Such advocacy ranges from dissolving the notion that there is any philosophy of neutrality, the problem of student internalization of value freedom, the ethics of civil disobedience to teachers' identification of themselves as class workers in common with non-professionals. Not only were teachers to radically restructure curricular content, methods, and community learning experiences, but also the need for "persuasive and revolutionary" opposition to capitalism is important, (and)

that word and deed are functionally mutual phases of the general task.

(Brameld, The Social Frontier, 2:4, p.56)

The interrelated notion of word and deed, or theory and practice, are concepts to which I will return in a later section of the study. In a general sense here Brameld as we interpret him takes these terms to be integral, in a politically critical sense, to educational practice.<sup>1</sup> Indeed the argument can be made that such concepts can be developed as criterial to a critically-reflective or emancipatory social education. As such it could contribute to ideas about knowledge, truth and validity if teachers were to develop a critical, social studies curriculum. In the development of this section I will tap something of the ethical and philosophical intents of the reconstructionist movement as it



pertains to contemporary exemplars in the social studies.

Despite the apparent paucity of reformist views within the reconstructionist movement, a number of competing schisms or sub-paradigms co-existed during the 1920-1935 period.

(See appendix VI) Harold Rugg, a social educator, during this period developed and introduced the first nationally-used set of composite junior social studies texts and monographs. His curricular intent was to equip students in the decision-making skills in a time of rapid social change. However, both Rugg and William Kilpatrick showed considerable opposition to Brameld's polemical stand regarding teachers' involvement in class struggle. Further opposition to the extremist position came from John Dewey, once it had been codified in a 1933 Progressive Education Association article entitled, "A Call to the Teachers of the Nation". This article contained the same strident tones as Brameld's later article in The Social Frontier. Considerable reinterpretation of Dewey's experimentalist legacy was occurring at this time amongst the partisan interests within reconstructionism. Although this legacy of pragmatism and experimentalism lent considerable 'theoretic justification' to the developing reformist position that "education is the fundamental method of social progress and reform" (Dewey for Social Frontier, 1935), it was modified by the sentiment of the child-centered faction (men such as Parker, Kilpatrick, Childs, Rugg) that the schools were not instrumentally in the position of building a new social order by themselves. Original experimentalist postulates denied the use of indoctrination-type teaching styles in opposition to Counts'



and Brameld's felt needs to do so.<sup>2</sup> Moderate or child-centred reconstructionists such as Kilpatrick, Dewey himself, Boyd Bode, and John Childs demonstrated more fidelity with the spirit of Dewey's philosophy and contributed toward a theoretical framework for integrating politics with education. Their argument appeared in The Educational Frontier (1933). This work essentially involved sketching a model of school-community relations and ideal typical program features that would ensue from the basic reconstructionist position. The school was to be seen less as a forum for knowledge acquisition, per se, but more as an ideal community wherein people engage in co-operative problem-solving and self government regarding social problems and value issues of the community. These issues would compose the core of the curriculum. Although, understandably, some confusion surrounds the Deweyan-derived form of instructional method to be used, there was general agreement amongst the extremist and moderate schisms that "the teacher could (was to?) provide leadership in remaking society according to his idealized conception of man...". (See appendix VI for further discussion on teacher autonomy and Dewey's legacy.)

The issue of whether experimentalist premises and the so-called (physical) scientific method, from which the instructional design arose, necessarily avoided classroom indoctrination toward a new social order did constitute a symbolic political struggle in itself, subject to historical misinterpretation. In fact, throughout the early and ensuing generation of reconstructionists pervasive criticism



was directed against the movement by the child-centered faction, which until 1947 had been the dominant group within the Progressive Education Association, and from conservative theorists and liberal apologists in the educational community and wider political public. The political and intellectual shift toward a more radical posture in reconstruction coincides with the renaming of the original association to the American Education Fellowship. The essence of the criticism in each case lay with the role of environmental manipulation might play in the release of creative energies in students and, with the narrowly based conception of citizenship that was akin to the later life adjustment theorists of education. What was common ground to this group of critics was the almost zealous belief that both teachers and schools were not competent, nor morally obliged to challenge the status quo of institutional and political life.

Bowers, in his discussion of the 'middle period 1930-40' of progressive and reconstructionist challenge, senses the ambiguity and uncertain grounds upon which the grand arguments of the moderate and radical or extremist groups were built. He notes, particularly, how the theory of Deweyan pragmatism served, albeit invalidly, to justify a host of implausible prescriptions for educational practice. Dewey himself appears to have struggled with the ambivalence of strategies for social reform and organizational re-arrangement suggested by his position. Bowers illustrates the problem of practice inherent in 'experimentalist' theory by citing Dewey in The Educational Frontier:



The philosophy of education must discover and ally itself with the social forces which promote educational aims, as well as uncover and oppose the vested interests which nullify and reduce them to mere flourishes or to phrases on paper.

Further on he admonishes:

Admit that education is concerned with the development of individual potentialities and you are committed to the conclusion that education cannot be neutral and indifferent as to the kind of social organization which exists...education must operate in view of a deliberately preferred social order.

(The Educational Frontier, 1933,  
p. 38, 291)

The significance of this ambiguity with the idea of practice lies in its suggestion that, if legal, economic and political conditions are such as to deny the learner and teacher the development of individual capacities, in the general state, the social conditions should be overturned structurally by the teacher and by implication the schools. As Bowers suggests then, there is an appreciable difference in practice between this position and that enunciated by Counts in the article "A Call to the Teachers of the Nation". If this point is granted then the historical importance of the reconstructionist lineage for educational practice and social change cannot be overlooked given the effect other elements of the experimentalist framework have had upon classroom organization, pedagogy and curriculum. I speculate that because the full theoretic significance of the pragmatist epistemology has not been drawn and developed at an institutional level,



the history of recent reform efforts in social studies education, for instance, amount to a status of 'no significant difference'. Equally, if I adopt a qualitatively different epistemology, theory of education, and theory of social relations, I will be obliged to debate or assess the worth of the scientific tradition that grounds reconstructionism in social studies by way of whether the 'experimentalist' mode, even if fully incorporated into school practice, could ever empirically achieve its political-educational goals of a renewed, dynamic form of critical citizenship. Arguably, given the political and educational importance of the issues and outcomes debated within and around reconstructionism, and coupled with the semantic and epistemic confusions of their public manifestations, the critical educator cannot overlook a rigorous analysis of contemporary exemplars in the social studies aimed at their conceptual consistency and possibilities of implementation.

By the mid 1930's sufficient 'ideological uncertainty' had crept into the Progressive Education Association so as to feed each of the constituent schisms, yet not allow any form of unified position on the role of the school in social reform nor for a total re-organization of the public school curriculum. Such divisions had led to a kind of intellectual status in the organization that paralleled Dewey's classic abhorrence of the split between theory and action. By 1935 some evidence (Cremin, 1961) indicates that the curriculum reform question was one which could unite the different groups in



some kind of ideological rapprochement. That is, some form of merger between Count's orientation towards radical social reform and V.T. Thayer's orientation towards curriculum reform was possible. The galvanizing concept for these groups was that of schools for democracy - a notion that overrode many of the ideological gaps paralyzing the linked P.E.A. to this time. Embedded within this idea were implications for social policy, for methodological and curricular revisions and for a philosophical underpinning. Smith, Stanley and later, Shores (of Fundamentals of Curriculum Development, 1950, fame) presented the idea of "participatory democracy" which could incorporate within it the notion of an organic community of co-operative relationships, strategies of group communication, "democratic deliberation", qualitatively distinct social studies courses in high school civics, (Ruggs as an instance) and the embellishment of 'democracy' "as elements of an inclusive rationale for social reform" (Graham, 1967). Whereas such justification as was generated for these individual pedagogical elements in the early progressivist period rested on ad hoc reasoning usually reduced to the individual child the mid - and later periods, when the radical reformists achieved hegemony, saw a coalescence of philosophy, policy and methodology justified by reference to the concept of "social democracy". It was but only a short step to the idea of co-operative group 'projects' which would take social education beyond the boundaries of the classroom, in the service of democratic reform in the wider world.<sup>3</sup>



In 1938 a P.E.A. resolutions committee recognized this professional convergence (or compromise). The committee laid a basis for realizing these schools of a democratic order, borne of a period of economic and political dislocation, by noting that school reform must work:

...for those learning experiences effective in developing insight, attitude, and skills essential to directing the evolution of our democratic culture.

(Report of the Resolutions Committee,  
in Graham (1967) p. 80)

Graham summarizes the specific directions the P.E.A. felt it should recommend to achieve their social policy ideal. This included support for research on 'democratic values' methods, new formats for teacher-training, alliances with other organizations supporting 'welfarist' programs instrumental for social change, the denouncement of emergent political authoritarianism, - a project incorporating the idea of the "basic unity of mankind". (Graham, 1967,)

Whether conceptually I can derive all of these, somewhat vague, programmatic tenets from the philosophical base of reconstructionism, is debatable. It is clear that the rather more radical elements do become evident with these proposals. I also ask what it is within the historical profile (beyond a subjective attachment to a new social order) of the reconstructionist philosophy that would allow commonality between social educators of the 1930's and those of the 1970's who are considered to be engaging in a socially



critical form of teaching and learning? Additionally, I ask, as previously, whether these metascientific questions and epistemic forms embedded in the philosophy are capable of generating a critical social practice that stems from the classroom? (The latter question I will deal with more extensively and with greater programmatic focus in a later section). For the moment it may be useful to elaborate partially on some of the features of method that are taken to be common to reconstructionist Social Education and to the "New Social Studies." The latter I characterize as the new wave mentality associated with the Brunerian and Fenton programs of the 1960's (Fenton, 1967; Lawton and Dufour, 1973)

Historically, the pragmatist-reconstructionist principles, such as can be identified, have a number of implications for the curriculum:

1. Knowledge is construed as a means for improving upon personal and collective experience as opposed to its classic formulation as an intrinsically valuable end. Equivalently stated, the generation of theory is inseparable from the practical uses to which it is put.
2. An active, reflective image of sociality is implied in a theory of learning whose essence is self-directed, intelligent and consequential decision-taking. This is in contrast to the passive determined, asocial image of man implied by faculty psychology or behaviouristic regimens of learning and development. That is,



the former recognizes the authentic possibilities for transcendence of experience and the redundancy of earlier psychology theory.

3. A related feature of this method is a conception of the individual or classroom student as having, in principle, control over the structuring of pedagogical and social events and of the capacity to be reflective over the possible outcomes of personal and collective acts - beyond those prescribed in the contrived rationality of decision-making situations of conventional instruction theory based in cognitive or behaviorist psychology traditions.
4. Experimentalist method conceives of the inseparability of intellect or reason from one's subjectively emotional states. This position contrasts strongly with the endemic separation of cognitive and affective schedules in teaching and learning arrangements.
5. i) Such a form of method has a conception of curriculum that inextricably relates school knowledge to 'everyday knowledge'.  
 ii) A corollary to this is the grounding of all school and curricular practice in the notion of desired social order and lifestyle.

(Through this method and quasi-epistemology the validity and meaning of an (educational) proposition or representation (curricular) is 'tested' against the success of its intended implementation or action).

6. That concept of "democratic deliberation" in use during the later reconstructionist period is paralleled by the



concept of 'discursive publics' wherein social knowledge is penetrated through a group assembly in which each participant, politically and psychologically unhindered, seeks to achieve a state of 'uncoerced consensus' with the other; the intent lying behind this being that of truth, justice and equality in communication and in social life. The argument, then, is that political, legal and social arrangements at the institutional level interpenetrate with one another at the level of group publics and of self-formation. Such structured arrangements, then, clearly have a bearing upon the outcome of authentic dialogue or uncoerced, deliberate communication.

7. The notion of truth operative in this tradition relies, in part, upon an achieved consensus in an uncoerced, critically-skillful public. That is, the validity of, say, curricular representations of salient social realities is true to the extent that an uncoerced agreement is reached by a majority of affected participants.

(Note that this conception of truth conditions seems to have been widely misinterpreted by curricular theorists and social educators in the reconstructionist period and during the recent revival of critical citizenship programs in the 1960's and 1970's. Its most obvious danger lies in not recognizing the historically mediated quality of ideas by dominant institutional infra-structures such as the economy. This could lead, in effect, to a total technical-conditionedness of many symbolic-conceptual systems by outmoded, historically-



redundant forms of life from earlier societal eras.

A person in a very real sense cannot be 'critically' reflective or even 'reconstructive' if this awareness is absent from teaching and learning. Put quite simply, the pragmatist reliance on 'the scientific method' must take note of its specific origins in a definite historic space and time. There is precedent for the misuses of an over-developed voluntarism in method particularly as Bower (1969) demonstrates with reference to the application of group discussion method in social problem resolution. He discusses the striking functionalist parallels that emerge from the radical extremist Brameld's curricular experiments and that of the later life-adjustment movement of the period 1945-1955 (containing such educators as Alice Miel, 1952, and Florence Stratemeyer, 1957). Clearly, the curricular intents of this later group of developers did not coincide politically or programatically with the radical reconstructionists, yet it is conceivable that a pervasive un-critical faith which associates the scientific method with a vision of the democratic order played a significant role in ideologically and practically neutralizing the intents of the later reconstructionists. I refer to the period 1944-1955 under the aegis of the American Educational Fellowship and the revitalized P.E.A. (See C.A. Bowers, 1969 and appendix VI for a more extensive profile.)

Of direct interest is how the contemporary Harvard Public Issues Program of Oliver and Shaver (1966) and their jurisprudential model of classroom learning, the "New Social Studies" advocates such as Fenton (1969, Massialas (1967) and



Hunt and Metcalf (1969) show almost boundless faith yet historical 'amnesia' in the uncritical adoption of notions of neutral, open-ended epistemologies of inquiry as a modern reconstructionist position.

The nature of the dilemma for those engaged in curriculum criticism is to determine to what extent certain elements of the experimentalist philosophy are necessary, but insufficient conditions for their capacity to realize critical reformist ends. My view is that these experimentalist ideas are hopelessly overdetermined with respect to their capacity to achieve educationally-inspired political change. Moreover, the experimentalist bias limits speculation on the nature of those epistemic features that could be synthesized in a form of inquiry congruent with the history of radical reconstructionist aims.

Some examples of pedagogical elements that were developed in the later reconstructionist period for the classroom teacher intent on "transforming the classroom into a center of direct social action" appeared in 1948 and which consequently became 'official' policy for the American Education Fellowship. The article entitled, "A New Policy for a New Times", (Progressive Education 25 :4, 1948) listed sixteen methodological elements.

Of the eight that Bowers reproduces at least three or four of the elements, according to my experiences, are likely to be found as content features of the vast majority



of secondary social studies programs in the ten major educational jurisdictions in Canada (and presumably the United States). At least two of the elements have been adopted as innovative components of social studies and humanities programs in secondary schools or at least received the blessing of officially sanctioned rhetoric at the diffusion stage of program development in Alberta in the late 1970's. Notably, two other components have been associated with progressivist reforms and open classroom experiments in elementary schools across the country on a mass scale in the U.K. A final element has achieved special program status for intellectually gifted students in a handful of high schools in urban centres in Canada. The table/chart appearing in appendix II suggests a number of alternative interpretations as to the political and educational fate of these once coveted reconstructionist tenets of method and content.

Several different directions of interpretation seem warranted. One could argue the position that those reform measures have been successfully 'incorporated' in the orthodoxy of schooling arrangements and conceivably neutralized; or that the adoption of these pedagogical elements, in as pure a translation from the progressive tradition as is institutionally practical, has led practitioners to the conclusion that the theoretical premises of these innovations have not been vindicated in practice; or thirdly that 'ad hocery' in school experimentation destroys the essential unity or gestalt of the reconstructionist tenets. That is, anything less than full scale adoption of all proposals at a school-wide level is bound



for failure or will lead to negligible differences in instructional outcomes.

It is interesting to note which of these earlier reconstructionist proposals of classroom method are taken, by contemporary proponents of reconstructionist doctrine, in the social studies (Newmann and Oliver, 1967; Oliver, 1976; Newmann, 1975), to be congruent with their own conceptions of methodological designs for communitarian and citizen action programs or conversely which proposals are taken to be repressive features of method. In identifying the above mentioned social educators as at least partial reincarnations of the 1935-45 reconstructionist period in its moderate and radical expressions, I will argue that current day public issues educators will show some receptivity to the forms of teaching and learning advocates for a critical citizenry proposed over 30 years ago. Recognizing this association also compels the astute observer to note that these very educational forms have been institutionalized to a large extent - albeit under varying organizational conditions in many elementary and secondary schools in North America. The impressionistic evidence suggests that few radical educational outcomes of the type envisaged thirty years ago have come to pass despite the recent process of institutional incorporation of counter cultural forms of the 1960's.

The preceding thoughts are a means of raising a warning about the uncritical acceptance of models of educational innovation for radical ends at face value. If I am committed to a radical educational practice, I am obliged to examine, through a form of critical analysis,



once again, the conceptual and methodological parameters in which political socialization and citizen action programs are situated so that contradictions in theory and practice may be overcome and re-synthesized to a higher unity.

In this study it is not my intention to develop any of the subsidiary questions surrounding the obstacles to organizational adoption of these innovative arrangements nor to elaborate upon the motives or possible recalcitrance that practitioners exhibit, through the logic of their actions, to radical reform projects. A more modest intent of this research is to begin to raise questions through conceptual analysis of the structural adequacy of inquiry models displayed by latter-day reconstructionists in their quest for a renewed democratic order - as grounded in the teaching and learning arrangements and dialogue patterns of a critically-reflective citizenry. To this end, then, I am merely turning the method of social criticism exemplified by the tradition of Dewey, Beard and Counts back upon itself.

As I proceed gradually to the next section where more contemporary illustrations of reconstructionism in the social studies are discussed, I will insert at this juncture a concluding yet transitional section that considers the form that some social reconstructionist thinking has assumed in Canadian education over the past decade. As a concluding point I will note some of the recurrent ethical and political features common to this tradition in Canada and North America as a whole.



Reconstructionism in the 1930's has shown itself to be a complex social, political and educational movement. At one point in its history, it was primarily articulated as a social and political policy that educators felt they had a responsibility to formulate. At another point in the career of the movement, reconstructionism was more coherently expressed as a set of school-centred goals regarding the restructuring of liberal democracy. As the movement struggled for legitimacy and professional survival, a series of confrontations between moderates and extremists gave it expression through designs for curriculum and instruction at the level of classroom activity. As an educational philosophy, its association with a discipline or subject area has never been historically or theoretically explicit. There has been, however, some agreement among practitioners and observers of the movement that the social sciences and hence social studies are the most fertile pedagogical base from which to give institutional meaning and organization to the movement at a school level. Certainly, 'curriculum developers' such as Harold Rugg, Theodore Brameld, Charles Beard, and more recently the Harvard School of social education, confirm the closeness of conceptual and political association of pedagogical social science with the development of a critically-minded citizenry. But the links between a discipline base, its practice and a social-educational movement have not been thoroughly explored or justified. Indeed, the assumption that reconstructionism should be identified



with a solitary base or discipline cluster could well violate the inter-disciplinary unity of purpose and interest that Dewey, Brameld and others sought for the movement. If the distinction between the terms 'field' and 'movement' has any significance for educational practice, then other discipline areas can be expected to make an integral contribution to reconstructionist curriculum designs. Historically, however, it has been social education rather than any other teaching area that has taken up the reins of reconstructionism and driven it through a variety of pedagogical forms - not, it must be said, without a historical legacy of accompanying contradictions and ambiguities in definitions, contents, strategies and outcomes.

This uncertainty is paralleled at a more general level with the difficulty theorists and practitioners have in coming to grips with the meaning of the term, curriculum. Does the term connote teaching acts, instructional styles, all the experiences undergone by a child in school; or, does it suggest the strict specification of all 'intended learning outcomes'? Such a problematic is significant not only for curriculum and social education researchers, but also for classroom practitioners. I see chronic uncertainty in the discourse and deliberation of curriculum and the social studies, and with the epistemic and philosophical assumptions underpinning different forms of curriculum classroom practice. Curriculum development in the social studies is likely to revert to a series of technical and managerial decisions -



rather than as a critically-reflective enterprise engaged in by developers and teachers. That is, forms of curriculum discourse and design congruent with a reconstructionist social studies are likely to be thwarted institutionally by the 'expert' prescriptions of content method and intent of an educational bureaucracy reliant upon 'top-down' patterns of curriculum decision-making.

G. Milburn (1977) suggests that to begin to clarify the practical and conceptual ambiguities of curriculum talk and its implication for social practice, we are faced with either adopting the 'conceptual analytic' device of logical stipulation that would indicate what curriculum ought to refer to and what would be excluded as educational referents from the term, or we can examine the various forms of what are taken to be curriculum practice in Canadian schools. I will adopt the latter option as fruitful for unearthing the operative assumptions and principles regarding current curricular structures and arrangements that are practised in particular social contexts. To opt for this approach does not suggest that practitioners or theorists are necessarily fully cognizant of these assumptions implicit in their work. In this study I refer to conceptions of curriculum because, firstly, it is not appropriate at the level of practice to separate out forms of organization and transmission, such as curricular designs, from the manifest contents and intents of social studies programs (reconstructionist or otherwise). Secondly, as Berlak (in Shaver, 1977a) reminds us, and as will be elaborated upon in a later section:



...curriculum theory that deals with a particular area of the school program (read reconstructionist social studies) is obviously only a piece of a broader curricular theory, and a curricular theory is only one aspect of a theory of schooling and society.

(Berlak, in Shaver, 1977a, p.46)

If I have successfully argued a need to reconsider the interpenetration of curricular and social education program elements, then we are in a position to investigate curriculum development-in-social studies education as a socio-political and ethical process of reproduction regardless of the particular orientation to which a person or school adheres.

#### TRACES IN CANADA

Milburn (1977) identifies three operative orientations in current Canadian school practice. Over a period of fifteen years educators have recognized and implemented forms of practice that could be labelled 'curriculum-as-disciplined study' (grounded theoretically in the forms of knowledge thesis of Hirst, Peters, Phenix and Bruner) in which program contents are primarily mediated by the structure and principles of academic disciplines; 'curriculum-as-humanistic child-centredness' in which formal program contents are organized for intents such as 'self-actualization' and creative wholistic development of the child. (This set of practices was particularly popular in the period 1968-1973 and involved the dissolution of many traditional institutional barriers such as norm-referenced evaluation and highly structured course sequencing. Exponents of this movement included Carl Rogers, Abraham Maslow, Hall-Dennis in Ontario



and such lay critics as John Holt and Everett Reimer). The third orientation 'curriculum-as-social reform' overlapped in time with the second. Of more concern for this study are social reformist curricula that carried the assumption that schools noting the parallel with the 1930's thought, "ought to give shape to a changed and better society" (Milburn, 1977). In his description of some of the features of this orientation, Milburn makes an implicit connection with social studies teaching in Canada. Schools that were charged, or seemed to be charged by some provincial administrators, with the task of easing intercultural tension in the Canadian mosaic, with developing increased affective tolerance for diverse political and ethnic groups, with generating within students a sense of global responsibility and interdependence in the world community or with simply portraying Canadian social history in a more comprehensive fashion relied upon curricular materials framed with reference to sociological, historical and geographical parameters. Values classification procedures, Canadian Studies materials, man-in-society courses, community-oriented programs, propaganda-bias detection skills have each been operationalized, if unsystematically, in many secondary social studies programs. A number of practitioners of community-oriented program designs have implicated teachers and students in confrontation encounters over both educational and governmental policy. Considerable range and degree of dissent has been reflected in programs that could be categorized as social reformist- some of which are easily tolerated by school and community representatives. Others, such as the Quebec Teachers' Corpor-



ation 1975 manual for teachers and students, suggested that working-class principles should be codified as school knowledge designed for emancipatory learning and the social criticism of narrow conservative economism. (The qualitative range of exponents of this position of active, community-based learning include Hodgetts (1968; 1980), Milburn (1976); Martell (1980); C.O.R.E. program based on the Philadelphia Parkway Program in the Edmonton Public System (1972-77); the C.E.Q. May 1st Manual (1975); Pratt (1973); Shor (1980) and Berlak (1981).) The preceding figures anchor this particular pedagogical tradition within political frameworks that range from conservative nationalism to liberal pluralism, to feminist world socialism respectively.

Despite considerable variation in the political and civic intents of these programs, each is motivated by the notion of a changed social structure, and idealized society and the inclusion of pedagogical strategies (whether in-class or community-based) that attempt to "raise" student consciousness through an explicit political-educational commitment. In each case, in the programs and conceptualizations cited there is agreement that social studies programs should achieve a core status in the school syllabus, that curricular contents are 'problem-centred' (in the sense of pressing everyday life concerns and social inequities of condition and opportunity) and that disciplinary forms of knowledge are subsidiary to the educational experience. Formal knowledge is useful to the extent that it confirms the 'correctness' of a strategy of action, enhancing the interpretation and clarification of a lifeworld problem. It should be noted that social science concepts and research techniques are borrowed heavily for use in classroom problem-solving.



A salient consideration that cuts across all three general curricular orientations and what is raised by not only Milburn, but by Shaver and Larkins (1973), Kehoe (1974), Berlak (in Shaver, 1977a) and others is the essentially unreflective nature of research, theorizing and implementation activities associated with social studies education. This point is usually made in the form of a methodological and conceptual criticism (accompanied by a recommendation that the deficiency be remedied in practice) that researchers and teachers lack a clearly established theoretical consciousness or recognition of the philosophical and epistemological assumptions that undergird the models, strategies or materials with which they work. If the omissions, in point of fact, are as widespread as the critics suggest, educational practice is conceivably compromised on two fronts. Those individuals involved in curriculum design work or policy decision-making are pre-disposed to committing mismatches of means and ends when the clarity with which they understand operational models is obscured. This kind of error leads to the classical case of decision-makers talking past one another and investing models and constructs with properties and powers they do not possess. Such naivete about the theoretic assumptions and intents that inform programs can lead to reactionary and defensive postures on the part of teachers who see themselves as strangers to innovation and curricular reform unable to debate authentically or justify thoroughly to themselves or to relevant publics the rationales, virtues or



drawbacks of programs they engage in. Classroom practice in the way of curricular reform, then, is transformed into an exercise in technical management. Secondly, I can expect those who are not cognizant of the organizing assumptions to be equally ignorant of the socio-political implications of the teaching and learning arrangements they seek to maintain. Considering that curriculum theory, in social education in particular, provides a particular representation of the nature of social reality and of the nature of participants' knowledge, the implications for a reconstructionist social studies are immense. Real and inherent possibilities emerge for the distortion or supervision of educational and political problems within a reconstructionist curriculum. It is clear, (Brameld, 1965), that simply because educators demonstrate on a priori reformist zeal in their policies for programs, does not guarantee a selection of congruent strategies in the translation of theory to practice. Given the ideological nature of advanced industrial society, the expectation that alternative symbolic systems are easily generated or operationalized is often times a rather vain idealistic outlook.

#### THE HARVARD SCHOOL

In depicting the need for alternative conceptions of social studies research or in the search-for optimal strategies to realize critical . reformist programs, writers such as Berlak (in Shaver, 1977a) and Shaver (1973a, 1977) stress the key words such as reflectiveness and deliberation as methodo-



logical tools that can be coupled with organizational changes. They intend to encourage thought about basic premises, predominant modes of inquiry, socio-historical contexts and the political ethical choices involved in planning, design or instructional levels.

Arguing along more substantive lines Kehoe (1974) indicates that prior to the emergence of the "New Social Studies" (that is, the physical science inquiry format of pedagogy) program intents and contents, at least in North America, took for granted as self-evident the intrinsic worth of values such as 'freedom, equality, rule of law' and other precepts of an advanced liberal democracy. In the mid 1960's with the introduction of pluralistic conceptions of teaching and learning, paralleling the dominant political metaphor in the larger society, positivist inclinations emphasised the generation and verification of knowledge-as-fact unadulterated by the separation of values from objective representations. Accompanying this break with traditional dogmatic forms of teaching and learning was a reconstructed role for the school. As an institution, serving, in good faith, the wider social interests of the society, procedural and behavioural values were to be promoted as content for social studies instruction. Emphasis on mastery of inquiry procedures and democratic decorum in the classroom would dissolve the unexamined dogmatism of future citizens destined for a life in pluralist democratic order. In this setting rational inquiry would disclose the objective structures of the physical and social world - yet would allow the separate but free-play of com-



peting value-preferences of culturally heterogenous lifestyles. Kehoe's work shows by implication that through distancing oneself, conceptually, from the proposed curricular models for citizenship education, a person not only raises questions of internal technical validity, but lays bare the obscured value position of pluralism as a desired end state. Additionally, we begin to lay bare how any forms of inquiry and program rationales are predicated upon a moral and ultimately political commitment to some arrangement of social relations in the world at large. Oliver (1957) and Newmann (1963) demonstrate a grudging awareness of this issue. Program developers of content for 'public issues' analyses, such as Newmann and Oliver (1970), suggest that the only defensible goal for a socially responsible social studies is the development of

...an explicit concept of citizenship  
education....

(Newmann, 1963, p. 404)

and one that sets the enhancement of individual dignity in a societal context. Elaboration of rationales and curricular end-points, whether inculcation of decision-making skills for responsible citizenship or more structurally-reformist goals, imply the importance of 'rationale building, if curricular change is to materialize in students' consciousness or in changed social relationships. Whether social educators beg to differ on the conceptions and imperatives of their instructional programs, it makes historical sense that in building programs for pluralism, the development of rationality, or radical social change, that these persons



not ignore the dominant value complexes of a wider ideology that are continually and tacitly re-affirmed in intellectual inquiry, in school life and community life. The 1966 Public Issues Program of Oliver and Shaver sought, as an integral aspect of its classroom 'face', to depict controversy and confrontation in social life as an inescapable element of achieving a stable consensus in a pluralist, liberal democracy. Clearly the point here is not whether Oliver and Shaver are accurate in representing the structural conditions of North American society as pluralist nor whether their pedagogical measures would generate responsible, effective citizenry, but that they have accepted the axioms of a deliberative rationality, one that is essential for developing and realizing the beginnings of a reconstructionist social studies. The empirical accuracy of their curricular images of North America as a liberal democracy is taken up later in the study.

In concluding this chapter, I want briefly to delineate a number of attributes of an ethical and political nature that would seem to characterize what I will take to be contemporary reconstructionist strands in social education. At this point, it may be useful to frame this ensuing discussion in terms of some relevant dimensions common to the vocabulary of social studies practitioners.

The following list comprises a systematic selection of ethical and political intents and recommendations distilled from particular social educators and seen by them as integral to a renewed conception of citizenship education for students in a complex industrial society. My intention here is to pro-



vide an impressionistic profile of features that can plausibly be termed 'reconstructionist' in orientation. These features follow no particular order of significance or classification and conceivably have implications for different orders of educational policy, program development, classroom practice, individual consciousness and macro-social practice.

- i) Orthodox social studies has given little consideration to the everyday requirements of or the measuring of citizenship education. Citizenship here can be taken as including a moment of creative resistance in an array of civic skills.
- ii) Research and development in social studies has been marked with a failure to deal with questions of "intellectual significance" or "pressing human needs".
- iii) Research projects and research project decision-making are ethical choices requiring moral justification with each step taken.
- iv) Renewed practice of social studies must consider the meaning of tests of social significance as opposed to the false dichotomizing associated with spurious scientific 'objectivism'.
- v) Renewed civic education deals rationally with major issues facing society in which material is presented to students that is more useful in allowing re-construction of their social and psychological realities.



- vi) Teaching and learning theories, as elements of a comprehensive rationale, cannot be seen apart from the context of social arrangements.
- vii) It is important to recognize the effects of institutional conditioning upon the legitimacy and plausibility of programs that generate skill in the political-decision-making process.
- viii) Research in social education must also be sensitive to 'teasing out' complicated (political) relationships.
- ix) It is significant to consider the probabilities of persons becoming competent critics of society despite the citizenship education approach adopted.
- x) Do teachers, as part of a larger program philosophy, encourage/discourage students to examine the relationships of socio-political economic arrangements, past and present, to the ways of people's everyday lives?
- xi) Schooling is to partially contribute to change by helping the young become more self-reflective and competent in questioning the adequacy of extant societal responses to changing conditions of social and political life.
- xii) It is assumed that experience, whether school experience or not, can alter the ways in which a person views the world.



- xiii) With increased awareness and consciousness of the forces operative on them and within them, students are capable of seeing the world differently and hence may be capable of acting differently.
- xiv) Simplistic arguments prevail in most statements of rationale or objectives; that is, the "of course" postulate or weltanschauung of ordinary language philosophy and its lay derivatives.
- xv) That the "structures" of academic disciplines are politically-neutral, organized bodies of substantive and methodological knowledge is patently false.
- xvi) It is the developing political consciousness of the individual teacher that is central to any change in teacher's (renewed) orientation to civic education. (Materials development or implementation models by themselves have negligible impact).
- xvii) It is important that teachers are exposed to the issue of continuity and change in social life.
- xviii) The primary aim of political education (read civic education) is to raise consciousness as a contribution toward political action.
- xix) A secondary aim of civic education is to examine and explore alternatives through skills and knowledge that permit past/present examination of the



consequences of political, productive and family relationships for social problems.

- xx) The adequacy of one's curriculum work resides in the effort to relate theory to practice and practice to theory.
- xxi) The curriculum efforts of politically conscious teachers, administrators and curriculum designers contribute to an enlightened civic education.
- xxii) Civic education represents a continuing struggle to renew our social, political and economic institutions.
- xxiii) Rationale-building involves a clarification of beliefs about what the world has been, is, can be and should be like.
- xxiv) Critical analysis of the assumptions and implications of proposed values or ethical education programs is an essential part of rationale-building for citizenship education.
- xxv) It is important to consider the (precise) role of social studies in encouraging social criticism.

Clearly, many competing conceptions of civic education exist. I am less certain that there are many competing conceptions of reform-minded social studies that show some practical affinity with radicalprogressive legacies from the past. It seems warranted to conclude, after an impressionistic kind of content analysis, that the preceding features are basically congruent with the tenets of the 'reconstructionist' tradition. These ideal typical features were adapted from



the exemplary work of Shaver and Larkins (1973), Newmann (1977), Berlak (in Shaver, 1977a), Shaver (1977), Berlak (1981), Gleeson and Whitty (1976).



## Footnotes

1. The work of Theodore Brameld in North American educational philosophy has generally not entered the public consciousness from the major debates within educational progressivism. In the early years of the decade 1930, at the depths of the depression, there was virtual unanimity amongst liberal progressives and radical reconstructionists that education was to promote social planning and the public ownership of means of production. This unanimity was achieved temporarily because of the liberal faction that turned slightly 'dirigiste' during this time. Amongst its more notable spokespersons were George Counts, Harold Rugg, and John Childs. Within ten to fifteen years these men were to do a volte-face ideologically and spurn the social radicalism of Brameld, Hook, Grossman, Edel and others.

The radical reconstructionists, in order to maintain some integrity and community with their distinct social-political orientations, found it necessary to inaugurate a journal, *The Social Frontier*, in 1933. Up to this time the radical faction, of what was seen as the progressive movement, had had great difficulty making its' view public through the regular journal of the P.E.A., *Progressive Education*. It was in the pages of *The Social Frontier* that Theodore Brameld began to write stridently in 1935 with an essay entitled, "Karl Marx and the American Teacher." With the formation of new journals by both the liberal and radical factions at mid-decade, the split between each faction was sealed. What became a mottled career of controversy, was to last over ten years.

By 1947 the liberal and conservative elements of progressivism capitulated the leadership of the P.E.A., which was renamed the American Education Fellowship, to the radical faction. The latter group composed of theorists such as Raup, Benne, Axtelle, Stanley and Brameld. During this time the A.E.F. developed a policy chiefly orchestrated by Brameld which reflected in its contents a resurgence of 1930's reconstructionist radicalism. This policy included political position statements, methodological, and curricular prescriptions designed as a bulkhead against a declining ideal of world civilization. Some of the principles involved the broader goals of world government



and order, and a socialized economy. Some of the curricular goals of the policy were the development of consciousness in students, teachers and citizens on the meaning, and values governing new social arrangements; the integration of subjects and detailed social designs for personal, family and civic living; and interdisciplinary inquiry that emphasized the social implications of science and the significance of community planning. Its methodological goals included establishing democratic discipline norms, anti-individualism and socially organic thinking in the classroom, and the development of 'realistic' program materials that aided students in detecting propaganda. (See appendix II for a fuller representation of the policy principles). Earlier, moderate reconstructionists such as Counts, Childs, Rugg and others shied away from this essentially Marxist formulation. These figures were increasingly affected by the growing post-war mood in the United States of nationalism and conservative militarism.

But in the years 1948-51 those individuals who stayed with the radical faction of reconstructionism enjoyed a peak of influence. By 1951 opposition to the principles of the A.E.F. policy statement re-surfaced. Almost singly, Brameld struggled to retain them. By 1955 social reconstructionism, and the renamed P.E.A. began losing their political and philosophical purity once again. Life adjustment education was a parallel movement that emerged out of the irresolute persons of the liberal and quasi-radical factions. Its focus as a movement was on 'problems of practical living': the necessity for constant psychological readiness for change. Hence the use of social engineering techniques became part of the life adjustment curriculum of reconstructionism, circa 1955. As Bowers (1969, p. 246) puts it 'politics and education were fused once again' but on this occasion individual socialization in the schools was directed by state needs rather than by the universals of humanization.

By the end of the decade 1950 and for the next ten years it is only Theodore Brameld (1965, 1971, 1973) and the philosopher Issac Berkson (1958) who were left as a strident, critical coterie that was in a direct political and intellectual lineage with radical social reconstructionism



with its ultimate roots in the Marxist tradition. In the 'progressive' radicalization of his philosophy Brameld distances himself from the progressivist legacy. Dewey's contribution is cut as early as 1950 and by 1961 (*Education for the Emerging Age*) not only is the early George Counts the only acceptable progressivist, but that the entire movement is taken, by Brameld, to be a transitional one that has neglected the real historical trajectory of the world to socialism. Brameld is supportive of some of the social consensus work of his former colleagues Axtelle, Benne, and Raup but essentially he builds originally from his own philosophical schemata. The school's tasks are re-emphasized toward building a world civilization, or global socialist community. Classroom life must stress notions of group mind, collective social experiments, the creative use of propaganda and myth-building; that is, the direct advocacy of cultural-political indoctrination and imposition in teaching and learning relations for a socialist future.

In the 1960's Brameld periodized American society and its shifts in educational provision. He identified the 'emerging age' as highly technicized, automated, with world population at zero growth. The economy would emerge as truly global, publicly planned, with resources based on social need. International or global government would be democratically regulated. Brameld seems to argue for a systematic inculcation of world order norms and global consciousness that could not be conveyed by methods of liberal experimentation and social inquiry.

Experimental method as a teaching and learning form, for Brameld, was a dominant tactic used to paralyze the organization of a common world community based on revealed public interests. In fact, it only bred "cultural illiteracy" amongst young men and women. Significantly, Brameld provides a tacit critique of the public issues - deliberative democracy tradition of social education. Rational argument and persuasion, as a pedagogical device, is seen as insufficient in itself to sway students to embrace and develop alternative (socialist) personal and social futures. Democratic deliberation, according to Brameld, acts in capitalist society as an internal holding device for social relations of inequality and exploitation. The



former provides an illusory sense of participatory decision-making. It fails to convince students and citizens through the force of a better argument that collectivist social arrangements are a preferred form of living. Hence, the creative or hortatory power of myth, persuasion, and indoctrination are necessary, preliminary devices to bring students and citizens to the edge of socialist consciousness. This means, too, for Brameld that they will come to accept the inevitability of class struggle and social transformation. Past this historical-political threshold social experience will build in citizens the convictions of the social justice of collectivism over capitalism. Myth-building and propaganda, for Brameld, become important devices for shifting student and citizen consciousness in the same way as capitalist ideology has operated for one hundred fifty years.

Towards the end of the decade, 1960, Brameld was severely isolated in his collectivist but doctrinaire methods and philosophy of social reconstructionism. It is arguable whether his philosophy could ever become a praxis of students intent on securing their own autonomy and responsibility in the increasingly corporatist life forms of capitalism. Of all the social theorists that come closest to Brameld's analyses of domination and resistance, of that time, is Herbert Marcuse. Each saw a certain urgency for subordinate social classes to embrace universal and transcendent social, libidinous and psychic forms. Marcuse's work on libido and social organization (1955), and the dessication of consciousness in the modern age (1964) complement the irrationalist plunge to a new world order of Brameld.

For Marcuse (1955, 1964) as Brameld (1965, 1973) citizens, teachers, and students not only had to accept a new world view that contained the processes of class struggle, and transitional dictatorship in the new social order but they also had to be concerned with method. That is, they could not simply anticipate the passage of capitalist society as a contemplative act or as an inevitable historical outcome. They had to actively contribute through social action to the transformation of that society. For Brameld method involved the inculcation in students and citizens " ... of a point of view consonant with the requirements on the new America" (Brameld, *The Social Frontier*, 2:4, p. 55).



He also urged teachers to embody the moral issues involved in oppositions to capitalism with a call to civil disobedience, against its institutions if necessary. For instance,

Marx almost admits that successful insurrection against the capitalist class is the highest moral act possible in our society.

(Brameld, *The Social Frontier*,  
2:4. p. 55)

As a third aspect of method, Brameld argues that teachers need to acquire "class consciousness" in the sense of their recognition of solidarity with other workers that included reporters, engineers, factory workers and ditch diggers. To recognize one's true "economic status" is a primary determination in choosing effectively the social outcomes of one's life. Herbert Marcuse's politics of negation, refusal, and transcendence, of the 1950's and 1960's, in my estimation show tacit but strong methodological parallels.

2. Ibid., See Footnote 1.

3. Ibid., See Footnote 1.



## CHAPTER 5

### LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL STUDIES EDUCATION

In order to engage in any critical analysis in the field of social studies reconstructionism, it is necessary, in the interests of interpretive inquiry in the social sciences, to present a brief, descriptive historical background of developments in secondary school social studies relevant to contemporary curriculum materials.

This section of the chapter examines key elements of educational policy and program design envisioned, by predecessors in the field, as salient for developing political consciousness and civic competence in future citizens living in liberal-democratic, complex society. To this end, my focus will be on features highlighting the Public Issues Program for secondary social studies (1966), the associated conception and practice of Jurisprudential Teaching and the "Community and Education" theme variants, of the period 1967-1977, that were initially spawned, it could be argued, with the development of the Harvard Social Studies Project, by Donald W. Oliver in 1956. This is not to claim that no other schools of thought in social education are illustrations of social reconstructionist tenets but that educational activities receiving most professional attention, in this view, over the last decade in North American schools, cluster around the associates of the Harvard School. Indeed, few



other programmatic proposals have reached the stage of implementation in public school systems.

A loose conceptual schema of analytic categories will be employed to establish, more closely, the educational parameters of these programs and proposals. I will present the outline of a schema that will be used to 'catch' the implications and meaning for educational practice of the work of F. Newmann (Education for Citizen Action, 1975) and that of D.W. Oliver (Education and Community - A Radical Critique of Innovative Schooling, 1976) considered as contemporary exemplars<sub>1</sub> of social reconstructionism.

Critical citizenship education curriculum proposals, whether expressed at the abstract level of conceptual rationales or at the level of actual program design, have characteristics that address three types of relationships within the society-at-large and within the context of instruction in the classroom. These three categories of relationships known as pedagogy, program/content, and evaluation constitute distinct 'message systems'<sub>2</sub> at whatever level of deliberation, and taken as a unity, can be said to constitute a curricular orientation. In this case, I am concerned with social studies programs which, due to their nature, often exhibit an explicit conception of the everyday world of social relationships, and specifications on how the form of these relationships may be altered through concerted change. They also offer conceptions of the nature of relationships generating school knowledge, non-school knowledge and include assumptions about teaching, learning and the develop-



ment of social consciousness amongst students.

I briefly illustrate the work of Fred Newmann (1975, 1977) and Donald Oliver (1976) in terms of the preceding categories as a precursor to a critical-historical analysis of the Harvard School of reconstructionism.

D.W. OLIVER AND THE HARVARD SOCIAL STUDIES PROJECTS, 1956;  
THE SELECTION OF CONTENT IN THE SOCIAL STUDIES, 1957.

Consciously following the lineage of social criticism in the social studies first developed through John Dewey and Charles Beard's (A Charter for the Social Sciences), the Harvard Social Studies project came to a first stage of fruition, after a decade of development, in 1966. Charles Beard and Harold Rugg, from the 1920's, were intent on developing a philosophy and objectives for a social studies of social reform that was to serve as a means to "a form of action on the part of some particular social group" enabling it to lead "a positive and creative attack on social problems" in an age of diminishing liberalism (Cremin, 1961, p.23 ). Beard's primary contribution to the history of pedagogical reform lay in his notion that teachers and students brought to the school an embryonic social theory of the ideal social order which would form the tacit criteria by which they would select content and form responses in the instructional situation. Although the thesis of the social framework of knowing has been elaborated, in one form or another, at least thirty years earlier in the social sciences, it rep-



resented a qualitative leap for educational theorists to plan consciously reformist curriculum with this elementary generalization in mind.

Oliver and associates have followed the intents of Beard whose faith in a secular, rationalist scientific approach to social problems and conflict incorporated notions such as the fundamental exchange of ideas, compromise, and 'democratic deliberation' as instrumental for a state of social harmony in a pluralist polity. Oliver considered that students emerging from secondary schools in the mid 1950's and 1960's were personally and collectively incompetent to generate decisions required of a citizenry in a democratic order. This paralleled an intuition common amongst secondary students that social studies curricula were deficient in social issues content. It was the intention of Donald Oliver and James Shaver to design a secondary social studies program for developing competence in the analysis of controversy and the ability to take defensible positions on social issues. The Citizen Education Project (1956) and later the Public Issues program carried with them an image of the 'ideal society' in which conflicting interest groups and individuals are allowed considerable range of freedom to pursue different lifestyles and standards at the expense of no subsidiary group. The programs stress the 'goodness' of a pluralist social order united by an overarching consensus on certain procedural norms such as rule of law, equality, freedom and respect for others. The model of the ideal



society was centred on the notion of a social community of discourse which was transposed, in turn, to the instructional level. Conflict and its resolution through justifiable stances was to be achieved through discourse, debate and advocacy.

Pedagogically, the model involves making explicit of the lifeworld of students and their perceptions of justifiable modes of conflict resolution. Oliver and Shaver's 1966 approach (Teaching Public Issues in the High School) centres on a process of classroom dialogue and debate. Historical and demographic background of issues is presented to students by the teacher who then demands that personal positions are taken. These are later defended and clarified using modes of reasoning from legal ethical inquiry. The same process is used with each issue presented wherein the interest of students is elicited, attention is turned to the value complexes implied, and the expression of personal preference is exhibited and then justified. Oliver and Shaver describe the 'bare bones' of the process by noting the role of the teacher in

...appealing especially to historical analogies to broaden the content of discussion. The initial questions raised by this material tend to be "should" -type ethical questions, but the class is inevitably thrust into legal, factual, and definitional questions when the student's own views of the "good solution" are compared with other "legitimate" social solutions. It is this amalgamation of law-government, ethics, contemporary, and historical factual questions developed around perennial issues of public policy that we refer to as jurisprudential (or legal-ethical) teaching.

(Oliver, Shaver, 1966, pp. 114-115)



Implicit within this form of pedagogy whose "... central objective is to teach the student to carry on an intelligent dialogue bearing on important public issues" (Oliver, Shaver, 1966) is the development of an argumentative, adversarial climate in the classroom where students ultimately take a position and justify decisions independent of the teacher with peers and significant others, in the formulation of critical political judgments. Conceivably, beyond the realm of analysis and generalization in authentic action. The authors do not elaborate on this point. Clearly, many assumptions are made about learners' cognitive styles, base competencies, and maturity, as well as teachers' willingness to accept negative reactions from the professional community that are unnecessary in programs emphasizing recitative approaches and the 'simple' mastery of social science 'facts'. The latter programs may deny the participation of certain kinds of teachers and learners.

The content of the program design is, essentially, unspecified by Oliver and Shaver who offer a framework for the selection and organization of content. They suggest that teachers use various strategies to generate knowledge. But, short of any systematic framework, issues can be drawn as critical issues "on the contemporary scene" or "topics... least understood" due to their cultural or geographic diversity, or those which can be most competently presented by the teacher. It should be noted that latitude in scope and sequence for controversy selection is designed to elicit



any emotional commitment within students to interiorize the role of the other. There are implicit boundaries on the nature of the content and manner of its selection. Above all else, it is teacher-centric to the extent that students have little scope to confer final pedagogical legitimacy on most classroom activities.

The Harvard Public Issues program by and large concentrates on orthodox forms of evaluation. The essential preoccupation with the program lies with assessing the degree of competence generated by students analyzing social controversies in terms of stand taking. Such devices as multiple-choice, critical thinking and oral analyses formats are used. Consideration has been given to the transference into reality of the jurisprudential skills of students. Some efforts have been made to employ direct and indirect observation and anecdote as methods of evaluation where students engage in 'street-corner argument'. Notably, there is a tacit interest throughout the battery of assessment devices to determine performance probabilities in non-school settings of the pluralist order. Critical thinking tests that have been typically relied upon to convey faithfully the outcomes of the jurisprudential model narrow most students' performances to conceptual and logical rigour in the 'cut-and-dried' analyses of issues. A problem within this program is whether instructional efforts and the concomitant assessments actually prepare students to take decisions arrived at into the realm of the practical. This type of 'environmental



competence' as a curricular concern is broached ten years later by Fred Newmann (1975). In the 1966 program it seems warranted to suggest that much of the critical political judgment of students remains within the classroom exhibiting, many of the properties of an idealist exercise.

To the credit of Oliver and Shaver, they recognize the probable institutional conservatism engendered by the use of legal-ethical procedures. This sentiment is strengthened when I note that rationale justification would seem to be an integral component of any implementation process.

F.M. NEWMANN, EDUCATION FOR CITIZEN ACTION (1975), "BUILDING A RATIONALE FOR CIVIC EDUCATION" (1977); AND F. NEWMANN ET AL, SKILLS IN CITIZEN ACTION: AN ENGLISH SOCIAL STUDIES PROGRAM FOR SECONDARY SCHOOLS (1977).

Newmann's major 1975 work has been identified as parallel to early reconstructionist work such as that of Counts, Rugg, Childs and Brameld in that it proposes "...a link among moral deliberation, intentions, enabling skills, and community involvement" (Nelson, 1977). Newmann grounds his justification for a revitalized civic action curriculum by portraying the general sense of cultural and political malaise and personal powerlessness endemic in the everyday life of citizens in the advanced industrial nations. He informs his readers that the majority of the attempts at citizenship education programs have offered confused, non-reflective and atheoretic rationales for their curricular



prescriptions and strategies. They are often hopelessly naive or contradict the intended aims of social studies programs. He considers that most programs suffer from an absence of a critical, active conception of citizenship and what is proposed is easily multiplied or incorporated into the technical 'logic' of institutional life.

Newmann contends that education for active citizens in a democracy requires a broadened conception of citizenship and of the strategies needed to realize it. He envisages students in conventional secondary schools engaging in collective institutional change, at the level of local educational policy and in the everyday decision-making routinely required of citizens in a 'constitutional democracy' beyond the boundaries of the school.

In order to set the tone of the following brief description, I rely on Nelson's quotation of Newmann concerning the relationship between the citizen and the state:

...first, that the purpose of civic education... is to teach students to function in a particular relationship with the state. Second, that the most desirable type of relationship between the citizen and the state is the structure of constitutional representative democracy. Third, that the major way in which this political arrangement differs from others is that the state 'belongs' to the citizens, and the citizens have certain inalienable rights to influence what the state shall do. The primary educational mission, therefore, is to teach citizens to influence the state. In contemporary society the inalienable right to do so (that is, the key feature of representative democracy) cannot be exercised.

(Newmann, 1977, pp. 3-4)



This position is clearly a more sophisticated expression of some of the political-economic contradictions in the modern state that were implied in earlier positions formulated by Counts (1969) and Rugg (1936). By proposing a much more elegant image of the macro-society, citing its basic deficiencies and the expected function citizens should assume, the lines of argument for the derivation of practical program prescriptions are that much more transparent.

The essential curricular outcome Newmann anticipates from his design is that of 'environmental competence' for students as future citizens. In spite of the presence of a number of forms of competence to be taught, each is simply expressive of the general capacity for students to influence the course of social events in directions congruent with their intentions. Newmann's position is justified in accordance with ethical, political and psychological principles. Content, within this program, incorporates theory, applied knowledge and selected issues through which the humanly innate interest in autonomy and self-responsibility is given expression. Such content is codified in course packages over a four-year period, and exposes students, under the rubric of social studies, to instrumental knowledge indispensable for the exercise of influence in public life. Social science concepts and methods, concepts and theories of social psychology and the humanities 'dovetail' as components of pedagogic theory. Semester courses in group dynamics, political-legal decision-making, and organizational



administration represent some of the areas students draw from to become 'sensitized' to the political and personal realities of gaining the competence to influence their environment successfully. Students are expected to engage in an extensive action project in relation to a problem of injustice, public policy or issue in the outside community that arouses their moral and emotional scruples. Newmann conceives that the ability to influence public affairs component is complementary to the conventional school syllabus. He argues for an even more comprehensive interpenetration of discipline-areas in the service of the primary goal of the revitalized secondary school curriculum-environmental competence.

Three pedagogical formats are envisaged for the social studies program. Considerable time is devoted to instruction on the

...realities of the use of power in politics and law, or research skills required to make intelligent factual claims about those realities, and on ethical, legal and political concepts that help us make principled personal choices on issues and strategies for action.

(Newmann, 1977, p. 16)

Secondly, it is anticipated that students will engage dialogically with one another on the normative grounds of judgements of 'proper' courses of action, on the secular bases of justice and fairness and on the value dilemmas implicit in institutional life. The model of social discourse employed in this phase of environmental competence is clear-



ly rooted in the jurisprudential model of teaching. The extent of teacher participation, however, has diminished.

Thirdly, students either singly or collectively embark on a form of collaborative teaching and learning in the context of a practicum oriented to the successful restructuring of some set of relations clustered around what is taken to be a problem. The three pedagogical formats, which in practice would likely overlap fluidly, also incorporate the earlier elements (of ten years ago) of instructional processes, reflective deliberation and action.

The final element in this program proposal has been elaborated. Actual pedagogic and curriculum provisions have been made to remedy the essential hiatus between theory and practice. To this end, I have addressed the 'political' problem of taking decisions and acting upon them in the effort to vindicate the theoretic representations of the curriculum.

The problem of evaluative criteria associated with the development of critically-minded citizen projects persists. Unless systematic effort and program mechanisms are applied to reconcile curricular theory and practice, the forms of evaluative activity will reassume a strictly technical means-ends character wherein students' successes in direct instructional courses will resemble a recitative knowledge of course constructs. Success in the deliberative phase will become the demonstration of logical consistency in argumentation; and, success in the practicum or action phase would be narrowed to the demonstration of 'valiant enthusi-



asm' and applied influence. It is unclear whether Newmann holds what is essentially a dialectical conception of curriculum development. Despite his introduction of the notion of dialectical synergism in cognitive development as a theory of learning (Newmann, 1977, p. 21), it is conceivable that the social structural dimension of social reality is disembodied from the psychological-geographical dimension of human consciousness. If a case can be made for this split between different moments of the social world then, by the logic of Newmann's own omission, the probabilities for a generalized environmental competence are much reduced.

DONALD W. OLIVER, EDUCATION AND COMMUNITY: A RADICAL CRITIQUE OF INNOVATIVE SCHOOLING, (1976).

Oliver's recent work represents the outcome of taking the alternative but complementary path of the "forked road" that loomed after the seminal "Education and Community" article of 1967. It should be noted that Oliver's current work, in contradistinction to Newmann (1975), features an evolutionary rather than an activist perspective. Both works seek to redress the alienated, fragmentary existence taken to be a property of the life-world in the advanced industrial state. There are also deep moral and ethical interests underlying this perspective, for Oliver.

Rather than striving for social reform through school-based teaching and learning as in the 1966 work where the



central pre-occupation was the preservation of the universalistic values of negative freedom and tolerance for dissent and diversity, the focus shifts ten years later to a reconstitution of the primary community and an attachment to the particularism of group ritual and celebration. Still present is an earlier emphasis on demonopolizing the hegemony of professional educational knowledge and practice. However, the secular thrust towards reform and the capacities to cope in the dominant, technical order have receded to a more distant horizon and are replaced by educational and political agenda structured to re-establish traditional bases of meaning. Notably, any analysis of the public school as a contemporary institution functional for dignified human survival is suppressed. Proposals for curricular and pedagogical revision are strongly underdeveloped in light of the fatalism that Oliver seems to accept regarding the dependent links of schooling with the technical order. Saliently absent is any profound analysis of political-economic structures that have a bearing upon the cultural and ideological complexes of the society.

Oliver's primary thesis depicts complex, industrial society as being in a state of historical imbalance in which the secular social form of "Corporate Organization" (Oliver, 1976) has come to dominate the productive, symbolic and psychological life of the citizen. Community, as the alternative social historical form of human relationships, has receded accompanied by a pervasive meaning and morality crisis. Former collec-



tively-shared normative conceptions of the world in which interdependence, affective ties and a sense of common fate which bound members of the human group are replaced with a social technical order based on rationalization, extreme division of labour and the importation of production principles. The resultant imbalance in "systems of sociality" has placed the human species on a survival crisis trajectory in which man's natural biological and cultural constraints are shattered. The fragile interdependence between man's evolutionary cycle and the non-human living world is dissolved by the 'overdetermined' character of an infinitely, adaptive, cultural symbolic system (represented by the dominant acquisitiveness of a control-seeking technical order). Such an 'ideological' symbol system has properties that mask and distort more primitive, underlying needs such as harmony with a truly complex universal animate and inanimate order.

Theorists of the social sciences are familiar with the classical distinction of society and community, first formulated by Toennies over a century ago. Several strategic responses are offered by Oliver to correct this 'imbalance'. On one level he advocates the construction of a 'counter-ideology' which builds on our knowledge of authentic human and universal needs. At a second level we see him advocating a form of structural synthesis of the forms of the technical order with those of a moral order. The moral component of the synthesis occurs through a communal contexts of alter-



native organizations and social relationships. At a third level he advocates in a restrained fashion the 'humanization' of institutional life in schools. However, having conceived of the school as in a dependent relationship to the technical order, any strategies of amelioration are at best palliatives in the face of the universal imbalance of "systems of sociality" (Oliver, 1976). At this point the distinction between school 'communitizing' and communitarian alternatives emerges. The former refers to the increasingly common process of inserting and secularizing vibrant community traditions into secular agencies of the dominant technical order thereby destroying the natural bases of community life and ritual. Communitarian project-building parallels the need to restore a sense of primacy to particularistic traditions, myth-making, celebration and the integrity of subculture.

Aside from developing an anthropology of human nature and an elegant exposition on the cultural and psychological dilemmas and dysfunctions of the gemeinschaft-gesellschaft schism in modern society, Oliver's proposals for educational reform are parallel to the proposals of the 1967 education-community model. These include organizational and program changes.

(a) The assignment of the school to a subsidiary support function for more primary institutions and a demystification of the power of 'scientific' knowledge in education;

(b) 1. The revision of curricular content in order to portray qualitatively new forms of human



habitation. Concurrent with this is a delegitimation of "utilitarian perfectionist" ideology, "developmentalist ideology" and the presentation of "communitarian-evolutionism" as an alternative world view. (See Oliver (1976) for these definitions.)

2. The development of educational experiences for teachers and students expressive of the new form of sociality.

3. The active establishment of communal organizations or "neighbourhoods" estranged from the sphere of the school.

It is far less clear which particular features of pedagogical style, program content, modes of evaluation or disciplined knowledge would co-exist with these utopian world-building projects. One could expect the spread of teaching styles closely resembling traditional modes of kinship transmission, revelation and communicative consensus (not the rationalized accountability models of schools of the technical order); curricular contents rooted in the folkways, metaphors and lore of the indigenous subculture; and a sense of valuation based on an intuitive sense of the presence or absence of security, identity and the certainty of primal ties. Oliver is pragmatic enough to recognize the institutional opposition to proposals of this type. He is certain enough of the imminence of the technical order that formal instruction, in skills and attitudes functional for life in this order, will be maintained, albeit in a circumscribed



arrangement.

It is difficult to engage in any extensive assessment of Oliver's school-based proposals since they are founded on a utopian model of organization not yet implemented in the mass society. I am in a position, however, to assess the adequacy of his conceptual rationale for the stated purposes at hand, and, in terms of the wider interest of this essay, for its congruence (the rationale) with a critical reconstructionism in the social studies. To what extent Oliver's and Newmann's proposals can address the structure of a social studies curriculum most appropriate for a critically-reflective, active citizenry is a task for the following section.

F.M. NEWMANN, D.W. OLIVER; "EDUCATION AND COMMUNITY", (1967)

Clearly the 1967 article by Newmann and Oliver falls in a line of descent from the reconstructionist faction of the progressive movement. The view elaborated here emphasizes yet another dimension of the multifaceted pragmatist philosophy. Harold Rugg (1936), but equally John Dewey (1965), envisaged the growth within schools of an ideal or utopian community that was intended to mirror a restructured social order. The centrality of the idea of community can be contrasted with its relative absence as a pedagogical element in the earlier Harvard series proposals where a competent responsible, discursive public was the major educational outcome. The position adopted here, with salient implication for educational practice, is motivated primarily by what the



authors see as the impotence of orthodox concepts and approaches to educational reform. The authors contend that most school reform efforts do not radically challenge institutional structures nor curriculum policy but merely look upon reform as calling for 'utopian withdrawal' from the prevailing system's constraints. No position known to the authors in the the history of school reform programs offer measures to reconstruct the total structural context through which the community pursues its educational aims. The authors are in agreement with Harold Rugg, who, in American Life and the School Curriculum (1936) claimed that the

(nearest approach to a school of living) is to build the whole educational program of community around the school.

(quoted in Newmann, Oliver, 1967,p.94)

Many interpretations can be drawn from the essential ambiguity of this passage as Donald Oliver makes clear in his 1976 work (Education and Community...). The practical distinction between 'communitizing' the school and 'communitarian' reform within the neighborhood is not resolved in this passage by Rugg. The essential point that Newmann and Oliver (1967) wish to make through Rugg is that in order to restore some authenticity and intimacy to public life, in the advanced societies, it is necessary for the school to "insinuate" itself into adult community activities both as a method of study and as a means of social reconstruction . It is clear that this intention necessitates a change in institutional arrangements to allow the implementation of this broader conception of education -



an education de-monopolized from expert control and legitimation.

Newmann and Oliver maintain that earlier efforts at school reform have been unsuccessful due to the lack of recognition of the role social contexts play in how education is provided. Their argument elaborates how context mediates revision of curricular intents as much as it does innovation inside and outside the school organization. Implicit within this virtual truism of social science is the more novel conception, for educators, that education as a human process rooted in a network of social relations in the community is often manifested, more authentically, in other than formal instructional contexts. The close but restrained parallel with Rousseau is not explicated here.

Newmann and Oliver propose an educational model containing three elements or dynamic contexts for learning. The school context is distinguished by a conception of education-as-planned systematic instruction. Program content and pedagogy centre on the mastery of basic literacy skills and the internalization of behaviours congruent with a pluralistic democracy. Content is above all problem-centred where skills and conceptual competencies emerge to the extent that insight and understanding of social problems is enhanced. The laboratory-work context serves as a forum for personally chosen "broader humanistic and aesthetic goals" (Oliver, Newmann, 1967). Learning in this context is operative in the midst of the human practice of task-oriented activities. It is not seen as a training ground for vocational preparation. The community-seminar



context is structured for the purpose of the "reflective exploration of community issues" and "...ultimate meanings in human existence" (Oliver, Newmann, 1967, p. 96). Within the total model it is this third context that homogenous and heterogenous groups gather to examine, discuss and take action on issues of mutual concern. There are several classes of issues that Newmann and Oliver anticipate would be focal for the community. These range from concerns for action of a corrective nature for specific persons; general public policy questions; broader questions involved with planning education for the community; pervasive structural issues related to macro-society sectors (such as educational relations with the economy, polity and authority structures). Students' involvement is assumed in each of these contexts but clearly those adults with experience, expertise and leadership would assume more functional positions.

Unlike my review of other program orientations in the Harvard series, the community education world defies simple analysis into common categories of pedagogy, content or evaluation and those of a curricular or problem-centred nature. Bestowing this educational model with a uniqueness not displayed by the discrete component structure of other means - ends program designs means that Newmann and Oliver ground most educational activity in the different contexts upon the notion of the interaction of reflection and deliberation. Closer, reciprocal relations between the problem-posing needs of the community, the interpretations given by community members, and the action based upon a deliberative consensus construe



educational practice as congruent with social and community change. Curricular planning moves much closer to a broadened notion of educational planning as an emergent process arising from the basic concerns of particular communities.

If I distance myself from this model, only slightly, one acquires an image of complex social organization interpenetrated with a 'plurality of structures and processes' (Jencks, 1972) in which competing private, public and voluntary groups are mobilized ultimately by a commitment to building or re-building a primary community of intimacy and meaning.

A conception of evaluation criteria tied to a quasi-dialectical model of action and reflection, in the laboratory and the community seminar contexts, relies on the success of a chosen strategy for resolving critical community problems. Students are seen as engaged in learning that provides/permits immediate construal of their lifeworlds in terms of particular sets of interests or projects in which they may spontaneously engage. A convenient illustration is that of the Highlander Folk School project in Tennessee; surprisingly, Newmann and Oliver do not use this school example for their purposes. However, the Highlander project is one instance of the unity of pedagogy, curricular content and procedures of evaluation. It is an example of "an action". Here adult educational programs involve the teaching of adults how to teach others to deal with social problems. To appraise the validity of reflectively-derived action in this example is to determine whether the problem



in question is resolved satisfactorily in terms of participants' needs. Program content consists of lifeworld problems affecting the students while the teaching and learning arrangements are directly conditioned by the nature of the emergent problem.

The 1967 Newmann-Oliver position represents an image of formal schooling as one subsidiary element in the personal and shared lifeworld of the individual in the community. Social deliberation and reflection are key processes that may be formally transmitted at the level of skills in the school context but which achieve historical and political significance when transposed in complementary educational contexts of an emergent community. The reader should be cautious lest he interpret this discussion of the 1967 position as an identification of the education community model with an emancipatory social education. It should be noted that although clearly illustrative of a progressivist line of argument, it leaves questions about basic contradictions in the structure society, the effects of alienated social relationships and the underlying spectre of exploitation unanswered; the very questions, of course, that were occasionally highlighted by early reconstructionist extremists.

In examining a number of developments over the following decade in the Harvard School associates' programs and proposals for citizen education curricula, it becomes clear that the 1967 model was in many ways a watershed for both Newmann and Oliver. On the one hand Public Issues exponents



such as Shaver, and Larkins have remained in a pre-paradigmatic state of intellectual evolution while on the other hand the neo-community and citizenship exponents such as Newmann, Oliver and recently Berlak (1977,1981) have undergone a 1967 paradigm 'shift' in terms of conceptual position. One which in a way incorporates the qualitative dimensions of the pre-1967 and 1967 paradigm in a newer curricular formulation or synthesis. This is not to suggest that both Newmann and Oliver have followed the same 'revolutionary' epistemic directions. Newmann in the 1975 work (Education for Citizen Action: Challenge for Secondary Curriculum) has maintained a sensitivity to the tenets of the 1967 model, yet develops a conceptual rationale and program design that situates the struggle for a critical citizenship within the prevailing legitimacy of the school.

#### A DOCUMENTARY ANALYSIS OF HARVARD SCHOOL SOCIAL STUDIES

There has been no major programmatic offering of the Harvard School exponents since the introduction of Donald Oliver's latest work based on the education and community theme. A primer oriented to classroom practitioners has been developed by Newmann and associates and contains implementation strategies and suggested skill repertoires that should accompany a social studies-humanities based citizen-action curriculum. One reviewer (Nelson, 1977) sees the latest document as a regression in position from the thesis enunciated in Newmann's 1975 work. Despite the latter's aware-



ness of the difficulties that would be raised at the institutional level for installing his program, reviewers have conceded that the 1977 skills oriented booklet represents a considerable compromise in terms of the practical outcomes for community action and in terms of the latent analysis of social structure that colours this collaborative effort at 'being practical'.

Aside from the preceding comments, it seems possible to claim for the period 1966-1976 that the Harvard School associates have been faithful to a line of political and educational thought that we can term moderate reconstructionism. Unfortunately, the specific historical conditions that gave rise to those unique curricular proposals have been obscured by the widespread but uneven incorporation many of these principles have undergone in the last decade in North American schools. Oliver (1976) points to a similar symbolic and political incorporation of formerly 'radical' ideas with his distinction between the community school and communitarian educational arrangements.

By and large, however, ranging from the Harvard Social Studies Project in 1956 to the current formulation on the community context and on the need for rationale building in the social studies, I identify a reformist orientation possessing a distinct cutting edge that so many other approaches to citizenship education have been lacking. In each of the works reviewed, an active social epistemology of curricular knowledge has been present which has been carried



through to a deliberative, rationalist and at time reflective mode of teaching and learning. One could argue that the jurisprudential mode of teaching contains within it the seeds of reflection and community action that have merged in 1975-76. Content has increasingly taken on a problems-of-daily-living focus such that the boundaries between school knowledge and everyday knowledge are increasingly porous. Teacher-based manipulation of content and the engineering of 'exciting' issues to generate student incentive have subsided, at least in rhetoric, to a point where major components of Oliver (1976) and particularly Newmann's curricular model require profound contributions from student perspectives. Such can be elicited through discursive, constraint-free speech communities. Discipline-based knowledge in the Newmann program has lost its hegemony as an intrinsically valuable form of knowing. Formal instruction in the latter program is primarily a means to an end: the development of personal and collective environmental competence in the influence of public affairs. Each programmatic shift since the 1967 watershed has indicated a more systematic contextual awareness such that program designs make practical provision for accommodating external social influence and personal perspective in reaching the goals of rational, critical citizenry with competence in decision-making.

It may be useful to denote some disparities within the deliberative tradition of the school itself. As to the question of evaluation, qualitative changes are evident when one considers that assessment procedures in Oliver and



Shaver (1966) and in Newmann and Oliver (1970) were primarily a classroom-bounded, paper-and-pencil format that sought a conception of valid learning through the matching of student argumentative and debating skills with the ideal canons of rational-legal inquiry. This model made sense if one could assume a social situation of all-conditions-being-equal (*ceteris paribus*) and in which well-argued thought unproblematically transfers, to the realm of rational action. The back of this idealist model of evaluation appeared to have been broken with the later education community and citizen-action programs of 1975 and 1976. The validity of curricular representation, of collaboratively produced knowledge and argument was supported by its success in resolving the public issues students chose to investigate or influence. In Oliver's case the wisdom or 'correctness' of learning outcomes rested on their contribution to feelings of intimacy, authenticity and fellowship in evolving primary group settings. To say whether these qualitative extensions in conceptions of evaluation actually contributed to the necessary goal of reciprocal reconciliation of theory and practice in teaching and learning is another issue. But whatever their outcome for social learning, (Habermas, 1975), the more recent proposals for teaching, program content and evaluation modes can be seen as the logically cumulative expressions of the original political and ethical premises of the 1956 Social Studies projects.

Other sources of conceptual and practical disparity with the Harvard School, although not massively contradictory, are the



phases each author went through with respect to the elemental social forms in which political education would be situated. It is clear that for the 1966-1970 period Shaver and Newmann were tied conceptually to the social context of situationally-bound, idealist-rationalism (where correct speech led to mutual respect, amongst students, of valid cultural differences and hence to implicit support for pluralist social forms). From the situation of 'pure speech' as the elemental social form, one can detect a shift by 1976 (for Oliver) to the lost, romantic community as the primary source of meaning for students and neighbors. This shift can be conceived of as a fatalistic retreat or withdrawel, by some, from the overwhelming irrationalities and 'repressive tolerance' (Marcuse, 1964) that had afflicted corporate society. 'Pure speech' for Newmann (1975) came in the social form of a discursively, deliberating public in a network of relationships constituted by human interest and political action.

From the ideal typical viewpoint, the social form of the pedagogical-curricular element embedded in the community-as-romantic retreat (Oliver) and within the discursive-political public (Newmann) by itself is a necessary but not sufficient precondition for the responsible, critically-minded, decision-making citizen that is argued for at length with each of the Harvard associates. Until other necessary conditions for critical citizenship are specified the sometimes disjunctive curricular revisions are difficult to explain. This problem is pointed out, ironically, by Fred Newmann in his "Building a Rationale for Civic Education"



in 1977 as he speculates on the sense of malaise and misdirection in social studies civic education. His diagnosis of the presence of incomplete rationales in social education sees designers and theorists disposed to commit unjustified, unclarified errors of assumptions, and contradictions regarding goals and methods. By highlighting the practical dysfunctions and 'no significant difference' findings associated with the model muddle, Newmann (1977) and Shaver (1977) go a long way to redressing the historic problems of an absence of public justification and of fragmentation of social education research in the area of citizenship.

This new sense of reflectiveness on questions of basic premises is most strongly articulated in recent research on 'rationale building'. James Shaver in a 1976 presidential address to the National Council for the Social Studies claimed repeatedly that, of all the deficiencies involved with social studies citizenship curriculum development, it is the failure to become explicit regarding the philosophical and empirical assumptions that underlie our formal program intents and the methodology that realizes these intents that are the basis of the pervasive "mindlessness" in educational practice (of which social studies is the "epitome"). The 'hidden curriculum' of our design proposals and policy directives steers theorists and practitioners away from dealing "with the questions of purpose and justification of purpose" (Shaver, 1977, p. 302). It is nowhere more 'mindless' than in the area of citizenship education. Such a conclusion is parallel



to the less polemical remarks of Kehoe (1974) who raised similar questions regarding the absence of a rigorous perspective or focus on the nature of citizenship. We can also consider the role of formal knowledge in the development of such curricula and the principles of content organization and selection that presumably converge in a nexus of social relationships that mediate an attitudinal and political outcome, termed civic behaviour. We have systematically neglected the pragmatist's axiom that, for students, everyday problems are the pedagogical basis of interest in learning. We have substituted academic (problem) content serving others' professional interests for lifeworld needs of the school, community and home. Both Newmann and Oliver in their later work recognize the commission of such a fallacy in early Public Issues treatments of social problems and values dilemmas.

In a 1977 position paper entitled "Building a Rationale for Civic Education", Newmann outlines a framework of elements that any revitalized program in social education must incorporate in its 'public' process of deliberation on purpose and method. He makes an effort to avoid a charge of ethical relativism by taking certain positions throughout the paper. He makes the assumption that any framework or rationale should conceive of the 'effective citizen' as integral to some community or constituency of interest. From here Newmann poses questions regarding the nature of the fundamental community, that civic education is intended to serve and the ultimate group referents for citizen loyalty and responsibility.



It is my conviction that few, if any, citizenship education programs have thoroughly addressed these issues. It could be argued that the Brameld and the early Counts' formulations identified those constituencies in the form of the world working class and its labor history. Yet serious lacunae are evident when the reflective social educator asks for a socio-historical and ethical grounding of the intents associated with the position. There was as much naive optimism over the power of natural science inquiry and the institutional openness of the school in the 1930's reconstructionists as there may conceivably be in the unexplicated assumptions of present partial and disembodied rationales of many social educators.

It may be useful to examine some of the alternative conceptions of constituencies in which citizenship education could be grounded. Newmann proposes that one constituency referent could be lodged in the particularistic memories of community membership (a turn of phrase similar to Oliver's education and community theme) at the level of collective consciousness or what we term one's cultural heritage. Or conceivably there may be no empirical community referent for citizenship effects but instead that civic responsibility be directed to the maintenance of secular principles of justice, truth and equality. This assumes the presence of sufficient commitment and skills that could be directed to this end. Buried within the absolutist rhetoric of the extreme reconstructionists such as Brameld, Hook, and Benne, was a constituency referent similar to Newmann's principles of human interest. Pointedly, however, such a



symbolic constituency in this case was not presented in a way which teachers or the public could meaningfully grasp and debate. The educational principles that flowed from early radical socialist positions had to be accepted, *prima facie*. The methodology and principles of knowledge organization then clearly made sense only to partisan groups.<sup>3</sup>

Newmann indicates that the implications of a sufficiently broad definition of critical are such that group affiliations, *per se*, risk being repudiated whereby the reflective citizen exhibits a loyalty only to principles of truth, critical inquiry and justice. Many of the possibilities citizenship social educators have for developing justifiable, defensible, conceptually-coherent rationales flow out of explicit images of the nature of social reality, of knowledge and of learning. From this images and rationales, in turn, principles of curriculum practice are deduced. If the rationale is to be seen as a "vehicle through which the educator justifies to the community" (Newmann, 1977, p.31) his delegated power theorists have an ethical and an intellectual responsibility to convey, if they are reflective ones, the structures and functions of their programs, in their particular and their wider contexts.

Through this review of the Harvard School associates, I have traced their intellectual and spiritual roots to the reconstructionist movement of progressivism. There is some precedence, then, for seeking to cultivate through the curriculum a dynamic form of discursive communication and thought. This kind of thought



allows practitioners in some cases, to separate the objective from the subjective interpretation of the world, in other cases to use it as a tool to dispel propagandistic 'ideologies' while in other programs discursive or dialogic communication has been seen as integral to informing action in the face of collective struggle. Shaver (1976) warns how the uncritical use of educational terminology, without the proper explication of principles and root metaphors or its correspondent societal forms, can, in program development, lead to naturalistic fallacies of the type Kohlberg and, more recently, Fenton are ostensibly guilty of. That is, "if one engages students in the discussion of moral dilemmas in hopes of raising their stages of moral reasoning, one has accomplished (moral education)" (Shaver, 1977, p.306). These risks are in part attributable to a narrow, ahistorical linguistic focus that accepts uncritically the 'things of logic for the logic of things'. A reductionist, technical conception of classroom-bounded competencies incurs the probability of reifying concepts and models at the expense of the practice of the lifeworld.

I can readily see the basis for linking epistemologies (derived from a particular instructional and philosophical orientation) with an ethical stance when so many models celebrate the procedural features of thought at the expense of a commitment to truth, justice and equality. It is, hopefully, not a gratuitous assumption when I say that Newmann recognizes this relationship since: "in this sense program decisions



(can be) seen as outcomes of struggles for power - not as dispassionate intellectual inquiries about the ideal form of education" (Newmann, 1977, p. 30). Without an unearthing of assumptions and dominant images regarding the implied nature of social relationships and knowledge constitution, all "intellectually complete rationales (can be seen as) merely rationalizations served up by vested interests striving to gain or maintain power" (Newmann, 1977, p.30)

As a result of this analysis, I feel justified in offering an argument at some length on the wider implications that may follow from the positions of the Harvard School reconstructionists.

Despite many references to and usages of the terms 'critical' and 'critically-minded' public or citizen, there has been little evidence as to their observable behavioural or attitudinal referents. During the 1966-1977 period, this term, or its equivalent expression, has been infused with considerable salience by Oliver, Shaver, Newmann, Berlak and others. Of those social educators it is only Harold Berlak, alone, who has given it a radically political connotation. The remainder of the associates in most cases refer to critical thinking or social criticism or critical citizenry in a 'unpacked' manner that defies essential understanding. These terms are subject to multiple shades of interpretation... The clues to the social and political direction their use may be headed are acquired only by a 'reading' of the context of the passage or docu-



ment in question. One would suspect that, given this observation as an indicator, several of the contemporary reconstructionists have not come to terms with their comprehensive rationales for citizenship education. The reader may be reminded that the same political blindspot afflicted the more moderate, or liberal-democratic reconstructionists of the middle period 1932-1938. Such individuals as John Dewey, William Kilpatrick and John Childs habitually re-interpreted the politico-philosophical positions of one another whenever they wished to appear as apologists of the most opportune position at the time.

Not until the most recent formulations on rationale building and social criticism has consideration been given, by the Harvard Associates, to underlying structural factors associated with socio-political conflict in a society. That is, some tacit radicalization may have occurred with respect to the model of society held by different associates. These have ranged from a liberal pluralistic conception, to a political economic conception, to one that specified the cultural hegemony of one class over other social groupings. In the earlier Public Issues and in Oliver's Education and Community series, no accounting is made for the exclusion from the classroom analysis sequence of themes on mass exploitation or the presence of widespread inequality and impoverishment over two-thirds of the globe. A rough impressionistic analysis yielded virtually no references to those forms of human relationships. Donald Oliver's attempt at analysis of alienation and fragmentation in the corporate technical or-



der of the advanced societies identifies the explanatory principle as one of 'imbalance' between primary and secular forces. Yet he provides no account of alternative mechanisms to explain such social and psychological distress. Fred Newmann, in his proposals for citizen action curricula demonstrates an almost naive faith in the validity of current institutional functioning. Students merely toil in the shadow of our grand democratic institutions. For reasons which he outlines he conceives of the competent exercise of influence as a taken-for-granted contribution for self-validating democratic order.

Little provision is made in each of these programs for reassuring the reader that the tacit preconceptions about the social order should not themselves be questioned since a reflective-deliberative public is the norm for communication to which we strive. Warranted speculation on strategies to develop radically-critical publics intent on large scale structural change is not offered. Because of the general pitch of the justifying phrases employed one would expect some discussion on radical strategies, if only to decide against them. One gains the impression of a sacralized area of 'explosive' significance that is considered beyond the limits of discourse of social educators - an omission that may violate the expressed ideal of deliberative rationality.

It should be noted, particularly in allusion to an earlier reference to the all-conditions-being-equal model of rational inquiry and communication exemplified in jurisprudential teaching, that any omission of reference toward



structural contradiction in macro-society would have implications for any community of communicative relationships proposed by Oliver or Shaver in their 1966, 1970 and 1976 formulations. Considering that student participants, as has been freely acknowledged by social educators from Beard onwards, bring certain perspectives, biases, maps and preferences of the social world to a group that is debating public issues, it is inconceivable that merely 'good argument' would resolve the effect of those forces that 'condition' or sustain particular patterns of social undertaking among students. If we recognize that students' biographies are immersed in dominant patterns of productive, cultural and political arrangements, then the transforming power of one world view for citizen education, implied by the instructional model, and one that omits consideration of structural factors affecting communicative performance and hence, competence, will be weak indeed.

Essentially, I have been expressing a position which in a different structural phase is termed the "limits of schooling" thesis (see Hurn, 1970), which for our purposes represents a view of the school's general ineffectiveness in citizenship education. Clearly, this is an area of education research and design that citizenship or reconstructionist educators should focus upon. I raise the question, as nonjudgmentally as possible, as to whether the Harvard School reconstructionist should have as much faith in the school as a locus of change, excepting the work of Donald Oliver? Yet the implications of this kind of analysis find a place in



any critically-reflective appraisal of reformist curriculum documents. It seems appropriate to conclude with James Coleman's impressions on the effects stemming from a range of citizen education approaches:

...the academic approach, which teaches citizenship in the classroom as something to be learned, much as any other subject, appears singularly ineffective... Attempts at introducing civic responsibility through student government and the like are generally ineffective... Attempts at civic participation and community projects seem to fail because they are seldom carried out....

Merit systems, standards of conduct and the like laid down by school authorities seem to work only for the docile; and for whomever they work, it is questionable whether they aid or impair citizenship education.

(Coleman, 1960, pp.288-289)

In The Adolescent Citizen ("A Sociologist Suggests New Perspectives") F. Patterson ed. Free Pr. Glencoe, 1960.



## FOOTNOTES

1. Use of the term, exemplars, in no way connotes a value judgement on the part of the reader as to the adequacy or significance of the Harvard School Programs regarding reconstructionism. The term is used, primarily, to declare a general conception shared by social studies commentators that associates of this School are historically closest to a critical social studies. Hence, we are representing what is taken to be the situation in the field not conferring the conception with any truth status. See recent reviews of this field by M. Levin (1969); G. Martell (1980); D. Pratt (1973); J. Nelson (1977a, 1977b); R. Simon (1977).
2. For a comprehensive exploration of the meaning of 'message systems' see B. Bernstein in "On the Classification and Framing of Educational Knowledge" (1971).
3. This approach has and does lay the designer and classroom practitioner open to a dogmatic mechanicism of style and posture - unable to innovate with confidence. They are in no position to defend the practice and arrangements that constitute the classroom structure. Unwittingly, they contribute, as individuals with vested interests, to an institutional rigidity and conservatism that is often misconceived. The problems of social change at the school and classroom levels is discussed by G. Whitty in Flude and Ahier; (Schools, Educability and Ideology, 1974). The innovation of a phenomenological perspective on pedagogy concurrent with strategies of structural change is suggested.



## CHAPTER 6

### THE STATE AND CURRICULUM PRACTICE

#### THE ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL STATE

But evolutionarily important innovations mean not only a new level of learning but a new problem situation as well, that is a new category of burdens that accompany the new social formation...At every stage of development the social evolutionary learning process itself generates new resources, which mean new dimensions of scarcity and thus new historical needs.... In the modern age, with the autonomization of the economy (and complementarization of the state) there arose the problem of a self-regulated exchange of the social system with external nature....If postmodern societies...should be characterized by a primacy of the scientific and educational systems, one can speculate about the emergence of the problem of a self-regulated exchange of society with internal nature.

(Habermas, 1979, p.164-165)

Habermas in more recent work on communicative action (1979, 1981) has combined this interest with an analysis of the possibilities and limitations encoded in the emergence of the late capitalist state and society. Work in critical theory (see Schroyer, 1973; Offe, 1972) is committed to understanding this social formation firstly, as a structural development within capitalism, and secondly, as to how technical developments and the altered social relations of production will affect the nature of social control and civic participation in everyday affairs. The literature on the advanced capitalistic formation is burgeoning in its range and



depth. It includes perspectives that range from the orthodox-economistic (Lenin, 1964; Mandel, 1975, 1978), to structuralist (Poulantzas, 1973; Althusser, 1971; Miliband, 1973) to cultural Marxist (Lukacs, 1971; Schroyer, 1973; Habermas, 1975; Offe, 1972) to name but a few representatives. I provide a cursory sketch based on research through critical theory of the features of advanced capitalist social formation outlining its visible or projected crisis tendencies and discussing how these affect participation, and practices of reform as conditions of social learning.

Habermas suggests in his work on advanced capitalist society, that it is the emergence of the state as a social, political organ of decision and co-ordination that is historically unique in the evolution of economic and cultural life. He implies that in the evolution of any social system, of the modern era, the growth in the forces of production, technical knowledge, and administrative rationalization also 'carry' with them a new set of political, social, and normative problems that must be accommodated. As new resources are generated, as the organization of production complexifies, as the scale of capital accumulation intensifies progress is not geometric and even on all fronts of social economic life. Within these movements, new historical needs, new forms of social intelligence, and new problems of social regulation for institutions as well as for collectivities of persons develop. Although the critical theory tradition will argue that the problems are conditioned as a result of the internal



capital-labour contradictions of capitalism, it is nevertheless the emergence of social-subjective nature that will pre-occupy the opposed interests of state-corporate planning and social political reforms. My concern in this study has been to thematize curriculum reform as social reform in order that we may understand the kinds of identifications, resistances and strategies to be developed to secure radical curriculum practice as the organization of publics in advanced capitalist society. To this end, it is vital as a citizen and integral to the intentions of this study to characterize the conditioning structure we inhabit in our lives and in our work in order to reflexively plan for conditions of social learning that will meet the "new historical needs" of this era. The history of radical curriculum reform should be the organization of persons, history of emancipation from personal and structural deformations. To gain individual and collective autonomy, however, means to address developments in the organization of communication and of production.

In his 1975 work Legitimation Crisis Habermas distinguishes between social integration and system integration. Each relates empirically and conceptually to one another. A social whole with recognizable boundaries has properties which demarcate it as a system with institutional sub-systems. Historically and functionally these constellations can be said to acquire an identity such as feudal, agricultural society or post-modern state capitalism. Equally, social integration occurs as a collective expression of bonds, cul-



ture, and expectations with persons in a society. The forms and understandings of their bonds and interaction, projected over a time, acquire a certain relational character cemented through coercion, sentiment, authority, or mutual obligation. These relations generalized represent a kind of social integration which can be identified as the means of holding persons together over time. This identity is held collectively by persons but is also held internally through consciousness. The essential boundaries of this social identity for persons are constituted by the negotiated lifeworld. As Alfred Schutz has indicated these lifeworlds each have normative accents or identities. The analysis of the late capitalist formation, because of evolutionary developments, must incorporate these kinds of considerations explicitly since not only has the internal structuring of institutional systems shifted under this economic form but so has the normative organization of social life. The bases, motivational and normative, upon which persons act in society appear to be shifting from the earlier liberal and monopoly phases of economic organization. Analytically, system and social integration shifts can be typified and reconceptualized as a result of their growing interdependence, suggestive of a re-politicization of the civil sphere characteristic of feudal societies. Hence threats to the integrity of the economic system rebound more intensively through social internal life which in turn generates crises and threats to the general viability of the social totality. In an era of reciprocal threats the continued pursuit of the private appropriation of social pro-



duction appears to lead to a constant series of crises in both systems and social integration. With the exception of orthodox economism, each critical research tradition on the state is in agreement that in spite of the enduring capital-labour contradiction, the crises-ridden nature of the social struggle under late capitalism differs from other eras. Any discussion then of the renewed role of the state in this society begins to note the logic of crisis tendencies at work.

"Those of us in the curriculum community who want to maintain these (enlightenment) values must fully understand the possibilities and limitations of the aggressor if their resistance is to meet with success" (Pollock, 1978).

It can be said that in the late twentieth century we, as persons in industrial societies, are both the victims and accomplices of an era that ushers in late capitalist social and economic relations. This is a situation where the state intervenes directly and indirectly to stabilize and direct the accumulation of capital at the same time as it mediates the structural conflicts that threaten to undermine the continuation of the social system. The market economy in this situation has become inadequate conceptually and structurally to procure, capitalize and distribute value-laden resources. Habermas (1975) and O'Connor (1973) credit the virtual emergence of its organized form to the quasi-global post-war reconstruction. National and international recovery programs for currency, capital growth, manufacturing capacity and resource utilization intervened and coordinated the problems of post-war settlement and reinvestment. Clearly, there



were precedents for this kind of state intervention in the economy and civil life in the Europe and North America of the 1930's and earlier. The extent of state-corporate co-ordination in investment and labour policies and the extraction of surplus value had not, however, been exceeded in the period 1950-1980 in western capitalist nations.

For instance, the units of productive forces in nineteenth and early twentieth century liberal and monopoly capitalism, the medium sized corporation, the commercial sector of small enterprises, and free trade zones have been replaced by national corporate interlocks, vertically integrated multinational and systematic state intervention. Economic activity is concentrated in key industrial, financial and resource sectors in fewer and giant enterprises. This has resulted in a number of outcomes once considered anathema and now an ideological refrain to the romantic, liberal economic mind: fixed prices, internal financing, credit and interest manipulation, foreign policy and trade determination, trade union quasi-monopolies of organized labour, large scale unemployment of labour and capital, unprecedented state social expenses for the dislocated unemployed, and the conscious practice of capital "investment strikes". The former represents a common pattern for western style capitalist nations.

The state essentially co-ordinates a 'pseudo-market' that sets minimum conditions for production, investment and consumption parameters in order for corporations and groups to receive incentives in the way of policy and economic re-



lief. Viewed as an historical constellation of relations, the state includes an aggregate of powerful business and industrial management, state bureaucracy leaders, and high ranking leaders of the successful electoral party. Although their interests in capital accumulation-expansion and domination are often cross-cutting, the presence of an identifiable overlapping network of political-economic interests can be documented; (see Castells, 1980; Clement, 1975; Porter, 1965; Veblen, 1899, 1923) as instances in the United States and Canada.

The most salient development in the inter-war period only intensified in the post-war 1945 reconstruction has been the virtual disassembly of the market mechanism as an unequal distributor of scarce values. Monopoly concentration and integration, and geometric technical development, disproportionate declines in capital returns have distorted the means of distribution of values and of labour. A difficulty for corporate-state planning in the mid to late twentieth century has been to maintain increases in productivity in expansion on all levels, profitability and to maintain full or sufficiently high levels of employment. In parallel to this has been the struggle to lessen the cost of labour which admitting of political compromise with organized labour. The typical reaction on the part of the state has been to initiate tighter and more comprehensive planning measures to 'smooth out' economic performance and cushion the conflict and social dislocation that occurs with wage earners. The



state empirically and historically allied with business and military interests while not 'appearing' to do so for the mass of persons, seeks to secure the political and social conditions for economic accumulation while concurrently dispensing the social benefits and tending to the manipulation of mass loyalties in order that systems integration can be preserved. The difficulty is, as Habermas (1975, 1979) points out, that as the logic of corporate expansion, consolidation, capital accumulation, and market domination unfolds the social, political and psychological effects on labour (that is, non-owners of capital producing equity) is increasingly severe. The more sophisticated the political-economic organization of society becomes the more deep-rooted are the symptoms of crises of consumption, employment, civic participation and personal autonomy. Clearly, the reorganization of the social structure can occur cyclically through crises-ridden irruption induced by capital re-trenchment, in which case social dislocation becomes increasingly severe and the bases of social integration are deformed or, the 'social system' is restructured on the basis of a new organizational principle. Although late capitalist society evolves economically, the basic relation of antagonism between capital and labour, usually latent in the advanced societies, still determines the parameters of distribution, consumption and work in everyday existence and the limited array of social reforms. Decisions, policy reforms, delegation of power, and the organization of dissent by the state and by labour



respectively are all centrally mediated by this relation. Earlier historical interests of capital although pallid images of a corporate present remain essentially tied to control and domination of nature, capital, persons, and now the generation of needs (see Marcuse, 1964). What has corroded beyond its historical developmental patterns is the organization of socio-cultural life in terms of its autonomy-seeking, recreative interests. How far the expectational and plausibility structures of contemporary, capitalist-conditioned consciousness can stretch on the labour side of the dialectic is an empirical question. That the state intervenes to construct a pseudo-consensus at the level of conflicting interests, and that it partakes in the construction or sponsorship of formal appearances of the society in the way of electoral politics, emasculated civic culture, reforms and curriculum planning exposes (the state) the extent of its rationalizations in social life. This, of course, contradictorily works to thematize its mediation role, and its potential historical alliances with capital in the public consciousness.

The genuine problem of a planned society does not lie in the economic but in the political sphere, in the principles to be applied in deciding what needs shall have preference, how much time shall be spent for work, how much of the social product shall be consumed and how much used for expansion etc....

(Pollock, 1978, p. 75)

Although Pollock is discussing the problems of an historically extreme form, authoritarian state capitalism, it



is clear that radical analysis can learn from his portrayal of these tendencies for organized capitalism. Interpret the above passage as saying that "rationalization", as a technical-cultural calculus of interests, insinuates itself within all public activities. Areas of public life, once the domain of practical reason and action, are converted into decisionistic trajectories and probabilities dealing with public opinion, the coercive interventions of state, social welfare, foreign policy, labour negotiation, domestic economic policy thresholds (that is, 'how much will they take') and so on. Essentially under organized capitalism and its institutional subsystems all economic problems are transformed to political problems - neither tradition, nor mass sentiment nor "economic laws" escape this pseudoscientific calculative rationality. Personal and collective responsibility as vectors of change are absorbed in decisionistic models of social and economic planning as simply more contingency factors. State planning succeeds with this approach to the extent that it can fabricate the appearance of an institution actively seeking publics' perspectives, sentiments and interests as integral material for decision-making. The extent of state boundaries around economic conduct is quite revealing. While many risks that financiers or industrial capital may have once assumed have disappeared, the degree to which their profits are disposed is circumscribed by the state. Price regulation, profit distribution, capital re-investment, and taxation measures are



all actively monitored by state agencies less, of course, for the general social interest and more because of the anarchic, counter-competitive tendencies of the different fragments of capital owners. However, in an historically under-regulated sphere the degree of intervention and internal policing is unparalleled. At the time of writing the Greymac Credit-Crown Trust affair in Ontario has demonstrated not only astronomical profits from one real estate sale 'flip-flop' and a perilously high deposits financing ratio but also an unmitigated provincial government involvement in historically independent areas - the capital investment and reinvestment of financial institutions to the point that the state is able to dispose of privately held assets and corporations. A similar case, again at the time of writing, occurs in Alberta where a well-known regional entrepreneur is involved in real estate development which is financed by an interlocking trust company (Fidelity Trust) that has extended itself beyond a safe equity base. Canadian government involvement here has led not only to disclosures of these transactions but the withholding of registration 'licences' to operate as a trust company, if capital is not refunnelled into the lending company. What this serves to show about state intervention is that much less, upon closer analysis, of its motivation is based upon protection of the public interest (clearly cases in other spheres where it does not act would support this) than it is upon incurring a series of business failures, financial chaos and fear, and a possible 'investment strike'. The other dimension to state



motives for intervention has to do with the kinds of sentiments and plausibility loss amongst non-owners of capital if their savings or money-earning coupons are dissolved in a corporate 'crash'. In one case the state, if it did not intervene, loses vital revenues and control of partial economic planning, and in the second case it loses legitimacy and in the longer term persons' willingness to participate in the appearances of political cultural life. Just the same it is under a regime of organized capitalism where corporate state motives coincide in an amalgam of 'risk-avoidance, market division, and price-interest manipulation'. It is only the large scale corporate interests, whether in finance, media, or industry, that hold a greater degree of autonomy and influence. Middle level and commercial entrepreneurs are fast transformed 'into rentiers whose income is determined by the state, who are given incentives to invest, but no freedom (negative) to withdraw such capital if the ventures mean a loss of money' (Pollock, 1978).

What possibilities are there for mobilizing conflicting interests, particularly non-owners of capital against the state and its antagonistic social relations? The history of social revolution has shown clearly that the consistently most successful group in terms of its capacity to articulate its interests, accumulate support and its structural understanding of its position have been the middle classes. Of course, I refer to the making of bourgeois revolutions based only transitionally on mass popular support. Yet, it is in



this social class that enlightenment values of equality, justice and freedom find their greatest resonance. As Habermas (1975) indicates, it is within the residues of old bourgeois political culture notions such as free assembly, public opinion and majoritarian influence that the state is, in principle, threatened. The task through monitored planning is to continually defuse these motivational, discursive remnants which could be coupled to motive-forming action or expression that would tend to delegitimize prevailing political and economic relations. Larson (1977), in a highly insightful analysis, depicts a correspondence between growing capital concentration and professional consolidation under the aegis of the state. In the way that the state-corporate capitalism absorbs small scale commercial activity, or leaves it to an anarchic death, occupational technization and 'professionalization' proliferates in the advanced societies but is tightly boundaried and controlled by state agencies. Bourgeois style rhetoric surrounds the sponsorship of occupational-technical groups that vie for 'professional' status one with another. Each lays claim for an area of expertise and authority, often in the service and 'helping' occupations, that demarcates some horizon of meaning that its members can invest in and police. What can be seen to happen, according to Larson, is that the state sanctions but also appropriates the essential survival decisions for each occupational group that tries to consolidate - leaving each stripped of any real autonomy or decision-making capacity. In fact, each of



these occupational groups as self conscious political entities has opted to 'buy-in' to the calculus of prestige and authority related to symbolic power over some arbitrary cutting-up of material and cultural reality. What each occupation, in this historical situation receives is a passing promise of recognition from the more powerful in the wonderful game of damaged appearances under organized capitalism; and the capacity to organize smaller groups of persons already mostly appropriated, body and soul, to an invisible but prevailing hegemony.

Political domination in organized capitalist states is achieved on a number of fronts the least of which is physical coercion. The state-corporate complex is able to promise persons or classes of persons, who usually, the prestige, security, and comfort that is assumed to be waiting in regulated occupations, suburban dwellings and stable disposable income. The 'abundant life' is equated with the 'good life'. As a result the former sphere is suitable for the manipulation of needs, and satisfactions both through the 'consent' of the consumer, and the range of commodities available. Clearly, in prevailing over the interests of capital in this way, the state seeks to turn the productive forces and surplus value generated by labour (mental and manual) against the possibilities of a generalized interest. Persons become in this kind of political economy victims and complicitous in turning the organization and encoded labour of society against themselves. Communicative



organization of the social world is a structuring relation that works to suppress the freedom of the individual and his class has become a progressive form of domination in an organized society.

...can state capitalism be brought under democratic control. The social as well as the moral problems with which the democracies are confronted has been formulated as follows....What ways and means can be devised to prevent the abuse of the enormous power vested in state, industrial and party bureaucracy under state capitalism? How can the loss of economic liberty be rendered compatible with the maintenance of political liberty? How can the disintegrative forces of today be replaced by integrative ones? How will the roots from which insurmountable antagonism develop be eliminated so that there will not arise a political alliance between dissident partial interests and the bureaucracy aiming to dominate the majority.

(Pollock, 1978, p. 93.)

As we have seen, the problem of social reform in organized capitalist society often comes down, but is not reducible to the 'asymmetrical relation' between capital and labour. As Mandel (1975, 1978), O'Connor (1973), Castells (1980) point out, the state is faced, as one consequence of this basic relation, with the chronic tendency for the rate of profit to fall despite productivity gains, cost consolidation and differential investment. Yet the state can only intervene systematically, so far, in the capitalization process without causing disincentives to invest on the part of major financial interests. At the same time, as we experience presently in 1983, economic and social dislocation result from the quasi-anarchy of competition



amongst capital blocs. Intervention is necessary for the state to secure legitimacy and offset motive-forming dissent. Yet to thematize intervention too far has its attendant risks. The likelihood of continuing and increasingly severe economic crises is real as is the possibility of derivative crises or socio-political deficits within the society. This is certainly true of Canada, presently complicated as it is by its relative underdevelopment and quasi-annexation by the United States economy. This problem is expressed structurally by the difficulty of progressively appropriating more and more surplus value from human labour and to stem the diminishing returns of profit.<sup>1</sup>

Organized capitalism of the kind I have been alluding to differs from liberal and monopoly phases by the degree to which it systematizes the procurement of capital. The era is characterized by extreme economic concentration and the growth of vertically integrated multinational corporations and large scale national firms. The commodity capital, labour, and service markets although clearly demarcated for sectional interests are highly organized as to external market share and as to internal corporate penetration of their respective markets. The era, as I have argued, is marked by consolidation, mergers, and continual capital reorganization for profitability and sectoral domination. The state, as I have considered, intervenes virtually systematically as 'functional deficits' develop in market anarchy. In earlier eras the market tended to be the



'steering' mechanism of the society economically and ideologically. Habermas (1975) considers that organized capitalism occurs with 'political planning of the allocation of scarce resources'. Up until that time capital deployment operated under boundary conditions set by the state such that the strategies and social effects of capital decisions were unmitigated.

Habermas (1975) defines and characterises the organized capitalist society in terms of three institutional subsystems: the economic, the administrative and the socio-cultural. The economic subsystem contains three sectors of corporate interest that include private-entrepreneurial activity, private monopolistic forms, and public sector industries such as Crown corporations and semi-public or subsidized large scale industries. Public and private monopolistic firms are typically capital-intensive while private-entrepreneurial firms are typically labour-intensive. Public and monopoly corporations face well organized labour unions while commercial or private business work with primarily fragmented, unorganized workers. This distinction has implications for how domination is secured in the organized state.

In the administrative system the state organization essentially centres many planning directives for the economy as a whole within itself; that is global planning that seeks to generate and ameliorate conditions for the accumulation of capital. This occurs within the tolerance limits of individual capital blocs. The state attempts to regulate



overall financial/fiscal performances of the different sectors which include strategies to 'regulate investment and demand'. While considered stabilizing tendencies in the realm of capital, their effect is primarily aversive to risk-taking by setting perimeters for growth, demand, interest, employment and investment targets. The state acts secondly to generate and ameliorate capital realization on a number of fronts, and thus 'replaces' the market. For the interests of this study the state acts to fill capital into neglected regions or sectors dismissed by the anarchic capital market. It acts to 'improve the material infrastructure' of society through education, health, transportation, regional planning and so on. It acts to develop the symbolic infrastructure in such areas as research and development, scientific grants and patents. It also acts to 'develop labour productivity' through the general provision of schooling vocational and trade schools, and adult learning. Clearly, there are a number of other key sectors in which the state makes social investments and causes social consumption but these are beyond the concerns of this study. International promotion, diplomacy and other measures are all designed to secure the productivity of capital commodities either directly through materials, financial incentives, credit provision, or indirectly by (manpower) labour preparation in the way of skills and consciousness. Indirectly, schools and curricula are important in developing a kind of reflexive labour in the way of technicians, re-



searchers and quasi-administrators. Mattick (1969) contends that reflexive labour is productive of surplus value in that indirectly, as does the state, it alters the conditions under which value can be appropriated.

Another aspect that can characterize the state's role in the reproduction of society is the generation of rational decisions over economic planning and investments, social conflicts, as responses to public interest groups and the distribution of social benefits. In the same way the private and state capital organization demand as criteria of success, the production of economic values so, too, the administrative subsystem must succeed in producing rational or plausible decisions which can satisfy civic or corporate demands for answers, for policies, or for intervention. In this way the state in its role as a collective capitalist and arbiter of cross-cutting capital blocs reconciles conflict and system integration by the production of values (economic), decisions (rational), legitimation (plausibility), and motives (meaning). These 'outputs' readily quantifiable in a socio-technical culture serve the twin functions of securing accumulation, conditions for accumulation, and mass loyalty.

Since the market as an institution and as ideology is freely manipulated under organized capitalism, its politically contingent nature as an historical phenomenon comes more to public consciousness. Given, too, that as a fair distributor of scarce value it fails, the unrestricted mar-



ket as an organization for 'steering' or integrating society is no longer suitable. The social relations and modes of production now require to be politically directed. Yet this intervention, an irreligious move for popular sentiment, means that there is a legitimation deficit, on behalf of the ideas of state, corporate and entrepreneurial activity, which must be filled.

But state capitalism does away with the market and hypostasizes the crises for the duration of eternal (Canada). Its "economic inevitability" signifies a step forward, a breathing spell for the rulers. Unemployment becomes organized. Only the already well established section of the bourgeoisie is still really interested in the market. Big industrialists today denounce liberalism only when state administration remains too liberal for them, not completely under their control. The modern planned economy can feed the masses better and be better fed by them than by the vestiges of the market.

(Horkheimer, 1978, p. 97)

The socio-cultural subsystem of organized capitalism Habermas conceives of, as providing through an organization of the lifeworld, sufficient rationality and motivation for 'citizens' to willingly participate in routine existence and to believe in the genuine quality or 'normalcy' of institutions and relations surrounding them. This does not mean that 'citizens' actively and passionately subscribe in their conduct to the moral or existential outcomes of economic and political life in the society; only that they do not rationally problematize nor act against its social foundations by withdrawal of their participation. Each of the subsystems I



have described overlap in functional interdependence (similar to Durkheim's 1964 construct of organic solidarity). Each subsystem produces quantifiable outputs such as values, decisions, meanings, and motivations. Since the market mechanism and its ideology of the exchange of equivalents is greatly dissolved as a symbolic device of integration, the general conditions of production are disclosed and risk disclosure of their antagonistic bases. As the market has been a central element in the bourgeois cosmology, the remnants of other external trappings such as civic rights, freedoms of assembly, petition, electoral process and so on have lost their motive-forming power to a large degree. To the extent that these action-laden traditions cease to exist there is a legitimation deficit. Real participation on behalf of citizenry would be fateful for the potency of interest formation and critique would threaten the social complex administered by the state. Formal democracy has evolved as an electoral institution that simulates participation through appearance. Citizens do not partake in action or decision but merely withheld assent from one pre-determined option or another. Political culture has been reduced to a ritualized passivity - a breeding ground of complacency, cynicism and self-doubt that anyone can 'understand society'. Substantive or democratic participation threatens through the consensus-making of its public to expose the private appropriation of socialized production more by 'anatomizing' the latent class structure of society. Formal or "anticipatory democracy" (Burt) secures mass consent but emasculates



the formation of grounded motives that reach for autonomy. Decisions are always being made for citizens, by others in an infinite range of expertise, for them by the state, by the school, by service industries and by media. Specialism and pseudo-professionalization fragment and undermine the historical integrity of the public sphere. Insidiously, a latent kind of class stratification is continuously reproduced through the anonymous organization of others.

It is catechism of the art of (authoritarian) rule that the differences between the ranks, whether it be skilled or unskilled labour or between races, must be systematically furthered by all media of communication - newspapers, radio, and movies to isolate individuals from one another. They should listen to everyone, from (Trudeau) to the local boss, but not to each other. They should be informed about everything, from the nation's policies for peace to the use of blackout lamps, but they should not inform themselves. They should lay their hands on everything but not on the leadership. Humanity is thoroughly educated and mutilated. If a region, for example the United States or Europe, is great or powerful enough, the machinery of oppression used against the internal enemy must find a pretext in the threats of the external enemy. (Witness the foreign and domestic policies of the Reagan government in 1982-83). (Emphasis mine)

(Horkheimer, 1978, p. 103)

According to Habermas, in the organized societies, legitimation is structured through the symbolization of 'civic privatism' in vocation and leisure and through the seepage of technocratic thinking and 'appliques' to all realms of the organized lifeworld. I have discussed this distinct 'privatist' syndrome more fully in Chapter 1. It involves



a concentration of persons' energies and talents in a possessive narcissism of homelife and ownership, extensive and conspicuous leisure routines, the procurement of financial security, and the fanatical preoccupation with achievement/advancement in work, games, possessions and indeed, ironically, in a cultivation of the 'natural life'. Belief in the panacea-like qualities of purposive, technical thinking is coupled to the practice of privatism such that persons compete spuriously amongst themselves and others oblivious to the basic antagonisms that propel them further and further into an autonomy-denying narcissism. School organization and curriculum development emphasize the appearances of co-operation and 'interaction' but essentially reward the quietly, furious, competitive performances of students who recognize not others, or the society they live in, but merely the distinction between work and play. Each of these cultural forms serve to sustain plausibility in an overarching way, of the organized relations of a society they inhabit by turning persons inwards, non--reflexively against themselves and others. The practical depolitization of social relations thus achieved instills in popular consciousness the history of society as a 'natural history'.

Organized capitalist society has evolved a complex response to crisis in all its dimensions. Its primary interest is to subdue economic crisis so as not to uncover the capital-labour antagonism or class relations of society. To this end our crises, of different types, evolve to contain human



collective energies within the prevailing social structure. Social class is a somewhat invisible relation in North American society. The fact that it has a non-appearance should not deter radical curriculum inquiry from uncovering it as a constitutive relation of our social world of ours and our students. Reform, particularly of the type sponsored by 'helping professions' such as social work, school teaching, law, clinical psychology, social democratic groups, is an endemic response in our time that partializes the understanding of conflict and drives solutions ever farther inward to seek a technical solution.

With the obsolescence of the market as an institution distributive of life-chances, capital-labour repoliticises issues of wage settlements, work condition, and entry-exit control over memberships. Administrative processing by the state of this primary political antagonism lead to the 'classic compromise' as adversaries achieve incremental demands rather than real gains. Habermas (1975) indicates that this administrative-political bargaining in the public and private economic sectors distorts the wage structure, job markets, causing permanent inflation and fiscal shortages within the state and corporations. The phenomenon of uneven development, well known in a regional economic context, occurs across the occupational sectors pitting 'workers' against one another in an infinite spiral. These social costs primarily absorbed by the state, or redirected through interest rate manipulation to labour, are distributed across



the softer social service areas such as welfare, education, health care which in turn are distributed unevenly by region. These phenomena coupled then with the links to a global economy reverberate in their effects upon routine life where we experience chronic inflation, increasing cycles of recession and slow recovery and permanent structural unemployment.

The bulk of the economic crisis is transformed and distributed socially and psychologically across dependent groups of citizens who even in their organization of dissent accept less and less real response from state and corporation. In a wave of fatigue it seems as if partial public dissent organized around rights issues simply witnesses the decline of historic public services if only their voices are just 'heard'. In what Schroyer (1973) has termed a 'refeudalization' of relations of production, serious radical curriculum inquiry must determine whether other practices under organized capitalism can extract economic value and thence domination. Is the political administration of consciousness through service sector 'consumer' relations, such as the student as a consumer of meanings, a strategic intervention of the state in the socio-cultural subsystem? As Habermas (1975) notes, under organized capitalist societies

...the system of world society shifts its boundaries so far into its environment that it runs up against limits of outer as well as inner nature. Ecological balance designates an absolute limit to growth. The less palpable anthropological balance designates another limit, which can be overstepped only at the



price of altering the socio-cultural  
identity of social systems.

(Habermas, 1975, p. 41)

Although the implications for the natural limits to growth, and the balances of global economics and politics will preoccupy citizens in years to come, I can only allude to the consequences of global-regional organized capitalism for the socio-cultural organization of character and action. It can be said that, in principle, there are no limits to the characterological re-organization of the person. Clearly the social and political regime that persons inhabit does affect the possibilities for psychic change. Socialization patterns through parenting, peers, and schooling have the recognizable forms and norms of the 'bourgeois era. If the parameters of socialization relations shift, then, in principle, there is a limit to how consciousness and 'relational capacity' may be shaped or arrested (see Pinar, 1983). Historically, all of us, our children and our students are the products of a socialization grounded in the linguistic organization of intersubjectivity. This means, as I indicated in Chapter 3, that language as speech presupposes that action-interests can be rationally justified or discarded, at bottom. Hence, the communicative organization of action can, as I have noted, become the public device, if politically mediated, that can sponsor critique, autonomy and the collective achievement of rational decision-making. Clearly, this threatens a social system based on veiled antagonism. With the displacement of sophisticated "steering systems" in the



advanced societies the state, for one, as an assembly of controlling groups needs to detach its decisions, socio-linguistically, from the members inhabiting dependent institutions in the society. Habermas (1975) envisages the possibility of "uncoupling" the political administrative subsystem in society from its socio-cultural grounding. In this way, providing the state can ensure a passive consent to the idea of its social appearances, that is, the pseudo-concrete, it can proceed in its planning devoid of the need to furnish reasons or notifications for the actions it initiates. As a result the desire to conform amongst persons could be achieved without the proliferation of reasons, discursively justified, provided that the world of appearances, or the pseudoconcrete and the political trajectories it takes are self-evidently plausible to citizens. To the degree that identity-giving interpretive systems are dissolving in the way we organize and select curricular text and pedagogical relations institutional arrangements must become an item for current curriculum research. One possible scenario is for curriculum theory to reconstruct a real moral education that pursues a communication ethics and universal morality.<sup>2</sup>

#### REPRODUCTION AND LEGITIMATION CRISES

I refer here to the collective and structural consequences for the state, under organized capitalism, if there are deficits of rationality contained in decisions by the state, if persons living in the society feel the prevailing



economic-political arrangements need particular justification, and if persons singly or collectively withdraw, retreat, or protest in their everyday lives from routines of work or leisure because of a larger system crisis. These are three key conditions that can plague an organized capitalist society to the extent its ongoing existence, as a set of social and political relations, is disturbed; that is, the procurements of social labour are disrupted. Although other analytic and empirical tendencies can surely be noted as to state crises tendencies, I refer to these three key ones and their interrelationships as important for understanding socio-cultural problems in resistance and reforms for curriculum planning.

What I argue is that the continued sanctity and reproduction of the state system is threatened if there occur deficits of plausibly rational decisions, policies, or interventions; of legitimation for the continued functioning of the political system; and of motivation for persons to perform as citizens, students, workers or good consumers toward the dominant social reality. If, we understood society as a social system, and isolate one phase of its functioning, we have a situation, as in the above context where benefits (in the way of goods and services) and rationality are supplied as 'inputs', derived from the economic and political-administrative systems respectively, to the social-cultural organization of persons which communicatively mediates their significance in terms of persons' own expectations. From these



inputs of benefits and rationality, once mediated by the interaction of persons, come outputs of legitimacy for the system and motivation to participate supplied by the social meanings from legitimacy. The core motivation to participate in the mundane routines of reproduction, to perform in educational and occupational settings, and to bestow legitimacy on the political system is anchored in the dialectical relations of 'inputs and outputs' which is, in essence, an individual and group phenomenon - the linguistic-communicative organization of action.

Clearly I borrow my analogy, as does Habermas (1975, 1979), from the vocabulary of systems thinking. But provided such an historical framework is seen only for its ability to organize our perspective at sufficient altitude to see the social totality, as a whole, then it is important that it be used in inquiry. Shifts in any of the subsystems trigger effects in the other. Particular historical circumstances affect each of the subsystems differently.

However, under late capitalism, economic disjunctures or crises of accumulation have become relatively constant as have shifts in normative structures or world views amongst all social strata. Considering that the expansive logic of accumulation is mediated through the capital-labour antagonism and that these movements coupled with socio-technical developments are structured into the system, the likelihood of constantly surfacing motivational, legitimation and rationality crises, or in short, reproduction crises, is great indeed. This recognition is one that



an historically conscious curriculum theory must incorporate within itself.

In particular, for the procurement of motivation, the cultural traditions, moral consciousness, and world views generated through pedagogy and curriculum, family, and media that have typically been grounded in bourgeois and pre-capitalist cultural traditions are undergoing change. In a liberal era of capitalism, the screen of bourgeois mythology coincided functionally with the operation of a market-oriented economy. With the ideological-cultural separation of work and power, civic participation split off from productive activity was easily sustained as a cultural element of the society. Under organized capitalism the cultural residues of bourgeois tradition cannot sustain this repoliticization of production through state intervention. At the same time, occupational skill and performance structures, and civic dependency needs shift due to the extension and further commodification of the market. These economic structural requirements 'force' changes in schooling practices, and parenting for which there is no ready-made pool of cultural precedents to draw upon. Since the socio-cultural sphere is vital, at this stage of normative and political-economic development, for grounding mass loyalty it leaves an object of administrative rationalization because of its pivotal nature in securing social integration firstly, and system integration secondly. Ironically, because organized capitalism shifts through its respective crises so



vociferously, it produces new needs for integration concurrently as well as generating needs in persons (material and emotional) which often cannot be fulfilled. In such a case, and one that I still point to with concrete instances, crises of meaning or legitimacy, or rationality, or material scarcity are always at a point of eruption. Horkheimer notes well the ambiguities of freedom and unfreedom we currently face under late capitalism:

In all the consistency which theory can find in economic development, in all the logic of the succession of individual social epochs, in all the increases in productive power, methods, and skills the capitalist antagonisms have in fact been growing. Through them human beings will ultimately define themselves. These antagonisms are today not only more capable of producing freedom, but also less capable. Not only freedom but also future forms of oppression are possible. They can be theoretically evaluated as either regression or as ingenious new equipment. With state capitalism those in power can strengthen their position even more.

(Horkheimer, 1978, p. 109)

...the selection for the concentration camps becomes more and more arbitrary...in principle anyone could be there.

(p. 103)

In order to limit the thematization of dissent or mobilization, the state must draw from the pool of cultural and normative legitimations that have accrued to it historically from other social eras. As I have discussed, if motive-forming action, as in the notion of public discourse, is grounded through the necessity of giving justifiable (in principle) reasons for economic and political policy, then



crises can reach a point that will destroy the plausibility of all formal political actions and become 'rich in practical consequences'.

It follows that the state must act whenever possible in situations that erupt and in sectors of the socio-cultural system to secure its unquestioned hegemony. Administrative rationalization is a favoured mode of intervention in matters of public opinion. This kind of activity occurs through the extensive use of government commissions, judicial decisions, public pronouncements, and the commercialization of messages and decisions. These devices seek to manipulate personal and collective sentiment through appearing to address issues, say, of unemployment, or immigration, or occupational replacement and retraining in such a way as to leave unbroken the structure of prejudice or one-sidedness of issues that persons mistakenly hold. Through finesse, state intervention appears to redress the wronged interests of persons; yet it actually retains them in a state of unreflexive dependency. In this instance, legitimation and presumably motivation is preserved. The relation is generalized in the commodification of goods and services where persons' physical and emotional needs are manipulated in a partial vacuum of alternative cultural resources.

However, there are limits, not completely knowable empirically, to the degree of intrusion in the cultural life-world of persons before the legitimacy of these incursions is bankrupted. If, as Habermas indicates, there are remnants of bourgeois and enlightenment culture that in earlier



eras had a political significance repressed today then these elements as meaning complexes can be communicatively mobilized as critique, analysis, and even reconstruction through either a practical or theoretic discourse. In re-embedding former meaning contents within an inter-subjective nexus, persons release the "semantic potentials" of text and symbol, thereby constructing a kind of future shared history and solidarily with one another. Presently, these kinds of alliances are shaky and shifting, usually organizing on public or community issues that have been 'split off' through a larger structural awareness. I refer, for instance, to the sometimes incomplete strategies of the women's movement over discrimination and abuse, or the student rallies organized around fee increases (plain and simple), or the distress of parents of "average" school children with school districts that extol the virtues of bilingualism, or the well-organized environment movement that fails to trace and publicly demonstrate the links of ecological destruction with capital expansionist logic. In all these cases it is typically the thematization that individuals or corporations or prejudice have erred; that we must take measures to avoid this kind of bad performance in the future. Public, political problems typically have their causal sources distributed along an apolitical continuum from neuroses, criminality, inefficiency, to hypercomplexity. These are measures where state agencies, corporate interests, or their delegates act indirectly to appropriate cultural traditions and resources



for motive-formation.

Public education over the last fifteen years in Canada has experienced a growth of administrative rationalization in the areas of school finance, policy making, curriculum objectives and selection, and instructional planning. Traditional curriculum organization was informally codified around the received cultural contents of a society and the life trajectories of students. Currently, the state, particularly through its financial leverage (Schechter, 1977) applies technical rational systematization to everything from goal selection, curriculum writing, teacher-in-service to the re-evaluation of its programs a few years later. Beyond the obvious control implications for teachers, students and learning outcomes, this action serves to relativize and politicize cultural traditions, conceptions of society, and psycho-pedagogy. The classroom realization of technicized curriculum contents affects how the social relations of teaching and learning are conducted; the nature of coming to know, and to act with knowledge as persons in the lifeworld they inhabit but partially create.

Two examples which demonstrate this technicization of culture and consciousness are the respective versions of the Alberta Social Studies curriculum guidelines that changed unremarkably over the period 1971-1981. Both the more liberal version of 1971 and the 'lighter' version of 1981 demonstrate teacher participation by appearance only. Each requires that teachers and students respectively internalize scientific pedagogy and social inquiry models within a set



of primary instructional options which decreased in scope over ten years (from open-ended to ministry-prescribed). The faith curriculum planners placed in technological thinking for its capacity to realize independence in decision making was misplaced, or was an opportunistic gesture; which one it was we cannot tell. Clearly, though the more that cultural contents are manipulated and normative expectations are altered, through external initiatives, the less power these contents as traditions, or any administered contents have as justificatory devices. If particular semantic and practical expectations grounded in the lifeworld are dissolved (in the effort to 'adapt to change' in modern Alberta) as a gesture in the demystification of the oldfashioned, their replacement can only lie in the restoration of practical interests in the curriculum by deliberation, dialogue and consensus making by the participants themselves. The original "nature like" course of curricular symbolizations of the world, or alternatives that depict the world society and historically only germinate through conditions of practical discourse. To the extent that this intervention happens, too much, counter initiatives form through teacher groups, citizen coalitions, and boards who had symbolically accepted the latest innovation from the Department of Education.

The evidence that teachers, as one group implicated, can only be pushed so far through their privatism by state is clear by their passive refusal to practice the new pedagogical norms of the 1971 and 1978 revisions. Clearly, the quality of peda-



gical encounters in social studies classrooms was quite separate from whether social inquiry was ever internalized in the consciousness of the schooled. Unfortunately, the retreatism that Downey et al. (1975) discovered amongst teachers is one form of withdrawal from the performance norms of the state; the recommendations that the state knew better were encoded in the 1981 curriculum guidelines for this field. But there are other efforts regionally, and internationally that I discuss in a later section on labour, school, and civic fronts that some publics are resocializing their interests through alternative political models. Again, on a regional level the C.O.R.E. program represents one such attempt to use school-community linkages to politicize a pedagogy of public issues.

A final point has to do with the kinds of warnings the early Horkheimer (1930-1950) makes about the vulnerabilities of freedom in complex capitalist societies. Reasons could be made as to the state's preference for using more repressive or coercive measures to secure mass loyalty and the continuous expansion of accumulation. Certainly, a number of societies in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Soviet Union deploy authoritarian, non-discursive forms of oppression. Yet the fact should not be overlooked that these regimes have economies highly problematic, more unevenly developed, and ridden with fiscal and inflationary crises than the societies of western Europe and North America. Because of the extremity of political invasion in these societies, and the chronic state of economic antagonisms many more generalizable interests are



transparently left unmet. Political coercion becomes an appropriate form of intervention for these societies given the configuration of their crises. In selected organized capitalist democracies these options of social and system integration are simply less appropriate - there is no surplus of social virtue that is available in Canada which could not drain away to become like that of Brazil or the Phillipines, for instance. In the social organization of production of Canadian society the procurement of an 'expansionary consent' is more desirable for capital development than is the narrow repression of needs. Furthermore, the position of Canada in the global capital hierarchy as a politically stable site to exploit, and its close, quasi-integration with the United States economy, cultivates the interests of competing capital investment blocs, with different market priorities to which the state must attend. The most compatible socio-cultural structures for organized capitalism in these societies, are those personality and motivational traits that Bernstein (1971) associates with the 'flexible conforming' man rather than the liberal-monopoly capitalism's 'submissive, inflexible' man.

I suggest the movement away from collection to integrated codes symbolizes that there is a crisis in society's basic classifications and frames, and therefore a crisis in its structures of power and principles of control. The movement from this point of view represents an attempt to declassify and so alter power structures and principles of control; in so doing to unfreeze the structuring of knowledge and to change the boundaries of consciousness.

(Bernstein, 1971, p. 111)



It has been argued through different formulations (Greene, 1974; Habermas, 1975, 1979; Castells, 1980; Mandel, 1975) that the particular motivational complexes most effective for sustaining faith and participation in the socio-economic structure are forms of privatism that seek to divert consciousness of self, of others, and of structures inwards or to subliminate actions and understandings in regressive forms. The idea of privatism suggests an active orientation to the administrative and economic system outputs and a disavowal of interest in issues of legitimation or problems of meaning in other or in the society they inhabit. In many ways, then, the classical ideal of the dependable if cynical consumer of commodified leisure, values and status. Typically, these reified states of consciousness are inheritances in cultural tradition from a more vibrant bourgeois era of commerce and civic life, that is they are attitudinal distortions uprooted in time and circumstance from a meaning context in which they had a formative-integrative role to play in the synthesis of personality structures within communities of shared interests.

The primary institutional expressions of privatism under monopoly and late capitalism is the achievement ideology or syndrome typical of occupational and educational hierarchies. It is action, grounded in the normative expectation of these institutions and projected through the consciousness of participants, that is geared competitively towards others. Communicative action of this nature is monological and produces essentially unstable normative re-



lations. Since strategic in orientation, this action has been, under earlier capitalist eras, instrumentally important to knowing and coping with the collection of economic and administrative values. That is, it represents in the argot of 'street wise' people 'playing' or 'knowing the system' (a common affliction, it is said of the legal profession). With shifts in the modes of surplus value extraction, and the access points to the privileged but parasitical, quasi-professional positions the secular form of privatism appears to be eroding in the organized societies. This has crisis-ridden implications at the level of the personality structure as well as at the political-administrative levels.

According to Habermas, there are "functional equivalents" for the replacement of privatism that as cultural contacts are politically and economically exploitable for purposes of legitimation. This means that because interaction patterns of contemporary social life, both interpersonally and institutionally, are 'shot through' implicitly with political contingencies that there is no generative base for the formation of true intersubjectivity and consensus-making. Privatism which has become an historical, parasitical deformity cannot engender interpersonal relations of equality or of shared interests. As a result even its evacuation plunges the experience of the everyday world into a further social anonymity. There are but a few remnants of marginal bourgeois culture that do contain traces of "communicative morality" (Habermas, 1975) which properly organized could become



counter-culture initiatives. I refer to the emergence of post-formalist art, universal ethics, and scientism of which only the latter is contributive as technical-productive force in economic accumulation. But these phenomena are best left to a later section.

What is particular about privatism and its implications for personal and collective praxis is its essentially negative relation to discursive will-formation or public discourse. When this is 'bolted' onto the expectational patterns of 'citizen duties' in the formal, anticipatory democracies, 'participation', in the organized societies, becomes a hollowed-out attentive but deferential affirmation of political-state elites decisions. Habermas displays the work of Almond and Verba (1965) on political culture. They argue that the bourgeois formal democracies contain pre-bourgeois traditional world views as well with the effect that citizens are confronted with the hortatory rhetoric of participation as appearance while the access points for engagement or debate in de-centred forums are few or non-existent. This occurs, they would maintain, not through the accidents of systems complexity but that this particular admixture of political culture maintains the motivational force necessary to believe in the political theatre but insufficient for persons to take a stake for themselves in it. Even

...the free-floating politician of the mass party whose blustering rhetoric has faded away, today indulges in talk of statistics, the national economy and "inside stories". His manner of speaking has become prosaic and well-formed. He main-



tains an ostensible contact with the workers and expresses himself in export figures and synthetic materials. He knows better than the fascists and masochistically intoxicates himself with the facts, which have already passed him by. When one can no longer invoke violence, knowledge must suffice.

(Horkheimer, 1978, p. 113)

The sociology of education (Sarup, 1978; Karabel and Halsey, 1977) testifies to the roles of the family and school in socialization and the transmission of class-specific motivational structures (see Bernstein, 1975). In realizing curriculum intentions, pedagogy in mainstream state schools inculcates as a kind of sub-text the silent, but vicious cores of repressed consciousness and achievement syndrome; both essentially hand-me-downs from earlier worlds of work and culture. What school sub-culture either intra or extra-classroom cannot provide is a communicative organization of interests and hence a morality amongst teachers and learners that is anything but flexible-submissive and rule-centred.

When the political conditions of the classroom shift so do the dependencies of learners on 'second-guessing' the system's requirements. The achievement syndrome, the repressed conscience and 'knowing the system' contains consciousness in a non-reflexive dependency. Institutions are known so as to be manipulated so that more benefits flow towards the cynical mind. The derivatives, in consciousness, or purely, stripped-down bourgeois traditions offer no relief from estrangement or anomie. They lack the political motive forming power for students or citizens. As organized



capitalism becomes more chronic as a social form, these traditions are further hollowed out and their power to confer political legitimacy on institutional life is dissolved. Persons begin to displace their energies in backwaters of narcissism which are only too readily commodified. Resistance or the idea of it becomes impossible to identify when cultural traditions provide no auspices for wholeness, solidarity or intimacy with others. To attempt political work on any front is a monumental task.

It is an expectation of the achievement syndrome in persons that rewards are distributed in direct proportion to the work done or the excellence attained under conditions of equivalence. This applies as much to the labour sector as it does to mental production of students in schools, and the distribution of life chance opportunities within the social structure. Empirically and ideologically, the power of these social forms is dissolving as the public sees more evidence of a structural mismatch between school attainment and preparation on the one hand and occupational access on the other. Students and parents are becoming more self-conscious, too, about the obscure correspondences between academic success, social class, curriculum differentiation and school outcomes. While state agencies and schools try to secure ever more firmly traditional and bourgeois forms of personal evaluation and accountability in the popular consciousness (see Guide to the Core Curriculum, B.C. Ministry of Education, 1977) social research suggests that contingent elements exclusive of the professional vocabulary of progressivism



more closely predict school success, and socio-occupational opportunity (see Rocher, 1975; Richer, 1975). Considering that the swelling ranks of the unemployed can become a chronic structural feature (of close to 20%), in both organized and competitive sectors, the incongruence between achievement ideology and school outcomes, and the likely loosening of privatism as a normative organization of real force, does organized capitalism face serious reproductive deficits of meaning and legitimacy after the 'Third Slump'? (see Mandel, 1978 on the effects of the 1974-75 recession.) Curriculum planning clearly has a role to play in the formation of a practical response.

As we have seen there is a constant interchange of cultural elements between liberal-monopoly capitalism and the organized form. Typically, bourgeois ideologies, as they pass through the historical matrices of each phase of capitalism shed yet more of their organic, creative core until the point is reached at which they contain no potency in directing the communicative organization of the lifeworld nor in offering only political legitimation functions. Habermas (1975, 1979) notes that only three cultural forms that evolved, *de novo*, in bourgeois consciousness at present, can contain latent possibilities for critique and reconstruction; non-formalist art, scientism and universal morality. I will discuss only the final one briefly.

It was under the regime of bourgeois formal law that the legal and the moral realms of action were split apart



thus freeing, in principle, their normative contents from tradition. This allowed their contents to be determined intentionally in the light of the free market. Both realms were based on general principles freed of dogma and prejudice. In the case of law these principles were assembled on the idea of the "bourgeois private person " constrained only by the power of the state and the necessities of material nature. Morality in the liberal world view, sees the state intervene only to enforce passive proscriptions in society. Hence, control is achieved through the internalization, in consciousness, of the concrete citizen. Given the over-arching notion of equivalence exchange at the time this became a practice, by those citizens capable of it, of universal morality. The particularist civic duties of citizens and their enforcement was contrasted with the global moral reach of the person in the world community.

Under these social relations, never actually redeemed, the distinction between civic life and obligations, ridden as it was by power relations, and the progressive universalization of normative systems can only be reconciled by the dissolution of different interest blocs; that is, only if persons dispense with a we-they fortress-hordes mentality where the pursuit of personal interest no longer is taken as competitive-aggressive denial of the other person. This disjunct between 'privatized' and 'socialized' interests is reconciliable since it is historically and psychically well-sedimented only through the organization of discursive will-formation. Only in the achievement of rational con-



sensus over matters of public interest would legal action coalesce with morality. Citizens, under this organization, would be encouraged to accept the ethical procedural axis of the justification of any future principles of social justice or of distribution of values as they emerge in social evolution.

The problem for organized capitalism is that the 'memory' of this cultural fracas and of the historical possibility of practical discourse cannot simply disappear. In order for any conceptual or moral system to evolve, rather than to regress, presupposes an axiomatic relation to truth. This is given with the notion of the ideal speech act as the unseverable presupposition of the achievement of equality, justice and freedom. Truth as an historical construct gains its meaning as and in the continual transcendence of socio-political relations. Either social and curriculum inquiry can lose courage and hide behind the old, decayed forms of knowledge of redundant social eras or it can act as a motive-forming force that unites private and social interests communicatively and publicly in its projects. The choice of the privileged intellectual is his: to redeem an honourable vocation or to retreat to his common, civil service posture. For under organized capitalism, there is a chronic need for legitimacy from spontaneous cultural contents that are readily appropriated by state-corporate interest. Ironically, these content traces although not usable to build mass alternative political or cultural



initiatives can form precedents as critical-practical collectives in art, in schooling, in political-civic affairs, and in science itself (despite the latter's philosophical degeneration).

A communicative ethics contained, as an experiential nexus, in communities of friends, of art, schooling, science and parenting could initiate new processes of socialization suitable for a post-capitalist, post-Marxist personality, interactive patterns, and social structure. The immanent ambiguity of these traces of bourgeois cultural traditions can either be purchased by dominant corporate-commodity logic and re-integrated into the tattered cognitive and moral patterns of the present or its promise of the secure, luxurious life can be refused. If the latter is chosen we join a loose union of resisters seeking that potential to universalise our identities cognitively, and morally; a task which I believe involves sustaining the dark side of crises.

#### CANADIAN SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

Since the demise of laissez-faire capitalism in western nations, there has been a corresponding consolidation and concentration of economic activity in increasingly fewer and larger economic institutions. The features of advanced monopoly capitalism and the effects of mass consumption societies have been widely documented, both in popular and in social science literature.<sup>3</sup> If I proceed from the assumption that the forces and relations for production are



instrumental in conditioning man's social relations, then the implications for social and ideological control of men's behaviour are highly significant in the current historical stages of western industrial development.

In a nation state such as Canada, evidence indicates the increasing consolidation of control of major economic sectors is in the hands of a relatively small group of individuals of homogenous ethnic, political and social class background whom we may term a "corporate elite". The residue of aspirants to crucial decision-making positions in the major economic sectors, which are under indigenous control, can be found to be absorbed at less crucial levels of Canada's corporations. It is important to make a distinction in the sources of ownership within the Canadian economy at this stage. The bulk of the miniscule native corporate elite has control of the major economic sectors of utilities, transportation, finance and banking, and finally that of communications and media. (Ownership here is held by those typically of upper class origin, Anglo-Saxon ethnicity and of Protestant affiliation). Other major sectors of economic life such as industry and manufacturing, and resource extraction and primary processing typically, are controlled through multinational corporate and subsidiary penetration, of the Canadian economy, by American, British and other foreign ownership ties. To some extent the senior decision-makers and corporate elites in this area are of diverse ethnic, middle class Canadian background, but also include



foreign nationals and Anglo-Saxon ethnics of middle class background.

It is important to see the economic and structural influence that the finance, utility, transportation and media sectors have upon the national economy and to appreciate the relative preponderance such sectors have over the foreign dominated economic sectors. However, it can be documented that the working relationships between the indigenous economic elite and the 'installed' elite are by no means aggressive but are accommodating and self-supporting of a functional interdependence in national economic relations. (It cannot be said that Canada, however, is economically independent and politically dependent. Its participation is strongly grounded in dependent international economic relationships but can be considered to have national boundaries in a political sense.)

The foregoing brief description of certain Canadian economic facts of life hinges on our earlier assumption of the primacy and determinate quality of the productive mode. Given the fact that our major economic institutions are consolidated and controlled by a small upper class and the remaining sectors by an elite on friendly and interdependent terms with the former, I can argue that the current pattern of economic relations in Canada is maintained for the interests of a small, elite class. Indeed, the significance of the occupational positions of the middle classes has declined from the point of view of independent economic activity and



decision-making. The increased loss of an autonomous entrepreneurial way of life is accented in the advanced capitalist phase of the western nations. With the middle classes, in fact, I can discern the growth of a second propertyless, wage-earning class, wherein their chief economic function becomes that of consumption factors who are destined to implement low-level technical decisions and to monitoring-type tasks for corporations. As a result of such developments I can term the homogenization of formerly identifiable social classes into one dependent economic stratum, and underclass.

It is necessary at this point to take a closer look at the particular institutional interrelationships of the Canadian economy in order to discern some of the implications for social control of the underclass and with a view of how knowledge is instrumental for the overclass-underclass, dominance-dependence relationship.

At least within Canada it is possible to trace the sources of ownership and control in both the major economic sector and that of the communications-media complexes. Given the degree of rationalization and concentration found in the former, it is reasonable to presume that something of the same form of relationship would obtain with the media. In terms of newspapers, journals, radio and television outlets, I can identify control over communication content and dissemination to be lodged again in the hands of small elite groups who have increasingly close economic and political ties



with one another. Media forms in this country typically take on the nature of interrelated complexes rather than, for instance, elite ownership being only restricted to series of television stations or newspapers. Talking in crude terms, the extent of elite ownership is not limited to collections of different media forms that have been consolidated, but to joint ownership of corporations in the major economic sector. Thus it is conceivable that small groups of individuals can have joint decision-making influence over both economic and media corporations. Briefly, this pattern of ownership and control becomes, then, supportive of both spheres of activity and is instrumental in the kind and scope of information projected to the consuming classes. If both media and economic enterprises rely considerably on mutual reinforcement for each other's livelihood, then both corporate sectors are concerned about dispensing the 'correct' information to the underclass from which they must generate implicit consensus as to their respective ideas and products.

Clement discusses the overlap of the two elites and thus their joint social interests. "The mass media in Canada are class institutions run by, for and in the interest of the upper class. More than that, they are instruments of the corporate elite because the media elite and the economic elite turn out to be the same people occupying the uppermost positions in two functionally defined domains of life in Canada" (Clement, 1975, p. 341). The further significance of this statement lies in the fact that, given this preponderant control over



public communication, the ideas projected through the media can be considered as the dominant ideology held by the upper class. This represents, as Clement argues, the major instrument for mental production in the country providing for a closed system of communication from upper class interests downward to the underclass. Claus Mueller (1973) comments that in mass industrialized societies, the closed, one-sided technical rationality of such communication results in the underclasses internalizing ideological knowledge as the only knowledge in circulation. Given the absence of alternative forms of discourse, potentially dissident groups have few symbolic resources with which to form counter articulations of their existential conditions; this results in distorted communication becoming generalized throughout the population.

It becomes appropriate at this stage to consider the form of knowledge that typically passes for communication and its related functions. Before doing this I must distinguish between popular knowledge disseminated through mass media and that of a more formalized scientific knowledge that pervades scientific communities. In terms of the latter form I am more concerned with the type of research knowledge that is contracted for and appropriated by industrial corporations and government departments.

The form of knowledge developed in research communities and taken over by government and industry quite clearly is of a type that is directed to improving productive capacity and to the refinement of techniques directed toward some end such as efficiency or the rationalization of varied technologies.



Hence, it is knowledge supported by the corporate sector and designed to enhance its quantitative growth and control. Seeing that such economic sectors affect the form of social relations of much of Canadian life, I must consider such knowledge forms to be highly valued by the dominant elites; this to the extent that corporate decision-makers, both media and industrial, would wish to convince other groups such as the underclass of its intrinsic value. Government or state elites in turn are clearly increasing their reliance upon the expertise of research communities. As Habermas (1970) indicates, one can see the beginnings of a technological determinism in the kinds of social and political problems selected by the state elite for solution. (That is, policies are to some extent formed in terms of the available<sub>4</sub> technical solutions attached to them at the time; such political decision-making, it can be said, is in the absence of rational discussion with publics, whose social interests will be most affected by such solutions..)

The dominant ideology will then reflect an interest in technological rationality and in the application of such rationality to the solution of "puzzles" in the economic subsystem of society and ultimately, to a solution of the problems found in the socio-cultural life as well. The guiding interests of research and knowledge that are absorbed by dominant institutional interests are likely to be those of prediction, control, and efficiency. The dominant scientific world view behind such interests, I would argue, is that of



logical positivist science. To the extent that communication and the media are concentrated and dominated in Canada by a corporate elite, then the symbolic expressions, world view, and logics-of-inquiry disseminated to the underclass is likely also to contain these dominant assumptions. Members of non-elite groups are likely to seek explanations, and technical solutions to their local context problems in the light of these assumptions. The underclass represents for the corporate elite not only a vital factor in the productive process but also a collection of masses who must be persuaded to believe in a modified overarching ideology of technological rationality.

#### CURRICULUM ORGANIZATION IN THE SCHOOLS OF THE LATE CAPITALIST STATE

In the same sense that the phenomenon of economic rationalization appears in the corporate sector, with appropriate forms of knowledge to sustain this movement, there has occurred in the educational institutions an equivalent tendency towards rationalized decision-making and rationalized educational knowledge.

It seems necessary, first of all, to locate the educational sphere within the social structure of an advanced industrial nation such as Canada. Education cannot primarily be considered, at least at the public school level, to be an independent or autonomous institutional order in the sense that the industrial, financial or state sectors are. I could say that the latter are sectors controlled and con-



centrated by elites in which decisions are taken, policies are adopted and goals are formed that, in principle, affect disproportionate masses of people. These decisions are of such a nature that the affected publics have little influence in their development and outcome. The educational sphere is best seen as an institutional subsystem of the state sector. In most cases how an educational institution functions both internally and in its outcomes is broadly determined by constitutional and administrative guidelines emerging from governmental authorities and departments; that is, it may be best put by saying, and, in reflection of present provincial trends, that many forms of educational activity are tolerated by provincial departments as long as it is confined within definite boundaries of practice that have been established hierarchically. A common thread running through all provincial systems of educational administration is the closeness that each governmental elite enjoys with corporate interests, either in the form of individuals having overlapping membership in both state and corporate elite or in the tendency for provincial receptivity to corporate and commercial lobbies, in the context of educational innovation and policy.

There appears a growing concern among public school educators, as reflected in their curricula and school organization, to explain or justify institutional activity in terms of a utility ethic. It would not seem unexpected for school officials to reflect the interests contained in a dominant ideology of technological rationalism. Given this



vital connection with the dominant institutional sectors of society, "educational institutions (are) induced to structure their overt motives in terms of the use to which knowledge can be put in the solution of material problems" (Esland, 1971, p. 101). It becomes rhetorical to ask which and whose material problems as the dependent nature of educational life predefines these as problems of the economic and state sector such as manpower needs, skills, flexible-general men-those with an implicit faith in the current structuring of Canadian society and its modes of conflict resolution.

As was discussed earlier, much of what passes for scientific expertise and research becomes transformed, at the corporate level, into technology, and as policy input, for the maintenance of the current social structure.<sup>5</sup> At the level of educational institutions I can see a corresponding response in terms of knowledge organization for the socialization and control of school clients - the raw pre-productive factors of the economy. The educational institutions' response to the dominant technological ideology can be found in the selection organization and distribution of knowledge as found in distinct school subjects. The latter can be understood as select symbolic universes of theoretical knowledge in which definite assumptions about man and his relationship to the world are found. Within the structure of a 'subject' are implicit methodological canons of inquiry; statements as to the proper data of the subject; and rules indicating the validity status of responses or outcomes ar-



rived at when one 'works' the subject. From this I will assume that particular conceptions of man, knowledge and society follow which to a large extent should be congruent with equivalent assumptions in the dominant ideology.

If I assume that the organization of the productive modes of a society has a determining influence on the institutions of the superstructure, which I will reconceptualize as the sphere of symbolic interaction (Habermas, 1970); and if, as can be documented, the existence of a corporate elite (Porter, 1965) can steer and control needs of the productive apparatus and consequently social relations in dependent institutions, then the requirements of a political-economic nature should seek to be partially addressed in the curricular organization of a school system. Curriculum in this sense would become "intentioned knowledge" leading to the control of pupils' consciousness and the internalization of a particular world view. The term curriculum as distinct from subject is understood as knowledge organized and realized in the minds of learners through an interplay of subject and pedagogical style.

There has been much debate and movement toward innovation in the field of curriculum theory and development (see Reid and Walker, 1975) over the last decade mostly in the United States and Britain, where practitioners in academic disciplines and in teaching fields have experienced a legitimacy crisis in the content boundaries of their fields. Much of the agreement of what formerly constituted the pro-



per subject matter of say physics, or anthropology or geography has dissolved. Once sacred subject divisions have become more porous and inclusive as each discipline attempts to incorporate content and questions belonging to formerly separate entities. Concurrent with this movement is a parallel 'adjustment' of pedagogy, and changing conceptions on the nature of the learner; all of which suggest an orientation in the curriculum ostensibly different from past practice. Bernstein discusses the growing boundary openness, the emphasis on learners learning how to inquire and the pluralization of knowledge paradigms as stemming from several sources.

"...we could consider the movement towards integrated codes as stemming from a technological source" (Bernstein, 1971, p. 67). He goes on to suggest, however, that the sources are 'deeper' and that this movement "symbolizes that there is a crisis in society's basic classification and frames, and therefore a crisis in these structures of power and principles of control" (Bernstein, 1971, p. 67). While for the argument of this study, I would accept that there is a plausibility crisis in the dependent and semi-autonomous institutions and hence educational classifications and frames, this uncertainty only becomes severe with the classroom teacher who feels personal anxiety and professional disorientation. Furthermore, it would not seem that this reflects a crisis in the power and control structures of society but more a retrenchment and consolidation of economic and ideological power as capitalism reaches a more advanced phase.



At the same time as subject fields become more inclusive and internally diversified there is a growing rationalization of knowledge in other sectors. This may be understood, I contend, by the contemporary need for multidisciplinary solutions to complex macro-level problems. These solutions, particularly in the case of Canada, typically represent dominant sector problems such as national unrest from immigration or increasing regional inequities. The solutions to these problems, it seems, are more of the nature of requirements for system maintenance, while their often basic (i.e., the problems') structural origin is overlooked or masked by the pervasiveness of the dominant ideology. The latter's features, in the Canadian context, are a mixture of laissez-faire liberal sentiments, welfarist assumptions, and the explicit exhortation that technology has infinite social problem-solving capacities (see Marchak, 1975).<sup>6</sup>

Curricular content and its realization should be fixed to these dominant societal symbols, but it attains its particular educational form through the mediations of the semi-autonomous schooling sector and from changes in the epistemologies of subject community and of instructional theory. As Esland writes, "These (influences) are the development of a subjectivistic and 'epistemological' approach to the human mind, and the 'ideologization' of technology, derived from economic rationality and political democracy" (Esland, 1971, p. 103). Given such influences upon curriculum organization in the schools I would infer that curriculum form would be



reflective of an instrumental rationalist ideology. The question of what scientific world view is represented by current curriculum paradigms is at this stage a researchable question. I would anticipate that insofar as insulated, structured contents are more likely to approximate positivistic world views, then innovation in the direction of pluralized openness in knowledge organization would be non-positivistic. A further question to be asked is whether such interdisciplinary approaches to teaching and learning are indicative of qualitative changes in the organization of schooling or whether we are viewing merely the rationalization of education knowledge?

#### IDEOLOGY, CRISIS, AND CURRICULUM IN CANADA

Let me return for a short time to the national and global contexts of the organized capitalist economy in order to illustrate how structural crises in the system dispose the state toward certain legitimation strategies.

Organized capitalism is characterized by crises that are not only economic but also political, ideological, and increasingly motivational. The degree of the generalized crisis is such that it has raised severe questions about the structure of social relationships underlying the pattern of capital accumulation. Such changes during the period 1965-1975 in North America included chronic tendencies of the rate of profit to fall, shifts in international capital investment, and natural resources pricing shifts. Additionally, this



period was one in which the state apparatus of many organized nations was threatened by the social movements, strikes, civil rights demands, liberation movements and counter-cultural initiatives. In all cases these collective protests, in a context of international capital shifts, affected the social hegemony of corporate interests in North America and Western Europe. Clear instances of an ideological crisis debunked the traditions of bourgeois culture that fixed a notion of work, consumption, family, and civic participation. Many counter-cultural initiatives in their diversity were united through a common interest in wholism, community life, self-integrity, and local devolution in a variety of life projects. Conventional patterns of production, consumption, and authority were consistently debunked; their once seemingly divine origins were revealed in their social class and historical particularity. Many of these utopian communal projects lacked the political organization to translate into enduring, practical relations. But the historical experience of those participations and observers was a significant first stage in any possible social transformation. Utopian experiments and the consciousness of situation and of class identity are necessary platforms on which to identify and formulate resistance to change that is anchored in the dominant arrangements of political and economic institutions. Clearly, political and cultural alternatives as idealized redemptions of capital-labour contradictions do not in themselves instigate wholesale structured collapse of systems.



The tenacity of the political and ideological repression and co-optations of organized capitalist society so often emasculate such alternative social relations. While other factors, as this study suggests, must be considered for mass social transformations, the continuance of alternative political and cultural initiatives do contribute to the growth of crises on multiple fronts in national and global capitalist relations. The state is forced to attend to and rationalize these constant irruptions.

Because capital accumulation is characterized by its chronic instability, its potential for inducing social disruption is considerable. The North American economy experienced eleven major recessions during the period from 1860-1940 with the 1929-1934 recession being the most severe (Castells, 1980). This latter crisis was experienced throughout the world in its nascent global economy. From this point on economic and social recovery, so to speak, was achieved only through state-corporate intervention in the way of Keynesian policies. As I have argued before the social relations and modes of production of capitalism are a complex contradictory process which is only always temporarily overcome by corporate capital re-valuation and state programs. This intervention occurred historically only when the market mechanism became inadequate as a privatized distributor of socialized values, in other words, when the possibility of 'self-reproduction' of capitalist social relations was threatened. Activities such as cor-



porate co-ordination, investment, and interest policy directives have been directed systematically to control employment, inflation, fiscal crises, and conditions for profitability.

United States government spending, for instance, increased from 8% in 1890 to 39% of the Gross National Product in 1960. This is a figure exclusive of military-defense expenditures. Total spending as a portion of Gross National Product by government has increased from 12.8% in 1950 to 22.4% in 1970. Such expenditure increase is keyed into two of the primary functions of the state in organized capitalism: accumulation and legitimation. Expenditure to sustain capital development, and the state's presence as a collective capitalist itself has enormous impact on economic life. But in order to secure and sustain these investments and surplus value extraction, the state acts to legitimate the operations of the economy and the motivational loyalty of different classes.

In most organized capitalist nations, spending and intervention are related. Social capital spending is intended to stimulate and support accumulation. Social expense spending is intended to secure legitimation and motivation. The latter includes spending for institutions and programs that work to generate social integration such as welfare, social security, unemployment and so on, and institutions that secure order through repression such as the police, army, and the judiciary. Social capital expenses are directed to fixed



capital and variable capital. In the first money is funnelled into physical infrastructure such as transportation and technology, and into human aspects such as research and education. Social consumption capital means expenditures are funnelled into labour power reproduction, housing, schools and health services. Clearly, social capital and social expense spending (O'Connor, 1973) are both instruments of accumulation and legitimation and are also instruments by which school facilities, training, teacher education, and curriculum planning are developed. The primary interest behind this kind of social capital spending and consumption is the reproduction of labour, power and consciousness. Since the state, economy, and socio-cultural life become increasingly interdependent in this era and because of the developments in technology (in reducing and displacing labour costs), the expenditures and their respective functions for system integration are complexly interrelated. In concert with these tendencies the use of human consciousness and technical knowledge become increasing factors of production. Because of this private capital, essentially, begins to control the resources and decisions determining general social and economic life. Since social expenses in education, training, labour preparation and curriculum planning are not directly profitable to private interest, the state must assume responsibility for this human reproduction. The state is also faced with meeting the social needs of interest groups neglected by private capital and which could become points



of social eruption or discontent. Each of these are drains on the fiscal resources of the state which it has increasing difficulties meeting with revenue from a distorted tax base and surplus population (devoid of income). In this kind of social equation the interests of the state and particularly, monopoly capital are tied and bound together in what O'Connor (1973) calls a "social industrial" complex or the social management of capital recession and re-investment. The competitive or private, labour intensive economic interests in the economic sector must be buffeted by this play of contradictions.

How does the state effect from an economic-political standpoint two mutually contradictory functions yet maintain the 'integrity' of the system as a whole?

...the state must maintain or create conditions in which profitable capital accumulation is possible. However, the state must also try to maintain or create the conditions for social harmony. A capitalist state that openly uses its coercive forces to help one class accumulate capital at the expense of other classes loses its legitimacy and hence undermines the basis of its loyalty and support. But a state that ignores the necessity of assisting the process of capital accumulation risks drying up the source of its own power, the economy's surplus...(it) must involve itself in the accumulation process, but it must either mystify its policies by calling them something that they are not, or it must try to conceal them (e.g. making them into administrative, not political-economic issues).  
(O'Connor, 1973, p. 6.)

The 'structural urgency' for co-ordinating and sustaining these two state functions is conditioned by the fact that




capital investments and capital consumption is increasingly socialized over time as disproportionately greater shares of costs are shouldered by labour and taxation. One factor involved is this that such social expenses as education and curricular planning and other human infrastructure proliferate as indirect investment and control functions. They do, however, have a regressive effect on the strict accumulation of monopoly capital or private investment. As O'Connor (1973) points out, the expansion of monopoly capital as a social system relation is irrational because it provokes unemployment, market rigidity, price fixing and so forth. This leads to the constant deterioration of demand and hence diminishing returns on capital invested and commodities that are distributed. Equally, as an option the state and monopoly capital can pursue expansionist policies to stimulate demand, such as credit and money supply circulation; a policy however, which leads to inflationary outcomes, decline in purchasing power and ultimate decline of favourable markets in which to invest. Something of the latter scenario has been occurring in the Canadian economy in 1981-83. Clearly, any state financing of social costs such as stabilization payments and legitimation costs, results in a chronic disparity between expenditures and revenues with the ability to generate disproportionately more revenues actually eroding. Labour, organized and unorganized, and other interest groups each approach the state for compensations of different kinds. Each of these claims is processed in a political-administra-



tive calculus. Such claims are part of a larger political struggle, primarily latent in consciousness, but which may or may not be redeemed by the state. The interests contained in these claims are often contradictory with one another since social capital disposition and social expense are antagonistic dimensions of a wider struggle. 7

Illustration of Particular  
Structural Elements in the  
Accumulation-Legitimation  
Thesis





Currently, in organized capitalist economies the preparation of labour power and consciousness has taken on particular importance for sustaining growth and control over production.<sup>8</sup> Scientific and technical developments play a vital role as factors of production (Habermas, 1970). Knowledge of this nature is increasingly displaying the craft-like specialty knowledge of the old working class. To inculcate and prepare labour power with the flexible, general skills required in evolving production relations represents a substantially higher cost than in prior eras of manpower training. State-sponsored training programs, schools, community colleges, and universities are under mounting pressure to emphasize and supplement traditional curricula with vocational orientations. Lower-level technical training has seen an unprecedented expansion of students since 1945. This has involved the subtle transformation of many higher education institutions from liberal-arts or professional programs to ones that explicitly exploit technology. As the state gains a bigger stake in the financing of these institutions so their emphasis seems to shift to quasi-professional, technical administrative preparation of labour. Education and 'specialized' teacher-training programs show a remarkable shift toward the technization of pedagogy and its intrusion into socio-cultural and family relations spheres never before affected by processes of rationalization. This represents a distinct re-organization of productive relations under the organized economy in which capital



equipment (automated machinery) replaces living labour. Consequently the skills required for workers and their absolute numbers have shifted. There are massive training efforts at the technical, semi-professional levels which key the work process more to the organization and control of production than it does to the application of highly-trained craft specialities. Clearly, the interests here, amongst capital, are to rely far less on living labour, in the effort to extract greater levels of surplus value in more controlled, planful ways. This shift in production requirements causes surplus population to grow as a contradictory phenomenon. On one hand this allows greater exploitability and competitiveness amongst labour, when it is needed by industry, but on the other hand requires that its potential for social discontent be cushioned by increased state expenditure.<sup>9</sup>

The more that the state plays a role in the financing of educational provision and labour power provision, that is, as requirements of worker consciousness are more determined by the capital-labour constellation, then the more educational institutions are modelled upon a logic of efficiency and technical rationality. Career education, vocationalism, have become the curricular expressions of 'reform', 'modernization' and 'individualization' in school life. Students' academic careers, and personality characteristics, only make sense if they are geared to 'marketable skills' whatever level of attainment is reached; from



secondary school to graduate school. Although program choice in schools and colleges appears to have multiplied the overwhelming organizational thrust is to 'tighter' teaching and learning arrangements, the rationalization of course offerings, and a 'return to repression' in schools.

A question that we return to repeatedly is how does the state in its organization of political rationality and legitimation successfully accomplish the twin contradictory functions of private appropriation, and the acceptance of progressive social 'immiseration'? Why is this antagonism not transparent to the mass of citizens? Wright (1978) argues that the introduction of Keynesian type intervention programs in the 1930's represented a durable precedent for the state to intervene more fully in legitimating expenditure. However, once state intervention is established at a general level through the presence of social services the 'benefits' that flow from these are institutionalized as expectations in popular thinking; in time these services become 'viewed as rights'.

Once a programme becomes seen as a right, the continuation of the programme adds little legitimacy (to the) state whereas a cutback...would constitute a source of delegitimation. There is thus not only a tendency for programmes once established to continue, but a constant pressure on programmes to expand, regardless of the requirements of the accumulation process... (in this situation) there is a tendency for unproductive spending to rise more rapidly than the requirements for realization of surplus value.

(Wright, 1978, p. 158)



How does the state accomplish the ongoing representation of social-political life in such a way that popular participation runs the society, that technical-rational thinking is the cultural panacea for all social problems, and to disguise the fact that constellations of state-corporate alliances as expressed in a social-industrial complex disproportionately determine policy of non-generalizable interest for the society as a whole? I have discussed a number of cultural and socio-psychological factors that are important in maintaining political mystification in the "talking shop" society of formal democracy (see Lenin, 1964, pt.1).

Habermas (1975) indicates that of the remnants of bourgeois cultural traditions still present in popular consciousness under organized capitalism, it is scientific technical rationality that displays a most contradictory position. On the one hand, it has been duly credited in liberal and neo-Marxist (see Bell, 1976, Schroyer, 1973) writings on post-industrial society as having the power of an overarching ideological totality - a logic of meaning and organization that has tended to overpower and nullify other forms of cultural and political initiatives on a massive scale. On the other hand Habermas argues that scientism, as an intellectual derivative of this ideology has powers of critique and analysis that allows it to be teamed against its own formulations in a self-criticism. I will not develop this half of the contradiction of scientific-technical rationality presently. Instead, I will characterize how this cultural



tradition is rooted as a world view formally and popularly in consciousness and how it is this kind of cultural appearance that radical inquiry and popular initiative must recognize, as one front of repression, in their projects of resistance.

Scientific rationality operates on one plane as a process of reification. In its commonsense reception it is seen as a presence completely independent of human decision and judgement. The distinction that human science makes between natural and social history is obliterated. Labour and interaction dissolve into one another, even for Marxists, in the technological determination of human projects. The argument draws upon the belief that the technical derivatives of this rationality supplant both redundant manual labour and inefficiency in administration. The base of private social interests that power this kind of calculative organization are severed from reflective critique. The accidents of history, class interests, and the prejudices of the current social order are all transcended within the scope of its mystification.

It is rarely considered how scientific-technical rationality is expressive of both a partial rationality and an over-arching or universal irrationality. It is used as a calculus of decision-making in organizations and economic policy for its spurious claims of precision, predictability and control over social processes. As a popular apologetic it becomes stridently anti-intellectual arguing that



intellectualism is part of the traditional and redundant relations of social ignorance that have kept the working classes from participating in the good life. Scientific rationality as a long-term organizational logic demonstrates its irrationality by its neglect and inability to account for historical evolutionary eruptions and movements of resistance. As a particular historical emergence itself its practitioners forget its roots in the bourgeois revolutions. Hence, through its systematic amnesia, it suppresses the practico-creative forces of a society as the only practical, organic possibilities for evolution of the species.

In its applied analyses of organized capitalism scientific-technical rationality presents itself as the only perspective that can reconcile the capital-labour antagonism. It is often the language of negotiation and resolution in organized labour negotiation, and in the justifications used by the state in response to public interest pressure. The organization of 'modern capitalist' production incorporates but does not integrate the person at his place of work. It serves under a plethora of 'benefits' and 'rights' to estrange persons from their work in the production of alienated, non practico-creative labour. Scientific-technical rationality appears in popular expression as a imminent form independant of living persons - and hence powerfully compulsive as an existential facticity -rather than as a complex of social relations. 'Perfectly rational' calculations made by capital groups on issues of investments, or labour cost



reduction, in the short term historically have led to over-production, declining profits, dwindling demand, and reserve pools of unemployed in the long-term. Specialization and expertise in these contexts of decision become the new form of philosophical blindness and amnesia of the age. Each of these dimensions of scientific-technical rationality are directly transposable to the conduct of organized schooling and curriculum planning as means of mystification and legitimation of the dominant social order.

If I examine the recent developments in the curriculum of two subject areas (see Stevenson and Wilson, 1977) in North American public schools, the above considerations become more significant for this study. In the area of reformist or public issues social studies education, there has been, within the last ten years, a broadening of what counts as valid knowledge to be transmitted to students (see Wright, 1978; Meyer, 1976; Michaelis, 1976). Particularly at the secondary level, curriculum shows a concern for broadening its conceptual base to include most of the social science disciplines (see Barr, Barth, and Shermis, 1977). Included in courses of study are themes and activities dealing with social problems of Canada and the United States such as multi-party politics, questions of ethnic prerogatives and multicultural policy, down to the question of foreign aid increases and so on. Additionally, these curricula stress activities designed for values clarification and for development of consistent, defensible ethical positions on the part of pupils (see Fraenkel, 1977). Such



features reflect contemporary developments in curriculum, instruction and schooling and fulfill much of the pluralist, integrated criteria as 'nurtured' in the United States and Britain (Warwick, 1973; Haigh, 1975).

Secondary science programs have undergone similar changes in which, as the documents term it, there has been a "humanization" of science teaching and learning. Indeed many of the science program features are noteworthy: to promote an awareness of the humanistic implications of science; to develop a critical understanding of current social problems which have a significant scientific component (who determines this?); to develop working attitudes similar to 'real' scientists; to familiarize students with the role of science in the development of societies; to develop competence in the skills, attitudes and methods of 'science'. Interestingly enough in the assembly of process skills and conceptual objectives of courses of study, it is usually only the methodological features which are given any pedagogical scope.

Science programs (see Alberta Department of Education, 1972) formally fit the prototype of integrated organization but in their essential 'bones' do not actually reach the integrated designs of social studies programs. I suggest, that even in the absence of content analysis trends, science curriculum in many Canadian provinces, at present, is representative of a positivist world view and directly translatable into a technological consciousness among students. The social studies program, in Alberta (1981) at present (expresses' the vocabulary and motives of quasi-historical-



interpretive world view and could indicate a practical interest in understanding features of the larger social structure. Intuitively, the social studies program provides signs in its design (cognitive-affective separation, e.g.) which suggests it comes from an epistemological community that works through a strict-exact conception of science and, in particular, of social science. Both trends in curriculum design, I would propose, are fundamentally supportive of a dominant ideological tradition of Canadian society; both would serve to maintain faith in the increasing ability of technology to 'solve' our pressing complex social and political problems; both designs will act to invalidate questions of radical strategy in dealing with regional and class inequities in Canada; and both could represent forms of science that can occlude such inequalities and, in fact, function indirectly to perpetuate them. Under the pedagogy implied by these two curriculum approaches, social control becomes, implicitly, more extensive through the effects of an intrusive, personalistic socialization. The socialization function is accentuated in a design based on the appearance of historical-interpretive science.

Other implications that I feel follow from: 1. the operation of curriculum development of logical positivist orientation, 2. which is based in a bureaucratised public school system, 3. located in a nation showing particular regional structural inequalities, are:

- (a) development and institutionalization of a scientific method, which when generalized to an every-



- day orientation scheme will tend to maximize personal and social qualities that legitimize inequalities of condition and opportunity in Canada;
- (b) which will lead to increased rationalization and bureaucratization of decision-making in schools despite official rhetoric about local decision-making and devolution;
  - (c) growth of a totalistic ideology at the macro-institutional level; growth of professional closure in the rationalizations and vocabularies of intent given by teaching personnel.

My general conclusion (is) that the conditions of organized capitalist societies simultaneously generate new possibilities for such a strategy and recreate obstacles to any attempt by socialist forces to use the capitalist state. The decisive task of any socialist strategy is to grapple with this intensely contradictory situation, rather than to ignore the contradictions in the polemical defence of a specific choice....Ruling classes do not rule by hegemony alone; they also rule through domination. An attack on the ideological hegemony of the bourgeoisie will not create a socialist society unless it becomes translated into an attack on the domination of the bourgeoisie. The strategy of using the capitalist state to destroy the capitalist state is implicitly an argument about such a possibility. To argue that structural changes within the capitalist state can facilitate a strengthening of the organizational capacities of the working class(es) is to argue that it can make such a challenge to bourgeois domination possible... (if) such a process leads to a qualitative transformation (destruction) of the class character of the state itself (then) a new type of state structure is established which can function to build socialist relations of production rather than simply undermine capitalist relations. Such a transformation represents a revolutionary break with capitalism.

(Wright, 1978 , p. 232, 249)



## FOOTNOTES

1. Habermas (1975) notes that in order to warrant talking about the "social contradictions" that underly this kind of capital-labour assymetry we would have not only shifted the truth or empirical contents of our statements about society we would also have to practice a communicative action in members' speaking and acting recognizing these empirical shifts; not then a logical shift per se. This has implications for the role ideology plays in organized society since if opposing interest groups do not recognize their claims as fundamentally incompatible then the extent of their conflict is not expressed. Ideology in liberal capitalism successfully conceals the skewed chances for the legitimate satisfaction of contending interests. In fact this represents a case of repressed communication which is served to forcefully sustain a system integration of the society. Rather than being considered as a structural antagonism conflicting parties discrepancies are seen in individual terms as arbitrary schedules of preferences.

It is under liberal and monopoly forms of capitalism that the social class structure as a central mediation is more visible. In these two cases the basic conflict is displaced onto the market mechanism - where a political problem is transformed into an economic one. This is a systemic problem which is distinguished by its flamboyance, the utopian hopes of labour and the moral fears of capital. Liberal-monopoly capitalism is typically a society ridden with economic crises. All eras of capital formation have been marked by periods of retrenchment and devaluation. This is experienced as the business cycle of recession and buoyancy with the attendant social outcomes. The internal structure of capitalist development follows the growth of capital and social wealth through progressive extractions of surplus value. The latter has typically been secured through technical developments that are capital intensive. With each retrenchment of capital formation the organic composition of capital (Marx, Grundrisse) shifts with an increase in fixed capital at the expense of variable capital (labour costs or wages). However it is only through human labour that surplus value occurs at all and can be progressively extracted. But this trend in effect represents the tendency of profit rates to fall and the disinclination to continually invest capital. Mass purchasing power (labour) in this equation is vital for capital realization yet real demand can only be sustained by the progressive yielding of surplus value to labour to purchase. Labour "costs"



are stripped incrementally of this accumulation. In such circumstances capital has not returned to its "owners" what it might; there is a corresponding disinclination to invest. The social outcomes of this phenomenon are what we experience presently: unemployment, small and medium business failure and state manipulation of interest rate structures, among other things. This dialectical relation between societal members represents an insoluble contradiction. In traditional societies this consciousness is mediated through magical or other non-rational consciousness. Liberal society mediates this conflict through displacement to the market mechanism - an institutional illusion 'freed of power.' In organized capitalism although economic crises are not typically systems threatening they do result in crises projected into a range of institutional subsystems. In each social formation the conflict is made opaque and the chances of (critical) reflection upon it are destroyed. Clearly, certain ideological devices remain from pre-bourgeois, and bourgeois periods of capital formation; namely equivalence exchange, commodity fetishism, individualized group conflict, universal achievement sentiments etc. However, under organized capitalism the nature of the displacement is different, the nature of communicative domination is different, the forms of market division and extension shift, as do the possibilities for renewal in surplus value extraction, technological developments, and hence the likely strategies for resistance. In short, major features of capitalist social formation change in the organized era.

2. Habermas, in *Legitimation Crisis* (1975) discusses the work of Keniston, in *Youth and Dissent* (1971), wherein the resolution of adolescent crises by some youth signifies a socially progressive outcome. Keniston shows how certain types of youth are able to stabilize critical-reflective perspectives on the links between their identity formation and dominant cultural interpretations. He shows how youth through a variety of conventional and non-conventional auspices exhibit what he calls either a "retreatist" syndrome or an "activist" syndrome. The range of possibilities for coupling these cultural energies to universalistic role organization is real.
3. See a variety of positions such as D. Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*, 1973; A. Touraine, *The Post Industrial Society*, 1971; J. Ellul, *The Technological Society*, 1965; L.G. Neuberg, "A Critique of Post Industrial Thought," Social Praxis, 3:1,2.



4. The notion of the tendency to encroachment of total administration in advanced industrial nations is discussed at length in J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, 1975.
5. See H. Rose, S. Rose, The Political Economy of Science, 1974 for an analysis of the ideological functions of natural science knowledge production.
6. See P. Marchak's analysis of the range of ideological traditions in Canadian political culture. Ideological Perspectives in Canada, 1975 especially chapters 1, 2, 3.
7. O'Connor (1973) notes that as political economy policy tries to control inflation and investment crises the state is faced with three major options. Firstly the state can construct and manage a version such that capital can be ultimately revalued. Secondly, a price and incomes policy can be installed across the society with certain key groups exempted. Thirdly, the state in alliance with monopoly capital can try to increase productivity, sector by sector, through technical innovations, and overexploitation ('speeding up work' and lengthening the working time) so that labour costs and state revenues are supplemented. Organized capitalist societies practice all of these options in various combinations.
8. "Defense, education, health and hospital, police, and corrections outlays at all levels of government increased from 1955-1960 to 1965-1970. Defense spending increased 16% between 1955-1960 and 53% between 1965-1970. Education expenditures rose 57% between 1955 and 1960 and 80% between 1965-1970. Increases in health and hospital, police and corrections expenditures during the same period were 60 to 91% and 53 to 79%, respectively." (O'Connor, 1973, p. 98-99) education, health and manpower, and housing and community development increased most rapidly. However it is military spending and income maintenance that are the largest items in the budget and which increased considerably. These figures, although assembled for the United States for a 15 year period mirror the trends in Canadian state expenditures for a similar period. (see Perspectives Canada III, 1980, p. 111, 113, 123). These trends indicate the increasing reliance on state spending in the areas of social consumption and social expenses as instruments of indirect capital valorization and social legitimacy. The pattern of spending also indicates the complex, functional interdependence between securing accumulation conditions, stabilizing these politically, and absorbing



the possibilities of mass dissent and motivation deficits in the population.

9. Leo Panitch, in a recent public lecture (February, 1983, Fredericton, N.B.) provided an analysis of recent capital-labour relations under the Canadian state of the 1980's. He claimed that we were at an "end of an era of industrial relations in Canada" - one that originally signalled free collective bargaining. Under the recent Bill C-103, of the federal parliament the state has shifted in its tactics of reform. Although expressed as reformist ideology, Panitch maintains that the Bill contains the means for suppressing labour in a logic of consent and coercion. The era of the granting of free collective bargaining and universal suffrage has drawn to a close as capitalist hegemony is re-entrenched in a time of fiscal and legitimacy crisis. Legalized consent through this shift in legislation, becomes one new form of incorporation of labour. The state is granted more scope in discretionary coercion and the abrogation of guarantees of right to strike, legal contract recognition, and statutory income policies (1975). Paradoxically, the new 'particular' ideology of the state is voluntary in appearance but in essence engineers legal consent and rationalizes coercion. Unions have been exceedingly respectful of this and similar legislation declining to participate in 'Charter' negotiations for instance. Years of practice at legalism have taken their toll on a leadership which has tended to 'police' their members more than anything. He argues that with the 'failure of social democracy' left groupings must change the discourse in this country and develop a new language of politics.









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